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SpringerBriefs in Economics
cover

Voting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate

Proving Their (In)Vulnerability to Various Voting Paradoxes

Authors: Felsenthal, Dan S., Nurmi, Hannu

  • Provides an overview of 18 voting procedures for elections resulting in the choice of a single winner
  • Describes the most common voting paradoxes
  • Illustrates by way of examples the vulnerability of some voting procedures to some paradoxes and explains in detail why some procedures are immune to some paradoxes
  • Serves as a companion to the 2017 publication by Felsenthal and Nurmi, Monotonicity Failures Afflicting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate
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Softcover 51,99 €
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About this book

This book deals with 18 voting procedures used or proposed for use in elections resulting in the choice of a single winner. These procedures are evaluated in terms of their ability to avoid paradoxical outcomes. Together with a companion volume by the same authors, Monotonicity Failures Afflicting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate, published by Springer in 2017, this book aims at giving a comprehensive overview of the most important advantages and disadvantages of procedures thereby assisting decision makers in the choice of a voting procedure that would best suit their purposes.

About the authors

Dan Felsenthal  is emeritus professor of political science at the University of Haifa. Currently he is also Research Associate at the Centre for the Philosophy of Natural and Social Science, London School of Economics and Political Science. His main research areas are measurement of voting power, voting theory and voting behavior, social choice theory, and various applications of game theory to politics. He has published many papers on these subjects as well as two books: Topics in Social Choice: Sophisticated Voting, Efficacy, and Proportional Representation (New York: Praeger, 1990), and (jointly with Moshé Machover) The Measurement of Voting Power: Theory and Practice, Problems and Paradoxes (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 1998). In addition, he edited (jointly with Moshé Machover) the book Electoral Systems: Paradoxes, Assumptions, and Procedures (Berlin Heidelberg: Springer, 2012). 
Hannu Nurmi was the Associate Professor of Methodology of Social Sciences in University of Turku 1974 - 1995. Thereafter he became the chair holder of Political Science in the same university until his retirement in 2012.During the academic year 1972-73 he was a Fulbright-Hayes Scholar at the Johns Hopkins University. In 1978 Nurmi held a British Academy Wolfson Fellowship at University of Essex and from 1991 till 1996 he was the Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences in University of Turku. In 1998 he was a Visiting Professor at University of Minnesota. Nurmi was nominated the Academy Professor of Academy of Finland for the period 2003-2008. He is a member of Academia Scientiarum Fennica (the Finnish Academy of Sciences and Letters) from 1982. From 2008 till 2011 he was the Director of Centre of Excellence in Public Choice Research of University of Turku. From 2012 he is Professor Emeritus in the same university. Nurmi's research interests include the theory of voting and electoral systems, applied game theory and causal modeling. 

Table of contents (7 chapters)

Table of contents (7 chapters)
  • Introduction

    Pages 1-6

    Felsenthal, Dan S. (et al.)

  • Voting Paradoxes

    Pages 7-14

    Felsenthal, Dan S. (et al.)

  • Voting Procedures Designed to Elect a Single Candidate

    Pages 15-25

    Felsenthal, Dan S. (et al.)

  • The (In)Vulnerability of Non-Ranked Voting Procedures to Various Paradoxes

    Pages 27-48

    Felsenthal, Dan S. (et al.)

  • The (In)Vulnerability of Ranked Voting Procedures that Are Not Condorcet–Consistent to Various Paradoxes

    Pages 49-79

    Felsenthal, Dan S. (et al.)

Buy this book

eBook 41,64 €
price for Spain (gross)
  • ISBN 978-3-319-74033-1
  • Digitally watermarked, DRM-free
  • Included format: PDF, EPUB
  • ebooks can be used on all reading devices
  • Immediate eBook download after purchase
Softcover 51,99 €
price for Spain (gross)
  • ISBN 978-3-319-74032-4
  • Free shipping for individuals worldwide
  • Usually dispatched within 3 to 5 business days.
  • The final prices may differ from the prices shown due to specifics of VAT rules
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Bibliographic Information

Bibliographic Information
Book Title
Voting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate
Book Subtitle
Proving Their (In)Vulnerability to Various Voting Paradoxes
Authors
Series Title
SpringerBriefs in Economics
Copyright
2018
Publisher
Springer International Publishing
Copyright Holder
The Author(s)
eBook ISBN
978-3-319-74033-1
DOI
10.1007/978-3-319-74033-1
Softcover ISBN
978-3-319-74032-4
Series ISSN
2191-5504
Edition Number
1
Number of Pages
XV, 134
Topics