Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in
Palgrave Macmillan
Book cover

Economic Analysis of Contract Law

Incomplete Contracts and Asymmetric Information

  • Book
  • © 2018

Overview

Authors:
  1. Sugata Bag

    1. Department of Economics, Delhi School of Economics, Delhi, India

    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed   Google Scholar

  • Deals with a specific but most pragmatic aspect of contractual environment where the application of contract laws and their efficiency estimates are not explored much in the contemporary literature

  • Specifically written for economists interested in models of the incentive effects of contract remedies

  • Uses legal examples from case laws to lie the foundation for every model discussed

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this book

Log in via an institution
eBook USD 119.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book USD 159.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book USD 159.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Other ways to access

Licence this eBook for your library

Institutional subscriptions

Table of contents (7 chapters)

  1. Front Matter

    Pages i-xvi
    Download chapter PDF

  2. Introduction

    • Sugata Bag
    Pages 1-22

  3. Basics of Economic Theory of Contract

    • Sugata Bag
    Pages 23-58

  4. Economics of Damage Remedies I: Unilateral Reliance, One-Sided Information Asymmetry

    • Sugata Bag
    Pages 59-90

  5. Economics of Damage Remedies II: Bilateral Reliance, One-Sided Information Asymmetry

    • Sugata Bag
    Pages 91-110

  6. Economics of Damage Remedies III: Incentives Under Expectation Damage With One-Sided Private Information – A Mechanism Design Approach

    • Sugata Bag
    Pages 111-145

  7. Economics of Damage Remedies IV: Incomplete Contracts, Bilateral Reliance, Two-Sided Asymmetric Information

    • Sugata Bag
    Pages 147-189

  8. Concluding Notes

    • Sugata Bag
    Pages 191-198

  9. Back Matter

    Pages 199-203
    Download chapter PDF
Back to top

Keywords

About this book

This book examines the main issues arising in economic analysis of contract law with special attention given to the incomplete contracts. It discusses both the main features of contract law as they relate to the problem of economic exchange, and how the relevant legal rules and the institutions can be analysed from an economic perspective. Evaluate the welfare impacts, analyses the effects and the desirability of different breach remedies and examines the optimal incentive structure of party-designed liquidated damages under the different dimensions of informational asymmetry. Overall the book aims to contribute to the legal debate over the adoption of the specific breach remedies when the breach victim’s expectation interest is difficult to assess, and to the debate over courts' reluctance to implement large penalties in the event of breach of contracts.

Authors and Affiliations

  • Department of Economics, Delhi School of Economics, Delhi, India

    Sugata Bag

About the author

Sugata Bag is Assistant Professor of Economics at the Delhi School of Economics, India. After earning his B.Sc. (Honours) Economics from Calcutta University , Professor Bag completed Masters and Doctoral work in Economics at Jawaharlal Nehru University. His research interest lies in the following domain-  Law and Economics,  Development Economics,  Contract Theory,  Applied Econometrics. 

Bibliographic Information

  • Book Title: Economic Analysis of Contract Law

  • Book Subtitle: Incomplete Contracts and Asymmetric Information

  • Authors: Sugata Bag

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-65268-9

  • Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan Cham

  • eBook Packages: Economics and Finance, Economics and Finance (R0)

  • Copyright Information: The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2018

  • Hardcover ISBN: 978-3-319-65267-2Published: 01 February 2018

  • Softcover ISBN: 978-3-319-87987-1Published: 06 June 2019

  • eBook ISBN: 978-3-319-65268-9Published: 24 January 2018

  • Edition Number: 1

  • Number of Pages: XVI, 203

  • Number of Illustrations: 2 illustrations in colour

  • Topics: Law and Economics, Public Economics, Business Law

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Back to top

Search

Navigation