Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems

Axiomatic Models of Bargaining

Authors: Roth, A.E.

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The problem to be considered here is the one faced by bargainers who must reach a consensus--i.e., a unanimous decision. Specifically, we will be consid­ ering n-person games in which there is a set of feasible alternatives, any one of which can be the outcome of bargaining if it is agreed to by all the bargainers. In the event that no unanimous agreement is reached, some pre-specified disagree­ ment outcome will be the result. Thus, in games of this type, each player has a veto over any alternative other than the disagreement outcome. There are several reasons for studying games of this type. First, many negotiating situations, particularly those involving only two bargainers (i.e., when n = 2), are conducted under essentially these rules. Also, bargaining games of this type often occur as components of more complex processes. In addi­ tion, the simplicity of bargaining games makes them an excellent vehicle for studying the effect of any assumptions which are made in their analysis. The effect of many of the assumptions which are made in the analysis of more complex cooperative games can more easily be discerned in studying bargaining games. The various models of bargaining considered here will be studied axioma- cally. That is, each model will be studied by specifying a set of properties which serve to characterize it uniquely.

Table of contents (8 chapters)

Table of contents (8 chapters)

Buy this book

eBook $84.99
price for USA in USD
  • ISBN 978-3-642-51570-5
  • Digitally watermarked, DRM-free
  • Included format: PDF
  • ebooks can be used on all reading devices
  • Immediate eBook download after purchase
Softcover $109.99
price for USA in USD
  • ISBN 978-3-540-09540-8
  • Free shipping for individuals worldwide
  • Institutional customers should get in touch with their account manager
  • Shipping restrictions
  • Usually ready to be dispatched within 3 to 5 business days, if in stock
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Bibliographic Information

Bibliographic Information
Book Title
Axiomatic Models of Bargaining
Authors
Series Title
Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems
Series Volume
170
Copyright
1979
Publisher
Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
Copyright Holder
Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
eBook ISBN
978-3-642-51570-5
DOI
10.1007/978-3-642-51570-5
Softcover ISBN
978-3-540-09540-8
Series ISSN
0075-8442
Edition Number
1
Number of Pages
V, 126
Topics