Constitutional Justice, East and West: Introduction

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A distinguished constitutional scholar recently remarked:

Given the vitality of both constitutional and statutory review in Western Europe and a few other assorted foreign places, it has gotten harder and harder for constitutional law scholars, both lawyers and political scientists, to take a completely American view. So long as judicial review was a peculiarly American phenomenon, it seemed sensible to try to explain it in peculiarly American terms. Why did Americans let their judges get away with a level of policymaking that no other people in the world would tolerate? Now we have to ask, why do so many people in so many parts of the world entrust so much of their governance to judges?¹

Why indeed? Today, the question posed by Martin Shapiro is nowhere as valid and urgent as in the new, post-communist democracies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). One of the most striking features of the ongoing transitions to democracy in these societies is the spectacular growth in the role and prominence of constitutional courts and tribunals in shaping the new constitutional order.

Before the fall of communism there existed only two constitutional tribunals in CEE: in Yugoslavia since 1963 and in Poland since 1985.² While they were not exactly sham institutions, their position was far from one that allowed the exercise of a robust constitutional review. Quite apart from legal definitions of their competence, the genuine powers of both were inevitably subject to the restrictions stemming from the Communist party rule. The position today is that all the post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe have

² It was actually in 1982 that the constitutional amendment creating the Polish Constitutional Tribunal was passed but not until 1985 that the statute on the Constitutional Tribunal, which established a specific basis for that body, was enacted. The Tribunal began its operations in January 1986. For the sake of completeness, mention should also be made of the Czechoslovakian Constitutional Court of the interwar period, although it was a rather feeble affair, see Herman Schwartz, The Struggle for Constitutional Justice in Post-Communist Europe (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 2000), pp. 29–30.
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corporal courts, and while the effectiveness of these tribunals varies, they have everywhere made a strong mark on the process of constitutional transition. Many of them have performed a wide range of constitutionally prescribed roles, including overseeing elections and referendums, deciding upon the prohibition of political parties and adjudicating on the conflicts of competences between state institutions. The most significant impact of constitutional tribunals however has been in that area which is the central focus of this book: the review of enacted law. Evaluating statutes for their consistency with the constitution is probably the most significant – and undoubtedly the most controversial – function that constitutional courts perform in CEE, and elsewhere in the world.

At least some of the constitutional courts of the region have dealt with national legislation in a manner contrary to the wish of the parliamentary majorities and governments of the day. Important aspects of laws on abortion, the death penalty, "lustration" (the screening of officials suspected of improprieties under the auspices of the ancien régime), criminal prosecution of former communist

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3 A partial exception is Estonia where, rather than setting up a conventional Constitutional Court, a separate chamber of the Supreme Court (the National Court) has been established, called the Chamber of Constitutional Control.


5 The abolition of the death penalty was decided by the constitutional courts in Lithuania, Ukraine and Hungary. For the text of the Hungarian Court's decision declaring capital punishment unconstitutional (decision 23/1990 of 31 October 1990) see Sólyom & Brunner, op. cit., at pp. 118–38; the decision was also reprinted in East European Case Reporter of Constitutional Law 1 (no. 2) (1994) at pp. 177–205.

officials responsible for crimes against the people during the communist period, economic austerity measures, fiscal policy, citizenship requirements, personal identification numbers for citizens, indexation of pensions, have all been struck down. It is no coincidence that the Hungarian Constitutional Court figures so prominently in this list of examples. It is perhaps the most activist constitutional court not only in CEE but also in the world. More importantly for present purposes, according to one of its leading commentators, "[i]t serves


8 For example, the Hungarian Constitutional Court struck down important aspects of a number of laws which were meant to constitute a package of austerity measures introduced by the Government in 1995; see e.g. decision 43/1995 of 30 June 1995 on social security benefits, reprinted in Sólyom & Brunner op. cit. at pp. 322–32.


10 In Slovenia, the Constitutional Court decided Case No. U-I-206/97, annulling on 17 June 1998 part of a law on the amendments to the Law on Foreigners. The amendments would change the required period before an immigrant could apply for permanent resident status from three to eight years. See Constitution Watch, East European Constitutional Review 7 no. 3 (1998) pp. 36–37.

11 On 13 April 1991, the Hungarian Constitutional Court declared the use of uniform personal identification numbers unconstitutional, decision 15/1991, reprinted in Sólyom & Brunner op. cit. at pp. 139–50.


as the exemplar for every new Constitutional Court in Central Europe". Some of these decisions have had enormous financial and budgetary implications; some transgressed clear and strong majority feelings and others rode roughshod over delicately crafted political compromises. There have been decisions taken on the basis of perceived irregularities in law-making procedures and in the constitutional divisions of powers among the lawmaking bodies, but far-reaching decisions have also been based on the constitutional justices' interpretations of vague and unclear constitutional substantive provisions on which reasonable people may disagree.

Constitutional discourses in and about CEE – that is, accounts and analyses of constitutional developments, produced by scholars, observers, lawyers and politicians – have not failed to recognize the momentous importance of constitutional tribunals. Indeed, in much of the scholarly discussion those courts have been credited with playing the central role in the constitutional transition from authoritarianism to democracy. They have been described as the promoters and defenders (often, nearly the only promoters and defenders) of the values of constitutionalism, the rule of law and human rights in political and legal environments contaminated by legal nihilism and marked by a disregard for individual rights and the lack of a tradition of Rechtsstaat. The following observation by Herman Schwartz, a distinguished American scholar and a perceptive student of post-communist constitutionalism, is fairly typical of the literature:

The performance of some of [the East European Constitutional] courts so far shows that despite the lack of a constitutional court tradition, men and women who don the robe of constitutional court judges can become courageous and vigorous defenders of constitutional principles and human rights, continuing the pattern shown elsewhere in the world. This is a heart-warming, feel-good story. It is a story about the courageous, principled, enlightened men and women of integrity who, notwithstanding the risks, take on the corrupt, ignorant, populist politicians. This is a story of the court as a noble “forum of principle” to be contrasted with the elected branches and their practices of horse-trading, political bargains and opportunistic deals. This is a story about impartiality against bias, selflessness versus self-interest. This is a story about respect for paramount values, announced in a Constitution, but which are not to be seen by every mortal, as they often

remain “invisible”. The story is all the better since it is linked – as in the passage from Professor Schwartz – with a global story. The men and women who don the judicial robes in Central and Eastern Europe are not alone. They belong to a small but distinguished community of constitutional judges around the world. And, consistently with “the pattern shown elsewhere in the world”, they will see to it that noble Constitutionalism will prevail over dirty politics.

It is a nice story but is it the whole story and is it an entirely accurate story? To be sure, among some of the most vocal opponents of constitutional tribunals in CEE were people like President Lukashenka of Belarus or ex-Prime Minister of Slovakia Meciar – not exactly paragons of democracy. But the nastiness of your opponents does not necessarily render you beyond any criticism. For all the importance of the emergence and growth of post-communist constitutional courts, the phenomenon has remained strangely under-theorized. Constitutional review has been applauded, celebrated and embraced with enthusiasm by constitutional observers and actors, within and without the region, but rarely have the difficult question of democratic legitimacy of those tribunals been raised.

And yet, one would think that these questions must arise whenever an unelected body exercises the power of annulling the decisions of electorally accountable bodies in a democracy, and that the best strategy for the courts themselves would be to face the problems of legitimacy squarely and openly. After all, as Alec Stone Sweet proclaims in his recent book on four powerful constitutional courts in western Europe: “When the court annuls a bill on rights grounds, it substitutes its own reading of rights, and its own policy goals, for those of the parliamentary majority”. This applies to Western and to Central/Eastern European courts alike, and not just to annulments on “rights grounds” but also on the grounds of inconsistency with such general constitutional clauses as “social justice” or “democratic state based on law”. However, the implications of this statement for the democratic theory and practice of post-communist polities have rarely been articulated in the discourse on constitutional tribunals.

In particular, rarely have the intransigent issues of political legitimacy, institutional competence, and possible infringements of the political rights of citizens been discussed. These three dimensions are, however, obviously invoked whenever the last word on the issue of rights protection or policy-setting are placed in the hands of a body which is not accountable to the electorate in the way

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16 The concept of “invisible constitution” was coined by the (then) Chief Justice of the Hungarian Court, László Sólyom, see Sólyom & Brunner op. cit. at p. 41, see also Zifcak, op. cit. at pp. 5–6.

17 Alec Stone Sweet, Governing with Judges (Oxford University Press 2000), at p. 105. Note that the phrase by Stone Sweet is not made in a critical context, and is not accompanied by an attempt to question the legitimacy of the “annulment” which is referred to in the quoted passage.
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