Background
The study of strategic behavior in queueing systems constitutes an important and dynamic trend in Queueing Theory that complements and extends earlier classical research directions concerning performance evaluation, optimal design and optimal control issues. Indeed, a reliable economic evaluation of service systems in real-life applications requires that the strategic dimension of the various agents be taken into account. Under this perspective, the agents are decision makers that aim to maximize their benefits, taking into account that the others have similar objectives, so a game-theoretic framework emerges. The interaction of Queueing Theory with Game Theory yields systems with fascinating performance analysis and optimization problems.

Scope
This special issue solicits papers that advance the state-of-art in game-theoretic models in Queueing Theory. Topics of interest include (but not limited to) existence, uniqueness and computation of equilibrium strategies, the application of pricing and other mechanisms to induce social optimality of equilibrium strategies, the role of information on the strategic behavior of the customers, optimization (profit/revenue/social welfare maximization) and applications in diverse areas such as healthcare, transportation, etc.

Submission Process
We request that manuscripts be submitted through the Queueing Systems web portal (link below). Please choose ‘S.I.: Strategic Queueing’ to ensure that the manuscripts are directed towards the guest editors for handling the review process.

Submissions Portal:

Author Instructions:
https://www.springer.com/business+%3E+management+operations+research/journal/11134

Guest Editors:
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