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<http://www.springer.com/978-3-642-30116-2>

Evolutionary Games in Complex Topologies
Interplay Between Structure and Dynamics

Poncela Casasnovas, J.

2012, XIV, 158 p., Hardcover

ISBN: 978-3-642-30116-2