Overview
- Contains new and original support for nonconceptualism
- Offers clear explication of nonconceptual content and nonconceptualism
- Provides the first systematic book-length presentation of the conceptualism-nonconceptualism debate
Part of the book series: Studies in Brain and Mind (SIBM, volume 8)
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Table of contents (9 chapters)
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Front Matter
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Back Matter
Keywords
About this book
The author defends nonconceptualism, the claim that perceptual experience is nonconceptual and has nonconceptual content. Continuing the heated and complex debate surrounding this topic over the past two decades, she offers a sustained defense of a novel version of the view, Modest Nonconceptualism, and provides a systematic overview of some of the central controversies in the debate.
An explication of the notion of nonconceptual content and a distinction between nonconceptualist views of different strengths starts off the volume, then the author goes on to defend participants in the debate over nonconceptual content against the allegation that their failure to distinguish between a state view and a content view of (non)conceptualism leads to fatal problems for their views. Next, she makes a case for nonconceptualism by refining some of the central arguments for the view, such as the arguments from fineness of grain, from contradictory contents, from animal and infant perception, and from concept acquisition. Then, two central objections against nonconceptualism are rebutted in a novel way: the epistemological objection and the objection from objectivity.
Modest Nonconceptualism allows for perceptual experiences to involve some conceptual elements. It emphasizes the relevance of concept employment for an understanding of conceptual and nonconceptual mental states and identifies the nonconceptual content of experience with scenario content. It insists on the possibility of genuine content-bearing perceptual experience without concept possession and is thus in line with the Autonomy Thesis. Finally, it includes an account of perceptual justification that relies on the external contents of experience and belief, yet is compatible with epistemological internalism.
Authors and Affiliations
About the author
Bibliographic Information
Book Title: Modest Nonconceptualism
Book Subtitle: Epistemology, Phenomenology, and Content
Authors: Eva Schmidt
Series Title: Studies in Brain and Mind
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-18902-4
Publisher: Springer Cham
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and Law, Philosophy and Religion (R0)
Copyright Information: Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015
Hardcover ISBN: 978-3-319-18901-7Published: 21 July 2015
Softcover ISBN: 978-3-319-37139-9Published: 15 October 2016
eBook ISBN: 978-3-319-18902-4Published: 06 July 2015
Series ISSN: 1573-4536
Series E-ISSN: 2468-399X
Edition Number: 1
Number of Pages: XI, 268
Topics: Philosophy of Mind, Epistemology