Overview
- Offers an action-based criterion to ground a graded distinction between perception and cognition in the mental processing hierarchy
- Provides a philosophical discussion of attention based on the biased-competition theory
- Presents a clear account of when and how attentional processes can shape perceptual experience based on the prediction-error minimization model of the mind
Part of the book series: Studies in Brain and Mind (SIBM, volume 16)
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Table of contents (8 chapters)
Keywords
- Attention biased competition
- Cognitive Penetration
- Distinction Perception Cognition
- Interaction Perception Cognition
- Predictive coding
- Prediction-Error Minimization
- Theories of Attention
- Attention and the Shaping of Experience
- Cognitive Processing Hierarchy
- Cognitive Penetrability of Perceptual Experience
- Theory of Attention
- How Attentional Cognitive Penetration Works
- Expectations and Predictions as a Model of Cognition
- Predictive Model of Attentional Cognitive Penetration
- prediction-error minimization model of the mind
About this book
This monograph presents a clear account of when and how attentional processes can shape perceptual experience. This argument is based on the prediction-error minimization model of the mind. The author believes that the topic of attention should take a more central role in the debate about the influence of cognition on perception. Inside, he shows how this can be possible.
The hypothesis that cognition may shape perceptual experience has been traditionally labeled as the cognitive penetrability of perceptual experience. Cognitive penetrability is relevant for several debates in philosophy and cognitive science. It tackles the possibility of gathering genuine knowledge on the basis of perceptual information about the world delivered by sensory channels. The problem, the author notes, is that if our previously acquired belief can shape current perceptual experiences, such experiences cannot serve as an adequate source of justification in retaining those beliefs or evenforming new ones. He argues that cognitive penetration may sometimes happen through attentional processes, but that its occurrence need not undermine perceptual justification.
The book provides an overview of the cognitive penetrability debate. The author discusses evidence that supports the occurrence of this phenomenon. Overall, this investigation offers readers a philosophical discussion of attention based on the biased-competition theory. It argues that attention is a property of mental representations that emerges from a metacognitive competition process.
Authors and Affiliations
About the author
Bibliographic Information
Book Title: The Attentional Shaping of Perceptual Experience
Book Subtitle: An Investigation into Attention and Cognitive Penetrability
Authors: Francesco Marchi
Series Title: Studies in Brain and Mind
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-33558-8
Publisher: Springer Cham
eBook Packages: Religion and Philosophy, Philosophy and Religion (R0)
Copyright Information: Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020
Hardcover ISBN: 978-3-030-33557-1Published: 24 January 2020
Softcover ISBN: 978-3-030-33560-1Published: 24 January 2021
eBook ISBN: 978-3-030-33558-8Published: 23 January 2020
Series ISSN: 1573-4536
Series E-ISSN: 2468-399X
Edition Number: 1
Number of Pages: XVIII, 157
Number of Illustrations: 1 b/w illustrations
Topics: Philosophy of Mind, Cognitive Psychology