Minimal Cooperation and Shared Agency

1. Front Matter

   Pages i-v

   PDF

2. Minimal Cooperation (Editorial Introduction)

   • Anika Fiebich

   Pages 1-7

3. What Is Minimally Cooperative Behavior?

   • Kirk Ludwig

   Pages 9-39

4. Joint Action: Why So Minimal?

   • Cédric Paternotte

   Pages 41-58

5. What in the World: Conversation and Things in Context

   • Shaun Gallagher

   Pages 59-70

6. Shared Intentionality and the Cooperative Evolutionary Hypothesis

   • Glenda Satne, Alessandro Salice

   Pages 71-92

7. Minimal Cooperation and Group Roles

   • Katherine Ritchie

   Pages 93-109

8. Towards a Blueprint for a Social Animal

   • Stephen Butterfill, Elisabeth Pacherie

   Pages 111-125

9. Modest Sociality, Minimal Cooperation and Natural Intersubjectivity

   • Michael Wilby

   Pages 127-148

10. Solving the Hi-lo Paradox: Equilibria, Beliefs, and Coordination

    • Francesco Guala

    Pages 149-168

11. Proprietary Reasons and Joint Action

    • Abe Roth

    Pages 169-180

12. Motor Representation and Action Experience in Joint Action

    • Corrado Sinigaglia, Stephen A. Butterfill

    Pages 181-193

13. From Collective Memory … to Collective Metamemory?

    • Santiago Arango-Muñoz, Kourken Michaelian

    Pages 195-217

This volume examines minimality in cooperation and shared agency from various angles. It features essays written by top scholars in the philosophy of mind and action. Taken together, the essays provide a genuine contribution to the contemporary joint action debate.

The main accounts in this debate present sufficient rather than necessary or minimal criteria for there to be cooperation. Much discussion in the debate deals with robust rather than more attenuate and simple cases of cooperation or shared agency. Focusing on such minimal cases, however, may help to explain how cooperation comes into existence and how minimal cooperation interrelates with more complex cases of cooperation. 

The contributors discuss minimality in cooperation by focusing on particular aspects. For example, they consider how social roles might deliver minimal cooperation constraints or what the minimal contextual criteria are for cooperation to emerge.

Readers will find the answers to these and other questions: What is minimally cooperative behavior? By what steps could full members of a society organized by conventions, norms and institutions be constructed from creatures with minimal social skills and cognitive abilities? What do we experience of actions when we act together with a purpose?

• Basic Joint Action
• Minimal Cases Joint Action
• Minimal Cooperation
• Minimal Shared Agency
• Minimality Joint Action
• Necessary Criteria Cooperation Shared Agency
• Bratman Shared Intentions
• Tomasello Cooperative Evolutionary Hypothesis
• Minimal joint actions
• lite shared agency
• minimal shared agency
• emerging mass action
• collective musical improvisation
• deliberation
• communicative practices
• minimal cooperation
• minimal conditions joint intentional action
• social roles minimal cooperation
• minimality cooperation
• cooperation shared agency

• Bremen, Germany

  Anika Fiebich

Anika Fiebich has finished her Ph.D. in philosophy on “Varieties of Social Understanding” in 2013 at the Ruhr-University Bochum, Germany, under the supervision of Prof. Albert Newen (Bochum) and Prof. Shaun Gallagher (Memphis). Her research focuses on various issues in the philosophy of mind and action. During her Ph.D. and postdoc time, she has worked at the Ruhr-University Bochum, École Normale Superièure in Lyon, Institut Jean Nicod in Paris, University of Memphis, University of Wollongong, Duisburg-Essen University, and the Center for the Study of Social Action at the University of Milan.

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