Cooperative Decision Making in Common Pool Situations

1. Front Matter

   Pages i-viii

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2. Common Pool Resources

   • Holger I. Meinhardt

   Pages 1-14

3. A Dynamic Resource Management Problem

   • Holger I. Meinhardt

   Pages 15-38

4. Cooperative Game Theory

   • Holger I. Meinhardt

   Pages 39-48

5. The Common Pool Game

   • Holger I. Meinhardt

   Pages 49-95

6. Convexity of Symmetrical TU-CPR Games

   • Holger I. Meinhardt

   Pages 97-117

7. Convexity of Asymmetrical TU-CPR Games

   • Holger I. Meinhardt

   Pages 119-174

8. Concluding Remarks and Outlook on Future Research

   • Holger I. Meinhardt

   Pages 175-179

9. An Overview of Bifurcation Theory

   • Holger I. Meinhardt

   Pages 181-193

10. Back Matter

    Pages 181-209

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The monograph gives a theoretical explanation of observed cooperative behavior in common pool situations. The incentives for cooperative decision making are investigated by means of a cooperative game theoretical framework. In a first step core existence results are worked out. Whereas general core existence results provide us with an answer for mutual cooperation, nothing can be said how strong these incentives and how stable these cooperative agreements are. To clarify these questions the convexity property for common pool TU-games in scrutinized in a second step. It is proved that the convexity property holds for a large subclass of symmetrical as well as asymmetrical cooperative common pool games. Core existence and the convexity results provide us with a theoretical explanation to bridge the gap between the observation in field studies for cooperation and the noncooperative prediction that the common pool resource will be overused and perhaps endangered.

• bifurcation
• cooperation
• decision making
• game theory
• management
• research

• Institute for Statistics and Economic Theory, University of Karlsruhe, Karlsruhe, Germany

  Holger I. Meinhardt

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