Introduction
Heiko Biehl, Bastian Giegerich and Alexandra Jonas

In the 21st century, close cooperation in security and defence appears to be indispensable, in particular between capitals on the European continent. The financial crisis, the complex nature of today’s threats and challenges as well as the US pivot towards the Asia-Pacific region all point to a future in which Europeans will have to shoulder an increasing burden in security and defence. Hence, if Europe, as a whole, wants to stay safe and relevant, it has to speak with one voice and bring its – combined – weight to bear. This is a widely shared view – at least in declaratory policy across the continent, and various initiatives and projects within NATO and the EU have been launched to move in this direction. Yet, if anything, the past few years have underlined how difficult implementation will be in practice. The state of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), a key multinational framework for security and defence cooperation in Europe and a forum of which 26 of the 28 countries examined in this volume are full members, is a good example for a discernible reluctance to engage in ever closer cooperation in the field of security and defence: Once a promising undertaking, today, CSDP’s future is uncertain and despite efforts to overcome stagnation and foster cooperation and integration in the field of security and defence, the latter proves to be an immutable national prerogative. In 2013, the European Council will feature specific discussions on CSDP, but at the time of writing it remained unclear whether this prospect would generate new momentum.

The lack of a united European position with regard to the Arab spring and the reluctance of EU member states to engage in operations at the upper end of the CSDP task spectrum clearly show that national preferences diverge. The debate surrounding the nomination of Baroness Ashton as the EU’s High Representative, the bilateral Franco-British defence co-operation treaty of 2010 and member states’ palpable reluctance to accept the reduced autonomy that would result from pooled and shared defence capabilities can be seen as other cases of the same phenomenon. Despite adaptation pressures, the European response remains vague. The financial crisis seems to have unveiled and possibly even reinforced profound differences in strategic preferences that, in previous years of prosperity, did not come to light that clearly. Accordingly, the evolution of a genuinely European strategic culture, as called for in the European Security Strategy of 2003, never seemed as remote as in 2012.

In this volume, we suggest that diverging national strategic cultures are among the key factors that can explain why, in particular in these times of crisis, progress on closer cooperation in security and defence remains slow.
and cumbersome. Hence, a stock taking of national strategic cultures in Europe – the respective cultural, normative and historical foundations as well as the nationally shared values and practices in security and defence policy – is necessary not only in order to grasp the roots of the present situation’s deadlock, but also to assess the potential for continued cooperation in Europe. After all, external pressures could just as well have led to an instantaneous boost in security and defence cooperation across Europe. A thorough analysis of strategic cultures, in particular if it goes beyond a mere enumeration of supposed national singularities, can be expected to shed some light on why this did not happen. Beyond an identification of divergences between national security and defence policies, a systematic analysis of strategic cultures in Europe also allows detection of gradual convergences, i.e. potential areas of closer cooperation between like-minded partners, whose long-term preferences are similar. Thus, a strategic culture approach can offer a useful tool for scholars and practitioners alike, pointing out areas of conflict among partners, suggesting aspects where convergence is emerging and could be strengthened, and hinting at opportunities for cooperation among some or all member states. Whether the creation of a new EU strategy document for security and defence would create momentum for the reanimation of CSDP or expose essential divergence seems to be a question that is closely linked to research on strategic cultures in Europe as well.

Taking all of this into account, this book’s aim is, first and foremost, to systematically map strategic cultures across Europe. Second, the book examines the implications of commonalities and differences between national strategic cultures, in particular with regard to future cooperation in the field of security and defence. Lastly and more generally, this volume contributes to the theoretical and conceptual debate on strategic culture. However, as a problem-driven undertaking, with strategic culture used as an analytical lens, its main purpose is to understand basic aspects of European security and defence policies, including the opportunities and limitations for collaboration in this policy field.

The idea for this project was born in 2008, when a comparative analysis on the strategic cultures of Germany, France and the UK was conducted at the Bundeswehr Institute of Social Sciences (SOWI) (Jonas/von Ondarza 2010). However, while building on this and further work at SOWI (Biehl et al. 2011), this volume is the first to look at security and defence cooperation in Europe beyond a narrow focus on either the EU/CSDP or the big EU member states only. In this book all EU member states, including Denmark (which claims an EU defence opt-out) and Turkey (as an important strategic partner) are covered.
Introduction

Besides generating 28 comparable European case studies, this project also aimed to bring a pan-European group of security and defence experts together to discuss the research process, the project’s theoretical underpinnings as well as its practical challenges. Thereby, the editorial team attempted to create common knowledge and to build a network of experts on national strategic cultures in Europe. Two author workshops were instrumental in generating a common view of the methodological as well as empirical challenges of the project. While these events did not necessarily lead to a universally shared understanding of the strategic culture approach and the future of European cooperation in security and defence, they provided participants with a thorough understanding of European partner countries’ security and defence policies, including their historical and cultural roots.

In order to generate comparable case studies, the editorial team set the parameters for the analysis of national strategic cultures. A limited number of general conceptual considerations and a detailed analytical framework were provided as guidance to the authors. While some contributors added further aspects to their analysis in order to capture the particularities of their specific country, all case study chapters follow the same basic structure. In this way, it was ensured that the resulting analyses offer comparative value without muffling the heterogeneity of security and defence policies across Europe.

On the Concept of Strategic Culture

In the last decade, the concept of strategic culture, i.e. a “strategic culture approach” to the analysis of a particular actor’s security and defence policy, has become increasingly popular. Originating in the 1970s as a state-centric approach, the concept is supposed to capture an actor’s identity in security and defence matters. Jack Snyder, who pioneered it in 1977 with a study about the differences between Soviet and US nuclear strategies, defined strategic culture as “the sum of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behavior that members of a national strategic community have acquired […] with regard to nuclear strategy” (Snyder 1977: 8). In Snyder’s view, historical processes that are particular to a specific country form a perceptual lens through which strategic issues are processed and

1 The workshops were held in Frankfurt/Germany (October 2011, organised in cooperation with the research project “Transformation of Security Culture” of the Goethe University) and Brussels/Belgium (February 2012, organised in cooperation with the Egmont Royal Institute for International Relations).
2 For a discussion relating to strategic culture predating Snyder see Macmillan/Booth/Trood (1999: 5ff.).
thereby affect policy choices (cf. Longhurst 2000: 302f.). The introduction of a cultural perspective to the analysis of security and defence policies was intended to challenge dominant theories of that time, which largely rested on the assumption that actors behave rational and act in pursuit of preferences largely determined by material factors. While some authors (Desch 1998: 169) have argued that strategic culture should be limited to supplementing Realism, as a conceptual back-up so to speak, others responded that doing so would not do the concept justice (Keating 2004: 12). Cultural approaches emphasise that national preferences and interests are not always objectively determined, but are created in a multifaceted way and complex environment. The sensitivity a cultural approach brings to historical experiences of societies and the ability of strategic culture research to connect domestic and international politics are important advantages for analysing security and defence policies.

Generally, one can distinguish between three generations of strategic culture research (cf. Göler 2010): The first generation, including scholars such as Colin Gray, conceptualised strategic culture as a context within which states form their security policies. Starting from the assumption that strategic culture produces tendencies, while not ultimately determining behaviour and policy choices, Gray emphasised that “everything a security community does, if not a manifestation of strategic culture, is at least an example of behaviour effected by culturally shaped, or encultured, people, organisations, procedures and weapons” (Gray 1999: 52). Hence, in line with this school of thought, strategic culture both, shapes the context for behaviour and is itself a constituent of that behaviour. (ibid.: 50) The second generation of strategic culture research then focused on the differences between a security community’s officially declared policy and the “real” aims and motives of the respective policy elite – a focus that somewhat deviates from this book’s purpose and therefore will not be further described (e.g. Klein 1988). Finally, the third generation of strategic culture research, including scholars such as Alastair Johnston, conceptualised strategic culture in a positivist tradition, as an independent variable that determines a specific actor’s foreign and security behaviour. For instance, Johnston described strategic culture as a “limited, ranked set of grand strategic preferences over actions that are consistent across the objects of analysis and persistent across time” (Johnston 1988: 38). This rather rigid approach, implying the option to derive falsifiable hypotheses, stands in stark contrast to the contextual first generation’s definition of strategic culture, which saw strategic culture as comprising “[…] socially transmitted ideas, attitudes, traditions, habits […], and preferred methods of operation that are more or less specific to a particular geographically based
security community that has had a necessarily unique historical experience” (Gray 1999: 51).

Boosted by the constructivist turn in international relations and, later on, in EU studies, the evolving European cooperation in security and defence matters increasingly came into the focus of strategic culture research. In this context, it is often claimed that the prerequisite for an effective and powerful CSDP is a common, European strategic culture – a belief that was reflected in the European Security Strategy of 2003 as well. A number of scholars who have worked on strategic culture and the EU have argued that a growing convergence between national strategic cultures is indispensable if a joint European strategic culture is to emerge (e.g. Howorth 2002; Matlary 2006; Jonas/von Ondarza 2010).

However, up until today, a unitary definition of what strategic culture is, whether in the national or the multinational context, how it is supposed to be used academically and whether it qualifies as a theoretical model, does not exist. While there seems to be implicit agreement that, at its core, strategic culture comprises a specific actor’s beliefs and assumptions that frame that particular actor’s choices in security and defence (Rosen 1996: 12), there are a number of unanswered methodological questions: Should strategic culture be used as an independent, intervening or dependent variable? How to operationalise strategic culture? Does strategic culture change or is it persistent if not static? Who are the carriers of strategic culture?

There is, hence, no blueprint for the analysis of strategic culture and academics worldwide have looked at rather varying items when trying to pinpoint the concept’s essence. For this volume, the editorial team, in order to ‘unpack’ the concept and make use of it, developed an understanding of strategic culture that mostly draws on the first generation of strategic culture research. In particular, we conceptualise strategic culture as a variable that structures what options are considered to be appropriate by a specific actor in security and defence, hence influencing, but not determining, behaviour. We shared this understanding of strategic culture with the contributing authors during the early stages of the project and repeatedly discussed it, in particular during the above-mentioned workshops. The basic definitions, we, as editors, adopted for the purpose of this volume as well as the analytical framework, including the key questions that contributors were asked to answer in their chapters, are presented in the following.
Basic Definitions

What is strategic culture?

Strategic culture is a number of shared beliefs, norms and ideas within a given society that generate specific expectations about the respective community’s preferences and actions in security and defence policy. In this context, a community’s security and defence identity, expressed through its preferences and behavioural patterns, derives from shared experiences and accepted narratives specific to a particular security community.

Who are the carriers of strategic culture?

The traditional emphasis has been on policy elites, in other words the strategic community of decision-makers and experts in a country. Recently, this focus has broadened to include the public. For this edited volume, authors were asked to primarily concentrate on elites. However, in some cases it might be necessary to examine the interplay between elites and the public in order to analyse how conflicting positions are balanced in a respective country.

Is strategic culture monolithic?

On the one hand, strategic culture is constructed and ‘culture’ (as well as the norms it implies) will therefore be contested within a society. There is thus room for competing views and attitudes. The concept implies that there will most likely be subcultures within a society and for some countries covered in the book it was worthwhile to touch upon the ‘debate’ between these subcultures. On the other hand, a key hypothesis is that strategic culture generates recognizable patterns and expectations of behaviour across time. Therefore, the underlying assumption has been that there is a dominant strand, reflected in elite discourse and policy practice, and that subcultures have to engage with it.

Does strategic culture change?

In order to be of analytical value, a distinction has to be made between mere viewpoints or opinions on the one hand and strategic culture on the other. Hence, strategic culture is expected to be persistent. Persistence, however, does not amount to saying that strategic culture is static. It can change quite significantly when confronted with so-called ‘crisis moments’, such as an external shock (e.g. war) or when the different norms of a strategic culture collide, for example, as a result of changing international circumstances. Such cultural dissonance can be expected to open a window of opportunity
Introduction

that policy entrepreneurs might use to reinterpret or redefine the underpinning norms.

Analytical Framework

Analysts seeking to do comparative work on strategic culture and to examine patterns of convergence and divergence had to unpack strategic culture in order to come up with analytical dimensions that can actually be empirically observed if properly operationalised (Giegerich 2006: 46ff.; Meyer 2006). In line with the basic definitions chosen and drawing on this work and earlier work at SOWI (Jonas/von Ondarza 2010), four issue areas were identified that reflect essential facets of national security and defence policies and, consequently, a particular nation’s strategic culture:

1) the level of ambition in international security policy,
2) the scope of action for the executive in decision-making,
3) foreign policy orientation,
4) the willingness to use military force.

Matching national positions in these four areas can be seen as a prerequisite for close cooperation in foreign, security and defence policy. In particular with regard to cooperation on the EU level, convergence in one or more of the above-mentioned dimensions has been, more than once, the catalyst for closer cooperation while divergence proved to be the source of stagnation. Naturally, a state’s positioning in one dimension might be connected to its positioning in other dimensions. Historical aspects, i.e. a respective strategic culture’s formative moments, are central to a state’s positioning in these dimensions. Hence, historical experiences have been presented by some authors as a prelude to their analysis while others incorporated them into the study.

Naturally, imposing the four-part chapter structure outlined above has forced some of the contributing authors to make compromises in terms of flow of argument and issues covered. Nonetheless, we feel that the comparability gained as a result on balance justifies this trade-off. As can be expected, the four dimensions worked better for some country studies than for others. On top of that, in some cases, contributors could draw on a wide range of existing literature on their country’s strategic culture, while, in other cases, authors were in uncharted waters. However, altogether, the analytical approach has proven rather successful in blending a framework to ensure comparability with flexibility to allow for the inclusion of important national specifics.
1) Level of Ambition

In the first dimension, contributors were asked to assess their country’s positioning on a continuum between passive indifference and active international leadership. The key questions authors were asked to address were:

- What are the country’s main objectives in the security realm?
- How do security and defence policy documents (such as national security strategies, white papers, etc.) define the role the country seeks to play? For example, do policy documents or policy elites claim a particular responsibility for international order, stability and peace?
- Which are the specific areas of geographic responsibility that a country defines for itself?
- Does the country show a tendency, either in discourse or practice, to promote proactive intervention as a suitable response to security challenges?
- How many troops has the country deployed (both in total and as a percentage of active armed forces) on crisis management operations and what are the arguments that are made in support of the deployments?
- Does the country define a formal level of ambition for its participation in international crisis management operations? For example, does the government say how many troops it is able to deploy simultaneously, for how long, in how many concurrent operations?
- Countries can be active through multinational frameworks or unilateral action. Does the country, either in key documents or in elite discourse, show a tendency, i.e. preferred channels to implement its level of ambition?

2) Scope of Action for the Executive

In the second dimension, contributors were asked to assess their respective country’s positioning on a continuum between a low level and a high level of executive flexibility. The key questions in this dimension were:

- Who are the key players in security and defence policy?
- What does the decision-making process for the deployment of armed forces look like?
- Are there constitutional provisions or other legal instruments that regulate the deployment of armed forces?
- Are there informal mechanisms or decision-making traditions that operate instead of (or alongside) formal legal instruments?
If there are instruments of parliamentary control, what do they look like? What powers does parliament have regarding the deployment of armed forces, how are they used and has the respective level of parliamentary control been altered in the recent past?

If there are weak formal instruments of parliamentary control (or none at all), how does the executive inform other actors (including parliament)?

Are there other players beyond the executive and legislative branches of government that influence decisions (such as, for example, the armed forces or interest groups)?

3) Foreign Policy Orientation

In the third dimension, contributors were asked to assess their respective country’s positioning on a continuum between a European and a transatlantic focus as their preferred forum of security and defence cooperation. With regard to this dimension, authors were provided with the following guiding questions:

- Do security and defence policy documents define a preferred arena for cooperation? Is it possible to detect a preference for NATO or the EU?
- How are the roles of the EU and NATO defined? Is their relationship described in terms of competition or compatibility?
- Is the role of the EU and/or NATO changing in relation to other forms of cooperation, such as coalitions of the willing or bilateral cooperation?
- Does the country favour a clear division of labour among the EU and NATO, either in functional or in geographic terms? Are there particular comparative advantages that are ascribed to specific organisations?
- Do documents or elite discourses describe specific objectives for the future development of the EU and/or NATO?
- Does the country assign particular instruments to the EU and/or NATO? How are the country’s factual military contributions divided between the EU and NATO, in terms of operations but also with regard to the EU Battle Groups and the NATO Response Force?
- Does the country define important bilateral relationships in the security and defence policy arena?

4) Willingness to Use Military Force

In the fourth dimension, contributors were asked to assess their respective country’s positioning on a continuum between reluctance and unconstrained
acceptance to use military force as an instrument of security policy. With regard to the last dimension, authors were asked to address the following questions:

- How is the role of the armed forces, as an instrument of foreign, security and defence policy, defined in comparison to other instruments such as diplomacy, development cooperation, trade, etc.?
- How are the core tasks for the armed forces defined? Is there an attempt to prioritise the different tasks, for example by saying that territorial defence is more important than international crisis management? If there is a prioritisation, is it reflected in recent defence reform projects, including force posture and equipment procurement?
- What percentage of GDP does the country spend on defence? Is it possible to identify what the money is being spent on? For example, how much goes towards personnel costs, how much is available for defence investment (equipment procurement + R&D)? Are the costs of international deployments paid out of the defence budget or are there other arrangements, for example, a special fund or contributions from the general national budget?
- Does the country usually deploy armed forces in international operations with or without national caveats? If there are caveats, what kind of restrictions do they entail?
- What kind of tasks do the deployed forces usually fulfil and how are their missions framed? For example, are operations framed with reference to humanitarian needs, international stability demands or specific national interests, etc.?
- Does the analysis of the international security environment – and the threats and risks it contains – within security and defence policy documents specify a broad preference for non-military instruments? What purpose is foreseen for the military against this background, for example, is it defined as an instrument of last resort?

In the following, the 28 country case studies will feature in alphabetical order. The ensuing conclusion will look at commonalities and differences between strategic cultures and discuss what these mean for cooperation in security and defence, be it in the CSDP framework or outside of it. Finally, the 28 contributions will allow us to assess whether the understanding and operationalisation of the strategic culture approach we chose and specified resonates with national realities in Europe and whether it is helpful in order to grasp essential facets of a nation’s security and defence policy.
Strategic Cultures in Europe
Security and Defence Policies Across the Continent
Biehl, H.; Giegerich, B.; Jonas, A. (Eds.)
2013, VI, 401 p., Softcover
ISBN: 978-3-658-01167-3