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Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO '87

Proceedings

  • Conference proceedings
  • © 1988

Overview

Editors:
  1. Carl Pomerance

    1. Department of Mathematics, The University of Georgia, Athens, USA

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS, volume 293)

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Table of contents (43 papers)

  1. Front Matter

    Pages I-X
    Download chapter PDF

  2. Communication Networks and Standards

    1. Standards for Data Security — a Change of Direction

      • Wyn L. Price
      Pages 3-8

    2. Integrating Cryptography in ISDN

      • Kåre Presttun
      Pages 9-18

  3. Protocols

    1. Special Uses and Abuses of the Fiat-Shamir Passport Protocol (extended abstract)

      • Yvo Desmedt, Claude Goutier, Samy Bengio
      Pages 21-39

    2. Direct Minimum-Knowledge Computations (Extended Abstract)

      • Russell Impagliazzo, Moti Yung
      Pages 40-51

    3. Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proof Systems

      • Alfredo De Santis, Silvio Micali, Giuseppe Persiano
      Pages 52-72

    4. How to Solve any Protocol Problem - An Efficiency Improvement (Extended Abstract)

      • Oded Goldrcich, Ronen Vainish
      Pages 73-86

    5. Multiparty Computations Ensuring Privacy of Each Party’s Input and Correctness of the Result

      • David Chaum, Ivan B. Damgård, Jeroen van de Graaf
      Pages 87-119

    6. Society and Group Oriented Cryptography: a New Concept

      • Yvo Desmedt
      Pages 120-127

    7. A Simple and Secure Way to Show the Validity of Your Public Key

      • Jeroen van de Graaf, Renė Peralta
      Pages 128-134

    8. Cryptographic Computation: Secure Fault-Tolerant Protocols and the Public-Key Model (Extended Abstract)

      • Zvi Galil, Stuart Haber, Moti Yung
      Pages 135-155

    9. Gradual and Verifiable Release of a Secret (Extended Abstract)

      • Ernest F. Brickell, David Chaum, Ivan B. Damgård, Jeroen van de Graaf
      Pages 156-166

    10. Strong Practical Protocols

      • Judy H. Moore
      Pages 167-172

  4. Key Distribution Systems

    1. Identity-based conference key distribution systems

      • Kenji Koyama, Kazuo Ohta
      Pages 175-184

    2. On the KEY PREDISTRIBUTION SYSTEM: A Practical Solution to the Key Distribution Problem

      • Tsutomu Matsumoto, Hideki Imai
      Pages 185-193

    3. Key Distribution Systems Based on Identification Information

      • Eiji Okamoto
      Pages 194-202

    4. Secret Distribution of Keys for Public-Key Systems

      • Jean-Jacques Quisquater
      Pages 203-208

  5. Public Key Systems

    1. An Impersonation-Proof Identity Verification Scheme

      • Gustavus J. Simmons
      Pages 211-215

    2. Arbitration in Tamper Proof Systems

      • George I. Davida, Brian J. Matt
      Pages 216-222

    3. Efficient Digital Public-Key Signatures with Shadow

      • Louis Guillou, Jean-Jacques Quisquater
      Pages 223-223
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Keywords

About this book

Zero-knowledge interactive proofsystems are a new technique which can be used as a cryptographic tool for designing provably secure protocols. Goldwasser, Micali, and Rackoff originally suggested this technique for controlling the knowledge released in an interactive proof of membership in a language, and for classification of languages [19]. In this approach, knowledge is defined in terms of complexity to convey knowledge if it gives a computational advantage to the receiver, theory, and a message is said for example by giving him the result of an intractable computation. The formal model of interacting machines is described in [19, 15, 171. A proof-system (for a language L) is an interactive protocol by which one user, the prover, attempts to convince another user, the verifier, that a given input x is in L. We assume that the verifier is a probabilistic machine which is limited to expected polynomial-time computation, while the prover is an unlimited probabilistic machine. (In cryptographic applications the prover has some trapdoor information, or knows the cleartext of a publicly known ciphertext) A correct proof-system must have the following properties: If XE L, the prover will convince the verifier to accept the pmf with very high probability. If XP L no prover, no matter what program it follows, is able to convince the verifier to accept the proof, except with vanishingly small probability.

Editors and Affiliations

  • Department of Mathematics, The University of Georgia, Athens, USA

    Carl Pomerance

Bibliographic Information

  • Book Title: Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO '87

  • Book Subtitle: Proceedings

  • Editors: Carl Pomerance

  • Series Title: Lecture Notes in Computer Science

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-48184-2

  • Publisher: Springer Berlin, Heidelberg

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

  • Copyright Information: Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1988

  • eBook ISBN: 978-3-540-48184-3Published: 16 May 2003

  • Series ISSN: 0302-9743

  • Series E-ISSN: 1611-3349

  • Edition Number: 1

  • Number of Pages: X, 466

  • Topics: Cryptology

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