2 The State and the Brotherhood under Nasser and Sadat (1954-1981)

The relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian state under the reign of President Mubarak, took its roots in 1954, when the freshly made President Gamal Abdel Nasser, in an almost fatal move against its potent political rival, the Muslim Brotherhood, detained several thousands of its members in only one night. This initialled a more than decade long repression wave, which the organization itself refers to as the “great infestation”. It was also Nasser’s erection of a distinct type of state – which dramatically differed from the monarchy that preceded it, and which largely remained in place under Mubarak – that lay the foundation stone of Brotherhood state relations under Mubarak (even if the level of repression that the organization was exposed to was to fluctuate).

This chapter will, thus, start with an introduction of the Egyptian state, looking at how it can be conceptualized and at how it took shape under Nasser and Sadat. It will then proceed to introduce the Brotherhood as an organization from its foundation in 1928 until the Presidency of Nasser and will look at its development under the Presidencies of Nasser and Sadat.

2.1 The State

In 1952 a military coup d’état of the group of “Free Officers” toppled the Egyptian parliamentary monarchy and established full independence from the British. Though the British had granted Egypt formal independence in 1922, it had maintained for itself major influence in vital political as well as economic domains.

After a short period of internal power struggles in the ranks of the Free Officers,

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149 Four domains had remained fully reserved for the British from 1922 until the coup: “The security of Imperial communications in Egypt; the defence of Egypt against all foreign aggression; the protection of foreign interests and minorities in Egypt; and the Sudan”. Panayotis Vatikiotis, *The History of Modern Egypt. From Muhammad Ali to Mubarak* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1991), 272. 4th edition.
Gamal Abdel Nasser ascended to power in 1954 and erected a specific type of state that has largely remained in place under Mubarak. This section’s goal is to describe the nature of that state. Of utmost importance will be the devices and measures that it typically resorted to in its interaction with societal groups, so as to give an idea of what kind of a state it was that the Brotherhood has been struggling with under Nasser, Sadat as well as later under Mubarak.

2.1.1 The Corporatist Nature of the State

In conceptualizing the nature of the Egyptian state, many authors have drawn on the concept of corporatism. Nazih Ayubi is one of the prominent examples in that regard. This section will largely refer to his reception of corporatism, as it lends itself well to the purpose at hand. Ayubi regards corporatism as “a useful analytical tool for understanding a whole range of devices for organising and managing state/society relations”. Ayubi is also compatible with the approach chosen here, as for him state and society are in a relationship with each other that can transform them both. He draws heavily on O’Donnell’s concept of corporatism but blends it explicitly with his own insights from Gramsci.

In Ayubi’s depiction, corporatism emerges in situations of a backward capitalist development, where the state attempts to propel capitalist development through an industrialization that is directed by the state, this, however, brings

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150 For Ayubi’s notion of “corporatism” see for example Ayubi, Over-Stating the Arab State, 19-35. In his “Over-Stating the Arab State”, Ayubi not only analyses the Egyptian state but looks at the whole variety of Arab states. He views the Egyptian state as not being utterly unique but as largely adhering to one general form of rule dominant in the Middle East, though this form has different variations. For other studies that have engaged with the concept of corporatism with regards to cases other than Egypt see for example Volker Perthes, The Political Economy of Syria under Asad (London: I.B. Tauris, 1997). Hardback in 1995. For studies that have drawn on the concept of corporatism with regards to Egypt see for example Robert Bianchi, Unruly Corporatism. Associational Life in Twentieth-Century Egypt (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).

151 Ayubi, Overtstating the Arab State, 20.

152 See for example Ayubi, Overstating the Arab State, 189. Ayubi here refers to O’Donnell’s view that corporatism is “bifrontal”. For more on that see also Guillermo O’Donnell, “Corporatism and the Question of the State”, in Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America, ed. James M. Malloy (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977), 48.

153 Ayubi, Over-Stating the Arab State, 20. For O’Donnell’s conception of “corporatism” as used in Ayubi see: Guillermo A. O’Donnell, “Corporatism and the Question of the State”.

154 See for example Ayubi, Over-Stating the Arab State, 5-35. Ayubi remarks that also O’Donnell was “inspired by the Gramscian concept of hegemony”. Ayubi, Over-Stating the Arab State, 32-33.
2.1 The State

with it an “exaggerated [economic] role of the state”, étatisme. Also, corporatism – for Ayubi – emerges when class structures are weak, which makes it impossible for a class – that could dominate the others and could establish Gramscian hegemony – to emerge. The state compensates this lack of hegemony by applying, on the one hand, strategies of inclusion and, on the other hand, strategies of exclusion, coercion and control.

Inclusion here refers to alliances with social groups that are of particular use for the state, this however automatically involves the exclusion of other groups. Inclusion is then realized through the distribution of economic goods, that create dependency and thus create loyalty to the state in a “tacit political pact”, in which the political voice is given away for material gains. The state’s provision of economic rewards is made possible by its dominant economic role, as well as by its rentier nature, either as it receives income from resources such as oil or as it receives considerable foreign aid. The creation of inclusionary alliances with certain social groups is then often realized through institutions of state or civil society – such as parliament, the bureaucracy or interest groups controlled by the state – which have three major functions: that of “representation, mobilization and control”. As the two latter functions clearly supersede the first, the respective institutions are marked by what has been described as “the politics of simulation”, where

155 Ayubi, Over-Stating the Arab State, 13.
156 See Ayubi, Over-Stating the Arab State. Ayubi states that “state corporatism tends to emerge in situations of ‘late’ industrialization and development”. Ayubi, Over-Stating the Arab State, 216. Ayubi writes that the leaders of the early Arab republics were then “dedicated ‘modernisers’ intent on accelerated industrialisation and fascinated by technologism”. Ayubi, Over-Stating the Arab State, 207. For more details on étatisme and how it figured in the early Arab republics see for example Ayubi, Over-Stating the Arab State, page 196-203.
157 Ayubi, Over-Stating the Arab State, 25.
158 See for example Ayubi, Over-Stating the Arab State, 25 in combination with 32-35. It is specifically concerning the inclusionary ans exclusionary devices that Ayubi turns to O’Donnell. See for example Ayubi, Over-Stating the Arab State, 32-33.
159 Ayubi, Over-Stating the Arab State, 246. Ayubi here refers to the tacit political pact in the context of the Arab oil monarchies, but talks about a similar mechanism in the Arab republics such as Egypt.
160 See for example Ayubi, Over-Stating the Arab State, 246-247.
161 Egypt can be considered as rentier or semi-rentier state as it receives foreign aid. See for example Ayubi, Over-Stating the Arab State, 219. In case of the Gulf monarchies, they can are considered rentier-states because of their oil income. See for example Ayubi, Over-Stating the Arab State, 224-230.
162 Perthes, The Political Economy of Syria under Asad, 170. Perthes here refers to Syria. But Ayubi refers to similar mechanisms being in place in Egypt under Nasser. See for example Ayubi, Over-Stating the Arab State, 207.
163 Ayubi, Over-Stating the Arab State, 213.
the state re-creates certain intermediary organisations and associations from above in its own image, sometimes with the intent of creating an organizational and political vacuum that others may not fill.\textsuperscript{164}

To enhance the loyalty of such institutions, they are then underpinned by \textit{informal} patronage-networks.\textsuperscript{165} These are, again, erected through the distribution of resources and are employed as vertical channels to funnel state-power through mediators that are involved in the alliance-forging at the macro level down to the micro level of the individual.\textsuperscript{166}

To sum up, the devices and tools that the corporatist state typically uses to deal with societal actors and groupings can be said to be: (1) inclusion or respectively co-optation, realized through the delivery of economic benefits, opportunities or prestige, and (2) exclusion and coercion – for those that are excluded from the privilege of being included.\textsuperscript{167} Ayubi then distinguishes several variations of corporatism: “state-corporatism”,\textsuperscript{168} found in the Arab republics including Egypt, and “societal corporatism”,\textsuperscript{169} found in the Arab monarchies.\textsuperscript{170} The latter form of corporatism he argues rests more on inclusionary measures (which the oil-rich monarchies can afford much more than the republics can), is less institutionalised and depends more on informal patronage networks.\textsuperscript{171} State-corporatism, Ayubi argues, generally deploys more exclusionary measures and is more institutionalised than societal corporatism.\textsuperscript{172} Within state-corporatism Ayubi distinguishes two forms.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{164} Ayubi, Over-Stating the Arab State, 213.
  \item \textsuperscript{165} Ayubi argues that clientelistic structures can figure as “pattern of vertical dependency” in a corporatist state. Ayubi, \textit{Over-stating the Arab State}, 169. He also remarks that Nasser’s Egypt used patronage systems a lot. Ayubi, \textit{Over-stating the Arab State}, 208. Tripp is making a bit of a stronger point in that direction as he does talk of this phenomena with regards to Iraq, while Ayubi suggests that such clientelistic structures might be of specific relevance only in the conservative monarchies of the Gulf and not so much in the republics. See Charles Tripp, “After Saddam”, \textit{Survival}, 44 (2002-03).
  \item \textsuperscript{166} See for example Nazih N. Ayubi, \textit{Over-stating the Arab State}, 169. To denote the informal nature of these networks of people of “personal trust”, Charles Tripp has termed this phenomenon as the “shadow state”. It evolves behind the scenes of the formal institutional set up of the state and represents the true locus of power. Tripp refers here to the case of Iraq. Tripp, “After Saddam”: 26.
  \item \textsuperscript{167} See Ayubi, \textit{Over-Stating the Arab State}.
  \item \textsuperscript{168} Ayubi, \textit{Over-Stating the Arab State}, 192.
  \item \textsuperscript{169} Ayubi, \textit{Over-Stating the Arab State}, 193.
  \item \textsuperscript{170} See Ayubi, \textit{Over-Stating the Arab State}, 189-194.
  \item \textsuperscript{171} See Ayubi, \textit{Over-Stating the Arab State}, 224-253.
  \item \textsuperscript{172} See Ayubi, \textit{Over-Stating the Arab State}, 196-221 and 339-352
\end{itemize}
Two Forms of State-Corporatism

For Ayubi’s consideration of state-corporatism in Egypt, two specific kinds of corporatism that O’Donnell puts forward are relevant: the first is labeled “populist-corporatist”. Here the basic alliance that is crafted by the state with a societal group is an alliance with the broader society in the sense of the poor masses that are being won as allies via welfare measures. In the same time those social groupings that have previously been dominant are now excluded. Populism is also marked by a special relationship between ruler and ruled:

The relationship between the ra’is [President] and the people is a direct one: immediate, emotional, marvellous, almost ‘bodily’. It forms the backbone of the political system, in a situation where political organisations are no more than tools for mobilisation.

Ayubi argues, however, that there is an inherent tension in the fact that the state, on the one hand, provides considerable welfare services to the people and, on the other hand, seeks to propel economic development via an industrialization that is led by itself, by the state. O’Donnell has argued that this will turn populist-corporatism into a different form of corporatism: “bureaucratic corporatism”. He argues that in this new form of corporatism, the state now increasingly begins to exclude the poor masses and to use repression against them, while it seeks to build an alliance with the private capital. While O’Donnell refers to cases in Latin America, Ayubi argues that in the Arab World the development away from populist-corporatism has unfolded differently: Though he argues that the state indeed is eventually forced to notably reduce its welfarist measures (and thus its alliance with the masses), due to economic stress, and now indeed increasingly seeks an alliance with private capital, Ayubi emphasizes that this shift in alliances and especially the reduction of welfare has been slow: though welfare was reduced it was not completely abandoned. Ayubi thus has argued, that in this

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173 Ayubi, Overtsating the Arab State, 196.
174 See for example Ayubi, Over-Stating the Arab State, 205-206.
175 See for example Ayubi, Over-Stating the Arab State, 201.
176 ‘Iyad Bin’ Ashur as quoted in Ayubi, Over-Stating the Arab State, 204.
177 Ayubi, Over-Stating the Arab State, 219.
179 O’Donnell depicts a cycle of populist authoritarianism evolving into increasingly exclusionary and coercive bureaucratic authoritarianism, mainly due to structural economic factors. O’Donnell, ”Corporatism and the question of the State”, 54-64. O’Donnell argues that a hallmark bureaucratic corporatism is the “political and economic exclusion of the popular sector”. O’Donnell, “Corporatism and the question of the State”, 50.
180 Ayubi, Overtsating the Arab State, 340.
181 See for example Ayubi, Overtsating the Arab State, 352.
new, or second form of corporatism, populist-corporatism elements are not completely eliminated and that the state’s shift in alliances with societal forces has, thus, not been as clear-cut as portrayed in O’Donnell’s depiction and that it is more refined.182

Corporatism under Nasser and Sadat
Ayubi considers Nasser’s rule as a prototype of populist-corporatism that was copied by other Arab states.183 The main alliance was one with the poorer classes, that were won into the coalition through the state’s provision of welfare.184 With this alliance Nasser now especially challenged “the traditional domination of rural oligarchies”,185 that had collaborated with the British. The domination of large landowners was broken through land reforms that were implemented already shortly after the toppling of the monarchy in 1952.186 They had two goals: (i) “their main political objective was to eliminate the power base of the large landlord as a politically influential force”,187 and (ii) their goal was to make capital available to finance the state-led industrialization.188 Also, the capital that was taken from this class was then spent for welfare policies, that established Nasser’s “alliance of popular forces”.189 As Nasser wanted to achieve development and modernization through state-led industrialization and import-substitution,190 he increasingly embraced socialist economic policies, especially with regard to economic planning.191

182 See Ayubi, Over-Stating the Arab State, 219-221. Ayubi also talks of the fact, that corporatism was now constituted of “more elaborate corporatist arrangements”. Ayubi, Over-Stating the Arab State. No particular term has here been adopted by Ayubi to label this type of corporatism. While Bianchi may be said to have termed it “unruly corporatism”. See Bianchi, Unruly Corporatism. Hinnebusch has simply called it “post-populism”. See Raymond Hinnebusch, Egyptian Politics under Sadat: The Post-Populist Development of an Authoritarian-Modernizing State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
183 Ayubi, Over-Stating the Arab State, 209.
184 Ayubi, Over-Stating the Arab State, 209.
185 Ayubi, Over-Stating the Arab State, 217.
186 Ayubi, Over-Stating the Arab State, 199. These reforms, however, were not radical in the sense that they completely dismantled this class, as it was the case for example in Syria in the 1960ies.
187 Ayubi, Over-Stating the Arab State, 201.
188 Ayubi, Over-Stating the Arab State, 202.
189 The Nasserist formula as quoted in Ayubi, Over-Stating the Arab State, 215.
190 Ayubi, Over-Stating the Arab State, 214.
191 See Ayubi, Over-Stating the Arab State, 196-203. Ayubi here argues that only structural measures of Nasser were those used in socialism. But Ayubi clearly states that Nasser did not adhere to socialist ideology but wanted to achieve modernization and development via the state-led industrialization. This then entailed socialist measures.
The populist alliance, however, also implied that those who were included economically through welfare were also to be controlled.\textsuperscript{192} This was guaranteed through incorporating people either in the state bureaucracy, that was heavily expanded under Nasser, or in the sole existant political party under Nasser – the Arab Socialist Union – or in interest groups that were tightly controlled by the state, and it was guaranteed through the dominant role of the state’s repressive arms, the military and the police forces.\textsuperscript{193} Tellingly, Ayubi depicts the Egyptian state under Nasser as having

revolved … around three poles: the President, the army and the party. So that what we had was a combination of a boss-state …, a security state (to include aspects of the police state or \textit{dawlat mukhabarat}) and a party state … that dominates over most associations in society [and in which] … the civil bureaucracy is directed and controlled by all three.'\textsuperscript{194}

A strong relationship between the President and the people was another major part of this system, as Nasser eloquently and vocally promised social justice and progress for the poor.\textsuperscript{195} But, however, it would soon grow more difficult for the state to provide extensive welfarist measures, and thus affected the state’s alliance with the poor.\textsuperscript{196}

The state had sought to provide “both growth and welfare, production and distribution”,\textsuperscript{197} but Ayubi argued it is hardly possible to continue both simultaneously in the long-term as they both follow different logics.\textsuperscript{198} And while the substitution of imports usually is supposed to work well in the beginning this effect can not be upheld in the long term, as it produces considerable economic difficulties for the state in later stages,\textsuperscript{199} making it difficult for the state to finance the extensive welfare. When Egypt faced a severe financial crisis in the sixties – that was further enhanced by the defeat against Israel in the Six Day War in 1967 – this, thus, triggered a shift in state policies.\textsuperscript{200} The state now in-

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{192} See for example Ayubi, \textit{Over-Stating the Arab State}, 207 or 217.
\item\textsuperscript{193} See Ayubi, Over-Stating the Arab State, 196-221.
\item\textsuperscript{194} Ayubi, Over-Stating the Arab State, 203.
\item\textsuperscript{195} See for example Ayubi, \textit{Over-Stating the Arab State}, 204.
\item\textsuperscript{196} Ayubi states that “Under the slightest pressure … the radical Arab regimes were capable of turning their backs on the socialist slogans … and of overseeing the implementation of economic liberalisation and privatisation programmes.” Ayubi, \textit{Over-Stating the Arab State}, 221.
\item\textsuperscript{197} Ayubi, Over-Stating the Arab State, 214.
\item\textsuperscript{198} Ayubi, \textit{Over-Stating the Arab State}, 213. For the antipodal logic see Ayubi, \textit{Over-Stating the Arab State}, 214.
\item\textsuperscript{199} Ayubi, Over-Stating the Arab State, 217.
\item\textsuperscript{200} See Ayubi, Over-Stating the Arab State, 214.
\end{itemize}
creasingly sought to ally itself with private capital, and in the same time gradually decreased its welfare measures under Nasser’s successor Sadat, who took power after Nasser died in 1970. However, Arab aid after the Yom Kippur War in 1973, as well as US aid after Egypt’s signing of the peace treaty with Israel in 1978/79 allowed the Egyptian state to sustain welfare policies to the degree that was necessary to guarantee the state’s survival. In line with the state’s seeking to build an alliance with private capital, Sadat started to gradually reverse Nasser’s socialist elements of economic policy and slowly opened the door for Egyptian as well as foreign private capital. However, in Sadat’s economic opening (infitah) business opportunities were only given to those who were loyal to the state. The state’s alliance under Sadat now shifted from a predominantly populist one, to be based increasingly on the state’s bourgeoisie and on “private parasitic capital (financial, commercial, industrial).”

This was paralleled by the fact that Egypt moved away from the Soviet Union, a partnership with it had been established under Nasser and had tightened as he had increasingly adopted socialist economic policies. Under Sadat, Egypt moved towards the West. Already in 1972, Egypt expelled its Soviet advisors, but the shift towards the West was then only finally completed with Egypt’s signing of the Camp David accords in 1979. Sadat’s change from a predominantly populist alliance to an alliance that centred more on private capital as well as his new strategic alliance with the West also markedly affected the legitimacies on which Egypt’s rulers had strived to base their rule upon.

2.1.2 Legitimatory Discourses of the State

Though the Egyptian state as an authoritarian state naturally has a legitimacy deficit, Saad Eddin Ibrahim and Hesham Al-Awadi, for example, have argued that legitimacy is not unimportant in the Egyptian context, but has always been...
given due attention by the respective presidents. In that sense this section will look at these claims made by Nasser and Sadat.

Nasser’s legitimatory discourse and his charisma reverberated with large segments in Egypt as well as across Egypt’s boundaries into the broader Arab world. Nasserism, however, did not start as a detailed worldview. Instead, it was driven especially by the following components: its opposition to the British and to the Egyptian King. Promising to eliminate the social injustices – that the collaboration of the colonialist British and the corrupt Egyptian king had brought to the Egyptians at large – Nasserism promised social justice and equality and development to the people. In that thrust socialist elements were mixed with pan-Arab nationalism, and Third Worldism. But Nasser sought not only to speak for Egypt alone but understood Egypt to be part of a larger Arab entity, that shared a common language and culture as well as a struggle for independence and against the colonialist West. Nasser aimed to present Egypt as the vanguard of this pan-arab and anti-imperialist project – and not without success: his nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956 did indeed thrust him to the top of popularity not only in Egypt but also in large parts of the Arab world.

In the anti-imperialist struggle, the issue of Palestine came to play a crucial role. As Palestine was seen as part of the western imperialist project, freeing

211 See for example Al-Awadi, In Pursuit of Legitimacy, 30-31.
213 Fürtig argues for example that the lower middle class were frustrated and humiliated under the rule of the British and the Egyptian king. See Henner Fürtig, „Ägyptens Gloria unter Nasser“, Informationen zur politischen Bildung 317, 4/2012: 28.
214 See for example Ayubi, Over-stating the Arab State, 204.
215 See for example Ayubi, Over-stating the Arab State, 197. Ayubi here says that Nasserism used some socialist terminology but was not wholeheartedly adhering to a socialist ideology. See Ayubi, Over-stating the Arab State, 196-203.
218 See Henner Fürtig, „Ägyptens Gloria unter Nasser“, 28.
219 See Fürtig, „Ägyptens Gloria unter Nasser“.
220 See Reinhard Schulze, Geschichte der islamischen Welt im 20. Jahrhundert, 169. Schulze writes that as early as 1945 the Palestine issue became framed as an important or even a key Arab issue within the Arab League.
Palestine was part of the Arab struggle for independence and was, thus, portrayed to be of high concern for Nasser.\textsuperscript{221} The dramatic Arab defeat against Israel in the Six-Day-War of 1967, in which Egypt lost the Sinai and control of the Gaza-strip to Israel, accordingly sent a fatal blow to Nasserism and panarab ideology at large.\textsuperscript{222}

While Nasser’s legitimatory strategy relied primarily on a secular form of nationalism,\textsuperscript{223} he did not refrain from employing Islamic rhetoric as a means to bolster his legitimacy.\textsuperscript{224} He had been “far from embarking on the ‘secularization’ for which some yearned”;\textsuperscript{225} Instead Nasser subordinated the country’s religious establishment to the state,\textsuperscript{226} and instrumentalized it as he “felt free to resort to its [Islamic] slogans and rhetoric in his speeches, and to use it [Islam] as part of state propaganda”.\textsuperscript{227} However, his lavish but piecemeal referral to Islam – in which Islam in the end always remained subordinated to secular notions of nationalism and was ultimately seen as nothing more than a \textit{cultural trait} of the “Arab nation” – was deeply offensive to some.\textsuperscript{228}

After Nasser’s death and the taking of power by Sadat, legitimatory discourse changed. Sadat lacked Nasser’s popularity and now sought to build his own legitimacy claim on the fact that he was the \textit{legal} successor of Nasser, and that he would erect the rule of law.\textsuperscript{229} The avowal to establish the rule of law was also in line with Sadat’s previously described reshuffling of corporatist alliances and with his “economic liberalisation” and his rapprochement with the West.\textsuperscript{230} Sadat now “reformed the Constitution, stressed the supremacy of the law, and declared Egypt ‘State of Law’. He [also] promised a new period of judicial autonomy”.\textsuperscript{231} However, this did not establish constitutionalism in a democratic sense in Egypt, as the political system remained authoritarian, and the process of liberalisation remained

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{221} See for example Al-Awadi, \textit{In Pursuit of Legitimacy}, 32.
  \item \textsuperscript{222} See Fürting, „Ägyptens Gloria unter Nasser“.
  \item \textsuperscript{223} For example Zubaida writes that Pan-arabism was the strongest component of Nasserism – as well as socialism, which is also secular. Zubaida, \textit{Islam – The People and the State}, 154.
  \item \textsuperscript{224} See Zubaida, \textit{Islam – The People and the State}, 154. Also al-Awadi referring to Majda Rabi’ says that “Islam was a powerful tool for Nasser”. Al-Awadi, \textit{In Pursuit of Legitimacy}, 35.
  \item \textsuperscript{226} Zubaida, Islam – The People and the State, 154.
  \item \textsuperscript{227} Zubaida, Islam – The People and the State, 154.
  \item \textsuperscript{229} Al-Awadi, \textit{In Pursuit of Legitimacy}, 35. In combination with Interview with Expert 7 (2010).
  \item \textsuperscript{230} See Gudrun Krämer, \textit{Ägypten unter Mubarak: Identität und nationales Interesse} (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1986), 45. Krämer writes that Sadat’s claim to establish the rule of law should have made Egypt an attractive partner for the West in terms economic and political cooperation.
  \item \textsuperscript{231} Al-Awadi, In Pursuit of Legitimacy, 36.
\end{itemize}
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