Authors:
- Applies game theory to the phenomenon of terrorism
- Explains why dramatic terrorist attacks occur at all
- Presents empirical evidence on the rivalry of al-Qaeda and Daesh
Part of the book series: SpringerBriefs in Economics (BRIEFSECONOMICS)
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Table of contents (7 chapters)
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Front Matter
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Back Matter
About this book
The so-called outbidding theory, which has become increasingly popular within the field of terrorism research, argues that terror groups vying for resources will engage in more and more violence to demonstrate their capabilities and commitment to their cause. This book challenges the outbidding concept by providing a game-theoretical analysis, which shows that a contest between two terror groups can be interpreted as a race for support. This interpretation may help explain why major attacks occur at all: not as a result of outbidding, but as a result of losing the race. In addition, the author shows that rivalry between terror groups does not necessarily lead to more attacks, but can result in less terrorism due to an increased probability of attack failure induced by the race. Lastly, the model is applied to the rivalry between al-Qaeda and Daesh, elaborated on with empirical evidence.
Given its scope, the book is a must read for researches and scholars working in the fields of economics, politics, the social sciences, and military history, as well as military and political decision-makers and authorities working in the field of risk management.
Authors and Affiliations
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BwConsulting, Cologne, Germany
Nina Ismael
About the author
Bibliographic Information
Book Title: Strategic Interaction Between Islamist Terror Groups
Book Subtitle: A Game Theoretic Approach
Authors: Nina Ismael
Series Title: SpringerBriefs in Economics
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-51307-8
Publisher: Springer Cham
eBook Packages: Economics and Finance, Economics and Finance (R0)
Copyright Information: The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020
Softcover ISBN: 978-3-030-51306-1Published: 11 November 2020
eBook ISBN: 978-3-030-51307-8Published: 10 November 2020
Series ISSN: 2191-5504
Series E-ISSN: 2191-5512
Edition Number: 1
Number of Pages: XI, 91
Number of Illustrations: 13 b/w illustrations, 2 illustrations in colour
Topics: Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods, Terrorism and Political Violence