Chapter 2
The Resilient Mind-Set and Deterrence

Theo Brinkel

Je suis rentré chez moi à pied, traversant la moitié de Bruxelles, longeant le quartier des institutions européennes – cette forteresse lugubre, entourée de taudis. Le lendemain, je suis allé voir un imam à Zaventem. Et le surlendemain – le lundi de Pâques – en présence d’une dizaine de témoins, j’ai prononcé la formule rituelle de conversion à l’islam.
(Michel Houellebecq, Soumission. Flammarion 2015, 257).

Abstract Finding themselves in an ideological competition with Russian nationalism and extreme Islamic jihadism, European societies need to mobilise their moral resources to provide themselves with the sense of purpose necessary to face down and neutralise the influence of current threats. The ambition of this chapter is to explore if and how Western societies can mentally arm themselves against such threats and whether the concept of resilience can play a role in this. Two options present themselves. The isolationist option aims at closing off society from outward threats and maintaining the status quo. The other option sees resilience as renewal. This one lends itself as a useful interpretative framework to further study of the resilience of the home front as a contribution to deterrence. It seeks to influence the international context in such a way that the core values of society are thought anew, modernised or made to work in a new context.

Keywords Deterrence · EU · Hybrid warfare · ISIS · Jihadism · NATO · Populism · Putin · Resilience · Trump · Values

Contents
2.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................. 20
2.2 Home Front Under Threat ....................................................................................... 22
2.3 Vulnerability of the West .......................................................................................... 23

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2.1 Introduction

“We, the Heads of State and Government of the North Atlantic Alliance, stand united in our resolve to maintain and further develop our individual and collective capacity to resist any form of armed attack. In this context, we are today making a commitment to continue to enhance our resilience against the full spectrum of threats, including hybrid threats, from any direction. Resilience is an essential basis for credible deterrence and defence and effective fulfilment of the Alliance’s core tasks.” Thus declared the heads of state and government of NATO at the Summit in Warsaw in 2016. They used a fairly new word in security speak: resilience.

Over the last few years, the word resilience has emerged in debates on security in the West in the context of ISIS attacks on European soil and of threats originating in Russia. The downing of civil airliner MH 17 in the summer of 2014 over the territory of Ukraine, with 298 people on board, among whom 196 Dutch nationals, shows how a regional conflict can have direct effects in countries that seemingly had nothing to do with it. Similarly, ISIS, operating in Iraq and Syria, is hurting Western societies, not only because of the terrorist attacks in European cities, but also because individuals in Western societies are attracted to the battle ISIS claims to be fighting. Furthermore, war in the Middle East and North Africa causes thousands of people to flee and apply for asylum in Europe, putting another kind of pressure on societies there.

In the meantime, public opinion in the West sailed its own course. In 2016 Dutch voters said no in a referendum on the question whether the Netherlands should ratify the Trade Agreement between the EU and Ukraine. A little later the United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union. And in the United States of America Donald Trump was elected as the new president on a platform of putting “America first”. In these cases, the outcome seems to have been influenced by the sentiment among broad groups in society to seek security in turning away from international developments. It has been branded as a wave of populist politics.

On a deeper level, mainstream Western leaders find themselves in a new ideological competition. On one side, there is populism, with its main example in Vladimir Putin, the president of the Russian Federation. On the other side, there is the amalgamation of jihadist groups and individuals, of which currently ISIS is the

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1 NATO 2016.
2 There are numerous sources underlining this. One example may be Foreign Affairs November/December 2016.
main proponent. And thirdly, there is the traditional Western world that claims to stand for values of freedom, democracy and the rule of law. Western governments find themselves steering between the Scylla of increased pressure from Russia and jihadism on the one hand and the Charybdis of the desire to keep increasingly isolationist voters satisfied. They find it hard to answer these ideological challenges with the need for unity and solidarity that the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union are supposed to uphold.

Many authors have tried to understand the currents at work in these developments. In his reaction to the terrorist attacks on 13 November 2015 in Paris, in the Dutch journal *Trouw* Philippe Bilger, former advocate general in France, said that we can’t win the battle (against terrorism, *ThB*) with the technical solutions that are now constantly debated. I know for sure, he said, that we need to offer an alternative to a belief that commends death. We need something more solid, something that is useful in peacetime as well. We need to look for the conviction that our idea of living together is as strong as their sick ideas. This is the very problem that this chapter wishes to explore.

The ambition is to find if and how Western societies can mentally arm themselves against such kinds of ideological threats and whether the concept of resilience can play a role in this. The provisional assumption is that a resilient society enhances overall mental deterrence against hybrid or terrorist attacks. In NATO parlance, deterrence is seen as the ability to discourage an opponent from taking an unwelcome action. This can be done through deterrence by punishment (i.e. the threat of retaliation) or through deterrence by denial (blocking the opponents ambitions). Especially in view of hybrid warfare, deterrence cannot be limited to military force only. As will be discussed below, hybrid warfare as employed by Russia involves a set of instruments, most of which in fact are non-military in nature.

Unquestionably, the presence of NATO’s Very High Readiness Joint Task Force in countries under threat, such as the Baltic Republics, is essential to deterrence. But deterring hybrid war will subsequently also require non-kinetic means, such as increased resilience of cyber networks, diversification of energy supplies, and strategic communications. Such measures make up “deterrence-by-resilience”; together, they are meant to dissuade the opponent by demonstrating that his threat is futile.

This idea is as follows: Finding themselves in an ideological competition, European societies need to mobilise their moral resources to provide the people with the sense of purpose necessary to face down and neutralise the effect and influence of current threats. This raises questions such as: How are these threats

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3 Several names are used to designate this terrorist group: Islamic State, Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. Daesh is an Arabic acronym that is used in France as well. For the sake of simplicity, this chapter uses the acronym ISIS. See amongst others: ICG 2014.

4 Bilger 2015.

5 NATO 2015.
relevant to our societies? And how can we deter them? Can the answer be found in the notion of resilience? How can resilience as a concept be used to enhance deterrence?

This chapter will first try to map the problem at hand and will attempt to indicate in what way Western societies have become vulnerable to ideological challenges resulting from hybrid warfare and terrorism that originate in other parts of the world. Next, this chapter will investigate if and how the values on which Western societies are based are losing attractiveness. Then, the emergence of the resilience debate will be described, as well as the way theoretical elements of this debate can be applied to current security issues. It should be noted here that this chapter does not deal with engineering aspects of resilience, e.g. the protection of critical infrastructure, cyber capabilities and other physical aspects of defence, but primarily with non-kinetic notions of morale, the mind-set of the society. The chapter will mainly have an agenda-setting character, signalling the importance of the subject and setting out markers for policy development. These will be presented in the concluding paragraphs of this contribution.

2.2 Home Front Under Threat

Resilience can be seen as a strategy for dealing with threats and shocks. This paragraph will look at threats that sometimes express themselves as shocks or disasters and that have been captured with the term hybrid warfare. Today, they mostly originate from along the Eastern and Southern borders of Europe. The term hybrid warfare—which will be dealt with extensively elsewhere in this volume—has been applied to the Russian aggression towards Ukraine in 2014 and the attacks of ISIS over the last three years in Paris, Brussels, Nice, Berlin or Istanbul. In these cases, the resilience of Western societies came under threat—indirectly as well as directly. In both cases the “lethality of state conflict” was mixed with “the fanatical and protracted fervour of irregular warfare”.6

The most cited Russian source on hybrid warfare is an article written by general Valeri Gerasimov, Chief of Staff of the Russian armed forces. As is described in the chapter by Han Bouwmeester elsewhere in this volume, Gerasimov’s article appeared in February 2013 under the title “The Value of Science in Prediction”. His article contains an analysis of how the West operated in the last 25 years, but it also reveals the current thinking in the Russian armed forces. Gerasimov noted how non-military action was far more effective than the use of force, especially in the field of information, psychological warfare and communication.7 Gerasimov himself uses the term non-linear warfare and stresses the importance of information warfare, which is aimed at influencing the morale of the society of the opponent.

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6 Lasonjarias and Larsen 2015, p. 3.
7 Perry 2015, p. 6.
Hybrid warfare can be defined as “... the true combination and blending of various means of conflict, both regular and unconventional, dominating the physical and psychological battlefield with information and media control, using every possible means to reduce one’s exposure”. Activities are aimed to mislead, cause confusion through psychological warfare, propaganda and media manipulation and cyber attacks. The purpose is to test the political will power and credibility of Western deterrence. In hybrid warfare there is not always a clearly demarcated war theatre. Frequently irregular troops are involved and the battle is often waged among the population. These conflicts are also played out in the virtual domain and through information and disinformation in so-called social media.

In the case of Russia, the opponent is a state. However, the Russian state uses non-state proxies, such as ethnic Russian nationalist insurgents. In the case of Syria, ISIS has been defined as a terrorist organisation, although it currently has features of a state and defines itself as an Islamic State. One may also take the example of Hezbollah, which is a political party that takes part in Lebanese politics, a religious social movement, as well as an armed group that in the view of Western governments is considered a terrorist organisation. The distinction between state and non-state actors has thus become blurred.

2.3 Vulnerability of the West

The terrorist attacks in Europe or the downing of the MH 17 show that our own societies are directly affected. However, insecurity is not the only consequence of such acts. With each shock, the vulnerability of Western society is highlighted. Underneath the incidents, more structural developments can be discerned, such as a decline of social cohesiveness in Western societies. As a result of these phenomena, the morale of Western societies has become involved.

Many analysts have raised this issue. In his seminal work on long-term social changes, “Bowling Alone”, Robert Putnam sees a connection between declining social capital and civic disengagement. When, he argues, social capital loses in quality we will be more and more inclined to free-rider behaviour and neglect our civic duties that make possible the functioning of democracy. In the Netherlands Kim Putters argues that as a society, we are losing a shared commitment that is based upon shared prosperity and freedom, together with trust in political leaders who, and the institutions which, are supposed to make that happen.

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8 Lasonjarias and Larsen 2015, p. 3.
9 Osinga 2016b, p. 18.
10 Fjäder 2014, p. 117.
Putters’ analysis is based on trends in Dutch society, but these developments can be seen in other Western countries as well. There are growing divisions between rich and poor, the highly educated and the less educated, young and old, different ethnic backgrounds and the stronger and the more vulnerable social groups. Especially among the poorer, less educated and older parts of the population, there is an increased feeling of insecurity, because of the economic and financial crisis, the influx of refugees and other immigrants, terrorist attacks, and insecurity in the labour market.\textsuperscript{13} To this, Fareed Zakaria added the factors of the openness and therefore vulnerability of Western economies and societies to the global market and the resulting loss of traditional jobs as well as high public debts and as a result a limited room for manoeuvre for government spending.\textsuperscript{14}

According to Cas Mudde, mainstream political parties appeared to be powerless in the face of two developments: the transfer of power to supranational entities such as the EU and the IMF as well as the transfer of power from elected politicians to non-elected functionaries such as bankers and lawyers.\textsuperscript{15} Concepts of belief, truth, the preparedness to bring sacrifices for the common good have weakened to such an extent that we feel threatened by people who are prepared to fight and die for an ideal.\textsuperscript{16} Such trends have made many in the public in the West more impressionable to alternative influences of populists and radicals.

One of the alternatives is presented by the rise of populist parties and politicians in many Western countries, which at the time of the writing of this chapter culminated in the election of Donald Trump as president of the United States. The character of populist politics may differ per country, but all its politicians perceive themselves as the mouthpiece of the common man. They express distrust of mainstream politics and share a nationalistic, isolationist or even xenophobic political view and an incredible bad taste in general. According to Michael Kazin, Donald Trump, during his election campaign saw himself as the spokesman for “working families”, “our middle class”, or “the American people”.\textsuperscript{17}

Populist leaders appear to feel ideologically close to the Russian president Putin or with his party, United Russia. Several publications have stressed the affinity of populist politics in the West with Putin’s political preferences. According to the German weekly Der Spiegel, for example, Russia has spun a tight network of right-wing leaders and movements in Europe: Marine Le Pen of the Front National in France, Mateusz Pikorski in Poland, Viktor Orbán the prime minister of Hungary, the British UK Independence Party and the extreme right-wing Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) in Germany. According to Olga Oliker,

\textsuperscript{13} Putters 2016.
\textsuperscript{14} Zakaria 2016, pp. 10–12.
\textsuperscript{15} Mudde 2016, pp. 25–30.
\textsuperscript{16} Durodié 2005a, pp. 42–43.
\textsuperscript{17} Kazin 2016, pp. 17–24.
populism differs from Putinism, but “it is notable that so many of those who seek to take Western democracies in a less pluralistic direction see Russia as a model”.

By supporting these politicians, parties, and movements, Russia hopes to create a wedge between Europe and the United States and to weaken cooperation in the West in NATO and the EU. The least that can be said about these populist movements is that they fit into Putin’s international ambitions. “It may well end in tears,” the Huffington Post wrote, “but the union between Putin and the populists is no marriage of convenience. It is true love.” To give but one example: Right after his election as prime-minister of Greece, Alexis Tsipras called for lifting the EU economic sanctions against Russia that had been introduced after the Russian annexation of the Crimea in 2014.

This populist movement has been identified above as one of the ideological competitors. The other one is the apparently much smaller group of sympathisers with jihadist extremism. In radical Islamist circles, it is argued that Western societies and secular and humanistic values have a corrupting influence on Muslims. Such views are regularly expressed in radical jihadist periodicals such as ISIS’ Dabiq or Al-Qaida’s Inspire. Furedi found that for many young people in Western Europe it has become easy to embrace Islamic counter-narratives that criticise the Enlightenment and applaud “jihadist identity politics”.

With their attacks, terrorists hope that feelings of insecurity and powerlessness among the general public are increased. The more this happens, Furedi argues, the greater the prestige of the attackers. Before ISIS became an attractive option, there has been a long-term development among young people in the West searching for a meaningful alternative. Western societies have not been able to sufficiently integrate these groups on the basis of its fundamental values.

Finding a remedy is complicated because democracy presupposes openness towards alternative ideologies and political convictions. In this line of thought, Henri Beunders finds that there is no dominant morality in Western societies anymore. Postmodernist thinking made everything relative and truth was seen as a linguistic construction of the powerful. The only moral guidelines a liberal democracy is able to produce, Francis Fukuyama argues, are the universal obligations of tolerance and mutual respect. When democracies were relatively homogeneous, this was not so much of a problem. However, societies today have become much more diverse than they had been fifty years ago. Relativism undermines democracy when the very political values upon which the political system is founded are questioned as well.

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18 Oliker 2017, p. 17.
19 Bidder 2016. See also Bidder and Witrock 2014.
20 Baggini 2016.
21 Jones et al. 2015.
22 Furedi 2015d.
23 Furedi 2015a, d.
24 Beunders 2016.
To sum up, Western societies have become vulnerable to shocks and underlying trends. Both the populist and the jihadist tendencies present radical alternatives to mainstream Western politics. Populist parties dominate the political debate. Mainstream parties find difficulty in voicing a convincing alternative. Western vulnerability can on the other hand partly be situated in the existence of marginalised groups in the societies that are impressionable for radicalisation or ideological mobilisation. In reaction, many governments say they feel the need to strengthen their resilience. Morale, in the sense of a resilient mind-set, plays an essential role in this. This is where the discussion of the concept of resilience is situated in this chapter.

2.4 The Emergence of Resilience

In an attempt to deal with these developments, debates have started in various relevant publications to include resilience within security strategies. With a bias towards the Netherlands, the following section refers to some recent papers that deal with resilience. The 2015 Dutch Clingendael Monitor, for instance, deals with the vulnerability of open, democratic and plural Western societies. They are said to be more vulnerable to threats of returning jihadists, undermining propaganda, economic pressure and cyber attacks. The Monitor notes that it is difficult to find the right answers to these developments.26 However, the Monitor leaves the question how societies can be made more resilient unanswered.

A report by the Hague Centre for Strategic Studies on resilience building makes some sound remarks on the subject. It says that resilience essentially makes up the immunity system of a society against conflicts. With that, the report points at people and social structures that help prevent conflicts from breaking out and that spring back once they have started.27 The report, however, concentrates on societies of countries where stabilisation operations are taking place. The focus in this chapter is on domestic resilience in the sense of the mind-set of Western societies in response to external threats. This specific field of research is relatively underexplored.

Domestic resilience is only implicitly referred to in the Netherlands’ government policy white paper on International Security of 2014 (Beleidsbrief Internationale Veiligheid), where the remark is made that nowadays our convictions regarding freedom of religion and speech, democracy and rule of law are ever more openly questioned.28 The concept of resilience is discussed more extensively in the Dutch national Counter-terrorism Strategy. There, resilience is predominantly seen as an instrument in preventing fear of and support for terrorism. Resilience is discussed in the field of communication with the general public as well as in strengthening the

26 Rood et al. 2015.
27 HCSS 2016, p. 7.
28 NL Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014b, p. 5.
mind-set among groups where potential supporters for radicalisation and extremist or jihadist ideologies can be found. According to the Counter-terrorism Strategy, suspect behaviour will be monitored and counteracted, and cooperation will be sought with educational institutions, associations, groups in society, and professionals. Terrorist websites will be removed and violent extremist narratives will be counteracted. ²⁹

The Global Strategy document of the European Union is one of the few policy papers that has tackled the moral dimension of resilience. It builds upon the premise that we “… live in times of existential crisis, within and beyond the European Union”. It reasons that resilience makes up an important element of the EU strategy and it sees values as central to that. The document says: “To engage responsibly with the world, credibility is vital. The EU’s credibility hinges on our unity, on our many achievements, our enduring power of attraction, the effectiveness and consistency of our policies, and adherence to our values.” These are said to be the values that were at the basis of the EU’s foundation, i.e. respect for and defence of human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law. Living up to these values internally and externally is seen as the most crucial of all measures, and as “the strongest antidote we have against violent extremism”. ³⁰

As was seen at the beginning of this chapter, the 2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw recognised the importance of resilience, mainly in the sense of civil preparedness, the sense of strengthening continuity of government, continuity of essential services and security of critical civilian infrastructure. ³¹ In a short piece on the same subject, NATO’s Jamie Shea argues that as the world has become more globalised, complex and confrontational, resilience has become a main topic among NATO’s leaders. Shea sees two challenges: one is to make sure that troops and materiel can be deployed rapidly to every relevant hot-spot within alliance territory, the other is the ability to anticipate, identify, mitigate and recover from hybrid attacks in such a way that the social, political and military cohesion is least affected. ³²

What the above-mentioned documents have in common is that the importance of moral resilience, the mind-set of the home front, is mentioned, but generally as a sideline that does not (yet) merit research on its own term. The EU Global Strategy paper is an important exception. Before we turn our attention to the mind-set of the home front, in the following sections we will try to learn more about the term resilience.

³⁰ EEAS 2016.
³¹ NATO 2016.
³² Shea 2016.
2.5 Resilience Theory and Security

The emergence of the concept of resilience in security policies runs parallel with the rise of the academic debate on the concept. In the field of security studies, this discussion has come up in relation to the hybrid character of warfare. Hybrid threats and attacks do not occur along the border between two opponents only, but can strike at the heart of the societies involved as well. Hybrid warfare is a challenge to traditional distinctions between war and peace, military and non-military instruments, between conventional and irregular warfare, and between perceptions of security at home and security abroad.

Resilience research started in ecology studies and psychology. The latter was mainly oriented at the capacity of individuals to recover from traumas and distress. The focus in the former was on concern for the decay of ecosystems and the capacity of ecosystems to recover from disturbances and shocks. From there, research broadened to the capacity of economic systems to recover from crises, to disaster management of societies to withstand and recover from disasters such as earthquakes. Recently, resilience as a concept has been extended to the way societies deal with (the threat of) terrorist attacks.\(^33\)

Rodin has made a useful definition of resilience in a general sense. According to her resilience is “...the capacity of any entity—an individual, a community, an organization, or a natural system—to prepare for disruptions, to recover from shocks and stresses, and to adapt and grow from a disruptive experience”.\(^34\) Martin-Breen and Anderies define a system as a “collection of agents and relationships among those agents”. A system may be a village, a region, a nation or the whole world.\(^35\) In Rodin’s definition three types of resilience can be discerned: resilience as (1) the capacity to recover, as (2) the capacity to adapt and as (3) the capacity to grow. We will have a brief look at these three types of resilience.

Resilience as the capacity to recover, also called coping or engineering resilience, is aimed at the ability of a social system to survive after a shock and return to its pre-existing state. According to this type of resilience a social system is capable of returning to a situation of stability after a temporary disturbance, or to continue functioning in a situation of instability. Another term used in this category is robustness.\(^36\) Much of the appreciation of resilience in government white papers or in NATO-related publications belongs to this category. Recommendations in this sphere are the ability of basic infrastructure to bounce back after a shock, the level of preparedness of society against terrorist attacks, counter-terrorist measures or emergency plans. An example of engineering resilience is the way cyber security is discussed in the Dutch policy paper on Defence Cyber Strategy. There, digital resilience is discussed in various paragraphs, but within the context of making the

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\(^33\) Frerks 2015, p. 490.
\(^34\) Rodin 2015, p. 3.
\(^35\) Martin-Breen and Anderies 2011.
\(^36\) Keck and Sakdapolrak 2013, pp. 6–7; Rodin 2015, p. 50; also Fjäder 2014, p. 12.
digital Defence network safe against attacks and capable of functioning as intended after a crisis has taken place.\textsuperscript{37}

This concept of resilience runs parallel to Bourbeau’s categorisation of resilience as maintenance: a way of constructing a shock with the intention to use resources and energies to maintain the status quo. Measures that serve the continuation of the status quo are formulated in such a way that the status quo is legitimized. Shocks are constructed as dangerous. According to Bourbeau an example of this can be found in the way the public debate on migration is framed in many Western countries.\textsuperscript{38}

The second type of resilience has been labelled adaptive resilience. It describes the ability of a system to adapt to changing future threats, to absorb shocks and reorganise in order to preserve the same essential structure, function and identity. This category takes change into account whilst keeping the functionality of a social system, such as food, water, housing, health-care, intact. In times of stability, changes may be gradual; in times of crisis they may be rapid.\textsuperscript{39} Giegerich also takes this approach when he defines resilience as the ability of societies to manage threats and risks, to adapt and to recover without losing the ability to provide basic functions and services.\textsuperscript{40}

The third type of resilience is related to the capacity to grow, often described as the transformative capacities of complex adaptive systems. According to Martin-Breen and Anderies this extends beyond the system itself and envisages the ability of a system to change the landscape of stability and create a fundamentally new one when ecologic, economic or social structures have become untenable.\textsuperscript{41} Therefore, according to Osinga, in complex adaptive systems, resilience is best defined as the ability to withstand, recover from, and reorganize in response to crises.\textsuperscript{42} What changes under crisis is the understanding of normality. In the words

\textsuperscript{37} NL Ministry of Defence 2015.

\textsuperscript{38} Bourbeau 2015b, pp. 177–178. What Bourbeau is looking for is to theorize resilience in order to get a better understanding of some aspects of securitization theories. Resilience can help to develop hypotheses that purport to get a better understanding of how societies adapt to shocks, and to compare how societies adapted in time or how different societies adapt differently in different places. This can help with the analysis of how security performances are received, evaluated and approved by audiences. From a constructivist perspective, resilience can help provide the literature with the socio-political use of memory and myth. Constructivism sees a shock or a trauma as an interpretative moment, where governments can use the opportunity to dictate a certain narrative about the origin, the meaning or the implications. Resilience as maintenance means that reactions are informed by the intent to maintain the status quo and it means that reactions are dominated by rigidity and anxiety. When resilience is presented in this manner, it may lead to securitization. For instance “(t)he social construction of refugee movements and mass migration as a significant disturbance necessitating a resilient strategy has led, ultimately, to the securitization of migration.” See: Bourbeau and Vuori 2015, p. 389.

\textsuperscript{39} Keck and Sakdapolrak 2013, p. 7; Martin-Breen and Anderies 2011, pp. 6–7.

\textsuperscript{40} Giegerich 2016, p. 69.

\textsuperscript{41} Martin-Breen and Anderies 2011, p. 38.

\textsuperscript{42} Osinga 2016a, p. 46.
of Bourbeau, this opens up the focus on the possibility of renewal of self-organisation, rearrangement and reorientation.\textsuperscript{43}

This third approach can therefore also be seen as what Bourbeau in another context calls resilience as renewal.\textsuperscript{44} A crisis can, thus interpreted, be used as an opportunity to transform basic policy assumptions and reshape social structures. Bourbeau took the migration crisis in Europe as an example. A society that chooses resilience as renewal, he reasons, can use the crisis as a trigger to reform its understanding of migration, diversity in society and integration and then develop a new policy in the field of citizenship and refugees.\textsuperscript{45} Such new understandings do not emerge in a vacuum, but build on experiences from the past, on collective memories and social history. In this way, in the words of Bourbeau, a crisis can be seen as an “interpretative moment”.\textsuperscript{46}

As the resilience debate has come up in the context of hybrid warfare, where communication, narratives and images play a crucial role, these points deserve some further exploration. Bourbeau’s findings can be situated in securitization theories, which deal with perceptions, justifications and the framing of security. Current government policies dealing with resilience are informed by the perception that we are dealing with threats against which a total defence is impossible. Nevertheless, Coaffee and Wood argue, governments can influence the way risks are dealt with.\textsuperscript{47} According to these authors, after the al-Qaida attacks on New York and London, a new protective and regulative state has emerged, which is expressed in terms of resilience rhetoric and which involves the spread of responsibilities for security over all layers of government, private organisations and citizens themselves. This rhetoric has replaced conceptions of emergency planning and civil protection from the Cold War era.\textsuperscript{48}

In the words of Bourbeau, the “cultural regime” informs the way a society adapts to shocks.\textsuperscript{49} The way people handle an emergency or a disaster is shaped by the cultural narrative that forms expectations and that sensitizes people more for one problem than for another. Furedi points at reactions to the notorious London smog of December 1952. Although 4000 people were killed in it, nobody at that time interpreted this as a disaster. He notes that “…perceptions regarding causation are shaped by a cultural script that seeks to endow events, especially extreme ones, with meaning.”\textsuperscript{50}

This is where the mind-set, the morale, of a society, comes in: it affects resilience to security threats and openness to the future. Bourbeau’s interpretation of

\textsuperscript{43} Bourbeau 2015b, p. 175.
\textsuperscript{44} Bourbeau 2015a, pp. 384–385.
\textsuperscript{45} Bourbeau 2015b, pp. 181–182.
\textsuperscript{46} Bourbeau 2015a, p. 375.
\textsuperscript{47} Coaffee and Wood 2006, p. 505.
\textsuperscript{48} Coaffee and Wood 2006, p. 514.
\textsuperscript{49} Bourbeau 2015a, p. 382.
\textsuperscript{50} Furedi 2007, p. 484.
resilience as renewal lends itself as a useful interpretative framework to further study of the resilience of the home front as a contribution to deterrence. It incorporates elements such as the ambition to actively influence the context in which the social system is supposed to operate. It also allows for taking aspects such as cultural narrative, interpretation, or memory into account. That would make it relevant to understanding Western government policies that use the concept of resilience to deal with hybrid threats.

2.6 Resilience Theory and Deterrence

Now that we discussed the concept of resilience, we turn to the relevance of resilience in relation to the deterrence of hybrid threats. We have seen that deterrence is the ability to discourage an opponent from taking an unwelcome action. And we will specifically look into the question how that can be enhanced through resilience of the mind-set. Two options present themselves. One aims at closing off society from outward threats and maintaining the status quo. This can be called the isolationist option and more or less follows the logic of Bourbeau’s coping resilience. The other option is in line with the concept of resilience as renewal. The choice between the two options is influenced heavily by the interpretation of the vulnerability of society in the face of risks.

The isolationist option is an interpretation of threats and risks that fits Bourbeau’s concept of resilience as coping, which would mean that resilience is primarily seen as a defensive instrument against risks that come from outside and threaten us. This means that the state today has to cope with insecurity in the sense of lack of knowledge about the future, insecurity in the sense of socio-economic uncertainty and insecurity in the sense of terrorist threats. According to Ulrich Beck, on the one hand these undermine the power of the state, on the other hand these confirm the power of the state beyond democratic legitimacy. Governments are increasingly inclined to limit civil rights and freedoms in order to protect their societies against risks, which, in practice, means more control at airports, more cameras, more interception of Internet data. This only results in giving up the free and open society governments are supposed to uphold, whereas the terrorist threat is in no way abolished.

Faced with the choice between freedom and security, Beck argues, “… the vast majority of human beings seem to prioritize security, even if that means civil liberties are cut back or even suffocated.” Coaffee and Wood are even more critical in that they add that governments deliberately appropriate the terrorist threat and create a climate of fear in order to justify the building of technologically driven

control strategies. Thus the state of civil liberties in the West comes under pressure.\(^{54}\) And the need for security is in principle insatiable. With ever-tighter measures the feeling of insecurity only increases. The idea settles that the authorities have lost control over security and are on the defensive in the fight against terrorists. To the sympathisers of jihadism this only shows how powerful they are, which further encourages other “hoaxers, loners and cranks”.\(^{55}\)

The alternative may be found in the other option, which sees resilience as renewal, as future oriented and proactive. This option would be in line with Beck’s plea to tap new sources of legitimacy such as global civil society and to strive for a cosmopolitan form of government that is a counterweight to international capital and that can create a post-national order on the basis of interdependence.\(^{56}\) This option seeks to influence the international context in such a way that the core values and interests are thought anew, modernised or made to work in a new context. Such a reinvigorated orientation in the world around us starts with charting who we are, what as a society we stand for and how this can be brought forward effectively in the world that surrounds us.

This is a widely shared analysis. Resilience is only possible if, as a society, we know what we find worthwhile to defend and where we want to be heading. Durodié is convinced that currently society does not have clarity about where it stands. This position undermines all technical solutions to make society more resilient. He feels that resilience basically is not a new technology but a cultural attitude that stems from a self-confident commitment to the society and clarity about its meaning and purpose.\(^{57}\) On this basis, deterrence can be enhanced in a context of hybrid warfare.

Often the resilience debate is about technical solutions and infrastructure. But public debate about common values and objectives is seen by many authors as a contribution to social capital and therefore, trust. Rodin points to the so-called softer characteristics of resilience, such as policy, norms and behaviour, and identity.\(^{58}\) Real resilience depends on who we want to be with each other. In the words of Durodié, that is what orients society to a sense of purpose and what is needed to win the hearts and minds of our own population. People are prepared to bring sacrifices if the purpose is important enough to live for.\(^{59}\)

Identity comes to life in communities. Keck and Sakdapolrak see social capital as a central factor in building and maintaining social resilience.\(^{60}\) According to

\(^{54}\) Coaffee and Wood 2006, p. 515.
\(^{55}\) Durodié 2005a, p. 45.
\(^{56}\) Beck 2006, p. 343.
\(^{57}\) Durodié 2004. See also: Durodié 2005a, p. 52.
\(^{58}\) Rodin 2015, p. 63.
\(^{59}\) Durodié 2005b, pp. 17–19.
\(^{60}\) Keck and Sakdapolrak 2013, p. 11.
Rodin, communities react in ways that provide more than just the sum of individual connections. Members of communities feel committed to the groups they are part of, such as neighbourhoods or voluntary organisations. What results, is social capital, “the glue that holds people together” and that leads to commitment, common values and opinions, a common purpose and a feeling of identity.\textsuperscript{61} Or, to quote Putnam: “Communities with strong social networks and grassroots associations are better at confronting unexpected crises than communities that lack such civic resources. […] Social capital, the evidence increasingly suggests, strengthens our better, more expansive selves. The performance of our democratic institutions depends in measurable ways upon social capital.”\textsuperscript{62}

The existence of such communities makes a society more resilient. What you get are relatively autonomous enterprises in which participants feel committed to a common purpose. The state needs to recognise the rights and freedoms of the communities and organisations in society and not impose efficiency from above. That would mean that a resilient society is not one that is centrally coordinated from above. The state should work with social capital, foster it, and not lead it. If one of the organisations—or even the state itself—breaks down, others can take over some of its functions.\textsuperscript{63}

Thus, Martin-Breen and Anderies argue, a society comes about with multiple strategies and multiple mechanisms that can perform similar functions. Efficiency is not the most important criterion.\textsuperscript{64} From a military operational perspective, Osinga argues, the more variables are available, the more dynamic and flexible a system can be. The key is self-organization. What makes an organization resilient are patterns of varying forms of interdependence. If one pattern of interdependency is eliminated, other areas can take over their functions.\textsuperscript{65} This is recognized by the EU Global Strategy document, where it says that the resilience of society can be enhanced by deepening relations with the civil society. The EU proposes to seek better contact with cultural organizations, religious communities, social partners and human rights defenders and will defend the role of civil society abroad.\textsuperscript{66}

The paragraphs above show how the mind-set can be resilient and enhance deterrence: common values and a sense of purpose, a feeling of community and commitment of its participants. A society that believes in what it stands for, is a resilient society.

\textsuperscript{61} Rodin 2015, pp. 63–64, 193–194.
\textsuperscript{62} Putnam 2000, p. 349.
\textsuperscript{63} Martin-Breen and Anderies 2011, pp. 18, 25, 46.
\textsuperscript{64} Martin-Breen and Anderies 2011, p. 10.
\textsuperscript{65} Osinga 2016a, p. 49.
\textsuperscript{66} EEAS 2016.
2.7 Conclusions

What we tried to do in this chapter is to explore if and how Western societies can mentally arm themselves against the mental aspects of hybrid threats and whether the concept of resilience can play a role in this. We have seen that Western societies experience threats from two sources: pressure stemming from Russia on its Eastern frontier and terrorist attacks from the Middle Eastern region. These threats are of a kinetic and a non-kinetic character. Given the focus of this volume, this chapter has dealt with the latter type of threat. In the face of this, governments feel the need to strengthen resilience. The importance of moral resilience, the mind-set of the home front, is mentioned, but generally as a sideline that did not (yet) merit much research on its own term. The EU Global Strategy paper is an important exception.

In the discussion of resilience theories we have seen that, under certain conditions, a resilient society enhances overall mental deterrence against hybrid or terrorist attacks. Two alternatives were presented. The first was resilience as maintenance, a way of constructing a shock with the intention to use resources and energies to maintain the status quo. Its basic attitude was to close the society off from the world outside. The second alternative was resilience as renewal. It incorporates elements such as the ambition to actively influence the context in which the social system is supposed to operate. It also allows for taking aspects such as cultural narrative, interpretation, or memory into account. It was suggested that by stressing common values, a sense of purpose, a feeling of community and commitment, the mind-set of Western societies could be more resilient.

Pleas for a government narrative and propaganda campaigns always run the risk of getting a manipulative character if stressing values is just an instrument and not felt as an end in itself. One might suggest that shocks in the form of propaganda campaigns can be a starting point for discussions in society about values in order to build trust in the nation and in the European Union. One might argue that information, moral, psychological and ideological measures aimed at the society as a whole, and well-chosen political and military leaders are the first phase in the defence against hybrid attacks resulting in the emergence of a resilient collective mind-set.⁶⁷ Such arguments don’t work however, if the public doesn’t perceive them as authentic.

Sometimes, the message is confusing. On the one hand, Western governments can be seen as supportive of processes of democracy, respect for human rights and the fostering of the rule of law, such as during the transformation period of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe that asked for and were granted membership of the EU and NATO. On the other hand, governments of the United Kingdom or the Netherlands were hardly seen fighting for a yes-vote in the referendum campaigns on the membership of the European Union or the EU trade agreement with Ukraine. Western governments stood by, doing little to help the population when over a period of five years when Aleppo was utterly destroyed.

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⁶⁷ Bilban 2015, p. 11.
The EU can stress its values in its policy papers, but should also practise them when faced with emission fraud by the Volkswagen car manufacturers.

Resilience requires focused activity and consistency. In this era of alternative facts, post-truth, deliberate manipulation of the media by populist politicians and Russia, a passive attitude will cede the battleground to strong consistent counter-narratives that resonate easily in the echo chambers of social media. And, no matter how well constructed the narrative may be, if you don’t mean it and if you don’t act accordingly it’s all to no avail.

References


2 The Resilient Mind-Set and Deterrence 37


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