Game Theory, Experience, Rationality

1. Front Matter

   Pages I-X

   PDF

2. Introduction

   1. Introduction

      • Werner Leinfellner

      Pages 1-8

3. Articles

   1. Keynote Lecture

      1. Game Theory, Experience, Rationality

         • Reinhard Selten

         Pages 9-34

   2. Rationality and the Foundations of the Social Sciences

      1. Counterproductive Rationality

         • Anatol Rapoport

         Pages 35-48

      2. Rationally Coping with Lapses from Rationality

         • Thomas C. Schelling

         Pages 49-53

      3. Do Rational People Make Mistakes

         • John D. Hey

         Pages 55-66

      4. Rationality and Knavery

         • Daniel M. Hausman

         Pages 67-79

      5. Structural Rationality in Game Theory

         • Julian Nida-Rümelin

         Pages 81-93

      6. Attractions to and Repulsions from Chance

         • Robin Pope

         Pages 95-107

      7. Agreeing to Disagree: Harsanyi and Aumann

         • Matthias Hild, Richard Jeffrey, Mathias Risse

         Pages 109-115

   3. Cooperation and Rationality

      1. Rethinking Rational Cooperation

         • Edward F. McClennen

         Pages 117-129

      2. Automata and Inner States for Repeated Games

         • Karl Sigmund, Maarten Boerlijst, Martin A. Nowak

         Pages 131-139

   4. Rationality and Economics

      1. Towards Bounded Rationality within Rational Expectations — Some Comments from an Economic Point of View

         • Lutz Beinsen, Ulrike Leopold-Wildburger

         Pages 141-152

      2. Macroeconomics and Behavioral Finance: A Tale of Two Disciplines

         • Thomas Russell

         Pages 153-159

   5. Bayesian Theory and Rationality

      1. Bayesian Subjunctive Conditionals for Games and Decisions

         • Brian Skyrms

         Pages 161-172

      2. Prediction, Bayesian Deliberation and Correlated Equilibrium

         • Isaac Levi

         Pages 173-185

      3. Consequentialism and Bayesian Rationality in Normal Form Games

         • Peter J. Hammond

         Pages 187-196

   6. Evolutionary Game Theory and Game Dynamics

      1. Game Theory, Sociodynamics, and Cultural Evolution

         • Werner Leinfellner

         Pages 197-210

      2. Microscopic Foundation of Stochastic Game Dynamical Equations

         • Dirk Helbing

         Pages 211-224

      3. Uniform Barriers and Evolutionarily Stable Sets

         • Immanuel M. Bomze

         Pages 225-243

When von Neumann's and Morgenstern's Theory of Games and Economic Behavior appeared in 1944, one thought that a complete theory of strategic social behavior had appeared out of nowhere. However, game theory has, to this very day, remained a fast-growing assemblage of models which have gradually been united in a new social theory - a theory that is far from being completed even after recent advances in game theory, as evidenced by the work of the three Nobel Prize winners, John F. Nash, John C. Harsanyi, and Reinhard Selten. Two of them, Harsanyi and Selten, have contributed important articles to the present volume. This book leaves no doubt that the game-theoretical models are on the right track to becoming a respectable new theory, just like the great theories of the twentieth century originated from formerly separate models which merged in the course of decades. For social scientists, the age of great discover­ ies is not over. The recent advances of today's game theory surpass by far the results of traditional game theory. For example, modem game theory has a new empirical and social foundation, namely, societal experiences; this has changed its methods, its "rationality. " Morgenstern (I worked together with him for four years) dreamed of an encompassing theory of social behavior. With the inclusion of the concept of evolution in mathematical form, this dream will become true. Perhaps the new foundation will even lead to a new name, "conflict theory" instead of "game theory.

• agents
• decision theory
• ethics
• game theory
• probability

`... the book is recommended to all who want to get first-hand information on rationality and what game theory can and cannot contribute.'
OR News, 8 (2000)

• University of Nebraska and University of Graz, Austria

  Werner Leinfellner

• Institute Vienna Circle, University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria

  Eckehart Köhler

Policies and ethics