Legal Conventionalism

1. Front Matter

   Pages i-vi

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2. Introduction

   • Lorena Ramírez-Ludeña, Josep M. Vilajosana

   Pages 1-5

3. The Notion of Convention

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 7-7

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   2. Pre-conventions. A Fragment of the Background

      • Bruno Celano

      Pages 9-30

   3. Re-examining Deep Conventions: Practical Reason and Forward-Looking Agency

      • Verónica Rodríguez-Blanco

      Pages 31-43

4. Conventions and the Rule of Recognition

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 45-45

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   2. Conventions, Reasons and the Law

      • Andrei Marmor

      Pages 47-63

   3. The Rule of Recognition as a Constitutive Convention

      • Jorge L. Rodríguez

      Pages 65-87

   4. Social Facts and Law: Why the Rule of Recognition is a Convention

      • Josep M. Vilajosana

      Pages 89-107

   5. Cooperative Conventions, Rules of Recognition and Institutional Practices

      • Rodrigo E. Sánchez Brigido

      Pages 109-126

   6. On Identifying the Law and Its Supposed Conventional Foundations. A Set-Theory Approach

      • Giovanni Battista Ratti

      Pages 127-144

5. Conventions and Legal Interpretation

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 145-145

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   2. Conventionalism Unchained and Sceptical. A Defence of a Quasi-Realist Account of Legal Statements Against Dworkin’s Criticisms

      • Federico José Arena

      Pages 147-178

   3. Conventionalism and the Causal Theory of Reference

      • Lorena Ramírez-Ludeña

      Pages 179-190

   4. The Interpretation of Plans

      • Scott Shapiro

      Pages 191-198

The concept of convention has been used in different fields and from different perspectives to account for important social phenomena, and the legal sphere is no exception. Rather, reflection on whether the legal phenomenon is based on a convention and, if so, what kind of convention is involved, has become a recurring issue in contemporary legal theory. In this book, some of the foremost specialists in the field make significant contributions to this debate. In the first part, the concept of convention is analysed. The second part reflects on whether the rule of recognition postulated by Hart can be understood as a convention and discusses its potential and limitations in order to explain the institutional and normative character of law. Lastly, the third part critically examines the relations between conventionalism and legal interpretation. Given the content and quality of the contributions, the book is of interest to those wanting to understand the current state of the art in legalconventionalism as well as those wanting to deepen their knowledge about these questions.

• Legal Conventionalism
• Conventions
• Legal Positivism
• David Lewis
• Andrei Marmor
• Herbert Hart
• Legal Interpretation
• Rule of Recognition
• Constitutive Conventions
• Coordination Conventions

• Pompeu Fabra University, Barcelona, Spain

  Lorena Ramírez-Ludeña, Josep M. Vilajosana

Lorena Ramírez-Ludeña is Lecturer in the Law Department of the Pompeu Fabra University (UPF) in Barcelona. She holds a PhD in Legal Philosophy from the Pompeu Fabra University. She has been visiting researcher in prestigious universities such as the University of Oxford and Yale University. Her research interests include theories of reference, legal interpretation, legal positivism and objectivity in law. Her publications include books, articles and book chapters in well-known journals and publishers such as Springer, Doxa, Analisi e Diritto and Marcial Pons.

Josep M. Vilajosana is Professor of Legal Philosophy at Pompeu Fabra University (UPF) in Barcelona. His research lines include legal theory, legal system’s dynamics, conventionalism and the right to self-determination. He is the author of many books and articles on legal and political philosophy. From 2010 to 2016, he was the Dean of the Faculty of Law at the UPF. 

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