Overview
- Focuses on phenomenal conservatism, one of the most influential and promising conceptions of epistemic justification
- Sheds new light on phenomenal conservatism by rejecting apparently consolidated objections to it while re-evaluating its various asserted virtues and advantages
- Provides an original contribution to the wider debate on epistemic justification
Part of the book series: SpringerBriefs in Philosophy (BRIEFSPHILOSOPH)
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Table of contents (6 chapters)
Keywords
- Phenomenal Conservatism
- Phenomenal Dogmatism
- Non-Inferential Justification
- Perceptual Justification
- Easy Justification and Bootstrapping
- Appearances and Seemings
- Inferential Justification
- Reflective Mental States and Justification
- Appearances and Scepticism
- Inferential Scepticism
- epistemic justification
- foundationalism
- phenomenal conservatism
- Bayesian reasoning
- philosophy of mind
About this book
This book examines phenomenal conservatism, one of the most influential and promising internalist conceptions of non-inferential justification debated in current epistemology and philosophy of mind. It also explores the significance of the findings of this examination for the general debate on epistemic justification.
According to phenomenal conservatism, non-inferential justification rests on seemings or appearances, conceived of as experiences provided with propositional content. Phenomenal conservatism states that if it appears to S that P, in the absence of defeaters, S thereby has some justification for believing that P. This view provides the basis for foundationalism and many ordinary epistemic practices.
This book sheds new light on phenomenal conservatism by assessing objections to it and examining epistemological merits and advantages attributed to it. In a nutshell, phenomenal conservatism is actually compatible with Bayesian reasoning, and it is unaffected by bootstrapping problems and challenges that appeal to the cognitive penetrability of perception. Nevertheless, appearance-based justification proves unstable or elusive and its anti-septical bite is more limited than expected. These difficulties could be surmounted if phenomenal conservatism were integrated with a theory of inferential justification. The book appeals to scholars and postgraduates in the field of epistemology and philosophy of mind who are interested in the rational roles of appearances.
Authors and Affiliations
About the author
Luca Moretti is a Reader at the University of Aberdeen’s Department of Philosophy and a Visiting Professor at the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy. He holds an MLitt in Logic & Metaphysics from St Andrews and a Ph.D. in Philosophy from King's College London. His research areas include epistemology and metaphysics, and he has substantively contributed to the debates on Bayesian coherentism, transmission and failure of transmission of justification, and phenomenal conservatism. Moretti has published articles in various journals, including Analysis, Philosophical Studies, and Philosophy of Science.
Bibliographic Information
Book Title: Seemings and Epistemic Justification
Book Subtitle: How Appearances Justify Beliefs
Authors: Luca Moretti
Series Title: SpringerBriefs in Philosophy
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-43392-5
Publisher: Springer Cham
eBook Packages: Religion and Philosophy, Philosophy and Religion (R0)
Copyright Information: The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020
Softcover ISBN: 978-3-030-43391-8Published: 10 March 2020
eBook ISBN: 978-3-030-43392-5Published: 09 March 2020
Series ISSN: 2211-4548
Series E-ISSN: 2211-4556
Edition Number: 1
Number of Pages: VIII, 91
Number of Illustrations: 1 b/w illustrations
Topics: Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind, Analytic Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Philosophy of Language