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Intrafamily Bargaining and Household Decisions

  • Book
  • © 1992

Overview

Authors:
  1. Notburga Ott

    1. Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität, Frankfurt 11, Germany

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Part of the book series: Microeconomic Studies (MICROECONOMIC)

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Table of contents (13 chapters)

  1. Front Matter

    Pages I-VIII
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  2. Introduction

    • Notburga Ott
    Pages 1-5

  3. Models of the ‘new home economics’

    • Notburga Ott
    Pages 6-18

  4. Family decisions as a bargaining problem

    • Notburga Ott
    Pages 19-32

  5. A Nash bargaining model for household decisions

    • Notburga Ott
    Pages 33-45

  6. Time allocation in a static bargaining model with household production

    • Notburga Ott
    Pages 46-67

  7. A dynamic model with accumulation of human capital

    • Notburga Ott
    Pages 68-97

  8. Pareto efficiency of family decisions

    • Notburga Ott
    Pages 98-109

  9. The binding force of intrafamily contracts

    • Notburga Ott
    Pages 110-126

  10. Introducing uncertainty: the possibility of conflict

    • Notburga Ott
    Pages 127-143

  11. Empirical tests of the bargaining approach

    • Notburga Ott
    Pages 144-160

  12. Survey of empirical bargaining models

    • Notburga Ott
    Pages 161-176

  13. Empirical evidence of the bargaining approach - first findings with German data

    • Notburga Ott
    Pages 177-195

  14. Concluding remarks

    • Notburga Ott
    Pages 196-198

  15. Back Matter

    Pages 199-242
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Keywords

About this book

A model of household decisions based on a bargaining approach is developed providing a comprehensive framework for the analysis of family behavior. Treating the family as an economic organization, household behavior is explained by the cooperation of utility maximizing individuals. The difference to traditional microeconomic household models is that theassumption of a joint household utility function is abandoned. Instead of this, a game theoretic approach is used to model family decisions as a result of intrafamily bargaining. Considering the development of the spouses` human capital in a dynamic approach, the long-term effects of intrafamily specialization in market work and work at home are analyzed. Onemajor finding is that in a dynamic setting non-Pareto efficient allocations may result. Empirical tests demonstrate the relevanace of the bargaining approach.

Authors and Affiliations

  • Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität, Frankfurt 11, Germany

    Notburga Ott

Bibliographic Information

  • Book Title: Intrafamily Bargaining and Household Decisions

  • Authors: Notburga Ott

  • Series Title: Microeconomic Studies

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-45708-1

  • Publisher: Springer Berlin, Heidelberg

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

  • Copyright Information: Springer-Verlag Berlin · Heidelberg 1992

  • Softcover ISBN: 978-3-642-45710-4Published: 17 February 2012

  • eBook ISBN: 978-3-642-45708-1Published: 06 December 2012

  • Series ISSN: 1431-6005

  • Edition Number: 1

  • Number of Pages: VIII, 242

  • Topics: Population Economics

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