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Palgrave Macmillan

British Military Planning for the Defence of Germany 1945–50

  • Book
  • © 1996

Overview

Authors:
  1. Paul Cornish

    1. International Security Programme, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, UK

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Part of the book series: Studies in Military and Strategic History (SMSH)

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Table of contents (8 chapters)

  1. Front Matter

    Pages i-xi
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  2. Introduction

    • Paul Cornish
    Pages 1-6

  3. Threat Perceptions, 1945–50

    • Paul Cornish
    Pages 7-32

  4. The Defence Budget, 1945–50

    • Paul Cornish
    Pages 33-70

  5. The ‘No War Rule’

    • Paul Cornish
    Pages 71-85

  6. Fragile Logic: Strategic Plans, 1945–47

    • Paul Cornish
    Pages 86-103

  7. Consolidation of the Cold War: Strategic Plans, 1947–48

    • Paul Cornish
    Pages 104-129

  8. Token Forces: Strategic Plans, 1949–50

    • Paul Cornish
    Pages 130-163

  9. Conclusion

    • Paul Cornish
    Pages 164-169

  10. Back Matter

    Pages 170-211
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Keywords

About this book

Using recently released archive material, British Military Planning for the Defence of Germany, 1945-50, reassesses Britain's strategy for the defence of Germany up to the outbreak of the Korean War. Convinced of the capabilities of strategic air power with atomic weapons, and convinced that the defence of the Middle East should be the first call on British planning, Britain's military chiefs made a series of token gestures designed to boost French morale and consistently refused to make a genuine 'continental commitment' of operational troops.

Authors and Affiliations

  • International Security Programme, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, UK

    Paul Cornish

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