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SpringerBriefs in Economics
cover

Strategic Interaction Between Islamist Terror Groups

A Game Theoretic Approach

Authors: Ismael, Nina

  • Applies game theory to the phenomenon of terrorism
  • Explains why dramatic terrorist attacks occur at all
  • Presents empirical evidence on the rivalry of al-Qaeda and Daesh
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eBook 42,79 €
price for Spain (gross)
  • The eBook version of this title will be available soon
  • Due: November 24, 2020
  • ISBN 978-3-030-51307-8
  • Digitally watermarked, DRM-free
  • Included format:
  • ebooks can be used on all reading devices
Softcover 51,99 €
price for Spain (gross)
  • Due: November 24, 2020
  • ISBN 978-3-030-51306-1
  • Free shipping for individuals worldwide
  • Immediate ebook access, if available*, with your print order
  • The final prices may differ from the prices shown due to specifics of VAT rules
About this book

This book applies game theory to the phenomenon of terrorism and investigates how the competition for support can influence the attack behavior of terror organizations. In addition, it examines the economics of terrorism.   The so-called outbidding theory, which has become increasingly popular within the field of terrorism research, argues that terror groups vying for resources will engage in more and more violence to demonstrate their capabilities and commitment to their cause. This book challenges the outbidding concept by providing a game-theoretical analysis, which shows that a contest between two terror groups can be interpreted as a race for support. This interpretation may help explain why major attacks occur at all: not as a result of outbidding, but as a result of losing the race. In addition, the author shows that rivalry between terror groups does not necessarily lead to more attacks, but can result in less terrorism due to an increased probability of attack failure induced by the race. Lastly, the model is applied to the rivalry between al-Qaeda and Daesh, elaborated on with empirical evidence.    Given its scope, the book is a must read for researches and scholars working in the fields of economics, politics, the social sciences, and military history, as well as military and political decision-makers and authorities working in the field of risk management. 

About the authors

Nina Ismael is a consultant at BwConsulting, the in-house consultancy of the German Armed Forces. She has previously worked as a research assistant and lecturer at the Department of Theoretical and Applied Microeconomics, Ruhr-University Bochum, Germany. Her research focuses on defense economics, the economics of national security, and industrial organization.

Buy this book

eBook 42,79 €
price for Spain (gross)
  • The eBook version of this title will be available soon
  • Due: November 24, 2020
  • ISBN 978-3-030-51307-8
  • Digitally watermarked, DRM-free
  • Included format:
  • ebooks can be used on all reading devices
Softcover 51,99 €
price for Spain (gross)
  • Due: November 24, 2020
  • ISBN 978-3-030-51306-1
  • Free shipping for individuals worldwide
  • Immediate ebook access, if available*, with your print order
  • The final prices may differ from the prices shown due to specifics of VAT rules
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Bibliographic Information

Bibliographic Information
Book Title
Strategic Interaction Between Islamist Terror Groups
Book Subtitle
A Game Theoretic Approach
Authors
Series Title
SpringerBriefs in Economics
Copyright
2020
Publisher
Springer International Publishing
Copyright Holder
The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG
eBook ISBN
978-3-030-51307-8
DOI
10.1007/978-3-030-51307-8
Softcover ISBN
978-3-030-51306-1
Series ISSN
2191-5504
Edition Number
1
Number of Pages
XI, 91
Number of Illustrations
12 b/w illustrations, 2 illustrations in colour
Topics

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