Web and Internet Economics

1. Front Matter

   Pages i-xiv

   PDF

2. Matching

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 1-1

      PDF

   2. Almost Envy-Free Repeated Matching in Two-Sided Markets

      • Sreenivas Gollapudi, Kostas Kollias, Benjamin Plaut

      Pages 3-16

   3. Dynamic Weighted Matching with Heterogeneous Arrival and Departure Rates

      • Natalie Collina, Nicole Immorlica, Kevin Leyton-Brown, Brendan Lucier, Neil Newman

      Pages 17-30

   4. A Fine-Grained View on Stable Many-To-One Matching Problems with Lower and Upper Quotas

      • Niclas Boehmer, Klaus Heeger

      Pages 31-44

   5. The Ad Types Problem

      • Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi, Julián Mestre, Okke Schrijvers, Christopher A. Wilkens

      Pages 45-58

   6. Multidimensional Stable Roommates with Master List

      • Robert Bredereck, Klaus Heeger, Dušan Knop, Rolf Niedermeier

      Pages 59-73

3. Markets

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 75-75

      PDF

   2. Optimal Nash Equilibria for Bandwidth Allocation

      • Benjamin Plaut

      Pages 77-88

   3. Counteracting Inequality in Markets via Convex Pricing

      • Ashish Goel, Benjamin Plaut

      Pages 89-101

   4. Markets for Efficient Public Good Allocation with Social Distancing

      • Devansh Jalota, Marco Pavone, Qi Qi, Yinyu Ye

      Pages 102-116

4. Mechanism Design and Pricing

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 117-117

      PDF

   2. Two Strongly Truthful Mechanisms for Three Heterogeneous Agents Answering One Question

      • Grant Schoenebeck, Fang-Yi Yu

      Pages 119-132

   3. A Generic Truthful Mechanism for Combinatorial Auctions

      • Hanrui Zhang

      Pages 133-146

   4. The Price of Anarchy of Two-Buyer Sequential Multiunit Auctions

      • Mete Şeref Ahunbay, Adrian Vetta

      Pages 147-161

   5. Revenue-Optimal Deterministic Auctions for Multiple Buyers with Ordinal Preferences over Fixed-Price Items

      • Will Ma

      Pages 162-176

   6. Robust Revenue Maximization Under Minimal Statistical Information

      • Yiannis Giannakopoulos, Diogo Poças, Alexandros Tsigonias-Dimitriadis

      Pages 177-190

   7. Revenue Monotonicity Under Misspecified Bidders

      • Makis Arsenis, Odysseas Drosis, Robert Kleinberg

      Pages 191-205

   8. On the Power and Limits of Dynamic Pricing in Combinatorial Markets

      • Ben Berger, Alon Eden, Michal Feldman

      Pages 206-219

   9. Competitively Pricing Parking in a Tree

      • Max Bender, Jacob Gilbert, Aditya Krishnan, Kirk Pruhs

      Pages 220-233

This book constitutes the proceedings of the 16th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, WINE 2020, held in Beijing, China, in December 2020. 
The  31 full papers presented together with 11 abstracts were carefully reviewed and selected from 136 submissions. 

The issues in theoretical computer science, artificial intelligence, operations research are of particular importance in the Web and the Internet that enable the interaction of large and diverse populations. The Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE) is an interdisciplinary forum for the exchange of ideas and results on incentives and computation arising from these various fields.

• artificial intelligence
• commerce
• computer networks
• computer science
• computer systems
• economics
• electronic commerce
• engineering
• game theory
• internet
• mathematics
• multiagent system
• nash equilibrium
• robotics
• robots
• sales
• telecommunication networks
• telecommunication systems
• theoretical computer science

• Academy of Mathematics and Systems Science, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China

  Xujin Chen

• Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Shanghai, China

  Nikolai Gravin

• Goethe University Frankfurt, Frankfurt am Main, Germany

  Martin Hoefer

• University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, USA

  Ruta Mehta

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