Overview
- Presents the argument that legal certainty regarding central bank autonomy is important to allow central banks to operate independently of political influence
- Provides a granular comparative analysis of six legal frameworks regarding central bank autonomy in Latin America from the perspective of legal certainty
- Analyzes the credibility of state commitments from a legal point of view, focusing on the role that legal rules play in the credibility of central bank commitments
- Includes a chapter on the legal analysis of court interventions in central bank autonomy in Colombia
Part of the book series: European Yearbook of International Economic Law (EUROYEAR, volume 15)
Part of the book sub series: EYIEL Monographs - Studies in European and International Economic Law (EYIELMONO)
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Table of contents (8 chapters)
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Front Matter
Keywords
About this book
The analysis covers three key areas: a constitutional analysis, a detailed study of the central bank statutes and a study of a number of underexplored threats to central bank autonomy.
After defining and identifying different types of legal certainty and linking them to the credibility of government promises, the author goes on to examine the grounds that the law provides for confidence that central banks operate independently of political influence. The secondpart of the book focuses on a granular analysis of the legal design of the central banks’ objectives and autonomy. Lastly, the third part features two case studies that represent little-known and unusual institutional threats to legal certainty relating to central bank autonomy, such as the interventions by the Constitutional Court of Colombia in the autonomy of the Colombian central bank, and the interventions of the Argentinean executive and legislative branches in the autonomy of Argentina’s central bank through stabilization plans introduced via emergency laws and decrees.
In sum, the book suggests that there are serious doubts about the ability of Latin American central banks to maintain price stability over time. Although central banks were granted a degree of autonomy, authorities in Latin American countries are able to affect central bank decisions. Most importantly, a lack of clarity, inconsistencies, or generous exceptions in the law provide ways for authorities to influence central banks even without bending or disregarding the rules.
Authors and Affiliations
About the author
Dr. Andrea Lucia Tapia-Hoffmann is an Ecuadorian-German attorney. Andrea holds a law degree from the Pontifical Catholic University of Ecuador (PUCE) in Quito, Ecuador and a doctoral degree from the Martin Luther University Halle-Wittenberg in Germany. She has broad international experience after working for several years in Ecuador and the United States. Since 2017 Andrea has worked as an in-house lawyer and data protection specialist in Germany. Her research interests are in economic law, comparative law, human rights, and privacy law.
Bibliographic Information
Book Title: Legal Certainty and Central Bank Autonomy in Latin American Emerging Markets
Authors: Andrea Lucia Tapia-Hoffmann
Series Title: European Yearbook of International Economic Law
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70986-0
Publisher: Springer Cham
eBook Packages: Law and Criminology, Law and Criminology (R0)
Copyright Information: The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021
Hardcover ISBN: 978-3-030-70985-3Published: 30 April 2021
Softcover ISBN: 978-3-030-70988-4Published: 30 April 2022
eBook ISBN: 978-3-030-70986-0Published: 29 April 2021
Series ISSN: 2364-8392
Series E-ISSN: 2364-8406
Edition Number: 1
Number of Pages: XXIII, 273
Number of Illustrations: 2 b/w illustrations, 1 illustrations in colour
Topics: International Economic Law, Trade Law, Private International Law, International & Foreign Law, Comparative Law , Latin American and Caribbean Economics