Chapter 2
Social Transformation Characteristics and Political Participation

Social transformation represents profound changes in production mode and lifestyle, which calls for structural changes in economy, culture, politics, and society, thus leading to a changed nature of political power, a core subject in political science. Such transformation, therefore, is closely related to participations, and political participation is the most significant among all participations. Theoretically, social transformation is inseparable from institutional changes, which is a direct result of political participation as institution is the critical kernel of politics.

2.1 Social Transformation Characteristics

2.1.1 What Is Social Transformation?

Human society is constantly evolving from a lower level to a higher level. Therefore, “all its social institutions established in turn in history are only temporary phases in an infinite process from lower to higher stages.” Such social development, termed “social change” in sociology, is generally believed to feature two forms, namely a gradual, quantitative change before a particular social form becomes another one qualitatively and a qualitative change, i.e., a social form has transited to another one. The social change China is undergoing is defined as social transformation by academia.

1Professor Li Jingpeng (1995) points out that power and interests lie at the heart of all political phenomena including class struggle (see p. 12). He adds that the new system of the study of political science is focused on the operation of political power and studies political subjects, political behaviors, political relationships, and political mechanisms (see p. 14).

According to Marxism, social change reflects social progress in conformity with objective laws and is most fundamentally caused by contradictions between forces of production and relations of production, and the resulting contradictions between economic foundations and the superstructure formed by political and ideological elements. These contradictions inevitably lead to various social reforms and revolutions in different societies.

China’s current social transformation is a holistic yet complicated social evolution that boils down to the accelerated modernization. Such transformation, as defined by many scholars, generally refers to changes in two aspects: One is the development issue of transformed social structure, i.e., the transformation that runs through the process of modernization from an agricultural, rural, closed, or semi-closed traditional society to an industrial, urban, open, and modern society. Modernization is a global trend and an issue of development, which has been influencing almost every corner of the world. The other is the reform issue of transformation of economic institution, i.e., from the self-sufficient traditional economy and the highly centralized planned economy to the socialist market economy characterized by effective roles of the market in resource allocation. As part of its reform initiative, China has experienced a unique process of changes in modes of production and exchange that is not very long compared to its progress toward modernization, and the establishment of its target institution will be completed by the mid-twenty-first century. It is the transformation in these two aspects, advancing side by side and interacting with each other, that has led to structural conflicts interwoven with institutional frictions, an important feature in China’s current social development.

Professor Li Yining describes China’s current stage as follows: China is a developing country in transformation. “Transformation” means its shift from planned to market economy, while “developing” signifies its heading from underdevelopment to modernization. It is the dual task of transformation and development that has brought China with extremely complicated issues.3 According to Li, transformational development implies both the institutional transition and economic development of a country. China is thus a country of transformational development, or a developing country in transformation, which faces the dual task of institutional transition and economic development.4 Some scholars, based on their observations on township enterprises, have defined “transformation” in a pure economic sense.5

---

4Ibid., 1.
5Fei and Luo (1988), 230. According to Luo Hanxian, the socialist economy in China today is in transformation. There are three aspects to it: the transformation from natural economy to commodity economy, the transformation from administrative economy (result of the people’s communes’ administrative power) to independent economy, and the transformation from agricultural economy to diversified economy (dominant industries have shifted in some economically developed areas.).
As concluded above, China’s period of social transformation began at the end of 1978, when the Third Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee made its strategic decision on the shift of the CPC’s work focus to economic construction and the ensuing rural reform started and has continued to this day. During this period, every great progress in China’s reform and opening up and modernization is closely linked with the effective policies formulated and implemented by the CPC in line with China’s national conditions. It is generally considered that these policies have been formulated and implemented with a focus on institutional transition, running through the whole period starting from the CPC’s decision on the shift in work focus made on the Third Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee, to the adoption of the Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the Reform of Economic Structure by the Third Plenary Session of the 12th CPC Central Committee which soon heralded in an all-round, urban-centered reform on economic institution, to the establishment of socialist market economy as the target pattern for China’s reform of economic institution at the 14th CPC National Congress, and finally to the adoption of the Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Issues concerning the Establishment of the Socialist Market Economy as a further step by the Third Plenary Session of the 14th CPC Central Committee in 1993. As a matured governing party that always stands in a pioneering position, the CPC has constantly focused on promoting an all-round social transformation while concentrating on the institutional restructuring, as evidenced by its rational definition of China’s current development stage, firm control over China’s political restructuring and development of democratic politics, as well as persistent endeavor in fostering civic virtues (covering moral and ideological development, legal system building and improvement in science, education, culture, health, and sports) that meet the requirements of modern society. All these efforts are translated into both rules and requirements for policy implementation and scrupulous operations in practice. The CPC in power is surely the leading force for China’s all-round social transformation, and this is both a prominent feature of China’s social transformation and the fundamental reality of China’s politics.

2.1.2 Transformation Characteristics: An Analysis

China has advanced on a unique path of social transformation that was initially led and powered by institutional transition, and marked by the progress of an all-round social transformation and accelerated modernization through the continuous deepening of institutional restructuring. This is a path of “Chinese characteristics”
primarily embodied in its “simultaneous progress of the two transitions and China’s adherence to its socialist political system.”

Given the transformation that China has undergone, four features exist in this complicated and all-round process: (i) It is a gradual progress, as it begins with economic restructuring and gradually advances in a practical manner through constant exploration and practice, including promotion of public innovations in some areas; (ii) it is holistic by nature, reflecting the interrelationship among social systems; (iii) it is not synchronized, as evidenced in the actual social transformation marked by the consequential emergence of many contradictions, and (iv) it is planned yet spontaneous. It is planned because, in a macro and strategic sense, the transformation is motivated by the rational choice made by the Chinese government when China is confronted with both internal and external contradictions and pressures, as most prominently demonstrated in its phased transition toward market economy. It is spontaneous because, in terms of reforms in specific and divisional areas, many new elements are created by public or grassroots sectors and assume increasingly important roles in social lives.

China is a developing country in transformation with its government playing a leading role in driving a social transformation that is gradual, holistic, and planned, yet rapid, large scale, extensive, and sometimes even abrupt mobilizations of social resources. These characteristics of China’s social transformation have produced great impact on many aspects, including exercise of power,

---

6Chinese social development research group, “Institutional Innovation and Challenges in the Mid-term of China’s Reform,” Sociological Studies 1 (1997). The report believes that at the turn of the twenty-first century, China would be in the most important transformation period. The transformation comes in two types. The first is institutional transition from a centrally planned redistributive economy to a socialist market economy. The second is structural transformation from an agricultural, rural, isolated, and traditional society to an industrial, urban, open, and modern society. Though the two changes took place concurrently during the past ten years of reform, they are totally different in nature. As a specific reform, institutional transition takes place in countries with planned economy. Even when the reform is progressive, institutional innovation must be accomplished in a relatively limited period. Otherwise, long-time institutional friction and lack of regulation will result in social disorder. Structural transformation is an unavoidable step in the modernization of all countries. As a matter of fact, it takes much longer than expected, as it usually needs the efforts of several generations to really change a country’s status in world economy. The concurrence of the two changes, plus the socialist political system that China still upholds, distinguishes China’s development model from those in the former Soviet Union and Eastern European countries, which feature institutional transition, and those in emerging industrial countries and regions in East Asia, thus forming the current Chinese characteristics in social development.

As for the Chinese path of development, American scholar Maurice Meisner believes that China, under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, was neither a socialist nor a capitalist country, no matter how many changes took place during that period. The Chinese path of development will never be fully understood as long as Marxists and non-Marxists still insist on the outdated hypothesis that there are no alternatives to capitalist and socialist society in the modern world. See Meisner (1992).

interest distribution pattern, economic, social, ideological, and cultural structures, moral values, lifestyle, marriage and family structure, and interpersonal relations (i.e., interpersonal communication, emotion, and psychology mechanisms). Such impact is remarkable in the following areas:

(I) Political areas (exercise of power);

(i) A highly centralized governance system has gradually shifted to a decentralized system with clearly defined responsibilities in exercising power;

(ii) Political power has been granted to a wider range of social groups, including all adult citizens who have been participating in governance more extensively and effectively, as best illustrated in direct elections at the grassroots level;

(iii) It is emphasized that the legitimacy of state governance is granted by the people and founded on the accountability for citizens, rather than theoretically advocating “power from the people”; 

(iv) The people have increasingly become the target, beneficiary, and authorizer of the government policy-making, and policies are made and implemented on the basis of the satisfaction, consent, and support from the people; 

(v) The exercise of political power has constantly become more transparent, and the level of democracy has increased in political life; 

(vi) The old regime of power and its operation mechanism still exist due to both subjective and objective factors, while the new regime of power and its operation mechanism are not yet institutionally regulated to work effectively, leading to rising contradictions in the exercise of power and surging inconsistencies over government policies and decisions among different governing authorities; 

(vii) The once-overall intervention of political power is now restricted, but such adjustment of intervention, due to lack of effective regulatory measures, has brought the influence of political power, consciously or unconsciously, into economic activities where institutional transition is underway. As a result, political power frequently deviates from its intrinsic purpose of representing all citizens, and the principle of equal exchange in market economy as the new economic system is seriously undermined, with social and public interests extensively jeopardized. Such political corruption is still spreading contagiously;

(viii) The control of political power over society is substantially weakened. As the old social control mechanism has become unbalanced and weakened during transformation and more time is needed before the new mechanism is fully established and effectively functioning, in addition to the inefficient legal system and a lack of public awareness of protecting lawful rights and interests in a legal approach, loopholes are abundant to be taken advantage of in the process of transformation, leading to an upsurge of difficulties in social control and increased public concern over social security issues.
(II) Social areas

(i) The relatively static, closed, and orderly social life has rapidly changed to a dynamic, open, yet relatively disordered one, resulting in great changes in lifestyles, which now feature a higher level of socialization and diversification, a widened gap in interpersonal relations and rising social pressures;

(ii) Social differentiation is accelerated, featuring a remarkably wider range and larger number of integral parts of social structure, making social structure more diversified in forms yet more specialized in function. Before China’s reform, the central government monopolized nearly all social resources and established a tightly categorized identity system through the long existing state-authority-centered administration of hukou system, labor force employment, and official personnel systems. Under the old identity system, people were categorized by their social class, urban/rural residency, official/worker occupation status, and workplace ownership. Since the reform was launched, the identity system has become more occupation-based. The conventional class of peasants is now further classified as agricultural producers, township and village enterprise workers, migrant workers, rural hired labor, rural workers in culture, education, technology, and health care, rural individual businessmen, rural private enterprise owners, township and village enterprise managers, rural administrative officials, etc. The class of workers is now further categorized as township and village enterprise workers, joint and cooperative venture workers, and private company and foreign enterprise employees, apart from the previous state-owned enterprise and collectively owned enterprise workers. In the meantime, the regulatory mechanisms’ conceptual elements of social structure have become more diversified and complicated as well;

(iii) Social mobility has become faster. The restructured ownerships, industries, and education institutions have provided unprecedented opportunities, driving forces and channels for social mobility as a result of significantly increased number of new social positions (occupations and professions), widened gap of benefits and interests, and expanded social openness. During the social transformation, the first wave of social mobility started from rural areas which were under the most formidable control, while the second wave started from urban lower classes and the third wave from within state-owned enterprises. The current social mobility displays the following features: Economic factor has become the primary reason for social mobility; more differences have occurred in social status; and the mobility has appeared disorderly and involved misconducts (see footnote 8). Five major trends are found in the current social mobility, i.e., from public to non-public sectors; from the primary industry to secondary and tertiary industries; from western inland areas to southeastern coastal areas and Special Economic Zones.

(ii) Social contradictions, clashes, and conflicts have intensified, ranging from structural conflicts of the urban–rural dual system to institutional frictions arising from deadlocks between old and new social systems, from conflicts of interest among different interest groups and social classes emerging as a result of accelerated social differentiation to clashes between old and new social norms and lifestyles, and even conflicts arising from unconventional social concepts.

(III) Economic area, as clearly shown in:

(i) Changed modes of production, exchange, and consumption;
(ii) Changed patterns of interest distribution;
(iii) More diversified secondary (industry and commerce) and tertiary (services) sectors, increased layoffs and unemployed and higher pressure on employment;
(iv) More specialized economic roles and entities involved in production, consumption, and other activities in market economy;
(v) Accelerated transformation into a market economy;
(vi) Remarkably market-oriented and socialized national economy;
(vii) Gradual establishment of new macroeconomic regulation and control systems;
(viii) Significantly enhanced roles of market in resource allocation;
(ix) Gradual establishment of market economy mechanisms with competition and efficiency increasingly becoming guiding principles in economic life;
(x) Constant expansion of industrialization, a key drive to China’s faster modernization.

(IV) Cultural areas

(i) Knowledge, culture, and higher education are increasingly respected due to extensively raised literacy rate, more accessible schooling, faster spread of knowledge, and further-developed IT and communication;
(ii) Unbalanced cultural development, with the increasingly dominant role of culture transmitted through movies and TV dramas in affecting the way people behave, has led to escalated conflicts between traditional and modern cultures, Eastern and Western cultures, mainstream and non-mainstream cultures, highbrow and lowbrow cultures, etc.;

---

(iii) People are having a stronger awareness of market economy and modernization. But diversified values have led to differentiated personal choices and in turn to confused social value systems and moral concepts;

(iv) There is an increasingly popular call for a new cultural orientation that stresses the value of personality development, progress and improvement, tolerance and respect, freedom and discipline, efficiency and fairness, love and responsibility, inheritance and innovation, and sophistication and unworldliness.

As concluded from the above analysis of changes in political, social, economic, and cultural areas, social transformation has improved social structure, enhanced social vitality, accelerated social development, and established modern values. It has at the same time, however, brought about complicated social issues and political, economic, and cultural conflicts. An analysis of these transformation characteristics is of great relevance to further elaboration of the theme of this paper.

2.1.3 China’s Basic Political Conditions: An Analysis

China’s basic political conditions need to be analyzed to thoroughly understand the issues of China’s revolution, socialist construction, and reform. It would not be possible to identify the trends of China’s political democracy building during the transformation period or to analyze what has happened in the process without a clear understanding of the essence of China’s basic political conditions. China’s basic political conditions refer to all objective realities independent of man’s will that have influenced China’s political democracy building and consist of the following factors:

(i) China is a country at the primary socialist stage for a long period of time. This national condition should serve as the basis for analyzing and addressing all issues during the period. The principal social contradiction at this primary stage is the gap between people’s growing material and cultural demands and the insufficient social production.

(ii) China is a developing country in the current world, given its less-developed social reality. Therefore, China as a developing country has to use politics as a major driving force in the government-guided process of social transformation to make a rational choice of modernization. It is now a pressing task for China to study and draw on the regular rules and patterns of the progress of modernization, which, specifically, involves two aspects: the rules concluded from developed countries and those from post-developed countries in their progress of modernization. In political areas, for example, the process of “social mobilization” is commonly experienced by all nations. In earlier modernized countries, the “social mobilization” has an impact on both social classes and the existing central political structure, but the impact is gradual and takes a longer period of time to phase in. In later modernized countries,
however, the impact on the general public directly caused by the fast pace of social mobilization along with the establishment of new social interests and centers of power comes instantly and abruptly, and its scope varies substantially. Besides, the pace of social mobilization in different institutional areas is also different from that in earlier modernized countries.

(iii) The CPC has been given the position, both as a result of historical development and as required by current reality, of leading China toward a prosperous, democratic, culturally advanced, and modernized country. Developing socialist democracy has been the goal that the CPC has unremittingly strived for, as democracy is the foundation for socialism and socialist modernization. Sticking to, strengthening, and constantly improving the CPC’s leadership are the key to realizing China’s rejuvenation and prosperity, improving people’s well-being, and ensuring cultural advancement and political democracy.

(iv) The political development goal is clear, which is to develop a socialist democracy with Chinese characteristics. In other words, China’s socialist democracy, under the leadership of the CPC, should be law-based governance and carried out on the basis that people are the masters of the country. To fulfill this goal, we should adhere to and improve the people’s democratic dictatorship led by the working class and based on the alliance of workers and peasants; we should stick to and promote the system of people’s congress, the system of multiparty cooperation and political consultation, as well as the system of regional ethnic autonomy; we should build a socialist country under the rule of law by promoting democracy and improving the legal system; we should strive to create a lively political climate with a stable society, a clean and efficient government, and harmonious and united ethnic groups as its bases. For today and in the near future, the chief objectives of the political restructuring are as follows: developing democracy, improving the legal system, separating government administration from the management of enterprises, cutting redundant government organs, promoting the democratic oversight system, and securing social stability and unity.

(v) There are conflicts between the political aim and the actual political practice. They are shown in the following three aspects. First is the conflict between the political aim and the institutional norms. The existing institutional guidelines are insufficient, inadequate, and incapable to ensure the achievement of the political aim and need to be improved. Second is the conflict between the high demand of such aim and the population quality. It requires a comparatively high level of sophistication of the population to make democracy happen. Such sophistication is shown in one’s love for his country and his compatriots and the respect to the laws of his country, as well as a proper state of mind, reasonable code of conduct, and a general understanding of knowledge, ideas, and practices. However, right now the problem is that the ideas of people, laws, and nation are lacking in China. When it comes to politics, Chinese people either show idealistic fervency and excessive agitation or are dismissive and indifferent like anarchists.
Both attitudes are shown at varying intensity. Furthermore, people in China have a rather limited knowledge about democracy and its ideas and the way of participation. All these defects are detrimental to the development of political democracy. The third conflict is between what is required for obtaining the goal and the lack of experience in implementation.

(vi) There is a discrepancy between what is available in the basic political system and what have been done during power operation. The availability of the basic political systems means the existence of the system of people’s congress, the system of multiparty cooperation and political consultation under the leadership of the CPC, and the democratic centralism which ensures that “all power of the state belongs to the people.” In practice, however, phenomena such as the party interfering with the state organs’ operation, officials pressuring and making decisions for their subordinates, replacing public opinions and supervision with that of the officials abound. Standard procedure for power operation either is not followed or does not even exist. The power operation of political democracy needs to be safeguarded by institutions with emphasis on standards and procedures. Democratic system itself is procedural that has a rigorous demand for the proper application of procedures. Whether the power operation has a strict procedure would determine whether the power is legitimate and whether such legitimacy is valid.

(vii) The economic, social, and cultural diversity in China and the differences in the development of social members and classes between urban and rural areas in different regions mean that national policies cannot produce consistent results. Under such conditions, the development of political democracy requires a process of introducing pilot programs, achievement evaluation, and gradual implementation instead of a one-size-fits-all solution.

(viii) The general public is increasingly demanding for political democracy, and the government has become more open and transparent in governance and the handling of administrative affairs. However, both parties still lack experience and practice in their endeavors. A lack of practice means that what one has done cannot meet the increasing demand for political democracy. A lack of experience in being open and transparent is reflected in three aspects: how, to whom, and to what extent.

In brief, China’s basic political conditions are defined by the leadership of CPC, its socialist system, its status as a developing country, its basic political systems, and the imbalance in its political development.

As can be seen from the analysis above of China’s basic political conditions, the development of political democracy in China, on the one hand, is stipulated by socialism. It is led by the CPC and has a clear fundamental political program and goals, with a firm institutional guarantee. On the other hand, it has distinct conflicts and various problems that may possibly or inevitably arise from the constraints in the current stage of development. These analyses show, both in theory and in practice, that the development of socialist democracy is a gradual process and needs to be pushed forward in an orderly and steady way under the
leadership of the CPC based on China’s national conditions. They can also serve as the starting point of identifying problems in actual practice when pursuing socialist democracy during the transformation period and actively exploring useful patterns so as to promote the development of socialist democracy with Chinese characteristics.

### 2.1.4 The Influence of Institutional Legacy

Social transformation is a path-dependent process, which means the social change of a nation takes place in its own historical setting. According to Marxism, changes in social patterns are mainly reflected in institutional changes. Douglass C. North, American economist and one of the founders of the new institutional economics, believes that “institutional change shapes the way societies evolve through time, hence is the key to understanding historical change,” and that institutional change is “overwhelmingly incremental and path dependent.” In terms of the relationship between institution and transformation, two problems are common in the transformation period. One is the insufficient institutional supply (or the lack of institutional resources), due to the fact that the original institution lacks vitality and is unable to meet the demand brought along with the social transformation efficiently. The other problem is related to path dependence, which means institutional legacy constantly affects institutional innovation. On the one hand, old institution disturbs innovation activities. To be more specific, old relations of production hinder the creation of a new institution. On the other hand, old institution is the basis of institutional innovation. The ties between both old and new institutions can never be severed, just like the continuity of history. It can be both an asset and a burden. Institutional legacy includes symbolic ones and material ones. Symbolic legacy provides efficient supply for institutional innovation by means of the old institution serving as the frame for and adapting to the new institution. Material legacy displays itself as a more rigid norm, which either curbs innovation activities by exerting enormous pressure on it, or serves it by becoming an integral part of the new institution. These two problems are interrelated, in a way that the widespread institutional shortage in the transformation period calls for innovation in institution building, a path-dependent process ultimately still influenced by institutional legacy. Histories of countries and regions that have completed the transformation or in the midst of it have proved this relation to be true.

An institution is a set of rules and norms that define appropriate and ethical actions, a framework in which people influence each other to form cooperative or competitive relationships and thus establishing an order. It is both a constraint of social interactions and a mechanism for maintaining balance. An institution is a

---

11Ibid., 126.
“public product,” or an intangible social resource created to provide an incentive-constraint mechanism for social exchange. Generally speaking, institutions fall into three basic categories: constitutional order, constitutional arrangements, and normative behavioral codes. Constitutional order refers to the fundamental rules establishing conditions of collective choice—the rules for making rules. It is the set of political, social, and legal ground rules that establish the basis for production, exchange, and distribution. Constitutional order evolves slowly, for it is more difficult to be modified than the operating rules formulated in accordance with it. It focuses on the terms and conditions of collective choice. Constitutional arrangements, or institutional arrangements, are specific set of rules set up within the framework of the constitutional order, including laws, regulations, associations, and contracts. They evolve the fastest among the three categories. Normative behavioral codes also evolve slowly like constitutional order, making its modification more difficult than institutional arrangements. These codes are very important for legitimating constitutional order and institutional arrangements. In fact, it is the normative behavioral codes, including cultural background and ideology, which lay the foundation for social normative study. Among these three types of institutions, institutional arrangement is the endogenous variable of institutional change, and constitutional order and normative behavioral codes are its exogenous variables. Institutional arrangements as the endogenous variable can be distributive or redistributive. The demand for changing the institutional arrangements is based on an understanding that potential profits cannot be obtained under existing arrangements. Actors realize that they will gain these profits if they change the original arrangements. Therefore, the motive for changing the income distribution pattern in favor of oneself instead of others is quite clear. Generally speaking, institutional innovation refers more to the innovation of institutional arrangements. The actual use and distribution of institution arrangements as a resource lead to conflicts between subjects of supply and demand, among different demand subjects, and between rigid norm and practical development. These conflicts appear more acute during the overall evolution of the society. The same institutional arrangements produce different results depending on the demand subjects. Some produce maximum yield, while others are counter-productive. Such evidences abound during China’s social transformation.

China’s social transformation has been influenced by the following six major institutional legacies: the traditional political institution before 1919, the new democratic political institution, the political institution adopted by the CPC during the wartime, the political model of the former Soviet Union, the political model during the “Cultural Revolution,” and the Marxist ideal political model. These institutional legacies have two main impacts. First, psychologically and morally speaking, normative institutional concepts such as “people-oriented,” “people

---

12The three categories of institutions have been widely acknowledged in the West. For more details of the three categories and their influence on institutional innovation, see International Center for Economic Growth (1992), 133–156.
are masters of the country,” “for people’s interests,” and “be responsible for people” become the check and balance on power operation. Characterized by adaptability and openness, these concepts provide impetus for institutional innovation, while ensuring continuity when replacing the old institution with the new one. These concepts emphasize the fact that power comes from the masses and should be exercised for the masses to fully boost their initiative and creativity. Second, decision-makers’ dictatorial manner, power worship, and obedience to authority are evident in power operation. Institutional legacies drawn from such phenomena exhibit the following five characteristics: (i) forcible execution as basic means; (ii) power usually derives from higher authorities; (iii) power is highly concentrated; (iv) power is not reciprocal and lacks principal–agent relationship, resulting in severe political asymmetry; and (v) power is exercised arbitrarily and randomly and lacks proper procedures. All these have led to disorderly and unregulated use of power, leaving the authority unsupervised and those in power corrupt. Specifically, the consequences are shown in the relations of nation and society, rule of law and rule of man, and inner-party democracy and national democracy. The key is to adjust the relationship between power and interests. These two impacts of the institutional legacies are the starting point where we begin to analyze China’s political institution and political phenomenon during the transformation period.

2.2 Political Participation

2.2.1 The Pattern of Political Participation

The expansion of political participation is inevitable as social transformation deepens. In other words, social and economic modernization will certainly lead to the expansion of political participation.

In the opening of their book No Easy Choice: Political Participation in Developing Countries, Huntington and Nelson stated that the expansion of political participation is the symbol of political modernization. In traditional societies, only a few elites could involve in governmental and political matters… But in all industrial countries of modern days… all acknowledge and emphasize the principle of active citizenship.13 In Huntington’s Political Order in Changing Societies, he revealed that a crucial turning point in the expansion of political participation in a modernizing society is the inauguration of the rural masses into national politics… In these countries, consequently, the key to political stability is the extent to which the rural mass are mobilized into politics after acknowledging the existing political system rather than standing against the system.14 Huntington analyzed

---

14Huntington (1988), 74.
that this rural mobilization or “Green Uprising” is far more important politically for the later modernizing countries than it was for most early modernizers. In the latter, urbanization and industrialization usually reached high levels before the bulk of the rural population became available for political mobilization. The share of rural population in total population dropped when it became more politically involved. However, in later modernizing countries, the process of modernization tends to start at all fronts. Therefore, it is possible for political consciousness and the idea of political participation to spread across the countryside at a time when urban development and industrialization are still at an early stage. If there lacks an effective and legitimate political institution, i.e., if the current social political system is unable to provide an effective and regular channel for the expansion of political participation, there will be signs of social instability to some extent.

There appears to be a very strong correlation between social and economic modernization and the expansion of political participation. What are the reasons behind this? Summarizing other people’s research, Samuel Huntington and Jorge Dominguez came up with five explanatory points from a general perspective. (i) In a society, the level of political participation varies with the social and economic status of its citizens. Economic growth increases the percentage of those with higher social status, enabling more people to get access to better education, become wealthy, and find middle-class jobs. A higher social status leads to a change of attitude, which, in turn, leads to more political participation, as people start to feel they possess necessary capability and political efficacy. These people are more likely to have more political participation than those who do not have the feeling of political efficacy. In other words, economic growth raises the percentage of those with higher social status, people who have a greater sense of political efficacy and capability and regard political participation as a civil duty, actively participating in political affairs and thus promoting the expansion of political participation; (ii) with social and economic development, the number of different organizations and associations increases and so does the number of people who take part in them, thus gradually improving the overall political participation. The proliferation of enterprise organizations, farmer associations, labor unions, and social, cultural, entertainment, and religious organizations is a characteristic of a highly developed society. Members of these organizations are much more likely to participate in politics than those outside them. Economic development enables more individuals to be part of organized groups and stimulates the overall involvement with organizations in two ways: by participating in social and economic development and by raising the community or group consciousness; (iii) economic and social modernization causes tension among social groups, as new groups emerge, established ones are

\[15\] Huntington points out that such phenomenon prevails in early modernized countries, with the USA as the only exception. In the eighteenth century, the American War of Independence, the principles of equality and democracy, high literacy rates, high level of education, and the prevalence of land ownership (except in the South) contributed to massive political participation by peasants before the emergence of cities in the USA. Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* 74.
threatened, and those at a lower social status try to use all possible opportunities to improve their status. As a result, the conflicts between social classes, regional power, and social groups are intensified and, in certain cases, generate the group consciousness, by which a certain group sees it necessary to take collective actions for protecting its interests from interference by other groups. In a word, this social group will be forced to turn to politics to defend its interests. Therefore, intense or long-term conflicts between social groups or challenges to their very survival can strengthen group identity, leading to the formation of an enduring pattern of political participation; (iv) to a certain extent, economic growth requires and facilitates the expansion of the role of a government. The scale of a government’s role is obviously influenced by the dominant political values and ideology in a society, but even more so by the level of social and economic development. The more the government policies affect the interests of social groups, the more they realize the connection between their own purposes and those of the government. Therefore, they will be more proactive in seeking to influence policy-making, in an effort to prevent the government from raising the demands in terms of tax, labor service, and regulation; and (v) social and economic modernization happens when a country is developing. The state government is normally an instrument for social and economic modernization. Consequently, the relation between the individual and the state government is of great importance to the individual and what they stand for, because the government wants to prevail over the individual’s any other allegiance; theoretically, an individual is fundamentally a citizen, which disregards any differences between social classes and social groups, and lays the foundation for public political participation. All citizens are equal in front of the government; everyone has the equal right and duty to participate in politics even at a minimum level. Thus, the political culture pertaining to social and economic modernization legitimizes and creates the environment for political participation.

The five connections show the relationship between social and economic modernization and the level of political participation. Although approaches to political participation generally become more varied along with economic development, such tendency does not explain the gap between the two (not a clear positive correlation), once specific approaches of political participation are taken into consideration. The differences between the two factors are manifest in three aspects: (i) The process of modernization, however irregular, usually evolves with time and is irreversible. In many cases, the level of political participation can vary greatly in a short period of time, experiencing sharp expansion (participation explosion) or shrinkage; (ii) many of the differences in way of political participation in certain societies are not determined by the different levels of social and economic development these societies have; and (iii) likewise, the different participation rates seen in each region are not necessarily the result of the different social and economic modernization stages they are in.

Apart from promoting changes in the modes of political participation, modernization has also facilitated the transformation of the bases of such participation from the traditional ones (patrons-protégés and social groups) to the modern ones (classes, interest groups, political parties), with the latter not necessarily undermining the role
of the former. In short, approaches to and bases of political participation in a modern society are more complicated and varied than in a traditional society.\textsuperscript{16}

As a rule, a consensus has been reached that political participation and social and economic modernization are interconnected. Conclusions based on such consensus are evident in literatures concerning empirical studies on specific approaches of political participation. First, political participation is associated with the social status of the participants, including sex, places of residence, ages, professions, incomes, education levels, and what audiovisual contents they consume. At the microlevel, every factor has its own influence on political participation in different environments of different societies to some extent.\textsuperscript{17} Second, which organization the participant is in is perhaps a more important factor than his social and economic status in elaborating differences in political participation at the meso-level. Third, the relationship between religion, ethnicity, region, and political participation is as close as that between social status and political participation at the meso-level.\textsuperscript{18}

\subsection*{2.2.2 Approaches to Political Participation}

In the study of politics, although the definition of political participation varies, the following approaches to political participation are generally agreed upon, as summarized by Ikuo Kabashima: (i) Voting. As the most popular political activity, voting requires little effort in participation compared with other political activities. Although imperfect as an approach to express political willingness, voting imposes great pressure on politicians and all people are influenced by the outcome; (ii) election campaigns, referring to participants persuading acquaintances and friends to vote for their preferred candidates, donating or raising funds for candidates and political parties, and helping run the election campaigns; (iii) regional activities, referring to taking part in citizen and resident activities in order to solve regional issues or to launch political activities with others. Regional activities include all political actions except voting, election campaigns, and other


\textsuperscript{17}Japanese scholar Ikuo Kabashima divides these factors into four categories to interpret their respective influence on political participation. See Kabashima (1989), 13–14.

\textsuperscript{18}Ikuo Kabashima summarizes the research findings of Samuel P. Huntington, Jorge I. Dominguez, Norman H. Nie, Sidney Verba and Anthony M. Orum on the relationship between political participation and racial, religious and regional differences: “The differences in religions, races and regions result in conflicting ideologies between different groups in the organization and drive citizens to take part in politics.” For more details of Anthony M. Orum’s research on the relationship between races and political participation, see Orum (1989), 288–290. Works of other scholars can be seen in aforementioned notes.
activities involving dealing with bureaucrats for participants themselves or their families. The pressure on the government varies depending on specific activities participants take part in; (iv) individual contacts, referring to dealing with bureaucrats for participants themselves or their families; and (v) violence: this approach to political participation is conducted “outside the legal framework,” while the other four are “within the legal framework.” Violence is the power to influence government’s decision by physically harming others or damaging personal properties. Acts of violence include coups and assassinations aimed at overthrowing leaders, creating chaos and riots designed to influence government’s decision, revolutions attempting to overthrow a political system, and so on. These phenomena usually occur in political systems where citizens do not enjoy full rights of political participation. Even if they do, the minorities in society and those who have strong political ambition are likely to resort to violence. Governments use legitimate means such as policemen and armed forces to deal with such political participation, which usually results in bloody riots.\(^\text{19}\) Norman H. Nie and Sidney Verba divide political participation into four models (or four forms): (i) voting; (ii) election campaigns; (iii) citizens’ active contacts; and (iv) cooperative activities.\(^\text{20}\) In their practical studies, Norman H. Nie and Sidney Verba did not ignore the fifth form—protests and other such activities, including parades, demonstrations, and other more direct ones.\(^\text{21}\) Lester Milbrath distinguished fourteen forms of political participation at different levels (see the list below).\(^\text{22}\)

Levels of political participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Working for a political party or government</th>
<th>Decision-making activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Serving as candidates for public office</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political fund-raising</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participating in a decision-making conference</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Becoming an active member of a political party</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engaging in a political campaign</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participating in a political meeting or rally</td>
<td>Transitional activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donating to a political party or candidate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Getting in touch with civil servants or party leaders</td>
<td>On-looking activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wearing signs or sticking slogans on vehicles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trying to persuade others to vote</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizing political discussions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participating in election campaigns</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Susceptible to political influence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\(^\text{21}\)Ibid., 319.

Almond and Powell Jr. hold that citizens have two forms of political engagement. One is participants’ activities. In these activities, ordinary citizens attempt to influence the making of policies. There are three basic forms of participants’ activities: (i) expression of interests—through small-scale engagement, and informal and formal group activities; (ii) aggregation of interests—by voting in elections and working for a party’s campaigns; and (iii) policy-making—by engaging in a referendum and participating in township meetings and workers’ meetings. The other one is national activities. In these activities, ordinary citizens are part of the implementation of policies, to which citizens respond as taxpayers, as welfare recipients, or simply as law-abiding persons. There are four basic forms of national activities: (i) resource providers—taxpayers, conscripts, and jurors; (ii) resource obtainers—social security recipients, welfare recipients, and recipients of veterans’ benefits; (iii) behavior administrators—obeying the law, parents sending children to school, and manufacturers complying with safety regulations; and (iv) symbolic recipients and providers—swearing allegiance, listening to political speeches, and voting in non-competitive elections. In specific studies, Almond and Powell Jr. listed the four most important forms of political participation of Chinese citizens: (i) formal political participation in national institutions, mainly the election of people’s representatives; (ii) participation in mass movements; (iii) political learning and discussion; and (iv) participation in the internal affairs at grassroots levels.

Although definitions of political participation vary, the government and the citizens always oppose each other during the latter’s political participation. From the perspective of social control, political participation not only represents citizens’ control of the government, but also means that governments can control citizens by involving them in government institutions.

There are some relatively common problems which can be called “flaws” related to political participation in most studies: (i) Voting is taken as the indicator of political participation with high voter turnout indicating the high level of political participation and then determining the degree of democracy; (ii) the study of the abnormal phenomena of political participation as a form of control used by both a government and its citizens is ignored, especially the study of the abnormal behavior of the government in political participation. This has caused a misunderstanding that citizens are the beneficiaries who hold the initiative in the political participation and that citizens will benefit as long as they participate in politics; (iii) general rules of one’s social and political life cannot be concluded only by quantitative research on individuals as a participating unit; (iv) as many forms of political participation cannot be determined through quantitative analyses and sampling surveys, conclusions drawn from such methods may be inaccurate, or even far-fetched; (v) some studies fail to examine political participation within the context of political development and neglected its social circumstances; and (vi) studies on the outcomes of political participation are insufficient.

---

24 Ibid., 594–596.
2.2.3 Types of Political Participation

Neither this chapter nor this paper is devoted to providing a final definition of political participation. The analysis of the types of political participation in this chapter aims to help define the concept of “political participation” in this paper.

Diachronic and synchronic approaches are adopted in classifying political participation. The diachronic approach deals with the development of a democracy through time. Diachronically, political participation is classified into two types based on the democratic system by which a state is governed. They are capitalist political participation and socialist political participation. The synchronic approach deals with the degree of political participation at a particular period of time. Synchronically, political participation is classified into following three types based on whether a citizen is capable of exercising his rights over issues concerning his interests and takes actions to defend them. They are voluntary participation, mobilized participation, and passive participation. Voluntary political participation refers to actions citizens voluntarily take to influence political process over issues concerning their own interests and needs. Mobilized political participation refers to actions taken to influence political process by citizens mobilized by others or answering the call of the government. Passive political participation refers to citizen being consciously or subconsciously indifferent toward political issues or acting passively in political activities. These three types of political participation are difficult to differentiate in real life because of the dynamic relations among them.  

Variables correlated with citizen political participation can be used to classify political participation. By examining whether people are motivated internally or externally, political participation can be classified into three types: voluntary participation (internal forces), passive participation (external forces, individuals as participating units), and organized participation (external forces, individuals in interest groups as participating units). In terms of its outcomes, political participation can also be classified into three types: passive participation (neutral), destructive participation (malign), and active participation (benign). In terms of its relationship with political institutions, political participation is classified into three types: institutional political participation (legal), non-institutional political participation (may or may not be legal), and marginal participation (reasonable but illegal, reasonable but illegal for now, or reasonable and may probably become legal in the future). The classification of political participation in this paper is based on its relationship with institutions.

Social transformation facilitates more participation, resulting in more people attempting to influence the government in various ways. Whether higher participation causes instability largely depends on the level of institutionalization of the government. Poorly institutionalized governments cannot meet people’s demand for political participation and see all forms of social instability, such as demonstrations,

---

strikes, chaos, violent and non-violent activities to overturn the government, and ubiquitous corruption. Poorly institutionalized governments can also be easily manipulated by emerging interest groups who seek to influence decision-making to better serve their own interests, which will inevitably lead to social instability, such as bribery by the rich, student riots, worker strikes, public demonstrations, and even military coups in some countries. A well-institutionalized political party can socialize citizens that are more interested in and have more demands for political participation, so that they will comply with the political behavior norms of the existing system. According to Huntington, a poorly institutionalized government will result in revolution due to its failure to satisfy the citizens’ need for participation. But how should we define the success of a revolution? Since the purpose of revolution is to establish a new political order and a highly institutionalized society, the success of a revolution depends upon the authority and stability of the resulting institutional system. If a highly institutionalized government reforms to accommodate the citizens’ increasing demand for participation, then how should we evaluate the reform? An important indicator for any reform is its effectiveness to eliminate the triggers for future revolution, rather than the value of the reform itself.

Of Huntington’s main findings, there are three points that are worth mentioning: (i) The legitimacy of modern society is generated from election, revolution, and nationalism. Accordingly, people should follow their government because it is voted through reasonably open and competitive elections; it served as a tool throughout history in establishing new and more mature society order, and it reflects the wish of a society (usually defined by race or language) to secure their unique and independent identities, free from the control of other social agencies. The three sources of legitimacy all have their corresponding administrations. Electoral legitimacy requires an electoral system and competitive political parties. Revolutionary legitimacy needs a well-developed ideology implemented by a dominant party in the system. Nationalism requires no specific administrative body because it is often related to the electoral legitimacy and revolutionary legitimacy; (ii) it has been proven that the Communist Party is the most successful revolutionary because it follows the theories of Leninism, which are highly effective in political organizations. Thus, a new political order may be established, featuring the synergy of civic participation and good governance; and (iii) to some extent, the stability of the government of a modern country depends on its ability to reform in rural areas. A reform that starts with satisfying the requirements of the intellectuals in cities is very likely to trigger revolution. This is because the intellectuals tend to be revolutionaries due to their sense of insecurity, feelings of alienation and guilt, and an urgent need for personal safety. In contrast, the reform that answers the demands of peasants will avoid revolution since land owners are the most conservative. No group is more revolutionary than peasants who own small lands or pay too much rent.26 Apply these arguments to the current political situation in China, and we come to the following conclusions: The

26These arguments are summarized by the author. For interested readers, please refer to the work of Samuel P. Huntington. *Political Order in Changing Societies.* Also, Huntington and Jorge I. Dominguez. *Political Development.*
Chinese government now enjoys ample sources of legitimacy (election, revolution, and nationalism); China has a well-institutionalized political system with strong capacities. A political system should be able to mobilize resources, distribute goods and services, regulate behaviors, and improve its abilities in other areas in order to realize its objectives. Western scholars have proven that compared with previous Chinese governments, the Government of People’s Republic of China has significantly improved the four capacities mentioned above, thus enabling further enhancement in government work. The reforms in China started in rural areas, which laid a solid foundation for future reforms and provided precedents and experiences to learn from. These reforms have provided proper access to political participation for citizens with increased enthusiasm.

2.2.4 Non-institutional Political Participation

Whether the study of political participation is a study of legal participation or of both legal and illegal participation is still up for debate. The author believes that the laws and characteristics of development can only be learned by examining the subject in context, for example, in social movements. This is especially true when political participation is studied. There are always conflicts between citizens and the government, no matter how developed a society may be. Conflicts are common, and so is cooperation. Some types of conflicting participation are permitted by government regulations (yet the extent and order are regulated), while others are not. Societies in transition, often with deficient institutions, have frequent occurrence of citizens violating institutional norms either consciously, willingly, and intentionally or not. Therefore, focusing on legal participation alone may limit the study of political participation. To arbitrarily classify non-institutional political participation as illegal is out of touch with the real world. It is partly due to the biased study of political participation.

Non-institutional political participation is a violation of the existing institutional norms and happens through channels of normal participation in the society. It falls into three types. The first type is characterized by emotional actions. This is because citizens are unwilling or unable to use existing participation channels or these channels are inaccessible to them. The second type happens with institutional rigidity and deficiencies. This type of resulting action can be creative or disruptive, or sometimes both. The third type is abnormal behavior of citizens when they are able to participate through normal channels. Such behavior is rational but not necessarily open.

Crane Brinton, an American historian, compared the causes, development, and results of the political revolutions in four countries during their transformation periods, including the English Revolution (the 1640s–1688s), the American Revolution (the second half of the eighteenth century), the French Revolution (1789), and the

---

Russian Revolution (1917). He then proposed the five primary causes of revolution: (i) The economies of the four countries were growing, not declining; (ii) there were severe conflicts between major social classes; (iii) many intellectuals became dissatisfied with the regime before revolution; (iv) the most distinctive feature was the dysfunction of governments; and (v) the ruling classes were riddled with corruption before revolution. In addition to studying the causes of revolution, Anthony M. Orum raised five important questions that must be addressed in estimating the possibilities of revolutions in all societies: (i) What is the nature of the society? Where is its economy heading, if it is heading somewhere? (ii) Who are excluded from social and political power distribution? (iii) How are they excluded? Who controls the means of exclusion? What is the extent of exclusion? What does it include? Does it include, for example, military weapons or propaganda? (iv) Do the organizations that inevitably lead to the movement have sufficient sources of spiritual and material strength? and (v) Are there signs of discontent? Is it difficult for discontent to come onto the surface? How likely is it to degenerate into non-political, rather than political upheaval? Based on the studies of Brinton and others, Orum proposed five indicators that were crucial to predicting social movements, which also shed some light on the causes of non-institutional participation. (i) The nature of society, i.e., which stage of development a society is in, is key in determining whether political participation is institutional or non-institutional; (ii) as social transformation proceeds, those who are excluded from social and political power distribution will naturally demand to share the gains and are highly likely to achieve their goal by non-institutional participation; (iii) the means and extent of government control determine the consequence of non-institutional participation; (iv) the organizations involved decide the scale of the non-institutional participation; and (v) the approaches of non-institutional participation depend on the participants’ attitude toward and understanding of the issues in question.

This paper classifies non-institutional participation solely on the basis of the citizen–institution relationship and focuses on actions rather than attitudes. The concept of political participation for this paper is not yet defined so far. As the paper is dedicated to the study of the political participation of Chinese peasants, the following points need to be clarified. The political participation of Chinese peasants refers to activities through which peasants influence the government and its decision-making process. (i) The peasant–government conflict is a theme of the whole paper; (ii) though peasants are now taking different jobs, they are still regarded as one social group in this paper. The rural population that has taken different jobs will be discussed differently further on; (iii) the case studies of this paper make clear distinctions between political activities and attitude—the two variables in political participation—and only focus on activities; (iv) since the topic of this paper is the political participation of peasants, the political participation of the civil servants or politicians who work closely with peasants will not be discussed, though they have a huge impact on peasants. The difference between village officials and peasants must be clarified. Village officials are indeed peasants, but they are responsible

2.2 Political Participation

for managing the village. Therefore, while peasants take part in politics on and off, often in their spare time, village officials and sometimes township officials act like professionals in politics; (v) the goal of political participation is to influence the government, which is deemed authority to allocate social resources, with legitimate decision-making power. In rural areas, local CPC township committees and village party branches, as well as the administrative organs at county, municipal, provincial, and state levels, have the authority to allocate resources. Peasants make all these efforts just so that the authorities will accept their demands, even the demand to replace the decision-makers. This paper analyzes the peasants’ actions not permitted by the governmental institutions, which include protests, demonstrations, and other radical behaviors, but does not discuss whether they are in line with the existing rules and regulations or not. However, intentional illegal provocations to governments will not be considered; and (vi) some peasants take part in politics out of their own will, while others may be mobilized. Several scholars confine their research to voluntary participation. In reality, however, only a handful of people take part in politics voluntarily. This is true not only for peasants, but also for workers and intellectuals. Mobilized political participation is more effective in swaying the government. In light of this, the paper studies both voluntary and mobilized non-institutional participation of peasants.

References


