Read While You Wait - Get immediate ebook access, if available*, when you order a print book

Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems

Litigation and Settlement in a Game with Incomplete Information

An Experimental Study

Authors: Ryll, Wolfgang

Free Preview

Buy this book

eBook $74.99
price for USA in USD (gross)
  • ISBN 978-3-642-61467-5
  • Digitally watermarked, DRM-free
  • Included format: PDF
  • ebooks can be used on all reading devices
  • Immediate eBook download after purchase
Softcover $99.00
price for USA in USD
  • ISBN 978-3-540-61304-6
  • Free shipping for individuals worldwide
  • Immediate ebook access, if available*, with your print order
  • Usually dispatched within 3 to 5 business days.
About this book

We investigate a two-person game of litigation and settlement with incomplete information on one side. So far, various theoretical attempts have been made to answer the question of why some people choose not to resolve their disputes and instead go to court and incur litigation costs, even if bargaining leaves room for both parties to fare better when avoiding the conflict. We can distinguish between games which focus on strategic elements like games with incomplete information (see, for example, P'ng (1983), Samuelson (1982) and Schweizer (1989» and decision-theoretic models neglecting strategic elements (see, for example, Landes (1971) and Gould (1973». The single-person decision theory approach to litigation assumes litigants to have a subjective estimate of the likelihood that the plaintiff will win the action. Differing views on the probability of winning the court case help to explain the fraction of cases that actually go to trial. Among others, P'ng (1983) points out the shortcomings of the single-person decision theory approach which does not take into account, for example, the different fee systems in England and the U.S. and the differences in information conflicting parties may have. P'ng constructs a model of one-sided incomplete information where the settlement terms are given exogenously. Schweizer (1989), on the other hand, extends P'ng's model and allows for two-sided asymmetric information where the settlement terms are determined endogenously.

Table of contents (8 chapters)

Table of contents (8 chapters)

Buy this book

eBook $74.99
price for USA in USD (gross)
  • ISBN 978-3-642-61467-5
  • Digitally watermarked, DRM-free
  • Included format: PDF
  • ebooks can be used on all reading devices
  • Immediate eBook download after purchase
Softcover $99.00
price for USA in USD
  • ISBN 978-3-540-61304-6
  • Free shipping for individuals worldwide
  • Immediate ebook access, if available*, with your print order
  • Usually dispatched within 3 to 5 business days.
Loading...

Recommended for you

Loading...

Bibliographic Information

Bibliographic Information
Book Title
Litigation and Settlement in a Game with Incomplete Information
Book Subtitle
An Experimental Study
Authors
Series Title
Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems
Series Volume
440
Copyright
1996
Publisher
Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
Copyright Holder
Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
eBook ISBN
978-3-642-61467-5
DOI
10.1007/978-3-642-61467-5
Softcover ISBN
978-3-540-61304-6
Series ISSN
0075-8442
Edition Number
1
Number of Pages
VIII, 176
Number of Illustrations
7 b/w illustrations
Topics

*immediately available upon purchase as print book shipments may be delayed due to the COVID-19 crisis. ebook access is temporary and does not include ownership of the ebook. Only valid for books with an ebook version. Springer Reference Works are not included.