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Preferences and Democracy

Villa Colombella Papers

  • Book
  • © 1993

Overview

Editors:
  1. Albert Breton

    1. University of Toronto, Canada

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  2. Gianluigi Galeotti

    1. University of Perugia, Italy

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  3. Pierre Salmon

    1. University of Bourgogne, France

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  4. Ronald Wintrobe

    1. University of Western Ontario, Canada

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Part of the book series: International Studies in Economics and Econometrics (ISEE, volume 28)

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Table of contents (14 chapters)

  1. Front Matter

    Pages I-IX
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  2. Introduction

    1. Introduction

      • Albert Breton, Gianluigi Galeotti, Pierre Salmon, Ronald Wintrobe
      Pages 1-10

  3. Unsatisfied Political Demands

    1. Front Matter

      Pages 11-11
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    2. Unpopular Policies and the Theory of Representative Democracy

      • Pierre Salmon
      Pages 13-39

    3. Equilibrium Political Inaction in a Democracy

      • Peter Howitt, Ronald Wintrobe
      Pages 41-64

  4. Bridges Between Demand and Supply

    1. Front Matter

      Pages 65-65
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    2. A Theory of Demand for Governmentally Supplied Goods and Services

      • Albert Breton
      Pages 67-100

    3. Organized Groups and the (Mis?)Transmission of Public Preferences

      • R. A. Young
      Pages 101-133

    4. Public Goods Provision Institutions

      • Marc Bilodeau
      Pages 135-155

  5. Equilibrium Political Platforms: Convergence and Divergence

    1. Front Matter

      Pages 157-157
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    2. The Silent Revolution of Probabilistic Voting

      • Jean-Dominique Lafay
      Pages 159-191

    3. Pivotal Voters and Political Equilibria

      • Gianluigi Galeotti
      Pages 193-213

    4. Political Exchange and the Allocation of Surplus: A Model of Two-Party Competition

      • Michele Grillo, Michele Polo
      Pages 215-244

  6. The Behaviour of Political Parties

    1. Front Matter

      Pages 245-245
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    2. Fourteen Ways to Credibly Escape a Credible Commitment (and Still Get Re-Elected)

      • Ronald Wintrobe
      Pages 247-264

    3. Issues and Party Alignments: A Review with Canadian Examples

      • Richard Johnston
      Pages 265-286
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Keywords

About this book

I. Until about a dozen years ago, the economic analysis of the relationship between political preferences and political demands was a rather straightforward, if dull, subject. The most common assumption was that the only political instrument available to citizens was the vote. Given this assumption, the analyst could express the outcome of the voting process in one of two ways. One possibility was to make the heroic assumptions necessary to obtain the median voter theorem, in which case, the political demands of the citizenry are simply the preferences of the median voter. The alternative was to make Arrow's Impossibility Theorem in which case even though individual preferences are well ordered, no collective preference function exists. On either of these approaches, institutions such as interest groups, political parties, or the structures ofpolitical representation played no role in the analysis. The work of "Chicago" scholars especially George Stigler, Gary Becker and Sam Peltzman took a different approach and emphasized the importanceoforganizationinmakingpoliticaldemandseffective, shifting thefocus from voting topolitical "pressure" byinterestgroups. However, in these models, voting as an instrument of political action simply disappears and the relationship between interest group pressures and electoral processes has never been clarified.

Editors and Affiliations

  • University of Toronto, Canada

    Albert Breton

  • University of Perugia, Italy

    Gianluigi Galeotti

  • University of Bourgogne, France

    Pierre Salmon

  • University of Western Ontario, Canada

    Ronald Wintrobe

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