Chapter 2
ICC, *Nihonjinron* and Native-Speakerism

Abstract In the previous chapter, I discussed key aspects of the Japanese EFL system and provided an account of the Japanese JHS English classroom as a context for ethnographic research. In this chapter, I concentrate on the three core analytical elements in this book: (1) ICC as a potentially important aspect of English education in Japanese JHS, with (2) *nihonjinron* and (3) native-speakerism as potential constraining forces in the development of (1). Before conceptualizing the ideological discourses of native-speakerism and *nihonjinron*, however, it is necessary to begin by proposing an ICC model which can potentially be integrated within existing EFL educational practices in Japanese JHS. If the goal in this book is to ascertain whether the two ideologies under investigative scrutiny are indeed constraining forces, we need to first establish what it is that they are supposed to constrain.

2.1 Intercultural Communicative Competence (ICC)

To understand ICC, it is important to first discuss intercultural competence, or IC, defined by Meyer (1991: 137) as “the ability of a person to behave adequately in a flexible manner when confronted with actions, attitudes and expectations representatives of foreign cultures.” Simply stated, IC is the ability to deal with difference, an ability which in large part entails managing one’s own value judgment when facing difference. This notion is useful to the overall argument in this book because it emphasizes concepts such as cultural and linguistic flexibility and adequacy in the presence of difference. However, to integrate IC-related elements to a foreign language curriculum, the concept must be revised to include, if not place a stronger focus on, the communicative aspects of this ‘confrontation’ with foreign cultures. To achieve this task, core elements from Byram’s ICC model are useful.

Byram (1997) places IC within the language learning context to conceptualize ICC. This shift is also discussed by Coperías Aguilar (2007), who argues that “IC can and should be acquired by people from all walks of life and involved in any kind of trade; however, when dealing with [foreign language] teaching and learning, it is ICC that we must aim at, as the focus is mostly on linguistic aspects”
(p. 65). However, most ICC models provided in the literature, including Byram’s influential model, do not simply add communication to the mix, but instead integrate criticality, or critical cultural awareness, as a core component. This element is perhaps more discernible in how the notion of the ‘native speaker’ has recently been criticized in the literature. Replacing the ‘native speaker’ as model for target language knowledge and use is the intercultural speaker, defined by House (2007: 19) as “a person who has managed to settle for the In-between, who knows and can perform in both his and her native culture and in another one acquired at some later date.” This shift from ‘native’ to ‘intercultural’ speaker, however, has yet to be fully achieved by foreign language practitioners at large. As Creese et al. (2014) point out, although native-speakerism and the notion of the ‘native speaker’ have been discredited in academia for years, the concept still bears relevance to practices on the ground. Byram et al. (2013: 251) also state that “for many teachers, learners and the general public, the purposes of language teaching remain the same and appear to be self-evident: to develop the ability to communicate,” a goal which in a CLT paradigm has long been defined with reference to the ‘native speaker’ ideal.

Moving from ‘native’ to ‘intercultural’ speaker requires looking at the language learner first as a complete individual with cultural knowledge. This challenges the deficit approach to conceptualizing the language learner as somehow culturally ‘deficient’ and in need of guidance from the ‘native speaker’. It also looks at language and culture learning not as a movement from L1/C1 (first culture) proficiency to L2/C2 (second culture) proficiency (with the ‘native speaker’ as ultimate point of reference) but as a complex process of learning to mediate between self and Other, or of learning to become a linguistic and cultural mediator. In short, intercultural communication is seen as an in-between space, a third space, where meaning is produced, consumed, and exchanged. Intercultural communicators are not mere representatives of their own cultures but instead act as cultural hybrids. This stance contrasts with what Alptekin (2002) calls the communicative orthodoxy —or target language and culture enculturation—based on the beliefs that (a) ‘native speaker-ness’ and authentic L2 use are homologous, and (b) the ultimate goal for the language learner is to develop native-like competency in order to gain membership in the target language community, said to be populated principally by ‘native speakers’ of the L2. Unlike Byram’s approach to ICC, the communicative orthodoxy creates a condition in which the experience of the idealized ‘native speaker’ overshadows that of the foreign language learner. This problem is noticeable in Fantini’s (2000) conceptualization of ICC as a matter of communicating appropriately and effectively with members of other cultures ‘on their terms’. Defining the language learner as possessing an etic perspective and the ‘native speaker’ an emic perspective, and intercultural communication as a process of the learner trying to understand the nature of the emic perspective, Fantini’s ICC model assigns the challenges of intercultural communication to L2 speakers, placing them at a clear disadvantage. This deficit approach means that ‘native’ and ‘non-native’ participants do not interact with Otherness from an egalitarian basis (Byram 1997). Instead of looking at the ‘native speaker’ as the end result or as the point of reference for standard L2 and C2, Byram’s ICC model views the intercultural
speaker as able to use the target language effectively and as being aware of (a) the links between language as an ‘object’, (b) language use as a culturally laden activity, and (c) the cultural ramifications of real-world intercultural communication. Accordingly, the individual possessing ICC is said to be able to navigate between languages and cultures, thus acting as linguistic and cultural intermediary.

Byram’s ICC model considers five distinct yet related knowledges or savoires. Although the following order is in no way prescribed as essential to Byram’s model, first comes savoir, or knowledge of the social realm, of cultural processes and of intercultural interaction. This element of ICC can be taught in class by focusing on the teaching of information about cultural ‘facts’ and processes, and looking at, for example, stereotypes and problematic cultural depictions in textbooks or other media. Second is savoir comprendre, or the ability to interpret texts or events from other cultures and one’s own culture. In class, this can involve careful reading, analysis and interpretation of texts and events. Third is savoir être: a more complex process of developing cultural curiosity and openness, or a willingness to suspend disbelief about one’s own and other cultures. This is commonly referred to as ‘decentring’: the ability to see things from others’ points of views. In the classroom, teachers can focus on, for example, cultural similarities and differences in order to develop learners’ curiosity and interest in Otherness and their ability to conceptualize different world views. Fourth is savoir apprendre, or the ability to learn new things, often independently, and apply this knowledge to real-world communication. This can, for example, involve role-playing specific intercultural situations in class. It can also involve students looking at instances of cultural misunderstandings and finding ways to overcome them, and analyzing critical incidents to find critical solutions. The last is savoir s’engager, or critical cultural awareness: the ability to apply critical thinking to the evaluation of cultural behaviors and social processes. Here, learners can be taught to recognize explicit criteria and perspectives from which to evaluate processes in one’s own and in other cultures. They can be taught to apply these criteria to, for example, evaluating how particular social problems and issues are dealt with in various cultures. Byram’s five savoires offer interesting pedagogical possibilities for EFL education in Japanese JHS because, although real-world experiences—or as Meyer would put it, ‘confrontation’—with difference are the ultimate goal, each of these five savoires can be explored and developed to some extent within the context of JHS foreign language education.

2.2 ICC-Oriented EFL Education

As discussed in the first section of the book, learning a foreign language is not simply a matter of accumulating rules and information about the target language: it is also about learning to manage value judgment in regards to difference, and thus about developing critical thinking skills. Even if Japanese EFL learners do not have ample chances to use the target language in real-world situations beyond the
classroom, they can nevertheless engage with criticality because difference is core to the EFL classroom experience. As such, learners can relate knowledge of the target language with cultural processes, which then allows them to develop critical cultural awareness, all within the context of the language classroom. In this way, the view towards ICC in this book goes somewhat against common approaches to conceptualizing ICC-oriented education which posit real-world intercultural interaction—that which takes place in the world beyond the classroom—as necessary to the development of ICC.

From the ideological perspective that ICC-oriented content can and should be integrated in Japanese EFL education, I argue that foreign language teachers should not only present information about the L2 but also provide opportunities for learners to engage with difference and learn to manage value judgments. Learners should be encouraged to re-conceptualize common assumptions about target language and culture, a process which involves re-conceptualizing culture as ‘object’ not necessarily contained neatly within particular national or geographical boundaries, but instead as a broader reality characterized by factors including ethnicity, age, politics, religion, social practice, and other areas of human experience. Language learners should also be encouraged to develop knowledge of their own culture and other cultures and how cultural identity(ies) come to life, develop empathy towards Otherness, and nurture greater self-confidence in the context of, or in the practice of learning about, intercultural communication. In large part, the JET Programme has been (in principle at least) in place for over thirty years now to create opportunities for this type of development to take place. Despite its original intentions, however, and while the program itself may have experienced modest successes over the years, contact with foreign ALTs should not be the only opportunity or context for ICC. Unless the foundations and framework for ICC are made clear to learners, the purposes of the JET programme will remain unclear and abstract to them. Indeed, the success of both the JET Programme and of ICC-oriented foreign language education in Japanese JHS depends on learners and teachers becoming aware of ICC as a target and essential component of foreign language learning.

Integrating ICC-oriented content constitutes an important change in the ways Japanese EFL education has been conducted so far. Ever since the emergence of new MEXT language policies at the end of the 1970s and early 80s, the target for language learning in Japanese JHS has remained L2 communicative competence. Recent policy documents include criticisms of test-oriented approaches in Japanese schools, and promote the well-known refrain that L2 communicative competence amongst Japanese language learners cannot develop without actual target language use, even if limited to the classroom. Although this policy shift might have encouraged (and may even reflect) modest changes in Japanese EFL education on the ground, more work is needed to integrate ICC-oriented content in Japanese EFL education. These changes will inevitably involve greater critical investigation of the communicative orthodoxy, particularly with regards to (a) the notion which binds ‘nativeness’ with authenticity, and (b) the ways in which culture teaching can be integrated in CLT-oriented approaches. Borghetti (2013) argues that, due to their marked emphasis on appropriateness and efficacy, most CLT approaches do include
cultural content to some degree, but that this content is often simplified or even stereotyped. As the work in Chap. 6 will show, this problem is clearly noticeable in data collected from EFL classrooms and EFL textbooks. One reason explaining the prominence of cultural stereotypes in CLT-oriented foreign language education is that, because communicative effectiveness is the main goal in CLT, culture tends to be regarded as a supplementary pedagogical element as opposed to an essential aspect of language learning and teaching. As Borghetti (2013: 255) points out, ICC-oriented pedagogy “is not a ‘content’ in the syllabus but a higher order educational goal which redefines the roles of communicative and cultural competences.” In this book, although I discuss ICC-oriented education in terms of ‘content’, my underlying intention is to present it not as an add-on to existing practices but as a context for foreign language learning, a ‘place’ in which it is possible for learners and teachers to explore and study language-related content as well.

For Japanese EFL learners to become active participants in intercultural communication, they need to develop some form of understanding or awareness of the ways in which language and culture interact, and how this interaction unfolds across cultures (Alexandru 2012). This awareness, however, is not limited to inter-language interaction, for the links between language and culture can also be analyzed ‘within’ one particular language. As such, while the development of ICC amongst Japanese EFL learners requires awareness of the links between language and culture, this development is essentially about becoming aware of core values and principles in everyday communication whether in the L1 (first language) or the L2 (second language), or as it will be revealed in my analysis of Japanese EFL classroom discourse, in both simultaneously.

At this point, contrasts must be drawn between intra- and intercultural communication, and presented to students as a basis for understanding intercultural communication. Four differences, potentially contained within the general theme of diverging communication styles, are of pertinence to the study in this book and to an ICC model suited for Japanese JHS English education. Intra- and intercultural communications can be contrasted in terms of:

- divergent means of expressing and contextualizing meaning
- divergent models for interpreting meaning
- divergent systems of reference
- divergent meta-communicative spaces.

Potentially, these differences can lead to problems in intercultural communication, especially when the communicative behaviors of outer group members are evaluated principally with reference to inner group models. If we look more specifically at contrasts between intra- and intercultural communicators, the challenges in intercultural communication become easier for teachers and students to identify. Other factors potentially leading to intercultural communication problems include interactants’
linguistic knowledge and competence (both L1 and L2)
- cultural knowledge and competence (both C1 and C2)
- linguistic and cultural identity
- tolerance for ambiguity (ethnocentrism vs. ethnorelativism).

Of importance here, the ICC model developed in this chapter is based on the assumption that intercultural interactants are all equally and fully invested in intercultural communication and its potential success. Although this cannot be taken for granted, this model does provide a blueprint from which contextualized ICC-oriented language education can take place.

I have argued so far that ICC-oriented education has an important place in foreign language education, specifically when the complex interaction between language and culture are perceived as core pedagogical concerns by language teachers and learners. For Japanese EFL learners to develop ICC, they must therefore be presented with information comparing and contrasting intra- and intercultural communications, and how diverging ways of communicating are rooted in specific cultural structures and practices. Arguably, knowledge of these contrasts can be related to three of Byram’s five savoirs listed earlier, namely savoir, savoir apprendre and savoir comprendre.

I have also brought attention to important elements when developing an ICC model suited for Japanese JHS English education. I now focus on the details of the model by first identifying what a model is, and then by outlining the requirements for an ICC model suitable to Japanese secondary school EFL education.

### 2.3 Requirements for an ICC Model Suited to EFL Education in JHS

A model is a conceptualization of a broad and complex process which in this book is the development of ICC amongst Japanese secondary school EFL students. Similar to a theory, a model is a tool with which researchers and practitioners come to understand the complexity of this process and the multiple factors involved in its real-world instantiations. As Spitzberg and Changnon (2009) specify with regards to ICC models, the reader of a model “should be able to interpret and experience the conceptualization by sensing and understanding how competence functions, comes about, or operates in relation to a number of other concepts that systematically account for the competence” (p. 5). Accordingly, the ICC model developed in this chapter looks at the multiple aspects of ICC which lead to competence, while also considering the context within which ICC-oriented EFL education can take place in Japanese JHS. Crucial to a realist approach to conceptualizing ICC-oriented EFL education in Japanese JHS is the understanding of this context as a resource both facilitating and constraining the development of ICC amongst Japanese learners.
Most ICC models proposed in the literature have so far provided researchers and practitioners with a wide range of important concepts and principles with which to understand ICC and implement related pedagogical approaches in language programs around the world. However, the majority of these models have emerged principally from European and North American contexts, where the reality of cultural diversity is more evident than, let’s say, in the Japanese context. In the Japanese context, and especially in areas across the country which are not as urbanized/globalized as the Tokyo megalopolis, the concept of cultural diversity is understood often at an abstract level, as something which exists beyond people’s everyday experience, as a discourse which people are aware of, (sometimes) consume, reproduce and/or resist, but also as an ontological presence somewhat unrelated to everyday praxis. Moreover, most available ICC models have been developed within the context of higher education, among students with more developed personal, conceptual, and intellectual maturity, and who often have regular exposure to cultural diversity on campus.

Considering these differences, implementing available models in their integral form in the Japanese secondary school EFL context would pose considerable difficulties for school administrators, teachers and learners. Because cultural diversity has arguably yet to fully permeate the Japanese zeitgeist, because Japanese secondary school students have not yet reached the level of personal, conceptual, and intellectual maturity that university students have, and because direct and regular exposure to cultural diversity in Japanese JHS is rare, ICC-oriented education at the JHS level requires considerable adjustments of existing models. Indeed, while some features of existing models can be of use, others must simply be discarded. Making these adjustments involves a prime focus on the essentials of ICC, such as those stipulated in Byram’s (1997) ICC model and the five *savoirs*. Furthermore, while ICC development in Japanese JHS is likely to be limited to knowledge of abstract concepts, with few opportunities for students to experiment with new information in situ, these adjustments also involve helping JHS English teachers in their attempts to first convince their students that ICC development is of importance to their lives, and that the EFL classroom is an appropriate environment for this type of development to take place.

Fortunately, there is ample material in the literature on ICC to draft a model and help Japanese EFL teachers make their case. Beltrán-Palanques (2014: 64) underlines the need for foreign language learners aiming to develop ICC to understand their own culture first. Although placing ‘understanding one’s culture’ as prerequisite for ICC is problematic because (a) any ‘basic requirement’ for ICC is difficult to pin down, (b) it prioritizes Culture 1 (C1) over Culture 2 (C2), and (c) it assumes that students cannot develop understanding of C1 and C2 simultaneously, Beltrán-Palanques’ argument has value in that the C1 provides an appropriate context within which learners’ understanding of culture as a general concept can emerge. Beltrán-Palanques (2014) sees this as a process of introspection which facilitates further exploration of L2 and C2. He recommends foreign language teachers to integrate culture teaching within language teaching by first looking at the existing linguistic and cultural diversity in the foreign language classroom.
A good starting point might be an exploration of the different ways in which boys and girls communicate. However, considering that most JHS English classrooms in Japan are not linguistically and ethnically diverse, it might be more appropriate to look beyond the classroom walls and introduce the concept of World Englishes to students as clear evidence of how English is used around the world. Doing so might also help learners understand the complex links between culture and language. Of course, the World Englishes approach can also provide teachers with the opportunity to introduce the very notion of a Japanese English variety, thereby exploring the possibility for alternative linguistic and cultural identities amongst learners. Perhaps most interesting is Beltrán-Palanques’ suggestion that teachers should provide an account of what culture—as a concept—involves, and of its role in intercultural communication.

A shortcoming in his argument, however, is the conflation between ICC and knowledge of appropriate language use. Here, the author operationalizes ICC as ‘situated politeness’, while leaving cultural knowledge and awareness somewhat in the periphery. It is, in other words, a somewhat simplistic view of intercultural communication which reduces ICC to rules of pragmatics in language use. This approach is problematic because, in arching back to a CLT paradigm, it fails to specify the benchmark for appropriateness (i.e., who is ‘equipped’ to make judgment about appropriateness?). Beltrán-Palanques’ approach therefore brings us back to native-speakerism to some extent. Despite its shortcomings, however, his approach does contain valuable elements, specifically his focus on linguistic and cultural diversity (within or outside the classroom), which is of particular interest to the ICC model developed in this chapter.

Also important is Beltrán-Palanques’ emphasis on a critical approach to conceptualizing culture, something which is lacking from recent MEXT policies and MEXT-approved textbooks. As will be discussed in Chap. 6, Japanese policy makers recommend the creation of learning materials which facilitate learners’ understanding and respect of both Japanese and foreign cultures (MEXT 2010). However, the teaching of culture remains under-defined, which suggests that policy makers see teachers as already competent in teaching cultural content, and that they only need appropriate materials. Writers including Tseng (2002) and Omaggio (1993) report the limited, or supplementary, presence of culture content in the EFL classroom, despite the widespread recognition of its importance to language learning. They also identify time constraints, teachers’ insufficient knowledge of what culture is and how it can be taught, and lack of practical techniques and activities in textbooks and teacher training programs. Almost two decades ago, Kamada (1996) identified this problematic approach to culture teaching in the Japanese EFL context thus:

many students have well defined ethnocentric and stereotypical viewpoints limiting their ability to objectively evaluate new or unusual ideas. Many often resort to narrowing things down to over-simplistic categories of either “good” or “bad” rather than viewing other ideas, peoples or cultures in a total context. Japanese students also have a tendency to reduce things to a common consensual agreement, rather than developing and expressing their own individual ideas (p. 154).
Arguing that Japanese students’ lack of experience and techniques for engaging with cultural themes in the language classroom is a source of concern, the author emphasizes the need for language education aimed at having pupils “recognize the value of diversity in cultural perspectives in differing peoples between and within cultures” (p. 154). While ‘recognizing the value of diversity’ can be integrated within savoir-être, it is also a central part of a broader process identified by Byram as critical cultural awareness: “an ability to evaluate, critically and on the basis of explicit criteria, perspectives, practices and products in one’s own and other cultures and countries” (Byram 1997: 53). Unfortunately, this awareness is not part of any policy promulgated by MEXT, nor is appropriate material leading to the development of this awareness to be found in MEXT-approved EFL textbooks. Seargeant (2009: 68) identifies this shortcoming thus: “Japan’s internationalization programme simply requires its citizens to be politer to foreigners and to travel abroad more often. What neither of these measures attempts to do is fundamentally alter Japanese culture to accommodate an evolving world model, or in any sense take an active role in shaping global culture.”

In the first section of the book, I have devoted some space to the questions what is critical cultural awareness? and what place does it have in Japanese JHS English education? Byram (2008) and Guo (2013) argue that the ability to think independently, to question the status quo, and think and act in critical fashion is an essential part of ICC and of intercultural citizenship because, in large part, membership to this type of citizenry requires awareness of the need to initiate and sustain change in the world. Consequently, the development of critical cultural awareness can be understood as part of an educational approach aimed at changing existing attitudes —especially those which complicate intercultural communication—and the tendency for people to resort to ethnocentric perspectives when facing cultural differences. Houghton and Yamada (2012) discuss the inclusion of critical cultural awareness in language education at the university level, and underscore the necessity for a shift from proficiency—practice- and skill-based language education—to criticality as a core educational objective. This shift from proficiency to criticality is central to the study in subsequent chapters, which is why I chose to begin the book by bringing attention to it.

However, the implementation of elements related to critical cultural awareness in Japanese EFL education and the development of critical cultural awareness amongst young Japanese pupils are two processes which raise a range of cultural (i.e., ideational) and practical issues, two of which include the generally problematic nature of criticality in Japanese education and a general lack of available classroom time. While the second issue can be overcome to some extent with more effective time management and a reallocation of pedagogical priorities, the first issue is certainly the most problematic. As Houghton and Yamada (2012: 10) point out, since critical thinking “is essentially transformative in nature, seeking to transform both self and society through critical reflection at both levels, the preservation of tradition for its own sake is rejected.” Although I do not see critical thinking as requiring the negation of traditions—traditions are relevant to real-world intra- and intercultural situations, and to the emergence of critical cultural awareness amongst
learners—it is fair to assume that critical thinking goes somewhat against the maintenance of contextual continuity (Archer 2012), or the idea of shared human experiences within a common social context (I explore this concept further in my discussion of agency in the next chapter). Critical thinking is particularly antagonistic to the tendency among people to maintain and reinforce problematic social conditions. From this perspective, it is possible to view the reinforcement of cultural traditions in culture-related foreign language education as a strategy to maintain the status quo and reduce the complexity of cultural processes by excluding elements which reflect ongoing social and cultural changes. In this sense, Houghton and Yamada’s argument is of crucial importance.

The integration of criticality in language and culture education is not as straightforward or common-sensical as it may seem. Snow (1998, in Rivers 2011: 75–76) looks at the challenges of teaching critical thinking in the Japanese context, and opines that “the adoption of a critical perspective by foreign language teachers is often ridiculed as being inherently disruptive, anti-authoritarian, and dangerous to those content with the way things are.” Indeed, integrating critical elements in ICC-oriented EFL education in the Japanese EFL context is challenging also because of the very nature of criticality and of how it is understood within particular cultural contexts or communities. At the onset of her book Intercultural Dialogue in Practice, Houghton (2012) provides anecdotes from her life in Japan in which she experienced difficulties trying to engage critically with Japanese people. Notably, she underlines the notion of ‘forcing cultural values upon the Other’ as a central problem in the judgmental perspective on criticality. Nevertheless, the inclusion of critical cultural awareness in Japanese EFL programs in secondary schools and universities is not inherently doomed because of said limiting cultural conditions. As Houghton and Yamada (2012: 11) underscore, the extent to which the focus on harmony in Japan and other Asian societies impedes this inclusion is open to question, especially if criticality is conceptualized with regards to contextual realities. However, what is clear and of value to the ICC model in this chapter is that the development of critical cultural awareness amongst young Japanese language learners necessitates “detachment and separation from one’s own habitual standpoint” (Houghton and Yamada 2012: 61). Byram (1997) explains this as decentring, or the ability to view the world through a different cultural standpoint. Within the psychobiographical domain (Layder 1997), decentring involves feelings of confusion and uncertainty regarding one’s self and cultural identity. As discussed earlier, decentring is an integral aspect of Byram’s (1997) savoir être: developing cultural curiosity and openness and demonstrating willingness to suspend disbelief about C1 and C2.

If we look at the most common usage, or understanding, of the adjective ‘critical’ in the Japanese language, we might gain some insight into the problems underlined by Snow and Houghton. ‘Critical’ is usually translated in Japanese as 批判的 (hihan teki), 臨界的 (rinkai teki), 危ない (abunai) or 危うい (ayai), expressions which refer to criticism, judgment, condemnation, blame, and a sense of antagonism. The very mention of the word can thus instill negative feelings and a sense that things are not right as they are. In short, it is possible for the notion
itself to trigger particular feelings amongst EFL classroom actors. A more appropriate translation of ‘critical’ is 批評的 (hihyou teki), which in addition to meaning *criticism* also refers to *review, commentary, council, remark*; in short, it is a form of *deliberation* about a particular issue of interest or concern. The translation of ‘critical’ as 批評的 (hihyou teki) is therefore more appropriate in the Japanese context because it denotes a sense of *involvement* on the part of social agents while mitigating the sense of antagonism. To some extent, we can conceivably draw parallels between 批評的 (hihyou teki) and *reflective deliberation*, a concept which I explore in the next chapter. With 批評的 (hihyou teki) as label, critical cultural awareness can, in a larger sense, be associated with education and personal/social growth.

In sum, criticality—as a cornerstone of critical cultural awareness—needs to be presented to foreign language teachers and learners as an engaging and dynamic aspect of ICC-oriented EFL education. Houghton and Yamada (2012: 25) suggest that “criticality development can be intensified through targeted instruction in focused lessons.” A language-related content which is well suited to the development of criticality among learners is, again, World Englishes, or the idea that English is a world language that is multifarious and undergoing constant change. The practice of teaching varieties of English in the EFL classroom constitutes a productive and engaging strategy for introducing critical cultural awareness because it involves a critical reevaluation of English as the object of study and the source of ‘difference’. Seargeant (2009) sees this as a pedagogical imperative for EFL teachers thus: “to unite by means of something that is itself only unitary in the imagination seems logically impossible. And yet discourses of English across the globe have become entangled with this persuasive discourse of English as a universal tongue” (p. 8). Creese et al. (2014) add another interesting dimension, arguing that language teachers need to become aware of the ideologies imbedded in language use. They propose that the “ability to draw on a range of linguistic resources which index a similarly complex range of social and historical experiences is an important proficiency for the language teacher in the language classroom” (p. 948). They qualify their overall argument as part of “an ideological orientation to language teaching which recognizes the diversity and variability of experience as the norm, and views excellence as locally negotiated” (p. 949). If we conceive of EFL programs as sites in which language learners become linguistic and cultural mediators, and if we move away from ‘native speaker’ to ‘intercultural speaker’ as model, critical cultural awareness can potentially become a central element in ICC-oriented approaches to EFL education in Japanese JHS.

2.4 Towards an ICC Model for Japanese JHS Education

So far, we have discussed a range of issues related to the need for and development of ICC-oriented education in Japanese secondary school EFL classrooms, and listed a few general principles and components which, when put together, can facilitate
this process. In this section, I develop an ICC model of potential use in Japanese JHS English education. This model builds on some of the ICC-oriented elements already available in both recent MEXT policies and in MEXT-approved EFL textbooks used in Japanese JHS, although its main sources of information remain ICC models available in the literature. In this model, affective and motivational factors are given less importance than, for example, the pedagogical components which facilitate the development of Byram’s (1997) five *savoirs*. Furthermore, this model considers (a) the strong possibility that, for most students, active interaction with Otherness is limited, and (b) a range of other pedagogical concerns in the Japanese JHS English classroom are bound to compete with, or constrain, ICC-oriented EFL education.

To begin with, I provide summary definitions of the three core components of ICC. By *intercultural*, I refer to objects, processes, or entities which involve at least two or multiple cultures simultaneously. Again, cultures are understood not necessarily as contained within national or geographical boundaries alone but also as potentially characterized by ethical, ethnic, generational, political, or religious features. Due to the central importance of culture in this book, I explore it further in the next chapter as part of the theoretical groundwork. Specifically, I look at some of the problems found in various presentations and discussions of culture—as a concept—in academic literature, policy discourse and in textbooks. I then propose a different approach to understanding and discussing culture. For now, I consider *intercultural* as an adjective attached to processes—discourse-based or otherwise—taking place at the interface of different cultures, which can trigger interactions, exchanges or relationships between these cultures, with this chain of ‘events’ making the boundaries between cultures porous and in constant flux. By *communicative*, I mean objects, processes or entities that depend on verbal or nonverbal communication between human beings for their existence. Communicative processes are hereby understood as relying on exchanges of information and meaning taking place through verbal or nonverbal means. Finally, I adhere to the notion of *competence* as the ability to do particular things in the real world, an ability which is understood as based on the capacity to (a) understand what is involved in doing these things, and (b) adapt to specific circumstances and needs in the process of doing these things. In short, competence is a human state rooted in particular forms of understanding which allows human agents to effectively and appropriately perform specific actions in context. In this book, intercultural communicative competence is understood first as “managing interaction in ways that are likely to produce more appropriate and effective individual, relational, group, or institutional outcomes” (Spitzberg and Changnon 2009). More specifically with regards to EFL education in Japanese JHS, ICC is also understood as the ability to understand what is involved in intercultural communication, the components of which can be traced back to Byram’s (1997) five *savoirs* discussed earlier. This ability can, in part, be demonstrated by Japanese JHS students through classroom activities and classroom-based assessment.

To ground their multifaceted and insightful conceptualizations of ICC, Spitzberg and Changnon (2009) provide summaries of a range of ICC models published over
two decades. They discuss five types of models: compositional, co-orientational, developmental, adaptational, and causal process. One of the similarities between them is that they all presuppose direct and ongoing interaction between self and a culturally different Other, which means that they are somewhat ill-suited to the Japanese EFL context. Furthermore, while most ICC models available in the literature are conceptualized in terms of four components—knowledge, awareness, attitudes and skills—any development of ICC amongst Japanese JHS students at this stage should be understood as involving principally the development of knowledge, awareness and attitude. These three components are understood as the basis from which the development of ICC-oriented skills can potentially take place, most likely with direct and active interaction with Otherness beyond the boundaries of the EFL classroom.

In light of this, I now look at particular elements from some of the models summarized in Spitzberg and Changnon (2009) which reflect some of the principles and components summarized above, and which contain features of interest to the model hereby developed. I consider aspects of different models by following a topical approach, which emphasizes the common aspects of various models as opposed to trying to understand the unique aspects of each model (Spitzberg and Changnon 2009). Table 2.1 does not provide a comprehensive summary of each of the five models of interest. Instead, it includes only the main features of interest from each model, along with an explanation of how these features can be beneficial to a model tailored to EFL education in Japanese secondary schools.

Drawing from the work in Spitzberg and Changnon (2009), compositional models are useful in that they specify the basic components of ICC, although they yield limited theoretical understanding of the links between components, making competence a vague concept. Developmental models are useful in that they integrate the notion of time, thus emphasizing ICC as a progressive and ongoing development. Their main shortcoming, however, is that while they trace the course of ICC in terms of stages they pay less attention to the contextual elements influencing this development. Finally, the main value of co-orientational models is that they look at the interaction between multiple components necessary for ICC-oriented education. They also consider the tendency amongst intercultural interactants to co-orient themselves, or collaborate with each other, in developing shared meaning. Revealing this tendency in intercultural communication can be valuable to Japanese EFL learners who may feel that English use and intercultural communication are overly challenging. However, co-orientational models are, like other types of models, not without flaws. As Spitzberg and Changnon (2009: 18) state, because they place emphasis on appropriateness in language use, and “take for granted the value of mutual understanding”, co-orientational models fail to consider the tensions inherent to intercultural communication, or the importance of ambiguity, uncertainty and misunderstanding. However, co-orientational models—specifically Byram’s (1997) Intercultural Competence Model—are of greater value to the model developed in this chapter because they focus on (a) the links between components (thus making competence a more concrete concept), and (b) the foundations on which ICC-oriented skills can evolve. As established earlier, the
Table 2.1 Summary of ICC models of interest

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<tr>
<th>Models</th>
<th>Interesting features</th>
<th>Relevance to ICC model developed in this chapter</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Compositional Models</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Intercultural competence components model (Howard-Hamilton et al. 1998)</td>
<td><strong>Attitude:</strong> <em>awareness</em> of values held by one’s and others’ groups and of group equality; <em>understanding</em> the importance of devaluing stereotypes, discrimination and ethnocentrism; <em>appreciation</em> of values such as risk-taking and role of cross-cultural communication</td>
<td>Emphasizes the goal of multicentrism as central to ICC, and acknowledges the role of communication in this process; also includes specific areas of concern for activities focusing on the development of critical cultural awareness amongst learners</td>
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| Facework-based model of intercultural competence (Ting-Toomey and Kurogi 1998) | **Knowledge dimension:** knowledge of concepts including individualism and collectivism, power distance, self and face models and facework communication styles  
**Mindfulness dimension:** mindfulness of reflexivity, openness to novelty, cultivation of multiple visions, analytical empathy and mindful creativity | Places greater emphasis on cultural factors in language use; prioritizes knowledge of cultural concepts facilitating understanding of cultures in general; looks at iterative reinforcing of each area to create links between these areas |
| Deardorff pyramid model of intercultural competence (Deardorff 2006) | **Knowledge and comprehension:** cultural self-awareness, deep understanding and knowledge of culture (including contexts, role and impact of culture and others’ worldviews), culture-specific information and sociolinguistic awareness  
**Requisite attitudes:** respect (valuing other cultures, cultural diversity), openness (to | Empirically based; also looks at the links between cultural elements and language use; places greater importance on attitude as foundation for knowledge development; more specific references to attitudes |

(continued)
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<th>Models</th>
<th>Interesting features</th>
<th>Relevance to ICC model developed in this chapter</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Co-orientational model</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Intercultural competence model (Byram 1997)</td>
<td>Knowledge (<em>savoir</em>): knowledge of social groups in one’s own culture and in other cultures, and knowledge of general interaction processes</td>
<td>Focuses on identity work in ICC (i.e., looks at values in one’s culture as potentially conflicting with those of target culture, thus placing ICC-oriented education as possible source of conflict in learners, and context within which the intercultural speaker as mediator can emerge; each <em>savoirs</em> can be explored within the context of classroom foreign language education; centrality of criticality in ICC-oriented education</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Discovery/interaction skills (<em>savoir apprendre</em>): the ability to learn new things and apply this knowledge to real-world communication</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Interpreting/relating skills (<em>savoir comprendre</em>): interpreting symbols and events of other cultures, and relating these interpretations to one’s own culture and experience</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Attitude (<em>savoir être</em>): curiosity and openness, readiness to suspend disbelief in regards to other cultures and one’s own culture</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Critical Cultural Awareness (<em>savoir s’engager</em>): evaluating practice, perspectives and products from multiple cultural viewpoints, being aware of identity criteria for evaluation</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Developmental model</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Developmental intercultural competence Model (Bennett 1986)</td>
<td>Ethnocentric stages: from denial to deference to minimization</td>
<td>Shows ICC development from ethnocentrism to ethnorelativism as a continuum of increasing sophistication regarding humans’ ability to deal with differences</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Ethnorelative stages: from acceptance to adaptation to integration</td>
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main concern in ICC-oriented education in Japanese JHS is the development of knowledge, awareness, and attitude as foundation for the subsequent development of ICC-oriented skills beyond the classroom. It is therefore assumed that the co-orientational nature of intercultural communication plays a more important role in the development of ICC amongst Japanese JHS students than the tensions inherent to intercultural communication. Ultimately, however, it is through adaptation and modification of components and principles found in various models that a viable model for the Japanese secondary school EFL classroom becomes possible.

The adaptation and modification of components from various models can, however, create another layer of complexity. According to Spitzberg and Changnon (2009: 35), while adaptability is central to all ICC models, “the concept of adaptability, however, has not been measured very validly, in part because it has not been conceptualized very carefully […] adaptability is always a process of shift or change, but from what?” In the model hereby developed, the features listed above are seen as principles. As such, adaptability involves looking not only at the conceptual links between principles but also at how each principle can serve as benchmarks in the development of Byram’s five savoirs. The changeability of ICC-oriented principles can also be seen in how they are integrated within ICC-oriented EFL education.

2.5 The ICC Model

By combining elements of interest from a range of ICC model already available in the literature, a hierarchy of priorities is bound to emerge. Bennett (2009: 132) argues that “intercultural competence is more than the diminishment of prejudice […] two of the core intercultural competencies—empathy and anxiety management—contribute importantly to enhancing the impact of intercultural contact, even more than the acquisition of knowledge.” Although each element included in the model outlined below is crucial to the development of ICC amongst Japanese JHS students, there is a natural progression from particular forms of knowledges and awarenesses towards a specific perspective towards the world. In this book, this perspective is contained within critical cultural awareness. Houghton and Yamada (2012) also see critical cultural awareness as the end point, and specify that “at the heart of [ICC-oriented] learning objectives, and indeed at the heart of critical cultural awareness itself, lies the issue of judgment which involves applying values as specific standards or criteria for evaluation” (p. 16). In this light, the ICC model proposed below attempts to organize the following seven requirements for ICC-oriented education in Japanese secondary schools:

1. education about ‘culture’ as a concept, and about culture as observable in the real world, using the various cultures of Japan as starting points;
2. education about cultural diversity in Japan (managing the evaluation of difference);
3. education about language varieties (i.e., world Englishes);
4. the de-mystification of the role of the ‘native speaker’ in foreign language education;
5. education on how to present one’s native culture;
6. education on how to inquire about other cultures; and finally
7. foreign language education for intercultural citizenship.

While these pedagogical endeavors can be contained within foreign language programs, the central motivation is to sensitize Japanese EFL learners to cultural diversity existing not only outside Japan but also within it. This drive is particularly important to the dislocation of the ‘one culture—one nation’ paradigm which I discuss later in this chapter. From these general principles, pedagogical objectives and curricular structures can emerge. This ICC model is structured in three separate but related boxes, one listing important culture-related components, another for the components which bind language and culture, and finally a box which includes critical thinking components (Fig. 2.1).

Instead of looking at knowledge, awareness, and attitude as separate elements requiring conceptual links, the development of each is understood in this model as occurring at times simultaneously and at other times separately. However, because

![Fig. 2.1 The ICC model](image-url)
attitude is understood as demonstrable in situations where ICC is required, awareness is therefore used at this point to signify an ‘end-point’ for ICC-oriented EFL education in Japanese JHS.

The strength of this model is that it specifies educational objectives in terms of targeted awarenesses. As such, we have a sense of what teachers should be building towards, and of the targeted worldviews in this process. Even if critical thinking components are placed above components of a different nature, all components are understood as both distinct and related to other components in an equal relationship. The main reason for this conceptual flexibility is that, since we understand ICC-oriented EFL education in JHS as the initial stage in Japanese students’ lifelong development of ICC, it is important not to locate ICC components within a firm hierarchical structure. The assumption is that the development of each awareness listed in all three boxes may not be predictable: each can develop either in parallel with other awarenesses or at different times. What matters most for JHS teachers and students is that the critical thinking components are reinforced as classroom activities are structured around ICC-oriented content. In addition, while the components included in this model reflect some of the content already found in MEXT policies and in MEXT-approved EFL textbooks currently used in Japanese JHS, the model also (a) identifies this content as part of ICC-oriented education and (b) places them into specific component groups, thus making them more explicit. This model also allows teachers to expand on the ICC-oriented content already provided by MEXT and textbook publishers. Finally, this model does not posit culture as an add-on to language learning and teaching. Instead, it looks at language and culture as distinct, emergent, and related ontological entities.

The model, however, is somewhat weak because the links between components and groups of components remain vague, which clouds understanding of causal relationships within the model. Furthermore, little is mentioned regarding the complex pedagogical processes required to reach these various awarenesses. Equally relevant, no information is provided with regards to potential outcomes of ICC-oriented EFL education guided by this model. Also missing are strategies for measuring outcomes. Although crucial to the development and implementation of ICC-oriented EFL education in Japanese JHS, these aspects will have to be dealt with separately, as they are not central to the overall analytical work in this book.

Now that ICC-oriented EFL education in JHS has been surveyed in terms of educational needs and core requirements, and has been conceptualized through a preliminary ICC model, let’s look at potential hurdles or impediments in the development of ICC amongst Japanese EFL learners. In the next section, I conceptually unpack two ideologies—nihonjinron and native-speakerism—which have been regarded by analysts as possible hurdles complicating ICC-oriented education in the Japanese EFL context. I begin with nihonjinron, follow with native-speakerism, conclude this chapter by drawing conceptual links between both ideologies, and provide reasons for why these two ideologies can be seen as potentially constraining forces.
2.6 Exploring Nihonjinron

In this section, I discuss nihonjinron—the main ideology under focus in this book—by considering the general content of nihonjinron, the critical work on nihonjinron, and the strengths and weaknesses of the critiques of nihonjinron.

2.6.1 The General Content of Nihonjinron

The written form of nihonjinron (日本入論) contains four symbols, the first three referring to ‘Japanese people’ and the suffix ‘ron’ (論) referring to ‘theory’. It is most often translated as a ‘theory of the Japanese’. However, the symbol ‘ron’ (論) can also refer to ‘opinion’, ‘view’, ‘way of thinking’, ‘reasoning’, ‘comment’, ‘discussion’, and ‘argument’ (Shogakukan 1993). Reischauer (1998: 371) defines it as a “discussion of being Japanese” within the larger discussion of Japan’s role in the world. The term also takes on other forms, such as nihon bunkaron (日本文化論), the ‘theory of Japanese culture’ (Befu (2001) argues that this is the most commonly used term in Japanese), nihon shakairon (日本社会論), or the ‘theory of Japanese society’, or simply nihonron (日本論), or ‘theory of Japan’.

As discussed in Chap. 1, the period preceding and during the Second World War saw repeated attempts by officials within the Japanese government to abolish English education (Kubota 1998). Some analysts identify this period as the birth of nihonjinron (Fujimoto-Adamson 2006; Yoshino 1992). Although this is a general consensus regarding nihonjinron in the literature, there are two problematic assumptions behind this claim: (a) nihonjinron as a nationalist ideology is assumed to have emerged because English came to be perceived as an intrusion in Japanese culture, and (b) nihonjinron is assumed not to have existed before World War II. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that the zeitgeist in Japan during the Second World War was particularly fraught with antagonism towards the West and English as the language of the enemy, and that the postwar period of rapid and broad social, economic, cultural, and political changes in Japan created a context in which nihonjinron was able to flourish.

Nakamura (1992) suggests four periods in the development of postwar nihonjinron. The period between 1945 and 1954 is characterized by negative views towards Japanese culture and language, which may be attributed to Japan’s military defeat and the ensuing sense of national shame. The period between 1955 and 1963, before the Tokyo Olympics, is marked by a tendency in academia and in popular culture to explain contemporary Japanese culture with reference to its historical roots. The discourse on the uniqueness of Japanese language and culture—recognized as central to the nihonjinron rhetoric—emerged during the third phase in the development of nihonjinron, from 1964 to 1983. Nakamura identifies the last stage of this development in the year 1984, when the ‘Japanese uniqueness’ discourse slowly yielded to a more universalistic interpretation of Japanese culture and language. These shifts in
emphases occurred in response to important economic, political, social, and cultural changes in Japan, often as attempts to protect Japanese culture and society against perceived pressures from the West, as represented by the United States.

Dale (1986), Nakamura (1992) and Yoshino (1992) underline the following five arguments in the *nihonjinron* rhetoric. In arguing for the uniqueness of the Japanese people, *nihonjinron* supporters emphasize racial, geographical, climatic, linguistic, and psychological aspects of the Japanese people and culture. First, *nihonjinron* adherents hold that the Japanese race is distinct from other races. The roots of this belief are explained by Yoshino (1992: 30–31) thus: “Japan’s postwar intellectual history has lacked an actively conscious refutation of genetic determinism,” thus leading *nihonjinron* supporters to construct a discourse around the notion of a distinct Japanese race. Underlined by Dale (1986), Nakamura (1992) and Yoshino (1992), the second *nihonjinron* argument—the unique geography of Japan—concerns the notion of the Japanese nation as an ‘island country’. The ‘Japan-as-island’ argument suggests that (a) it is geographically improbable for Japanese culture to have been influenced from outside, and (b) the Japanese archipelago, over time, produced a homogeneous society. As the analysis of classroom data in Chap. 6 will show, this argument has also been extended to suggest that Japanese people are, in essence, poor foreign language learners. The third *nihonjinron* argument—the unique Japanese climate—is directly connected to the second argument: it proposes that Japanese culture and people are unique because of the singular Japanese climate. These two views are rooted in the assumption that there is a direct causal relationship between the natural environment in which a group lives and the perceived essence of the people constituting that group. In other words, natural environment, biology, psychology, language, and culture are conflated together into a general sense of ‘Japaneseness’. The fourth *nihonjinron* argument concerns the uniqueness of the language. As Japanese culture and language are seen as essential characteristics of Japanese people, language and culture are understood to be direct products of a unique geography and climate. From this basis, the *nihonjinron* advocates then promulgate the view that the Japanese language has no parallel in the rest of the world. This logic is aimed at solidifying the beliefs that (a) only people of Japanese blood can comprehend the subtleties of the language, and (b) Japanese people are poor foreign language learners. Fifth, *nihonjinron* writers, notably Doi (1986), Kawai (1984) and Okonogi (1982), argue that the psychological structure of the Japanese mind is unique. Their arguments usually build on the perception of a unique ‘vagueness’ said to characterize the Japanese language, which is then said to reflect a unique psychological make-up unseen around the world. Groupism, or the primacy of the community over the individual, is also seen by *nihonjinron*-influenced psychologists as a uniquely Japanese trait. Doi (1986) concludes that this peculiar characteristic of the Japanese comes from the complex and unique term *amae*, which he believes is without equivalent in any language.

As pointed out earlier, Befu (2001) explains the five *nihonjinron* arguments as emerging from the twin processes of selectivity (i.e., conscious selection of traits and features of that group which serves the task of differentiating it from other groups) and generalization (i.e., overlooking variations within a group). By
emphasizing the notion of a Japanese ‘essence’, *nihonjinron* adherents put *emic* knowledge (i.e., insider’s knowledge) above *etic* knowledge (i.e., outsider’s knowledge). This strategy is seen, for example, in Doi’s (1986) assertion that Japanese psychology is unique because the Japanese language contains notions that cannot be translated into other languages.

*Nihonjinron* adherents and writers assume that particular behaviors, artifacts, or customs said to belong to Japanese culture are reflections of a Japanese ‘essence’, that what links them together is a sense of Japaneseess shared among the population and which has transcended historical boundaries. Linked to this assumption is a belief that the Japanese population at large acts, behaves, and believes in a unified fashion. This marked tendency in the *nihonjinron* discourse also characterizes the ideology as a product of anthropological functionalism which, according to Yoshino (1992: 24), “explains social practices in terms of their contribution to society as a whole.” Proponents of anthropological functionalism attempt to explain societies and cultures, which are highly differentiated and dynamic systems, by imposing a certain order to them. They dismiss variations within society as mere exceptions to general rules. A functionalist approach to Japanese culture implies that the principal task of the members of Japanese society is to replicate specific Japanese customs, behaviors, and rituals in order to affirm their allegiance to the dominant culture. Related is the notion of cultural determinism—the notion that culture determines human agents at both the emotional and behavioral levels. In sum, *nihonjinron* can be understood as a view of Japanese culture, people, language and nature as fused together into a unified Japaneseess: a self-generating and largely unchanging ‘entity’ with its own unique order and logic.

### 2.6.2 *Nihonjinron* as Cultural/Ethnic Nationalism

*Nihonjinron* has been defined as a form of nationalist discourse, a belief shared by groups of people that their community (a) is distinct, (b) has unique characteristics not found elsewhere, and (c) necessitates protection from outside influences. Kowner (2002: 171) draws on Befu and Manabe (1987), Dale (1986) and Yoshino (1992) in stating that *nihonjinron* “represents the very ideology of contemporary Japanese nationalism.” Yoshino (1992: 1) points out that “cultural nationalism aims to regenerate the national community by creating, preserving or strengthening a people’s cultural identity when it is felt to be lacking, inadequate or threatened.” Befu (1992, 2001) argues that *nihonjinron* has effectively replaced other more controversial national symbols, such as the flag, the national anthem, and the imperial system.

Although the identification of *nihonjinron* as cultural nationalism is useful, and to a large extent appropriate, it is important to distinguish between this particular form of nationalism and *nihonjinron* as defined thus far. Cultural nationalism essentially defines a nation as a shared culture, and in this way *nihonjinron* suits this definition well. However, cultural nationalism is neither ethnic nationalism nor
liberal nationalism in that it centers on a national identity formed by a common language and cultural traditions. In other words, cultural nationalism does not necessarily contain the notion of a common ancestry or ethnicity, something which characterizes nihonjinron. As such, it is perhaps appropriate to define nihonjinron as a fusion between cultural and ethnic nationalism.

## 2.6.3 The Emergence of Nihonjinron in and Outside Japan

While Eckstein (1999) sees the nihonjinron discourse as largely self-imposed, it is important to stress that the image of Japan as a homogeneous nation has been formulated by both Western and Japanese academic traditions, Benedict’s (1946) book *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* being a famous example of the Western nihonjinron rhetoric. Dale (1986), Napier (2007), Sugimoto and Mouer (2002) and Yoshino (1992) agree that the notion of Japan as a socially, culturally and linguistically unique entity has both helped define the relationship between the West and Japan, and served the needs of both—the West’s need to position Japan as the subordinate, oriental ‘Other’ (Said 1993) and Japan’s need to assert itself through ‘self-Orientalism’ (Iwabuchi 1994). Befu (2001: 8) provides a simpler interpretation in his argument that the nihonjinron literature is both a ‘self-portrait’ and a portrait of the “Other”. The contrasts between these different views on nihonjinron help us understand ideology, in a general sense, as a process which can be used by human agents to serve purposes of inclusion and exclusion simultaneously.

Dale (1986), Kaneko (2010), Nakamura (1992) and Yoshino (1992) agree that nihonjinron is often uncritically accepted by the local population. However, Haugh (1998) provides evidence to the contrary. In his study of ‘native’ Japanese speakers’ beliefs about nihonjinron and their perceptions of ‘non-native’ Japanese speakers, he shows that ‘native speaker’ beliefs are not simply pro- or anti-nihonjinron, or pro- or anti-‘non-native-speakers’ using Japanese. In fact, the author shows strong evidence that the majority of Japanese people disagree with the notion that foreigners are essentially unable to use the Japanese language appropriately and fluently. This suggests that the nihonjinron rhetoric about the uniqueness of the Japanese language may not necessarily be shared by the Japanese population at large. While Haugh argues that the notion of Japanese as a vague language constitutes one of the main aspects of the ‘uniqueness’ argument in nihonjinron, he also shows that there is mixed support among Japanese people for the idea that the Japanese language is unique. Solidifying this view further, he then provides evidence that a majority of Japanese people have positive attitudes towards foreigners using Japanese. In Chap. 6, I analyze JHS students’ responses to an attitude survey exploring their levels of agreement with nihonjinron tenets, and show that students generally do not think that Japanese culture or language are inherently unique, thus only accessible to inner-group members. These findings as well as those from Haugh (1998) contradict those provided by Dale (1986), Kaneko (2010), Nakamura (1992) and Yoshino (1992), who argue that the idea of a unique Japanese culture
and language as the sole domain of the Japanese people receives widespread support within the Japanese population.

One reason which may explain such contrasting accounts of the reception of *nihonjinron* among the Japanese population is that the *nihonjinron* rhetoric can be found in various fields of inquiry, from pop literature to academia, including politics and society (Benedict 1946; Clark 1977; Hamaguchi 1998; Nakane 1967, 1973; Reischauer 1978; Takeuchi 1999; Tsurumi 1997; Umehara 1990), economics and business management (Abegglen 1973; Itagaki 1997; Kagono 1997; Nakane 1967; Vogel 1979), and psychology (Araki 1973; Doi 1986; Nakamura 1973; Tsunoda 1978). In the field of education, few researchers have explicitly used *nihonjinron* arguments in their work. However, more extreme approaches to nationalist education have been suggested, notably by Kageyama (1994), who argues that postwar Japanese education, having been deeply influenced by the Occupation, has neglected the nurturing of a Japanese national spirit. He asserts that, while Japanese myths—symbolized by the Imperial System—have always played an important role in the creation of a Japanese national spirit, postwar education has actually led towards the loss of a Japanese ‘essence’. With *nihonjinron* surfacing in many areas of research on Japan, it is not surprising to see gaps and contradictions in the ways *nihonjinron* is identified and analyzed. In the next section, I focus more closely on the consumption aspect of the ideology, which reveals a similar degree of complexity.

Befu (1992) argues that the general *nihonjinron* literature reached its peak popularity in the mid-1970s because of a shift in academic and political discourse from militaristic nationalism to other, less extreme and controversial forms of nationalism. Dale (1986: 15) states that “in the roughly 30 years from 1946 to 1978, approximately 700 titles were published on the theme of Japanese identity, a remarkable 25% of which were issued between 1976 and 1978.” It is important to state that this number does not include articles from periodicals and newspaper articles. If such materials were included, Befu (2001) argues that the list would double, even triple. Befu and Manabe (1987) state that, by the end of the 1980s, the list of *nihonjinron* books extended to a thousand titles.

Since this period, however, the popularity of *nihonjinron* has diminished considerably. During the 1990s, the burst of the Japanese economic bubble revealed contradictions within core *nihonjinron* beliefs, notably those emphasizing the uniqueness and superiority of Japanese culture. Another reason is that the body of research on Japan has extended since, and many are aligned with new theoretical and methodological developments, providing new perspectives and theories on Japanese culture and society. While some critics have adhered rather strictly to the problematic Marxist conception of ideology as false consciousness to define *nihonjinron* as “serving the interests of the Japanese government and its large corporations” (Kubota 1999: 19), most analysts agree that *nihonjinron* has, at least since the 1990s, become recognized by many as a dubious approach to the study of Japanese culture and society.
2.6.4 Consumption of and Support for Nihonjinron

The research on *nihonjinron* has been quite extensive, especially since the 1990s when the ideology underwent greater critical scrutiny. However, while the tenets of *nihonjinron* have been explored at length, little has been said about the consumption aspect of the ideology at the level of agency. Below, I summarize studies which, to some extent, reveal insight into this particular dimension of the ideology.

Yoshino (1992) justifies his sociological study of the relationship between educational practices and the ‘consumers’ of *nihonjinron* by arguing that research which addresses “‘what occurs, by whom, and to whom’ within Japanese society” (p. 133) is missing in the literature on *nihonjinron*. He conducts a qualitative study of the ways in which *nihonjinron* becomes integrated into social practices. His respondents come from what he calls “a fairly large provincial city [...] representative of the nation as a whole” (pp. 104–105). His qualitative approach consists of face-to-face and telephone interviews, questionnaires and letters exchanged with educators and businessmen. In addition, arguing that age is an important factor to consider in a study of Japanese nationalism—a point which Gano (1987) echoes in his own study of the supporters of Japanese nationalist discourse—Yoshino concentrates on headmasters aged 55 and above (almost two-third of his respondents). He found that 28.6% of educators and 75% of businessmen in his study supported *nihonjinron*. The author indicates a tendency among many of his respondents to agree with tenets of genetic determinism: “many respondents used the phrase *nihonjin no chi* (Japanese blood) to refer to what they considered to be the immutable aspects of Japanese identity” (p. 118). However, since Yoshino’s conclusions are based exclusively on participants’ stated views—without comparison against ethnographically collected data revealing both discourse practices and social practices—it remains difficult to accept his conclusions as accurate reflections of support for *nihonjinron* among Japanese people at large. It is also important to state here that support for an ideology and the impact of this ideology on social practice are two distinct and emergent aspects of consumption. Nevertheless, Yoshino’s study provides a rich discussion on *nihonjinron* as ideological discourse, making his study one of the most widely quoted in the literature.

Befu and Manabe (1987) also conducted a questionnaire survey to determine the extent to which the Japanese people showed interest in the tenets of *nihonjinron*. Out of 944 respondents, they determine that over 80% showed interest in *nihonjinron*. 38% believed that Japan is a homogeneous nation, 36% believed in the homogeneous society idea, and half believed that Japan is a unique culture. 63% of respondents believed that non-Japanese nationals are incapable of fully understanding Japanese culture. However, this particular finding is contradicted by Haugh’s (1998) study, which shows that the majority of Japanese people disagree with the notion that foreigners are essentially unable to use the Japanese language appropriately and fluently. Befu and Manabe (1987) suggest a positive correlation between increasing age and degree of *nihonjinron* espousal, and find a negative correlation between level of education and level of adherence to *nihonjinron*. Yet, in
terms of standard of living, they claim that the opposite is the case. Their conclusion is that \textit{nihonjinron} finds support mainly among older males with a higher standard of living. However, on this basis and without providing corroborating evidence, the researchers are quick to conclude that \textit{nihonjinron} has a negative impact on educational practice. In moderate contrast, Sullivan and Schatz’s (2009) empirical study of rural university students reveals a positive relationship between national identification and English learning attitudes and self-assessed English proficiency. Similar results are found in Rivers’ (2011) study which reveals that both nationalism and patriotism are significant indicators of students’ positive—not negative—orientation toward English-speaking culture and community. As with the Yoshino study, however, these studies are based almost exclusively on data gathered from participants’ stated views, and therefore do not necessarily reveal insight into the links between ideological discourse and social practice. These studies mainly reveal claimed \textit{nihonjinron} espousal among small portions of the Japanese population at very specific points in time.

Befu (2001)—another oft cited \textit{nihonjinron} critic—argues that the \textit{nihonjinron} discourse still resonates, especially in certain academic circles and in the media. He argues that “most Japanese are themselves very much interested in their national identity and have articulated their interests in a variety of ways, notably in published media, so much so that \textit{nihonjinron} may be called a minor national pastime” (p. 3). The problem with Befu’s views, which can also be found in many other studies on \textit{nihonjinron}, is that it conflates interest in \textit{nihonjinron} with support for \textit{nihonjinron}. In contrast, while Manabe, Befu and McConnell (1989) argue that there is a certain degree of interest among the Japanese public in \textit{nihonjinron} ideas, they also point out that not all Japanese behave like the \textit{nihonjinron} writers claim they do. In other words, the existing research on \textit{nihonjinron} has yielded somewhat contradictory and inconsistent findings and claims about \textit{nihonjinron}, largely because of problematic and/or under-defined theories and methods grounding analyses of data related to the consumption of \textit{nihonjinron}.

Dale (1986), Kawai (2007) and Seargeant (2009) argue that many Japanese writers and academics focusing on postwar Japanese social history have constructed their works through a \textit{nihonjinron} perspective. The diffusion of the \textit{nihonjinron} ideology is said to have also spread into popular culture. According to Sugimoto (1999: 81), “major bookshops in Japan have a \textit{nihonjinron} corner where [many] titles in this area are assembled specifically for avid readers in search of Japan’s quintessence and cultural core.” In addition, he refers to an earlier study which estimates that around 20 million Japanese people had read one or more books in this category by the end of the twentieth century. Concerning the possible impact of \textit{nihonjinron} on the discourse of English in Japan, Seargeant (2009) argues that English is represented in the media and in the private education market in ways which are consistent with a \textit{nihonjinron} approach. As mentioned earlier, Gano (1987) finds that age is a strong indicator of nationalistic attitudes in Japan. As for findings from Befu and Manabe’ (1987) study, his figures show that older, middle-class Japanese men and women demonstrate a stronger tendency to agree with \textit{nihonjinron} tenets. Loveday (1997) complements Gano’s findings by stating
that Japanese people between the ages of 18 and 29 are more tolerant of foreign
cultures in general and of language contact with English. He also points out that
higher educational background and higher occupations are indicative of nihonjinron
adherence. Kowner (2002) echoes these conclusions, arguing that nihonjinron is
mostly promulgated by a large number of educated middle-class Japanese
individuals.

To my knowledge, no study has been conducted to measure the degree of
support for nihonjinron outside Japan, a broad and complex area of clear relevance
to the study of the production and consumption of nihonjinron. Befu (2001) gives
us a glimpse of the production of nihonjinron literature outside Japan, stating that
“one out of seven nihonjinron books published in the thirty-three year period since
the end of World War II was contributed by a foreigner” (p. 57). This research
finding suggests that the relative popularity of nihonjinron extends beyond Japan’s
geographical boundaries, and may have influenced Japan–West relationships to
some extent.

Perhaps what emanates most from these studies is that nihonjinron receives
mixed support within the Japanese population. While the relative popularity of
nihonjinron in Japan is real and measurable, it should not be understood as con-
firmation that nihonjinron constitutes a hegemonic or ‘common-sense’ attitude
among all Japanese people. It should also not be interpreted as confirmation that
support for the ideology among Japanese people (a) is the same as interest in the
ideology, (b) is consistent among the Japanese population at large, (c) has increased
since most of these studies were conducted, and more importantly (d) should be
understood as the ideology directly influencing social practices on the ground.
Nevertheless, these observations do lend support to the idea that, as an ideology,
nihonjinron remains an articulation of a particular worldview which remains a topic
debate about Japan and its place in the world. Moreover, nihonjinron may enjoy
support at specific times and among specific segments of the population, although
its expression and consumption “may be widely peddled beyond” (Comaroff and
Comaroff 1991). In short, what the studies on nihonjinron summarized so far reveal
is that the ideology is part of ongoing deliberations taking place both within and
outside Japan about Japanese identity in a globalized and globalizing world.

As an ideology, however, nihonjinron is understood by most as providing
limited insight into Japanese language, culture, and society. Mishima (2000) goes
further by suggesting that nihonjinron’s prioritization of emic knowledge has
locked the Japanese people into a discourse on Japanese uniqueness from which it
is increasingly difficult for them to get out. In other words, despite contrasting
accounts of nihonjinron, the constraining properties of the ideology constitute the
main focus of analysis in the literature. In this book, the analysis of the potential
links between nihonjinron and ICC-oriented EFL education in Japanese JHS, on
the other hand, also look at ideologies in context as both constraining and enabling
forces.

The following section deals with the critiques of nihonjinron, a body of aca-
demic works produced mostly since the end of the 1980s, both within and outside
Japan, also formulated by academics and intellectuals, yet aimed at discrediting the ideology.

2.6.5 Themes in the Critiques of Nihonjinron

With the burst of the Japanese economic bubble in roughly the last decade of the twentieth century came a new critical approach to Japanese social studies, notably through the critical works of Befu (1983, 1992, 2001), Dale (1986), Goodman (1992) and Yoshino (1992). In this section, I explore interrelated themes common to the nihonjinron critiques, including nihonjinron and the socialization of the Japanese, the ‘fluidity’ of nihonjinron, and nihonjinron, anti-multiculturalism and foreign language education. To be sure, the multiple references to the ‘nihonjinron critics’ in this book come with recognition on my part that (a) I am also a nihonjinron critic, and (b) this group of researchers is certainly not a unified one, as many different and often contrasting perspectives on nihonjinron have been provided over the years.

Perhaps the most salient theme in the nihonjinron critiques has to do with the production, diffusion, and consumption of the ideology as part of a strategy for self-preservation. Some critics hold that this strategy is perhaps most visible in how foreign language education is conducted throughout the country. Dale (1986), Kawai (2007) and Seargeant (2009) argue that nihonjinron writers project the image of Japan as a monolingual nation, which comes with the additional implication that Japanese people are essentially poor foreign language learners. The myth of the Japanese as poor language learners has been propagated by some nihonjinron-oriented psychologists including Tsunoda (1978). What is intriguing about this aspect of nihonjinron is how it characterizes Japan and Japanese-ness from a deficit perspective. Seargeant (2009) explores this aspect in his complex and insightful argument unpacking the nihonjinron critique:

in its anatomy of the state of ELT in Japan, much of this literature would seem to posit that the ‘problem’ lies in the history of Japanese society (a chronology of fractious international relations), in its current infrastructure and organization (a hierarchical society with a language which explicitly encodes such social stratification in its politeness codes) and in the way it structures and enacts education (built around a critically important exam system), all of which are incompatible with successful English language teaching strategies. There is a danger that in pursuing this approach the suggestion becomes that English is something for which Japanese society itself will have to alter before it can be properly adopted and effectively taught. The pedagogical significance of this is that the ‘foreignness’ of English, as both code and cultural practice, is foregrounded (p. 60).

Most nihonjinron critics point out that fears related to the notion of English as a tool for the Westernization of Asia are prevalent in Japan. Authors including Fujimoto-Adamson (2006), Liddicoat (2007a) and Seargeant (2009) argue that this tension has led towards the construction of a contradictory discourse on English in the country. However, looking at the links between English education and the
Japanese concept of internationalization, Horio (1988) does not see such contradiction. To him, the *kokusaika* (internationalization) discourse in Japan can be interpreted quite straightforwardly: “internationalization here means nothing other than Japan’s ambition to rise to a position of singular importance and power in the twenty-first century” (p. 365). However, the argument that Japanese society as a whole resists multiculturalism contrasts with Coulmas and Watanabe’s (2002: 249) argument that, due to increased immigration in Japan since the 1990s, issues related to bilingualism and multilingualism are beginning to have a greater impact on communication patterns, institutions, and questions of identity in Japan. Their argument suggests that *nihonjinron* is not necessarily part of the arsenal of said common-sense ideas shared amongst Japanese people. Instead, it is part of ongoing debates in Japan centering on issues pertaining to education, Japanese cultural, ethnic, and linguistic identity(ies), and globalization. This significantly contrasts with views proposed by critics such as Itoh (1998, in Seargeant 2009: 54), who claims that the “combination of natural [island nation] and voluntary [sakoku] isolation created a uniquely homogenous culture and parochial mentality. The sakoku mentality still lingers and underlies the modern Japanese way of thinking and behaving. This mindset is not only ubiquitous in the business sector but is also prevalent in Japan’s cultural, education, and societal systems.” While this view might have some appeal, it is certainly not a consensus.

The argument that current approaches to EFL education in the country are aligned with a *nihonjinron* mindset—because these approaches are said to be geared towards protecting a sense of Japanese identity in the face of cultural and linguistic pressure from English—has emerged largely through analyses of language policy discourse. In particular, many analysts have noted the gaps and contradictions in recent Japanese government policies on EFL education, as well as between policy discourse and classroom practices, as indications that EFL education is guided by *nihonjinron*-oriented perspectives (Hashimoto 2009; Hato 2005; Hugues 2005; McVeigh 2002; Nishino and Watanabe 2008; Reesor 2002; Schneer 2007; Seargeant 2008; Yoshida 2003). Reesor (2002) suggests that, in their desire to protect the integrity of Japanese national identity, some MEXT policy makers intentionally complicate the creation and implementation of communicatively oriented policies aimed at facilitating the development of Japanese EFL learners’ communicative abilities in the target language. While this claim is somewhat questionable and based more on interpretation than empirical evidence, most *nihonjinron* critics agree with it. The underlying argument here is that *nihonjinron* advocates working for MEXT place certain values on the national language—Japanese—which are then applied to English to form a negative image of English as ‘the foreign language’. The implication is that these advocates see the EFL project in Japan more as an attempt at negating Japanese cultural identity than as a valuable educational enterprise. This argument is followed by the idea that current educational policy in Japan is part of a broader ideological process—*nihonjinron*’s cultural determinism (Seargeant 2009)—of ‘distancing’ learners from target
knowledge because the latter is considered a corrupting force. This argument is echoed by Liddicoat (2007a), who agrees with the idea that Japanese EFL education is influenced by nihonjinron. The author attempts to support this view by conducting a critical analysis of Japanese English language policies. He argues that nationalist ideologies and essentialized concepts of Japanese identity directly affect the framing of the discourse on intercultural understanding, and that this process is developed discursively in the government’s language policies. This mirrors arguments promulgated by Hashimoto (2007), Horibe (1998), Kubota (1998, 1999, 2002, 2003, 2004), McVeigh (2002), Reesor (2002) and Seargeant (2009), who also maintain that the introduction of English in Japan has historically been perceived as a colonizing force from the West (especially the United States), thus leading to the emergence of a discourse on English which paradoxically reinforces Japanese cultural and ethnic nationalism.

In contrast, Sower (1999) questions the argument that English is still a colonial force from the West, pointing out that the global reality of the 21st century contrasts significantly with the era of colonization which marked previous centuries. Accordingly, the claim that English education is a de facto tool for Western (i.e., American) hegemony remains debatable, especially when considering for example the fact that populations from outer and expanding circles constitute the large majority of English speakers in the world today. Indeed, many academics focusing on language policy around the world, notably Spolsky (2004) and Fishman (2006), have somewhat discredited Phillipson’s (1992) notion of linguistic imperialism. Fishman (2006: 323) points out that some of the countries that have come to emphasize continuous, strong, and early concentration of English in education have been distinctly anti-Western in their orientations—for example, Cuba and Saudi-Arabia—and have used English in order to more expeditiously influence and oppose the West, that is, to push their own agendas through English, rather than to be influenced by the agendas of the “conspiratorial imperialists.”

Many nihonjinron critics hold that the Westernization of Asia through English still remains a thorny issue in Japan. Liddicoat (2007a) and Seargeant (2009) argue that, because it is largely perceived as a culturally invading entity, there is a perceived need in Japan to resist the influence of English, a need which is met through the assimilation of the target language into the local culture (e.g., katakana English—English with marked Japanese pronunciation—and juken eigo—English education entirely geared towards entrance examinations). Seargeant (2009: 52) focuses on the larger social implications of such approaches to foreign language education by arguing that “the exam system, considered incompatible with practices normally associated with CLT, is central to the education system in general and plays an important structuring role in society in enabling the reproduction of hierarchies in university and company status.” Focusing more specifically on the pedagogical ramifications of a test-oriented education system, other nihonjinron critics such as Kawai (2007), Kubota (1998, 2002), Liddicoat (2007a, b) and McVeigh (2002) hold that limiting English language education to assessment purposes is typical of a
**nihonjinron**-type approach to English because it keeps the target language outside the realm of language praxis. The proposition here is that Japanese EFL learners do not have to learn English for communicative ends, but rather as an exam subject. This, they argue, is a pedagogical strategy aimed at limiting the influence of the target language on Japanese culture and society. The problem with this argument, however, is that this marked focus on exam preparations in the Japanese education system is not limited to foreign language education but concerns most school subjects. Yet, this problem goes unnoticed. McVeigh further argues that, as a result of this apparent self-protecting approach to foreign language education, EFL learners in Japanese universities experience language learning within a system fraught with contradictions and illogicalities. The author adds that this engenders a ‘simulation’ of English language education. Although few writers make explicit reference to **nihonjinron** as impediment to the development of ICC amongst young Japanese EFL learners, their general conclusions would certainly support this assertion.

Some **nihonjinron** critics see direct links between the ideology and educational practices, arguing that the ideology serves to inculcate particular perspectives on cultural, ethnic and linguistic identity(ies) as a vehicle for the socialization of Japanese people. Yoneyama (1999: 20) argues similarly to McVeigh (2002), stating that “the English discourse on Japanese education has largely been a branch of **nihonjinron**, focused on the socialisation aspect of Japanese society.” She suggests that this discourse reduces human agency to its functions of subservience to, and maintenance of, social structure (i.e., the school, the community, the nation). A noticeable problem in Yoneyama’s study is that she assesses the Japanese school system as a single and unified social unit, leading her to argue that the current educational discourse completely restrains learners’ sense of agency:

The Japanese high school to which students are bound […] is a stifling place. Its organisational structure is extremely formal, rigid, and autocratic. Not only student-teacher relationships, but relationships between teachers and between students are hierarchical. Student-teacher communication is typically teacher-centred, one-way and top-down, and the student-teacher relationship is bureaucratic, distant and impersonal. In this milieu, students largely do not expect things like understanding, respect and personal care from teachers. Paternalistic care is nothing but a myth. Students are assigned a subordinate role and expected to remain silent (p. 244).

Claiming that such milieu is entirely driven by a **nihonjinron**-type approach to education, Yoneyama implies that powerful **nihonjinron** supporters within the education system are actually successful at fulfilling their objectives of socializing Japanese pupils through subjugation. The result is a society in which the individual is subdued by overwhelming structural forces. She solidifies this perspective by comparing the Australian and Japanese school systems as fixed, essentialized, and dichotomous entities.

Interestingly, while the ideology of Japanese uniqueness has often been presented in the literature as a ‘fact’, or a fixed entity more or less directly affecting social practices on the ground, it has also been described as a form of discourse which has undergone considerable changes over the years. In other words,
nihonjinron has also been described as a fluid and negotiable discursive entity. As revealed in the above section on the general contents of nihonjinron, the ideology took on different shapes throughout history. Befu (1992) states that nihonjinron, being a less controversial form of nationalism, became popular during the 1970s because of a shift away from militaristic nationalism, which had become highly controversial after the war. Sugimoto (1999) relates one specific instance which demonstrates how nihonjinron has been constructed over the years:

In the 1990s, Japan’s cultural uniqueness advocates came to realize that they gave critics of Japanese practices ammunition to chide Japanese leaders for falling out of step with internationally accepted norms. In the face of the rising US-based revisionist argument that Japan is unfairly closed and even ‘alien’, some nihonjinron theorists shifted their emphasis away from Japan being portrayed as an isolated unique case and started maintaining that the ‘Japanese model’ has universal applicability (p. 86).

Arguably, this shift in nihonjinron rhetoric came in reaction to specific political and social needs in Japan. Kowner (2002) explains this process thus:

the resurgence of the nihonjinron discourse in recent decades is an outcome of its ability to fulfill much of the needs of both its producers and consumers. Further, the tremendous popularity of nihonjinron at present suggests that there has been a continuous process of mutual feedback between these two parties, a process that inevitably culminates into a multifunctional discourse (pp. 176–177).

This argument draws from the notion of multifunctional discourse found in Befu (2001). Seen from this angle, the formulation of nihonjinron over the years as a fluid and ongoing process can be understood as a response by the Japanese elite to the said need to maintain nihonjinron’s popular appeal in the face of significant social changes in the country. Befu (1992) provides a historical account of this process by explaining that “the popularity of nihonjinron in postwar Japan is a consequence of Japan’s inability to exploit effectively the most important symbols which express national identity and nationalism” (p. 27). Because certain national symbols—e.g., the flag, the national anthem, the national emblem—are both fixed ‘objects’ (i.e., with clear boundaries) and historically problematic (thus arguably unappealing to Japanese people), nihonjinron can instead be used as a unifying force because of its porous and adaptable nature (Yoshino 1992). Clammer (1997: 96) echoes this argument by saying that “‘being Japanese’ is not an essentialist notion: it is something that requires constant construction and reconstruction, and this is done by a variety of means.” These perspectives recall Thompson’s (2007: 26) notion of dissimulation as core feature of ideological discourses, as a process of constantly diversifying and displacing meanings and references in order to sustain and justify the established social order. These arguments also present nihonjinron as false consciousness, a discursive system aimed at preserving hegemonic power.

In the next section, I describe two conceptual problems observed in many of the nihonjinron critiques: (a) the common conceptualization of nihonjinron as false consciousness, and (b) the depiction of nihonjinron as entity with agentive properties.
2.6.6 Two Conceptual Problems in the Nihonjinron Critiques

Before I discuss the two main problems in the nihonjinron critiques from the angle of theory, it is important to state from the onset that inconsistent, underdeveloped, or incomplete theoretical groundwork can seriously undermine ideology critique. This is because studies which look into the relationship between discourse and other events in the social realm require movements back and forth between empirically observable objects/processes and realities which cannot always be gauged directly through the senses. Because the data required in this type of research is not always specified empirically, we need to test our hypotheses by following traditional philosophical methods—i.e. work our way through empirically and conceptually grounded issues by engaging in rational deconstruction and reconstruction. As such, ongoing refinement and sophistication of existing theoretical tools in critical social research is vital. In the production of nihonjinron critiques, however, this type of engagement is too often lacking. Earlier in this chapter, I justified my discussion of ICC in EFL education by pointing out that, if the goal in this book is to ascertain whether nihonjinron and native-speakerism are indeed constraining forces, we need to first establish the object(s) or process(es) that is/are being constrained. Instead of boldly claiming that EFL education as a whole is being constrained by nihonjinron—as McVeigh (2002) and Seilhamer (2013) do, for instance—we need to specify which aspect(s) or element(s) is/are under threat from the ideology. In this way, one of the most noticeable conceptual problems in the nihonjinron critiques is the general lack of attention to the constituents and more detailed aspects of Japanese EFL education, particularly the conspicuous shortage of references to ICC.

The first problem in many of the nihonjinron critiques is the almost exclusive emphasis on the ideology as a political strategy employed by those in power to subjugate the mass. This takes directly from the Marxist view of ideology as false consciousness. Seliger (1977) argues that this conceptualization of ideology is problematic because (a) it makes ideology exclusively an instrument of coercion and deceit, (b) it assumes that opposite to ideology is a non-ideological state, or a world in which biased perspectives are no longer possible as a result of all-encompassing social emancipation, and (c) it attributes ideology to the bourgeoisie alone (Thompson 2007: 81), with the dominated population not only as victim of ideological coercion but also essentially ideologically free.

Adhering to the notion of nihonjinron as false consciousness, most of the nihonjinron critics make a direct connection between the Japanese elite and the formulation and diffusion of the ideology. Perhaps most explicit in making this connection is Goodman (1992), who argues that, because there is a ‘general consensus’ on defining ideology as a system of sociopolitical beliefs which aims at emphasizing specific characteristics of a nation or culture, with the goal of social unity, nihonjinron must therefore be an ideology. Goodman then states that such ideological discourse becomes, for many Japanese, and over time, their worldview.
This perspective is replicated in Befu’s (2001) claim that *nihonjinron* is the civil religion of Japan. Goodman (1992) adds that *nihonjinron* serves the maintenance of relations of domination in society in that it represents the ideology of the ruling class in Japan—the leading industrialists, bureaucrats and politicians—who wish to promote a sense of nationalism that disguises internal inequalities of age, gender, geographical region and class, and encourages economic growth through propounding the idea that all will benefit equally from Japan’s new wealth (p. 11).

This argument is echoed by Kubota (1998, 1999, 2002) and many other *nihonjinron* critics including Dale (1986) and Yoshino (1992), who share the consensus that *nihonjinron* supporters project *nihonjinron*-oriented values and lifestyles of dominant groups within Japanese society—especially middle-class adult males—and diffuse them to all members of that society, thereby making the ideology a hegemonic tool used to maintain and reinforce relations of domination. Gayle (2003: 147) argues that *nihonjinron* was, during the end of the 1960s and onward, a “linkage of bourgeois modernity and the nation, especially in the context of high growth policies which had already begun to produce their yield.” Kowner (2002) goes further by conflating ideology with hegemony in his definition of *nihonjinron* as the hegemonic ideology in contemporary Japan. According to him, “not only are its tenets endorsed by the political establishment and the economic elite […] there is virtually no other ideology that competes with *nihonjinron*” (p. 172). Further in his argument, Kowner points out that *nihonjinron* is a vast discourse within Japanese social life created by the elite, and actually sees it not as a tool but as an agent of social control. Focusing more specifically on the Japanese education system, McVeigh (2002) holds that the Japanese state is engaged in the active ‘molding’ of unsuspecting human agents into tools of capitalist greed through institutionalized ideological pressure, this pressure being worded in educational policies. He identifies cultural nationalism—one aspect of *nihonjinron*—as this institutionalized ideological pressure.

In short, the notion of a unique Japanese society, culture, language and people appears to be understood by prominent *nihonjinron* critics as a strategy based on a very specific understanding of ethnic identity to maintain a specific type of status quo or specific power structures within Japanese society. While a marginal voice among the *nihonjinron* critics, Sugimoto (1999) does provide a more moderate view by indicating broader social changes as influencing the role and impact of *nihonjinron* in Japan. Although he argues that *nihonjinron* does have widespread political bases, he adds that the discourse of Japanese identity is also shifting as a result of the impact of globalization. This view suggests that, as the increasing flux of information and resources from outside Japan potentially contributes to changing attitudes among Japanese people towards Japanese identity, *nihonjinron* might not be such an effective tool for social control after all. Yet, in Sugimoto’s analysis the emphasis remains on the ideology as a tool for social oppression and control.

Another conceptual problem observed in many of the *nihonjinron* critiques is the tendency to present the ideology as agentive entity which can ‘do things’ in the real
world. When discussing conceptual entities such as agency, projects such as EFL education in Japanese JHS, and even objects such as policy documents or textbooks, there is a tendency among writers and analysts concerned with a wide range of social issues to use metaphorical means of conveying particular ideas to create structures of meaning. For example, at the beginning of the introduction I referred to this book as a book which explores questions related to culture in language education, identity and ideology, from the angles of pedagogy and research. By saying this book explores I assigned agentive properties to the book and removed myself as the agent who explores the range of questions guiding the inquiry in this book. Many reasons can justify this rhetorical decision, one being that I did not want to front the first person singular too early in the book. I also felt that, by reading this book explores, the reader might indeed understand who actually does the exploring in the book. In short, metaphorical moves such as displacing the agent of particular actions are often used by writers to achieve particular stylistic effects, and may not necessarily be used with the express intention of promulgating and reinforcing particular ideological perspectives.

However, Carter (2000) would disagree, arguing that such rhetorical moves are not accidental; instead, the perpetrators of such moves draw from the assumption that discourses can assume agential powers. In making this assumption, authorship of discourse is muted or mystified. For the critical study of ideology—especially that which places an explicit emphasis on the linguistic mechanisms of ideological discourse—this is a problem because this type of inquiry is (or at least should be) specifically concerned with rhetorical moves which displace the agent of actions as indications or traces of ideology in language use (Fairclough 1992, 2010; Thompson 2007). If we look at how nihonjinron has been discussed and presented by its critics, we notice this tendency to displace agentive properties away from the actual agents of social actions (i.e., human beings) towards nihonjinron which, ontologically speaking, remain an abstract entity without powers to act in the real world. From a CDA perspective—an important aspect of the study in this book which I explore in Chap. 4—this tendency is problematic because if we make ideology the generating force behind actions we lose sight of actual causal structures (Thompson 2007: 121). Verschueren (2012) also identifies this tendency in the study of ideology in general, presenting his own epistemological position thus: “I explicitly distance myself from a reification of ideology that would posit it as autonomous reality in the world of thought in contrast with discourse, or with history, in such a way as to talk of dominance and hegemony as facts rather than processes” (p. 4). This argument provides a way to simultaneously avoid talking about ideology as an active social agent, hiding the producers and diffusers of ideology, and presenting ideology as fixed, or as Verschueren puts it, a ‘fact’ rather than a discursive process engendered by human agents.

Below, I have selected segments of writings from a few prominent nihonjinron critics in order to demonstrate how these writers assign agentive properties to the ideology. In Table 2.2, I list both finite verbs (transitive)—for example, “Nihonjinron cuts across the political divide (Sugimoto 1999)” —and nonfinite verbs (followed by infinitives or gerunds)—for example, “Nihonjinron attempts to
As shown in this table, *nihonjinron* is followed by both finite and nonfinite verbs (causative verbs, eliciting verbs, and both factive and non-factive verbs affecting object complements), thereby becoming the agent of specific actions. The rhetorical effect is that readers can be misled as to who is performing the action. Moreover, by making ideology the generating force behind social actions, these writers dissolve human agency into a larger, more abstract structural entity, here represented or instantiated by the ideology of *nihonjinron*. Thompson’s (2007) argument that such discourse processes are typical of ideological discourse suggests that the critics of *nihonjinron* also use ideological means to conduct their critiques, or at least use rhetorical means which can be identified as ideological. While it is possible that these particular syntactic constructions were formulated by the *nihonjinron* critics with metaphorical rather than ideological intents, it is important to remember that *nihonjinron* (and native-speakerism) is an ideological discourse, and thus remains an abstract entity lacking agentive properties or the ability to do things in the real world. This does not remove its ontological properties: it simply places it within a particular stratum of the social system and specifies its relationship to other objects and realities in the system. As critics of ideology, we must therefore guard ourselves from assuming or claiming that ideology has the capacity to impact social practices, for it is people who ‘do things’ in the real world. As reiterated throughout

### Table 2.2 *Nihonjinron* with agentive properties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Finite verbs (transitive)</th>
<th>Nonfinite verbs (followed by infinitives or gerunds)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sugimoto (1999)</td>
<td>Use; define; play down; cut; derive; lose; generate</td>
<td>Tend to use; purport to analyze; tend to praise; fail to specify; avoid addressing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liddicoat (2007a, b)</td>
<td>Make; affect; construct</td>
<td>Attempt to frame</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Befu (1992)</td>
<td>Define; substitute; arouse; obliterate; replace</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugimoto and Mouer (2002)</td>
<td>Shape (used in the passive form “shaped by <em>nihonjinron</em>”); encourage; circumscribe (used in the passive form “circumscribed by <em>nihonjinron</em>”); inspire</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yoshino (1992)</td>
<td>Discuss; explain</td>
<td>Purport to demonstrate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
this book, while ideology is a resource situated within the Cultural System, it does not perform any particular acts in the real world.

With this picture of \textit{nihonjinron} as ideology centered on the notion of Japanese uniqueness, and a general sense of what researchers and critics have said about it, I now turn to native-speakerism, another ideological discourse said to act as a constraining force in Japanese EFL education. Compared to research on \textit{nihonjinron}, however, research on native-speakerism in the Japanese context is rather limited. The following section therefore offers only a summary description of native-speakerism. More informative accounts of the ideology are provided by Leung et al. (1997), who situate native-speakerism in the language classroom; and Houghton and Rivers (2013), who provide an extensive discussion on native-speakerism in the Japanese context. Finally, Holliday et al. (2015) unpack a broad range of issues related to native-speakerism in the ELT profession around the world. For a nuanced understanding of native-speakerism and related research, I invite the reader to appreciate the debate between Waters (2007) and Kabel (2009), which highlights the importance of, and the challenges involved in, shifting to a postmodern paradigm in native-speakerism research. Since this debate offers valuable insight into theoretical and methodological issues grounding ideology research, I refer to it in Chap. 4.

2.7 Exploring Native-Speakerism

Native-speakerism is an ideology rooted in a particular set of beliefs about language and identity. Simply put, its adherents privilege the knowledge of a mother tongue over the knowledge of other languages. ‘Native speakers’ of a language are thus considered the owners of and best references to that language, while ‘non-native speakers’ are seen as ‘imperfect native speakers’. Thus, native-speakerism is based on the notion of nativeness, a condition which is seen as endowing ‘natives’ with \textit{emic} knowledge and ‘non-natives’ with \textit{etic} knowledge. The ideology can be understood as part of a broader set of assumptions about language learning which first gained prominence with the Direct Method—\textit{a.k.a} the Berlitz Method—at the end of the nineteenth Century (Byram 2008; Cook 2010), assumptions which refer to perceived features of ‘native speakers’ beyond linguistic ability (Aboshiha 2015).

The constraining influences of native-speakerism (Houghton and Rivers 2013) can thus be seen as linked to other beliefs in the superiority of \textit{emic} knowledge over \textit{etic} knowledge. Drawing from Doerr (2009), three distinct yet related ideological perspectives can be said to contribute to the emergence of native-speakerism as a discourse of inclusion and exclusion. The first one is based on the ideological merging of nation, language and culture, and the view that being born in a particular nation endows one with ‘native speaker’ status—\textit{i.e.} ‘owner’ of national language and culture. The second perspective, which provides further grounds for the first, promulgates a fixed view of nation, language, and culture as populated by a relatively homogeneous group of people. The third perspective draws from and reinforces the
first and second perspectives, and promotes the idea that being born in a particular nation (with a particular language and culture) endows one with intimate and intuitive knowledge of, and insight into, the national language and culture. This knowledge is then regarded as superior to any forms of knowledge learned by outsiders or ‘non-natives’. In native-speakerism, nation, language, and culture are thus bound at the biological level.

Like all ideologies, native-speakerism is a simplistic and biased view of the world. Situated in the language classroom, native-speakerism has been identified in the expression of idealized, static and normative views of the target language, and in teachers requiring learners to imitate ‘native speakers’ (Angove 2014; Glasgow 2014) in order to hopefully attain ‘near-native’ L2 skills. Throughout this book, I frame terms such as ‘native speakers’ and ‘non-native speaker’ in single quotation marks to highlight their problematic nature, especially with regards to the fusion between ‘nativeness’ and language- and culture-related ideologies, as summarized in Derivry-Plard (2014) and in the following discussion. Doing so brings attention to Holliday’s (2015) important point about ‘native’ and ‘non-native’ labels: the fact that these are labels and not actual groups of people. In his enriching analysis of race ideas, however, Carter (2000: 4) does the opposite, arguing that ideas and propositions about race – that there are races, for example, or that some races have natural, unalterable aptitudes or characteristics, or that history is the history of race struggle – have a social reality, embodied in texts of various kinds and in the practices of social life. Thus they have a definite ontological status, and I therefore do not propose to use inverted commas when discussing them. Race ideas, concepts, terms are ontologically no different from, say, Buddhist ideas or Renaissance ideas or Green ideas and, it seems to me, no more deserving of being shackled by inverted commas.

Echoing Carter’s argument, the social reality of terms such as ‘native speakers’ and ‘non-native speaker’ underscores their ontological status. Nevertheless, in framing referents including the adjective ‘native’ in single quotation marks—except of course for the term native-speakerism—my goal is to provide a constant reminder throughout the book that we are dealing with aspects of a particular ideology, and not sociological elements or categories with explanatory potential. Indeed, not using single quotation marks might lead to a blurring of this important distinction.

In their exploration of native-speakerism, Houghton and Rivers (2013) equate ideology with imperialism and colonialism, and argue that native-speakerism goes ‘beyond ideology’, that it should instead be placed under the umbrella term of chauvinism. This conceptualization is interesting because, as they point out, it draws connections with other ‘isms’. Echoing Holliday (2005), the authors identify native-speakerism as “a fundamental breach of one’s basic human rights” (Houghton and Rivers 2013: 14). However, labeling native-speakerism as an ideology is, in my view, appropriate. In the next chapter I provide a theoretical conceptualization of ideology which includes both nihonjinron and native-speakerism, one which moves beyond the structuralist emphasis on the “powerful social and material forces […] arrayed against the individual […] severely curtailing their freedom” (Sealey and Carter 2004: 44), and reframes ideology research as an epistemological perspective.
concerned with (a) ideology as constraining and enabling force, (b) how ideology is formulated, diffused and consumed on the ground, and (c) the contradictory nature of ideology in context.

Earlier, I described *nihonjinron* as possessing five core arguments: racial, geographical, climatic, linguistic, and psychological. Likewise, Rivers (2011) looks at the Japanese EFL context and describes native-speakerism—particularly the notion of the ‘native speaker’ as owner of and best reference to a target language—as containing four central features:

1. linguistic—‘native speakers’ should be monolingual, possessing innate knowledge of their native language;
2. racial—‘native speakers’ should be Caucasian and should come from inner circle countries, i.e., countries where English originally emerged (Holliday 2015; Kachru 1992);
3. behavioral—‘native speakers’ should be friendly and entertaining;
4. cultural—‘native speakers’ should reproduce Japanese stereotypical images of cultures found in inner circle countries.

Native-speakerist practices can thus be seen as a set of strategies to protect monolingual ‘native speaker’ teachers and promote western cultural values in places where English education is in demand. Cook (2010) suggests that such practices allowed for the expansion of English education and related businesses all over the world and made it possible for monolingual ‘native speaker’ teachers to find and secure employment. Littlewood and Yu (2011) suggest that native-speakerism has enjoyed strong support within Western methodological traditions “to protect the status of the native speaker teacher and in so doing, to support neo-colonial control” (p. 65). Kamal (2015) points out that language teachers who are also native-speakerism adherents tend to see their learners from a deficit perspective, i.e., as “having difficulty grasping the language and implementing study strategies that are necessary for excelling in their studies” (p. 124).

Along similar lines, Holliday (2006: 386) refers to “the native speakerist ‘moral mission’ to bring a ‘superior’ culture of teaching and learning to students and colleagues who are perceived not to be able to succeed on their own terms.” This sense of moral mission to colonize the non-English-speaking world has been identified by many critics, notably Holliday (2006, 2015), Kachru (1992) and Phillipson (1992), as embedded in EFL professional practices. Some native-speakerism researchers have suggested that, while educated ‘native speaker’ teachers can expect some degree of professional success as EFL teachers in Japan due to their (perceived) unique insight into the target language and culture(s), the success of ‘non-native speaker’ teachers cannot necessarily be taken for granted. For many of them, professional abilities must constantly be demonstrated and recognized. Ng (2014) and Nonaka (2014) discuss the struggles ‘non-native teachers’ experience in the search for recognition and acceptance from both learners
As such, native-speakerism can be understood as an ideological discourse used by social agents to reinforce particular relations of domination in the global ESL/EFL industry. Creese, Blackledge and Takhi (2014: 938) define native-speakerism as positioning “the native speaker teacher as the possessor of the right cultural and linguistic attributes to represent the target speech community.” In her study of teacher identity, Swan (2015) reveals that ‘native speaker’ teachers are often employed in EFL contexts based on their perceived superior knowledge of culture and spoken idioms, and not particularly their overall L1 linguistic ability. In the Japanese JHS English classroom, where teachers are most often ‘non-native speakers’ and where the ‘native speaker’ ALT pays occasional visits throughout the year, the role of the ‘native speaker’ is usually that of linguistic and cultural model, while the ‘non-native’ teacher uses other skills—e.g., grammar knowledge, teaching skills, etc.—to make up for their said lack of linguistic and/or cultural ‘prowess’ (Kubota 2009). In arguing thus, Kubota draws an important link between nihonjinron and native-speakerism. Parallel to nihonjinron, the racial or ethnic component of native-speakerism is potent, particularly with the notion of the ‘native speaker’ as white male (Amin 1997; Braine 2005; Todd and Pojanapunya 2009). McVeigh (2002) discusses the self-orientalizing discourse in the Japanese EFL context (Iwabuchi 1994; Kubota 1999; McVeigh 2002) also as a process of racialization: “essentializing and exoticizing the “West”—or Occidentalizing—is the other side of the coin of self-orientalism. Occidentalizing is pressed into service to self-orientalize, and the premise of this dynamic is often racial (i.e., “whiteness” = the foreign Other)” (p. 150). Kubota and Lin (2009) draw similar connections between whiteness and the idealized ‘native’ teacher. Holliday (2015) and Kumaravadivelu (2015) both identify native-speakerism as a form of neo-racism, or as implicit racism, “hidden by supposedly neutral and innocent talk of cultural difference” (Holliday 2015: 13).

This characteristic of both nihonjinron and native-speakerism indicates the presence of deeper yet largely unspoken features of both ideologies which recall Bourdieu and Passeron’s (1990) notion of symbolic violence as an unperceived form of everyday violence. This idea is particularly useful here, as it allows us to interpret the racial dimension of native-speakerism as ‘unperceived’ violence because it has (potentially) become naturalized and subtle to the point where it operates “below the level of consciousness” (Eagleton 1991: 115). Swan et al. (2015) discuss the outcome of native-speakerism as having “produced a litany of very often unreal expectations, qualities, skills and behaviours attributed to ‘native speaker’ English language teachers” (p. 1). Despite having received ample criticism in academia, the authors characterize native-speakerism as a hegemonic force in EFL education around the globe, i.e., it has (seemingly) become so common-sense to everyone as to have become a norm and a legitimate criterion for evaluation and categorization. Describing native-speakerism as a form of cultural disbelief, Holliday (2015: 11) concurs by arguing that “although the ‘native-non-native’ speaker division is well-established as a problem, as an ideology, native-speakerism has almost disappeared between the lines of our everyday professional lives.” As
Archer (2003) suggests, native-speakerist beliefs can be located at the heart of the EFL industry around the world, without human agents operating within this industry being fully aware of its presence or impact. She points out that “a native English speaker may advance her academic career, thanks to the predominance of the English language, without any acknowledgment on her part that the conditions of her actions are the heritage of British colonialism” (p. 4). Although I revisit the notion of ideology as symbolic violence in the next chapter, it is worth pointing out at this point that, while Bourdieu often refrained from referring to ideology in his work, critics of both nihonjinron and native-speakerism have often constructed their arguments with reference to Bourdieu’s theories, particularly in their framing of ideology as an unperceived and naturalized/naturalizing force.

Yet, as with all ideologies, native-speakerism can be a double-edged sword, or as it is often referred to in this book, both an enabling and a constraining force. Although ‘native speakers’ often benefit from discourses and practices oriented towards native-speakerism they can also lose in the process. Some native-speakerism researchers explore this particular feature of the ideology and define the ‘native speaker’ also at a disadvantage (Houghton and Rivers 2013). According to Breckenridge (2010: 5–6), “the current representations of native speakers detract from professional development by perpetuating static identities rather than encouraging professional development.” Holliday (2015: 15) adds that “teachers who are labeled ‘native speaker’ also suffer from being treated as a commodity by being reduced to a list of saleable attributes. They can also be caught up in discriminatory employment practices.” These two complementary views suggest that, in engaging in native-speakerist discourses and practices, perpetrators of or adherents to native-speakerism discriminate against both themselves and their intended victims, making native-speakerism a discourse of both inclusion and exclusion. To a large extent, the view of ideology as both a constraining and an enabling force is aligned with Thompson’s (2007) notion of ideology as emerging from “complex ways in which meaning is mobilized for the maintenance of relations of domination” (p. 5). Ideologies are not self-contained and fully consistent entities: they are also fraught with contradictions. Consequently, as we observe the links between ideology and social practice—or the lack thereof—we should also expect contradictions to emerge. I reiterate this view at different points throughout the book.

As for the critical work on nihonjinron, the consensus in the literature on native-speakerism is that it is essentially a constraining force. Alptekin (2002) looks at native-speakerism in foreign language education, and concludes that the ideology “is constraining in that it circumscribes both teachers and learner autonomy by associating the concept of authenticity with the social milieu of the native speaker” (p. 57), thus failing to reflect the complex status and manifestations of English language use in the world. The exacerbation of native-speakerism as constraint has also been observed in how the ideology tends to be reproduced by ‘non-native speakers’. Seargeant (2009: 92) quotes Kramsch (1998) as saying that ‘native speakers’ are often viewed around the world as the ‘real thing’, or the best reference to the standard target language. Seargeant adds that “the native speaker model often
receives less criticism from non-native speakers themselves and is still considered highly desirable as a norm in many societies” (p. 93). In short, native-speakerism as a manifestation of cultural disbelief (Holliday 2015) has been identified less as ideological and more as hegemonic in the EFL industry (conceptual distinctions between ideology and hegemony are made in the next chapter). It has also been described as reproduced by both ‘natives’ and ‘non-natives’. In this way, similar conclusions can be drawn with regards to nihonjinron: the ideology of Japaneseness has been reproduced by Japanese and non-Japanese alike.

2.8 Conceptual Links Between Nihonjinron and Native-Speakerism

In the above discussion, I drew preliminary links between nihonjinron and native-speakerism, with ‘race’ being the main point of contact. In this section, I clarify some conceptual similarities and differences between both ideologies, thus presenting both as central objects of inquiry in this book. In doing so, I also initiate the theoretical groundwork in the following chapter. The content of this section, however, should be understood as based on awareness of a crucial distinction in ideology critique between ideology as ideational structure and ideology as practice, with both layers possessing distinct and emergent properties. As Carter (2000: 83) points out with regards to race, “race ideas have an objective existence, in books, pamphlets, [etc.] The existence of race ideas is therefore not reducible to the individuals or collectivities that may claim to ‘know, believe, assert or assent’ to them.” Similarly, when I explore conceptual links between nihonjinron and native-speakerism, I am specifically referring to the ideational features of both ideologies. In subsequent chapters, I concentrate on the consumption aspects of both ideologies, and in doing so my concerns are with the instantiations (as well as the notion of importance) of ideology at the level of practice.

Perhaps most relevant to the study in this book is the parallel between native-speakerism and nihonjinron as both containing similar belief structures pertaining to language and identity. Indeed, both ideologies promulgate the notion of monolingualism, or the idea that a person possesses one basic language—the ‘native’ language—with other languages as supplementary. Within monolingualism, there is also a belief in ‘nativeness’, or the notion of a fixed biological ‘essence’ which leads individuals to exhibit specific signs, behaviors, etc., which are then seen as expressions of particular features of this said ‘essence’. Within the context of both ideologies, language use becomes a window through which particular judgments about individuals can be made, thus placing native-speakerism and nihonjinron studies within the field of language ideology research. For example, for nihonjinron adherents the use of Japanese by non-Japanese can trigger a range of reactions such as surprise or resentment. Within a native-speakerist framework, pronunciation deemed ‘non-native’ can lead to the framing of individuals within particular social parameters
constraining these individuals’ range of possible alternatives (Pavlenko and Blackledge 2004). Seargeant (2009: 162) discusses language ideologies thus:

Marked features such as unorthodox usage will be interpreted according to the ideologies of language which constitute the context of interaction between interlocutors. The interpretation will depend on the participants involved, their social and geographical background, the purpose of the interaction as well as various other psychological variables and prejudices.

For the author, language ideologies are a permanent reality in language use around the world: “divorcing the use of the language from the complex set of beliefs which constitute its existence within society is neither practicable nor, one could argue, possible” (Seargeant 2009: 165). Similarly, Woolard (2010) refers to ‘unconscious ideologies’ implicit in speech practices, and cites Silverstein’s (1979) extensive and groundbreaking work on language ideologies, stating that Silverstein’s goal is “to show not only that linguistic structure is subject to rationalization in the sense of noticing and explanation, but that rationalization actually affects this structure, or ‘rationalizes’ it by making it more regular” (p. 241). In short, language ideologies not only reveal how beliefs about individuals can be related to language use, they can also reveal complex processes such as how specific linguistic features emerge, how linguistic changes take place, and how language use in the real world can be related to broader ideological structures.

As discussed earlier, the scope of native-speakerism and nihonjinron can also be said to reach epistemological realms beyond the limits of language. Kubota (2009) points out that the ‘native speaker’ ascription is not solely based on linguistic attributes but also on social, cultural, political and racial factors whereby ‘native speaker-ness’ is associated with a specific look (e.g., whiteness, blond hair, blue eyes, etc.). Similarly, Japaneseness is grounded in a set of beliefs related to specific ethnic features, from which a range of assumptions (linguistic, cultural, behavioral, etc.) can then be ascribed. As such, both ideologies can be characterized as self-orientalizing discourses, and in the Japanese EFL context, as processes of racialization of EFL education in Japan.

Both ideologies differ in terms of their respective epistemological foci. Native-speakerism is arguably most salient within the realm of language learning, whereas nihonjinron pertains to a range of concerns within and beyond language education. Another way to distinguish both ideologies is to look at their international scope. For example, evidence in the literature shows that native-speakerism has been observed and studied in multiple language learning contexts around the world, with reference to ‘native speakers’ of any language (although the focus has mainly been placed on English). On the other hand, while I mentioned earlier the fact that the nihonjinron discourse emerged both within and outside Japan, the ideology of Japanese uniqueness is arguably concerned with Japanese culture and society, even if it is formulated with reference to a non-Japanese Other. In other words, the population of adherents is likely to be much wider for native-speakerism than for nihonjinron.
At the same time, many ideological discourses in the world are analogous to *nihonjinron*. Wodak et al.’s (2009) study of nationalist discourses in Austria show how the uniqueness argument can be found in most contemporary nation-states. In Ashwill and Duong (2009), we can also find elements parallel to *nihonjinron* in their account of nationalist discourses in Viet Nam and the U.S. The authors define Vietnamese nationalism as expressing itself “in a variety of ways, mostly benign, including intolerance, bemusement, and puzzlement, but rarely outright hostility” (p. 149). Similar views have been suggested with regards to *nihonjinron*. What emerges most from Ashwill and Duong’s account of Vietnamese nationalism is the sense of isolation from the rest of the world, leading many Vietnamese people to hold ambivalent and conflicting views of their own culture, from outright patriotism to an inferiority complex towards other nations. In Japan, similar beliefs have been identified, most prominently with regards to Japanese national symbols (e.g., flag, national anthem, imperial family, etc.), which have remained problematic cultural and political elements since the end of the Second World War. Interestingly, Ashwill and Duong report that a large proportion of American university students hold views of their national culture “rooted in a cultural mythology infused with a deep-seated sense of cultural superiority and an inability to critically reflect on their own society” (p. 146). They also state that a majority of American university students have a very limited knowledge of their own history and culture, and of world history and of the role of the U.S. in foreign affairs. Similar criticisms have been made by analysts and social commentators with regards to Japanese university students. In this sense, the many parallels to *nihonjinron* around the world give the ideology of Japaneseness an international scope.

Despite notable differences, and considering the epistemological perspective in this book, both ideologies share a broad range of features. What binds *nihonjinron* and native-speakerism together is that both ideologies prioritize specific forms of cultural, ethnic, and linguistic identities. As mentioned earlier, part of the *nihonjinron* argument reinforcing a Japanese cultural, ethnic, and linguistic uniqueness is the notion that Japanese people are poor foreign language learners. As discussed earlier, this perspective parallels some of the core native-speakerism tenets. As such, both ideologies can be said to reinforce the monolingual paradigm as a means to strengthen cultural and linguistic identities. More importantly perhaps, like most ideological discourses focusing on issues of identity, they are dependent on *alterity* as a process of formulating ‘Otherness’ or ‘Otherization’ (Said 1993; Iwabuchi 1994). In other words, both ideologies are rooted in awareness that one is inherently related to an Other, which provides not as much an alternative to self but a negation of self. They are both acts of identity (Taylor 1994) aimed at fulfilling a demand for recognition of one’s authenticity, or a sense of being true to oneself and to one’s ways of living. Kim (2009) discusses the propensity in alterity modes of identity categorization—e.g., in-group versus out-group—towards de-accentuation of similarities, de-personalization and de-individuation, and psychological and communicative distancing. Seargeant (2009: 74) argues that for *nihonjinron* adherents cultural differences are useful in that they reinforce “an argument for national difference being a reflection of genetic difference along ethnic lines.” Thus, both
ideologies are seen as based on alterity, and as emerging from cultural dichotomization—e.g. Japan versus West, ‘native’ versus ‘non-native’. In his analysis of native-speakerism, Kumaravadivelu (2015: viii) argues that “the inequality is created by the process of marginalisation on the part of native speakers, and sustained by the practice of self-marginalisation on the part of non-native speakers.” This characterizes native-speakerism as both constraint and enablement, as both inclusion and exclusion, and as Kuramavadivelu would define it, as both a cause and a consequence. In this sense, nihonjinron and native-speakerism can be understood as ideologies with both constraining and enabling potentials. Furthermore, both are oriented towards discourses of the Center: for native-speakerism the Center is an idealized and essentialized Britishness and/or Americanness; for nihonjinron the Center is an idealized and essentialized Japaneseness. The identities of both included and excluded can thus be related to discourses and practices drawing from and reinforcing these Centers.

2.9 Nihonjinron and Native-Speakerism as Hurdles in the Development of ICC

Categorizing nihonjinron and native-speakerism as constraining and enabling forces stands in contrast to how researchers and critics have presented and analyzed both ideologies. The latter have often accentuated, if not concentrated solely on, the constraining potentials of both ideologies. The overarching argument among critics is that, because these two ideologies do not provide structures and possibilities which reflect English use in the world today, adherents of these ideologies are thus said to impose a problematic and counterproductive system of beliefs and practices within which the range of possibilities for language learners is restrained. To discuss either native-speakerism or nihonjinron as constraint, researchers often point at the contradictory ideational structures in both ideologies. Byram (2008: 57–58) counters the core principle in native-speakerism—the idea that being born in a particular language grants a person emic and thus superior knowledge of that language—by arguing that “native speakers are multifarious, have competences that differ from each other and vary over a lifetime and are often multilingual.” In his critical evaluation of native-speakerism, Seargeant (2009: 92) broadens the focus from ‘native speakers’ to the English-speaking world at large, and points out that as the number of non-native speakers grows, the relative nature of authenticity can allow for a shift in authority, and the desirable model need not be that of the L1 user but of L2 speakers using it as a lingua franca. In such cases, what is authentic to the native speaker is likely to be contrived and inappropriate for the nonnative. In recognition of this, the hegemony of the native-speaker model has been repeatedly problematized in the last two decades.

In other words, the constraining influences of both ideologies are generally understood as resulting from conflicts between their simplistic and contradictory
features and the increasingly complex reality in which EFL learners live. In discussing nationalism as a hurdle to ICC, Ashwill and Duong (2009: 148) describe these conflicts thus:

Nationalism and the sense of cultural superiority that accompanies it naturally lead to a static and narrowly framed view of the world. The task of creating globally competent citizens cannot be accomplished without first debunking certain cultural myths, proving the ‘commonsensical’ to be nonsensical and revealing ostensibly ‘eternal truths’ to be falsehoods.

From this basis, it is conceivable for EFL teachers and learners who are simultaneously nihonjinron and native-speakerism adherents to find the development of ICC a difficult process, especially since two of its core features involve cultural decentring and the ability to manage difference. Kim (2005) discusses identity inclusivity—the tendency towards cosmopolitanism and awareness of the relative nature of values—and identity security—the sense that one is self-confident enough in one’s identity to take risks and be flexible in intercultural situations—as characteristics of successful intercultural communicators. As such, nihonjinron and native-speakerism adherents may find it complicated to participate in intercultural communicative situations because the ideologies to which they adhere contain perspectives which posit particular identity orientations—those aligned with intercultural communication—as problematic.

In this chapter, I have developed an ICC model suited to the Japanese JHS English classroom, and discussed two ideological discourses said to act as impediments to the development of ICC amongst Japanese EFL students. I have also observed that in the critical work on both nihonjinron and native-speakerism both ideologies are portrayed most often than not as constraining forces to be contended with (due to their said enduring nature as common-sense ideas). The work in this book specifically hones in on these issues, and attempts to determine whether or not nihonjinron and native-speakerism are hegemonic forces, and whether they can be identified as constraining forces in Japanese EFL education. In the next chapter, I survey a range of theoretical issues grounding this work.

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