Global Public Policy and Governance - Call for Papers: Organisational Justifications in Public Governance
Call for Papers:
Guest editor:
Ian THYNNE, Visiting Professor,
Department of Politics and Public Administration, University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong SAR, China
Submission deadline for proposal: 1 May, 2022
Submission Instructions
Before submitting your manuscript, please ensure you have carefully read the submission guidelines (this opens in a new tab). The complete manuscript should be submitted through the submission system (this opens in a new tab). To ensure that you submit to the correct thematic series please select the appropriate thematic series in the drop-down menu upon submission. In addition, indicate within your cover letter that you wish your manuscript to be considered as part of "Organisational Justifications in Public Governance". All submissions will undergo rigorous peer review and accepted articles will be published within the journal as a collection.
Reviewers should follow Springer Nature’s and the journals more detailed Peer-Review Policy (this opens in a new tab).
Introduction
Formally constituted organisations are core contributors to public governance involving the state, market, and civil society. Their functions and operation are significant in what they do, how they do it, and what they achieve, as supported by the legal instrument by which they are established, accompanied by the source, kind and exercise of their legal powers. Individually and together, they certainly matter in why, when, where, how, and for whom public action is framed, taken, and assessed in the public interest.
Organisations of immediate interest are those deliberately established by governments as semi-autonomous organisations of the state beyond, but varyingly within the purview of, ministries and departments. Included are executive bodies, statutory bodies, and state-owned companies. They are examples of “agencification” (Caulfield et al., 2006; Peters & Bouckaert, 2004; Pollitt & Talbot, 2004; Verhoest et al., 2021) and/or “corporatisation” (OECD, 2017, 2018; Lane, 1997; Thynne, 2018, 2021). They are “para-government” or “quasi-government” organisations to which “quangos” generally applies (Curnow & Saunders, 1983; Flinders & Smith, 1999; Greve et al., 1999; Hood, 1986; Hood & Schuppert, 1988).
The establishment and powers of semi-autonomous organisations are designed and adopted ostensibly as being fit-for-purpose as embraced by their functions with form following function. Over time, they are shaped and reshaped by various internal and external developments as purposes are pursued and lessons are learnt. Involved are mixes of conscious and spontaneous reform and change consistent with the formal and informal attributes of organisations which affect how establishment, powers and purposes are aligned in practice.
While there are challenges in ever proving that the establishment and powers of organisations are logically aligned with their purposes, it is possible to know from documents and interviews whether and, if so, how their key stakeholders – as members of a government along with a treasury department and/or a state/public service commission – justify them with reference to the purposes. Justifications, or an absence of justifications, could valuably complement other information in making sense of their existence, activities and achievements when they are called to account and controlled in various forums. There could be important lessons for enhancing their efficiency and effectiveness, and potentially also for their redesign or even abolition and replacement by other organisations.
Semi-Autonomous Organisations: Establishment, Powers and Fitness-for-Purpose
The establishment and powers of semi-autonomous organisations as executive bodies, statutory bodies and state-owned companies involve the use of executive decisions, statutes, and organisational constitutions. These legal instruments as bases of fitness-for-purpose are pertinent in the design and adoption of organisations in practice, while also having theoretical value in guiding and informing organisational inquiries and assessments (Wettenhall, 2020; Verhoest et al., 2021; Thynne, 2018). They are significant in the processes of organisational reform, as appreciated in comprehensive comparative studies (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2017; Pierre & Ingraham, 2010; Verhoest, et al, 2012).
Since the late 1970s, a large majority of semi-autonomous organisations as state-owned enterprises (SOEs) with commercial purposes have been established and empowered as state-owned companies. In 2015, for example, companies comprised 2,043 (82%) of the 2,467 SOEs wholly or majority-owned by the central governments in 40 developed and developing countries. They represented “92% of all SOEs by value and 84% by employment.” They were particularly prominent in the network industries and finance, including 92% of SOEs in electricity and gas, 77% in telecommunications, 75% in transportation, 88% in other utilities, and 82% in finance (OECD, 2017, pp. 8, 14-16, 20). The percentages highlight the significance of knowing justifications for the adoption of state-owned companies.
An assessment of the purposes and performance of various semi-autonomous organisations in 20 countries in 2015 hypothesises “that in countries where many services are provided through agencies rather than through traditional government bureaucracy, public sector performance will be higher than in countries with a low number of agencies.” This hypothesis interrelates organisational status and performance measured as “output, outcome, efficiency, and value for money.” Findings are that agencies are “hardly related to output and outcome, and negatively related to efficiency and value for money”, such that “the [positive] economic claims underlying agencification programs are . . . refuted” (Overman & van Thiel, 2016, pp. 617, 628).
Other assessments of semi-autonomous organisations in several countries have also interrelated organisational status and performance (Peters & Bouckaert, 2004; Caulfield, et al, 2006; Verhoest, et al, 2004, 2010, 2012; OECD, 2002). Not surprisingly, there have been various high-low and low-high relationships between autonomy and performance. A significant finding has been a mismatch of powers and ability, with organisations often having considerable powers to perform functions in pursuit of their purposes, but having their ability to exercise those powers limited by a government or by relevant ministries or departments. This has rendered them relatively autonomous from the government in one way, but largely controlled by it in another. They have been “this but that” in being established and empowered as one type of organisation, but treated operationally as though they were of some other type (Thynne, 2018, p. 12).
Assessments of semi-autonomous organisations and performance have confirmed the need for relevant stakeholders not only to justify establishments and powers as being fit-for-purpose, but also to act in accordance with the justifications. Other than possibly because of internal mismanagement, shortfalls in performance might sometimes result from illogical alignments of establishment and powers with purposes, necessitating essential adjustments. But they could also be a consequence of inappropriate government intervention irrespective of the logic of the alignments and the quality of management. This requires semi-autonomous organisations to protect themselves against unwarranted expectations and demands. Inadequate self-protection could make their status and distinctiveness reasonably meaningless, as well as reducing the efficacy and integrity of their work and achievements (Thynne, 2021).
Propositions, Hypotheses and Questions
Three interrelated propositions underpin analyses of organisational justifications involving the establishment, powers and purposes of semi-autonomous organisations:
• The first proposition is that the establishment and powers of organisations are vital in shaping their formal identities and, thus, are meaningful bases on which to address their fitness-for-purpose.
• The second proposition is that formally declared purposes of organisations should be paramount considerations in any justifications of their establishment and powers.
• The third proposition is that, in addition to their establishment and powers, many other features of organisations, formal and informal, affect how they are designed and managed in alignment with their purposes without diminishing the importance of their establishment and powers.
These propositions indicate a possible cause and effect relationship between the purposes of organisations and their establishment and powers, with purposes being an independent (cause) variable and establishment and powers being dependent (effect) variables. In response, two hypotheses are relevant, with one being positive, and the other not so positive:
• The positive hypothesis is that key stakeholders, in understanding the importance of logically aligning the establishment and powers of organisations with their purposes, will seize opportunities to justify the alignments on all relevant occasions.
• The not so positive hypothesis is that key stakeholders, while possibly understanding the importance of aligning the establishment and powers of organisations with their purposes, will miss opportunities to justify the alignments by only doing so when requested.
The propositions and hypotheses raise fundamental questions about organisational justifications, types, purposes, and diversity in governance. Justifications ought to be clear and substantial. Accordingly:
• If justifications are clear and substantial, by whom are they articulated? In what forums are they articulated? What specific matters are highlighted? What are the responses to them within and beyond government?
• If justifications are not clear and substantial, or are not provided at all, why is this so? Is it just assumed that different types of organisations are needed for different purposes: that one size does not fit all and, therefore, that diversity is inevitable without justifications being required? If so, how valid is this assumption?
• On what comparative experience and evidence do justifications rest involving the achievements of different types of organisations with similar purposes? If there are no supporting experience and evidence, is there any sense in different types of organisations being established and empowered for different purposes?
Paper Proposal and Final Submission Arrangements
Papers are invited which address the above propositions, hypotheses and questions, with each paper considering semi-autonomous organisations in a selected governmental system. The variety of governmental systems covered in the Special Issue will provide a comprehensive basis for detailed comparative insights and understanding.
The papers will need to identify and assess specific justifications (or absence thereof) concerning particular types of semi-autonomous organisations. It will be necessary to extend the analysis of justifications well beyond the more general justifications normally discussed in the literature.
Proposals for papers (500-600 words) should be submitted to Ian Thynne – thynne@hku.hk – by 1 May 2022. They should comprise the working title of the paper, research questions, methodology, and initially expected findings. Follow-up responses will be emailed to proposal authors by 1 June 2022.
Authors of accepted proposals will be invited to submit full draft papers to Ian by 1 November 2022. The drafts will be assessed and commented on by Ian, followed by revised versions being subject to double-blind peer review.
Thereafter, the final versions of papers accepted for publication (in 2023) will need to comply with the requirements of Global Public Policy and Governance, with an APA referencing style and a word limit of 10,000 words.
References
Caulfield, J., Peters, B. G., & Bouckaert, G. (Eds.). (2006). The diffusion of the agency model. Public Administration and Development, 26(1), 1–92.
Curnow, G. R., & Saunders, C. A. (Eds.). (1983). Quangos: The Australian experience. Sydney: Hale & Iremonger.
Flinders, M. V., & Smith, M. J. (Eds.). (1999). Quangos, accountability and reform: The politics of quasi-government. London: Macmillan.
Greve, C., Flinders, M., & van Thiel, S. (1999). Quangos: What’s in a name? Defining quangos from a comparative perspective. Governance, 12(2), 129–146.
Hood, C. C. (1986). The hidden public sector: The quango-cratization of the world. In F.-X. Kaufman, G. Majone, & V. Ostrom (Eds.), Guidance, control and evaluation in the public sector (pp. 183–205). Berlin: Walther de Gruyter.
Hood, C. C., & Schuppert, G. F. (Eds.). (1988). Delivering public services in Western Europe: Sharing Western European experience of para-government organization. London: Sage.
Lane, J.-E. (1997). Incorporation as public sector reform. In J.-E. Lane (Ed.), Public sector reform: Rationale, trends and problems (pp. 283–300). London: Sage.
OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development). (2002). Distributed public governance: Agencies, authorities and other government bodies. Paris: OECD Publishing.
OECD. (2017). The size and sectoral distribution of state-owned enterprises. Paris: OECD Publishing.
OECD. (2018). Ownership and governance of state-owned enterprises: A compendium of national practices. Paris: OECD Publishing.
Overman, S., & van Thiel, S. (2016). Agencification and public sector performance: A systematic comparison in 20 countries. Public Management Review, 18(4), 611–635.
Peters, B. G., & Bouckaert, G. (Eds.). (2004). Symposium on autonomous organisations in the public sector. Public Administration and Development, 24(2), 89–181.
Pierre, J., & Ingraham, P. W. (Eds.). (2010). Comparative administrative change and reform: Lessons learned, Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press.
Pollitt, C., & Bouckaert, G. (2017). Public management reform: A comparative analysis – into the age of austerity (4th ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pollitt, C., & Talbot, C. (Eds.). (2004). Unbundled government. London: Taylor & Francis.
Thynne, I. (2018). Fundamentals of government structure: Alignments of organizations at and beyond the center of power. https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.128
Thynne, I. (2021). State-owned enterprises: Structures, functions, and legitimacy.
https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.1407
Verhoest, K., Peters, B. G., Bouckaert, G., & Verschuere, B. (2004). The study of organizational autonomy: A conceptual review. Public Administration and Development, 24(2), 101–118.
Verhoest, K., Roness, P., Verschuere, B., Rubecksen, K., & MacCarthaigh, M. (2010). Autonomy and control of state agencies: Comparing states and agencies. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Verhoest, K., van Thiel, S., Bouckaert, G., & Laegreid, P. (Eds.). (2012). Government agencies: Practices and lessons from 30 countries. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Verhoest, K., van Thiel, S., & De Vadder, S. (2021). Agencification in public administration. https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.1466
Wettenhall, R. (2020). Machinery-of-government building blocks: Ministries, departments, and agencies. https://doi-org.eproxy.lib.hku.hk/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.1373