Introduction

The topic of “targeted killings” is strongly – but by no means exclusively – related to the State of Israel. Since the 1970s, dozens of alleged “terrorists” are reported to have been assassinated by Israeli security forces in Israel and abroad. In the early 1990s a number of human rights associations alleged that the Israel Defence Forces had set up units of “pseudo-Arabs” whose official mission was to catch wanted terrorists, but whose operation procedures de facto allowed the forces to kill their targets in many cases rather than arrest them. However, such a practice was vehemently denied by Israel and is thus at least not the official beginning of a policy of targeted killings.

A. The Recent Situation in Israel

The topic became more prominent when Israel, as a consequence of the sharp escalation of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict in October 2000, officially adopted a strategic military policy aimed at “neutralizing terrorist organizations” by “targeting wanted terrorists” suspected of initiating, planning, and executing terrorist activities against Israeli citizens. The Israeli Deputy Minister of Defence stated:

1 The term “terrorism” will be examined thoroughly infra, Introduction, Chapter F) II.


3 Compare Emanuel Gross, The Struggle of Democracy Against Terrorism: Lessons from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Israel, Charlottesville 2006, p. 222.


5 Gross, Struggle of Democracy, p. 222.
I can tell you unequivocally what the policy is. If anyone has committed or is planning to carry out terrorist attacks, he has to be hit ... It is effective, precise, and just.6

In the context of the al-Aqsa Intifada,7 within less than two and a half years, 1,828 Palestinians are reported to have been killed by the Israeli Forces. At least 128 of them are reported to have lost their lives as a result of the Israeli policy of targeted killings, including 42 bystanders in such operations.8 Presently,9 these numbers have risen to 4,396 Palestinians killed by Israeli Forces. This number includes 372 persons reported to have been killed during targeted killings, 147 persons of whom are reported to having been bystanders.10 According to these numbers, innocent people make up about 39% of the persons killed in Israeli targeted killings.11

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7 The 2000-2005 al-Aqsa Intifada is also referred to as the Second Intifada, as opposed to the 1987-1993 First Intifada, compare infra, Part Five, Chapter A).

8 Orna Ben-Naftali; Keren R. Michaeli, ‘Justice-Ability: A Critique of the alleged Non-Justiciability of Israel’s policy of Targeted Killings’, in: 1 J. Int’l Crim. Just. (2003), pp. 368-405, at 370 with further references. During the same period, 460 Israeli civilians and 216 Israeli security personnel are reported to have been killed by Palestinians, see ibid. This thesis is in no way meant to relativise any violent action taken by either side. Also killings of Israelis by Palestinians raise issues of international responsibility, see e.g. Demian Casey, ‘Breaking the Chain of Violence in Israel and Palestine: Suicide Bombings and Targeted Killings under International Humanitarian Law’, in: 32 Syracuse J. Int’l L. & Com. (2005), pp. 311-344, at 330-336.


10 See B’Tselem, ‘Statistics: Fatalities 29.9.2000-31.12.2007’. During the whole period, 705 Israeli civilians and 325 Israeli security personnel are reported to have been killed by Palestinians, see ibid.

The most prominent cases under this policy, among others, were the eliminations of Sheikh Ahmed Ismail Yassin, the founder of the Hamas organisation and Salah Shehade, the commander of the military wing of the Hamas. After many eliminations had taken place, Israel finally officially accepted responsibility for the policy both through notices issued by Israel Defence Forces’ spokesmen and through interviews given by senior political figures and defence officials.

Until now, these operations have been executed by using three main techniques, namely sniper shooting, bomb laying (especially placing bombs in cars and phone booths) and pinpoint air strikes by fighter planes and helicopter gunships. Almost all operations have taken place in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and most targets have been mid-
to high-level officials of various Palestinian militant organizations involved in violent operations against Israeli targets.\(^\text{18}\)

A petition brought before the Israeli Supreme Court against targeted killings was first rejected by reasoning that “choice of means of warfare” was not justiciable.\(^\text{19}\) The Court ruled that

the choice of means of war employed by respondents in order to prevent murderous terrorist attacks before they happen, is not among the subjects in which this Court will see fit to intervene.\(^\text{20}\)

Obviously, the policy became the subject of intense public, political, and legal controversy in domestic and in international fora. In that discussion, the policy of targeted killings has been labelled as “unlawful killings” by the U.K. Foreign Secretary Jack Straw\(^\text{21}\) and as a “summary execution that violates human rights” by Anna Lindh,\(^\text{22}\) then the Foreign Minister of Sweden. It has been described as being “contrary to


\(^{22}\) The then Swedish foreign minister, Anna Lindh, told the Swedish news agency TT with reference to the United States dropping a bomb on six al-Qaeda terrorists in Yemen: “If the USA is behind this with Yemen’s consent, it is nevertheless a summary execution that violates human rights. If the USA has conducted the attack without Yemen’s permission it is even worse. Then it is a question of unauthorised use of force.”, see Brian Whitaker/ Oliver Burkeman, ‘Killing Probes the Frontiers of Robotics and Legality’, in: Guardian, November 6, 2002.
international law” by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, and the issue was *inter alia* considered by the United Nations Human Rights Committee in its 2003 review of the report submitted by Israel. The Committee stated that

The State Party should not use ‘targeted killings’ as a deterrent or punishment. The State party should ensure that the utmost consideration is given to the principle of proportionality in all its responses to terrorist threats and activities. State policy in this respect should be spelled out clearly in guidelines to regional military commanders, and complaints about disproportionate use of force should be investigated promptly by an independent body. Before resorting to the use of deadly force, all measures to arrest a person suspected of being in the process of committing acts of terror must be exhausted.

In late 2006, the Israeli Supreme Court finally considered whether the policy of targeted killings of the Israeli government was lawful under international law. The Court held that hostilities were taking place in the context of an international armed conflict but that the “terrorists” who are targeted by Israeli forces do not have combatant status under international humanitarian law. Therefore, the Court considered them to be civilians, but as civilians taking a “direct part in hostilities”. The Court stated that a person who is belonging to an armed group and “in the framework of his role in that organization he commits a chain of hostilities” is loosing his immunity from attack. However, after taking this “law of war” approach, the Court introduced human rights elements well know from the European Court of Human Right’s McCann judgment such as a general test of proportionality to the question.

23 See UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, Statement at the UN Headquarters, in: *Off the Cuff – Remarks to the Press and the Public*, March 22, 2004 (unofficial transcript).


26 Id., para. 39, 46 *ILM* (2007), at 393.

B. The Further International Context

Beside Israel, it is foremost the U.S. which has an – albeit not official – practice of targeted killings. In the past, this mostly concerned assassination plots by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). A prominent recent example which is part of the so called “war on terror” is the killing of six alleged terrorists in their car by a U.S. Predator drone in Yemen:

On 3 November 2002, over the desert near Sanaa, Yemen, a Central Intelligence Agency-controlled Predator drone aircraft tracked an SUV containing six men. One of the six, Qaed Salim Sinan al-Harethi, was known to be a senior al-Qa’ida lieutenant suspected of having played a major role in the 2000 bombing of the destroyer USS Cole. He ‘was on a list of “high-value” targets whose elimination, by capture or death, had been called for by President Bush.’ The United States and Yemen had tracked al-Harethi’s movements for months. Now, away from any inhabited area, the Predator fired a Hellfire missile at the vehicle. The six occupants, including al-Harethi, were killed.

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28 Compare especially Supreme Court of Israel, “Targeted Killings” (Merits), para. 40, 46 ILM (2007), at 393.


Four years later, in June 2006, the targeted killing of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of al-Qaeda, was celebrated as a strategic and political victory by the U.S. Since September 11, 2001 a series of at least nineteen targeted killings by the U.S. via Predator fired Hellfire missiles is reported to have taken place, killing at least four senior al-Qaeda leaders and also many civilians. This practice is continued. On January 28, 2008, senior al-Qaeda commander Abu Laith al-Libi and several other persons were reportedly killed by a Predator fired Hellfire missile in Pakistan.

But also democracies which are less involved in the so called “war on terror” do not necessarily decline targeted killings as a means. Such States which have not been directly affected by transnational terrorism sometimes offer what has been termed as “nice recipes … that have little practical relevance” and “seem to be blind to real life hard choices”. On the other hand, for example, Germany’s Federal Minister of the Interior, Otto Schily, in a 2004 interview took into account
the possibility of killing suspected terrorists. His successor, Wolfgang Schäuble, recently addressed the topic in relation to Osama Bin Laden:

Imagine someone knew what cave Osama bin Laden is sitting in. A remote-controlled missile could then be fired in order to kill him. Schäuble criticised that the question of legality of such an action was not regulated under German national law – based on the fact that such an action is not explicitly rendered legal under German national law. It is questionable whether the latter was possible at all if not only national but international standards are taken into account. In trying to answer this question, the emphasis is put on State behaviour and responsibility and not on individual criminal liability. However, before going into the question of legality, a word about terminology is in order:

C. Defining “Targeted Killings”

During World War II, in April 1943, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, commander in chief of the Japanese Combined Fleet, was on an int-
spection tour hundreds of miles behind the front lines. Having broken the Imperial Japanese Navy’s message code, U.S. forces knew his flight itinerary and sent sixteen Army Air Forces P-38 Lightning fighter aircraft to intercept him. Near Bougainville, in the northern Solomons, the American pilots shot down their target, a Betty bomber, killing all on board, including Admiral Yamamoto. Was this a ‘targeted killing’?  

The answer to this question depends on the definition of “targeted killings” and has no prejudice on the question concerning the legality of such an act. The focus is on killings by State actors of singled out individuals. The context in which these killings take place is generally non-penal – be it at war or in times of peace. However, any penal aspect involved in such a killing does not automatically exclude it form the definition of “targeted killings”. Nevertheless, the death penalty is not the subject of the present considerations. While non-penal in that context means preventive, this term has to be understood in the widest sense possible, as many killings labelled as preventive turn out to be penal, if looked at closely. It will be shown infra that this distinction has a strong influence on the question of the legality of a given “targeted killing”.

I. Different Terms Frequently Used

Different terms are used for what will be referred to here as targeted killings. The use of such terms is often value-laden and already includes a legal prejudice. The terms frequently used are the following: “assassination policy”, “assassination”, “defensive assassination”, “elimination”.

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43 But see Solis, 60 Nav. War C. Rev. (2007), at 128 and 130, stating that a “combatant taking aim at a human target and then killing him is not what is meant by the term ‘targeted killing’” on the basis that such an action would be legal in the context of an armed conflict. On this question see infra, Part Two.
44 See also Anderson, in: Wittes (ed.), at 356.
nation policy”, 48 “extra judicial executions”, 49 “extra-judicial killings”, 50 “extra judicial punishment”, 51 “interception”, 52 “liquidation”, 53 “liquidation operation”, 54 “liquidation policy”, 55 “long-range hot pur-

2; Amnesty International, AI Doc. MDE 15/005/2001 (February 21, 2001); Asaf Zussman/ Noam Zussman, Targeted Killings: Evaluating the Effectiveness of a Counterterrorism Policy, Jerusalem 2005, e.g. at p. 23.


51 Luft, 10 Mid. E. Q. (2003), at 3.


53 Political correspondent Qeren Neubach on Israel TV Channel 1, Jerusalem (in Hebrew), at 16.30 gmt, on June 20, 2001, according to BBC Worldwide Monitoring, June 20, 2001.


55 Statement by the Palestinian Minister of Local Government Sa’ib Urayquat in Voice of Palestine, Ramallah (in Arabic), at 11.33 gmt, on August 20, 2001, according to BBC Monitoring International Reports, ‘Palestine Minister slams Israeli “War Crimes”, criticizes US role’, August 20, 2001; Voice of Israel, Jerusalem (in Hebrew), at 8.00 gmt and 12.00 gmt, on February 2, 2002, according to BBC Monitoring International Reports, ‘Israeli PM’s Meeting with Palestinian Leaders had Arafat’s Approval’, February 2, 2002.
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