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Handbook on Approval Voting

  • Book
  • © 2010

Overview

Editors:
  1. Jean-François Laslier

    1. Labo. d'Econometrie, École Polytechnique, Palaiseau CX, France

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  2. M. Remzi Sanver

    1. Dept. Economics, Istanbul Bilgi University, Istanbul, Turkey

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    You can also search for this editor in PubMed   Google Scholar

  • Surveys all major developments in Approval Voting since the publication of the seminal book by Brams/Fishburn (1983)
  • Combination of theoretical and empirical results
  • Written by specialists of the various disciplines involved
  • Includes supplementary material: sn.pub/extras

Part of the book series: Studies in Choice and Welfare (WELFARE)

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Table of contents (20 chapters)

  1. Front Matter

    Pages i-xviii
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  2. Introduction to the Handbook on Approval Voting

    • Jean-François Laslier, M. Remzi Sanver
    Pages 1-12

  3. History of Approval Voting

    1. Front Matter

      Pages 14-14
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    2. Acclamation Voting in Sparta: An Early Use of Approval Voting

      • Charles Girard
      Pages 15-17

    3. Going from Theory to Practice: The Mixed Success of Approval Voting

      • Steven J. Brams, Peter C. Fishburn
      Pages 19-37

  4. Axiomatic Theory

    1. Front Matter

      Pages 40-40
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    2. Collective Choice for Simple Preferences

      • Biung-Ghi Ju
      Pages 41-90

    3. Axiomatizations of Approval Voting

      • Yongsheng Xu
      Pages 91-102

  5. Committees

    1. Front Matter

      Pages 104-104
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    2. Approval Balloting for Multi-winner Elections

      • D. Marc Kilgour
      Pages 105-124

    3. Does Choosing Committees from Approval Balloting Fulfill the Electorate’s Will?

      • Gilbert Laffond, Jean Lainé
      Pages 125-150

  6. Strategic Voting

    1. Front Matter

      Pages 152-152
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    2. The Basic Approval Voting Game

      • Jean-François Laslier, M. Remzi Sanver
      Pages 153-163

    3. Approval Voting in Large Electorates

      • Matías Núñez
      Pages 165-197

    4. Computational Aspects of Approval Voting

      • Dorothea Baumeister, Gábor Erdélyi, Edith Hemaspaandra, Lane A. Hemaspaandra, Jörg Rothe
      Pages 199-251

  7. Probabilistic Exercises

    1. Front Matter

      Pages 254-254
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    2. On the Condorcet Efficiency of Approval Voting and Extended Scoring Rules for Three Alternatives

      • Mostapha Diss, Vincent Merlin, Fabrice Valognes
      Pages 255-283

    3. Behavioral Heterogeneity Under Approval and Plurality Voting

      • Aki Lehtinen
      Pages 285-310

    4. In Silico Voting Experiments

      • Jean-François Laslier
      Pages 311-335

  8. Experiments

    1. Front Matter

      Pages 338-338
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Keywords

About this book

Under Approval Voting, voters can ''approve" as many candidates as they want, and the candidate approved by the largest number of voters is elected. Since the publication of the seminal book written by Steven Brams and Peter Fishburn in 1983, a variety of theoretical and empirical works have enhanced our understanding of this method. The behavior of voters in such elections has been observed both in the laboratory and in the field; social choice theorists have analyzed the method from the axiomatic point of view; game theory and computer science have been used to scrutinize various strategic aspects; and political scientists have considered the structure of electoral competition entailed by Approval Voting. This book surveys this large body of knowledge through a collection of contributions written by specialists of the various disciplines involved.

Editors and Affiliations

  • Labo. d'Econometrie, École Polytechnique, Palaiseau CX, France

    Jean-François Laslier

  • Dept. Economics, Istanbul Bilgi University, Istanbul, Turkey

    M. Remzi Sanver

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