Economic Analysis of Contract Law

Incomplete Contracts and Asymmetric Information

Authors: Bag, Sugata

Free Preview
  • Deals with a specific but most pragmatic aspect of contractual environment where the application of contract laws and their efficiency estimates are not explored much in the contemporary literatureSpecifically written for economists interested in models of the incentive effects of contract remediesUses legal examples from case laws to lie the foundation for every model discussed

Buy this book

eBook $84.99
price for USA in USD
  • ISBN 978-3-319-65268-9
  • Digitally watermarked, DRM-free
  • Included format: PDF, EPUB
  • ebooks can be used on all reading devices
  • Immediate eBook download after purchase
Hardcover $159.99
price for USA in USD
  • ISBN 978-3-319-65267-2
  • Free shipping for individuals worldwide
  • Institutional customers should get in touch with their account manager
  • Covid-19 shipping restrictions
  • Usually ready to be dispatched within 3 to 5 business days, if in stock
Softcover $109.99
price for USA in USD
  • ISBN 978-3-319-87987-1
  • Free shipping for individuals worldwide
  • Institutional customers should get in touch with their account manager
  • Covid-19 shipping restrictions
  • Usually ready to be dispatched within 3 to 5 business days, if in stock
About this book

This book examines the main issues arising in economic analysis of contract law with special attention given to the incomplete contracts. It discusses both the main features of contract law as they relate to the problem of economic exchange, and how the relevant legal rules and the institutions can be analysed from an economic perspective. Evaluate the welfare impacts, analyses the effects and the desirability of different breach remedies and examines the optimal incentive structure of party-designed liquidated damages under the different dimensions of informational asymmetry. Overall the book aims to contribute to the legal debate over the adoption of the specific breach remedies when the breach victim’s expectation interest is difficult to assess, and to the debate over courts' reluctance to implement large penalties in the event of breach of contracts.

About the authors

Sugata Bag is Assistant Professor of Economics at the Delhi School of Economics, India. After earning his B.Sc. (Honours) Economics from Calcutta University , Professor Bag completed Masters and Doctoral work in Economics at Jawaharlal Nehru University. His research interest lies in the following domain-  Law and Economics,  Development Economics,  Contract Theory,  Applied Econometrics. 

Table of contents (7 chapters)

Table of contents (7 chapters)

Buy this book

eBook $84.99
price for USA in USD
  • ISBN 978-3-319-65268-9
  • Digitally watermarked, DRM-free
  • Included format: PDF, EPUB
  • ebooks can be used on all reading devices
  • Immediate eBook download after purchase
Hardcover $159.99
price for USA in USD
  • ISBN 978-3-319-65267-2
  • Free shipping for individuals worldwide
  • Institutional customers should get in touch with their account manager
  • Covid-19 shipping restrictions
  • Usually ready to be dispatched within 3 to 5 business days, if in stock
Softcover $109.99
price for USA in USD
  • ISBN 978-3-319-87987-1
  • Free shipping for individuals worldwide
  • Institutional customers should get in touch with their account manager
  • Covid-19 shipping restrictions
  • Usually ready to be dispatched within 3 to 5 business days, if in stock
Loading...

Recommended for you

Loading...

Bibliographic Information

Bibliographic Information
Book Title
Economic Analysis of Contract Law
Book Subtitle
Incomplete Contracts and Asymmetric Information
Authors
Copyright
2018
Publisher
Palgrave Macmillan
Copyright Holder
The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s)
eBook ISBN
978-3-319-65268-9
DOI
10.1007/978-3-319-65268-9
Hardcover ISBN
978-3-319-65267-2
Softcover ISBN
978-3-319-87987-1
Edition Number
1
Number of Pages
XVI, 203
Number of Illustrations
2 illustrations in colour
Topics