

Chapter 2

Creating the Security Council and Its Sanctions System

2.1 Defining Global Principles

With the term “sanctions” in disgrace, it should strike no one as peculiar that throughout the planning of the United Nations and its founding charter, no discussion or debate seems to ever have taken place about this all important political device. The coyness was related to a number of causes. The first, and in the public’s mind, the most prominent one was the deep disappointment with the performance of the League of Nations, the precedent multilateral organization that was established together with the signing of the Peace of Versailles in 1920. Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations also prescribed a sanctions system. With overly ambitious objectives with which the US Senate rejected and denied US membership, European vindictiveness against Germany and exclusion of the Soviet Union, the League was soon known as the “League of Victors” that lacked any true political will to settle disputes in any other manner than the traditional balance of power strategy. The League’s sanctions were rarely applied, and in the few instances when they were, for example, against Italy for its attack on Abyssinia, or against the parties of the Spanish Civil War, it was a toothless exercise.

The failures of the League’s sanctions mechanism had informed US political leaders’ belief that military solutions rather than non-violent strategies were needed to respond to Japan’s attack against Pearl Harbor. Even for an eventual postwar world, the creation of the United Nations and the Security Council was heavily indoctrinated by the premise that security threats would originate from highly militarized, totalitarian regimes. Such emergencies could be met only with diplomacy backed up by very decisive military force. And because America’s entry into WW2 was preceded by a period of economic boycotts and economic warfare interventions

the leading statesmen barely considered the modern version of peaceful, coercive sanctions measures as an option, as the records of their meetings reflect.¹

President Roosevelt had been contemplating the creation of a world organization equipped with instruments under which “all peace-loving nations would unite.” Yet FDR also understood that he first needed to provide a reason for people to believe in a future peaceful world. He hoped to unite Americans and the global population in the fight not only against the Axis but also in defense of what he proposed to be values of global importance. The resulting Four Freedoms speech (Roosevelt 1941), which was actually FDR’s third inaugural address, delivered with soaring optimism four reasons why Americans and world citizens, regardless how weary of WW1 and the Depression, had a responsibility to fight for a new and more humane world.

In other words, at least eleven months before America entered WW2, the US President had already concluded that a new global organization would have to replace the now defunct League of Nations. In his mind it would eliminate isolationism and give the great powers (at the time the US, UK, Russia, and China once it was saved from Japan) the responsibility to defend and protect principles of freedom. He believed these international norms, expressed in his Four Freedoms, to be important to all people of the world. The question was how to convince Americans, governments, and people from around the free world to build the necessary collective security framework to protect and defend these ideals.

Box 2.1 FDR’s Four Freedoms

“In the future days, which we seek to make secure, we look forward to a world founded upon four essential human freedoms.

The first is freedom of speech and expression—everywhere in the world.

The second is freedom of every person to worship God in his own way—everywhere in the world.

The third is freedom from want—which, translated into world terms, means economic understandings which will secure to every nation a healthy peacetime life for its inhabitants—everywhere in the world.

The fourth is freedom from fear—which, translated into world terms, means a worldwide reduction of armaments to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that no nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical aggression against any neighbor—anywhere in the world.

That is no vision of a distant millennium. It is a definite basis for a kind of world attainable in our own time and generation. That kind of world is the very antithesis of the so-called new order of tyranny which the dictators seek to create with the crash of a bomb.”

¹ Only one brief exchange between Roosevelt and Stalin during their meeting in Teheran is recorded during which the American President allowed that embargoes or quarantines could be useful against attacks on the sovereignty of small states—effectively envisioning measures available today under Article 42 of the UN Charter, rather than UN sanctions measures provided for under Article 41.

2.2 Seven Years That Changed the World

Starting with FDR's Quarantine speech and vigorous denunciation of sanctions in October 1937 his administration began to devise the new world order. Among the American strengths he could count on were its industrial production powers and explosive military buildup. Although the strength of its Dollar and economy had not yet reached the pinnacle of its global economic power; through its Treasury Department's experiences the US had accomplished all the levers to apply very consequential economic sanctions on anybody in the world. Thanks to these powers, the US was able to tackle its herculean task of conducting numerous negotiations with the key allies of Great Britain, Russia, and later with China, to agree on the governance structure of the future world order. Roosevelt also had to jump-start America's military-industrial sector and mass recruitment needed to build a dominant global force capable of defeating Germany, Italy, and Japan, as well as deterring any other future aggressor from challenging Pax Americana. Finally, he had to rebuild the global economic structure to ensure that the war effort and the subsequent peace could be funded. Within seven years, these efforts culminated in the high summer of 1944 when the future began, thanks to:

6 June 1944: The landing on the French coast of Normandy by the American-led Allied forces, that finalized the physical and political remaking of Europe.

1 July 1944: The conference at Bretton Woods convened "representatives of free men" to establish the economic order of the postwar world and to prevent future dictators from using economic aggression against their neighbors.

21 August 1944: The Dumbarton Oaks Conferences between the US, UK, Russia, and China created the blueprint for the United Nations, the Security Council, and the UN sanctions system.

The radical changes of the summer of 1944 were not only aimed at the destruction of the dictatorships of Hitler, Mussolini, and of the imperial regime of Japan; the world changed in a more profound way. Finally American leaders created "the basis upon which *ordinary men and women* everywhere will be able to exchange with one another the natural riches of the earth and the products of their own industry and ingenuity,"² as FDR would years later describe his deeper motivations.

Americans needed to seize the chance to end European-style balance-of-power politics that enabled the forceful annexation of lands and colonialism, the two most important ills that they held to be the true reasons for the world wars. This fight was so fundamental to American values and ideals that it had motivated Woodrow Wilson to involve America in WW1 and create the League of Nations. His failure to obtain the consent of the US Congress and the League's poor performance were

² US President Franklin D. Roosevelt's welcome address read on 29 June 1944 to participants at the Bretton Woods (New Hampshire) Monetary Conference for the establishment of a new international monetary system; United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference: Bretton Woods, Final act and related documents; United States Government Printing Office, Washington; 1944. pp. 121.

merely further grist for Roosevelt's mill that churned with increasing impatience towards changing a world order most clearly epitomized by the British Empire. The United Kingdom occupied over one-quarter of the world and, through its dominions and colonies, had reduced more than half of the world's population to second-class citizenship, and had coerced unfair trade privileges that distorted global commerce to the detriment of every other nation. In short, the Imperial Preferences, as British trade dogma was called, combined with imperial arrogance dominated large swaths of the world's population and violated every single one of Roosevelt's four freedoms. American politicians would not fight a global war merely to enable the reviled British system. "Our victory must bring in its train the liberation of all peoples ... the age of imperialism has ended!" said Undersecretary of State Sumner Wells during a Memorial Day address.

Despite these enormous imperial privileges, the British had managed to nearly bankrupt themselves. The British Exchequer was broke, although how broke, the British leaders so carefully concealed that not even Roosevelt could have known. While teetering on the economic abyss, it could neither afford nor did British leaders have the political will to build its military into a force with a fighting chance against the German Wehrmacht. Maintained as a volunteer garrison force of small professional and mechanized forces to protect its far-flung empire, British forces and their armaments were outdated, troops poorly equipped, and the recruitment of soldiers and refurbishing the forces with new supplies were badly neglected.

2.3 The Foundations of the United Nations

United Kingdom Prime Minister, Winston Churchill did an admirable job of selling—some would have said hyping—the UK's role as the last bastion between the German Navy and the American shores. Roosevelt took full advantage of this supposed British service to convince the US Congress to support military aid to the United Kingdom. But he was far more ambitious. He understood that British military and economic weakness in the face of mortal threats by Nazi Germany offered a unique opportunity to remake the world according to American ideals and values. In the bluntest terms, the US was willing to offer England military aid against the elimination of all forms of discriminatory treatment in international commerce, and the reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers. The actual terms were subject to many months of negotiations between delegates of the US and the United Kingdom and eventually led to the special Anglo-American relationship. It was expressed first with the Lend-Lease Agreement that the US Congress approved in March 1941, with the Atlantic Charter, and finally with the Anglo-American Mutual Aid Agreement. With the Lend-Lease Agreement, Roosevelt established the framework for delivery of military material, fuel, and other necessities enabling the United Kingdom to do battle against Germany.

The Atlantic Charter resulted from the first meeting, secretly organized in August 1941,³ between Roosevelt and Churchill. It led to a very informal, never officially signed nor recorded agreement and was announced in a joint statement by the two leaders. Article VIII of the Charter provided a first framework that, although lacking

Box 2.2 The Atlantic Charter

Joint declaration of the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, representing His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, being met together, deem it right to make known certain common principles in the national policies of their respective countries on which they base their hopes for a better future for the world.

First, their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other;

Second, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned;

Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them;

Fourth, they will endeavor, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity;

Fifth, they desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved labor standards, economic advancement, and social security;

Sixth, after the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want;

Seventh, such a peace should enable all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance;

Eighth, they believe that all of the nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons, must come to the abandonment of the use of force. Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea, or air armaments continue to be employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security, that the disarmament of such nations is essential. They will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable measures which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments

³What subsequently has come to be known as the Atlantic Charter was a Joint Declaration by the President and the Prime Minister that they drafted during the Atlantic Conference, during a secret meeting code-named Riviera on 9 August 1941. It took place on board the USS Augusta in the Placentia Bay, Newfoundland, Canada, to which Roosevelt travelled during what was officially termed a ten-day fishing trip vacation. No signed copy of the declaration exists nor has one ever been officially recorded.

specificity, is considered an important foundation for the eventual establishment of the United Nations.

Most important, and very hard fought over, was, however, Article VII of the Anglo-American Mutual Aid Agreement that was signed in Washington on 28 February 1942, two months after the US entered into WW2. It converted Congressional approval for the Lend-Lease Act into a bilateral agreement. Article VII ended British Imperial Preferences and signaled loudly that the US would not indulge a partner with continued colonial aspirations.

While Roosevelt wrestled with the British Empire, the Japanese assaulted Pearl Harbor in December 1941, destroying and sinking 21 ships of the US Pacific Fleet and forcing America to confront the least enviable outcome: a two-ocean war with the Axis. As the leader of the free world, Roosevelt formalized the terms of an international coalition, which 26 countries joined immediately⁴ on 1 January 1942; 21

Box 2.3 Article VII of the Anglo-American Mutual Aid Agreement

In the final determination of the benefits to be provided to the United States of America by the Government of the United Kingdom in return for aid furnished under the Act of Congress of March 11, 1941, the terms and conditions thereof shall be such as not to burden commerce between the two countries, but to promote mutually advantageous economic relations between them and the betterment of worldwide economic relations. To that end, they shall include provision for agreed action by the United States of America and the United Kingdom, open to participation by all other countries of like mind, directed to the expansion, by appropriate international and domestic measures, of production, employment, and the exchange and consumption of goods, which are the material foundations of the liberty and welfare of all peoples; to the elimination of all forms of discriminatory treatment in international commerce, and to the reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers; and in general, to the attainment of all the economic objectives set forth in the Joint Declaration made on Aug. 12, 1941, by the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.

At an early convenient date, conversations shall be begun between the two governments with a view to determining, in the light of governing economic conditions, the best means of attaining the above-stated objectives by their own agreed action and of seeking the agreed action of other like-minded governments.

⁴Representatives of the following States signed the Declaration in Washington on 1 and 2 January 1942: The big Four: Republic of China, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, United States. Members of the British Commonwealth: Australia, Canada, British India, New Zealand, South Africa. Representatives of exiled governments: Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Kingdom of Greece, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Additional States: Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama.

more nations would follow before WW2 ended.⁵ The military pact committed the signatories to employ their full military and economic resources against the Axis and not to agree to a separate armistice or peace with the enemy states. Roosevelt called the military pact the Declaration of the United Nations, consistent with his vision of a global, collective security system.

While the members of the newly formed military alliance fought for peace over the next three and half years, the United Nations that Roosevelt intended as protector of international peace still needed to be created. The negotiations were long, arduous, and were led, in almost all sessions, by Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin. Around this core group, other statesmen were sometimes invited to meet in Moscow, Washington, Casablanca, Quebec, Cairo, Teheran, and Yalta before the delegates of 50 states met in San Francisco to adopt the UN Charter. The visions held by the three leaders sometimes differed substantially, but Roosevelt's actions left no room for doubts that he had a plan and all the means to realize it.

2.4 US State Department and the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)

The intellectual heavy lifting had fallen to Roosevelt's Department of State whose leadership was deeply divided between Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, a plodding, pompous and pretentious Southern Democrat, and his Under Secretary, Sumner Welles, a privileged and popular New York Democrat with close personal ties to FDR. During Hull's two-month summer vacation, FDR asked Welles to form a special committee to draft plans for the post-WW2 world order. "What I expect you to do, he told Welles, is to prepare... the necessary number of baskets and the necessary number of alternative solutions for each problem. When the time comes, all I have to do is reach into a basket and fish out solutions that are sound and from which I can make my own choice."⁶

For this policy planning group Welles mixed his closest advisers from the Department, Dean Acheson, Adolf Berle, Herbert Feis, and Leo Pasvolsky, with the expert groups of the CFR who were already engaged in the State Department's contingency planning. The planning group was named, obliquely, the Advisory Council on Postwar Foreign Policy. Its name neither betrayed its true mission nor its rather astonishing public-private partnership with the CFR advisory groups that served in Roosevelt's senior war and postwar strategy planning bodies. Even the New York Times, usually a reliable chronicler of FDR's maneuvers, alluded only in vague and confusing terms to the Advisory Council. An article that described an administrative

⁵ Later signatories: Brazil, Ethiopian Empire, Mexico, Commonwealth of the Philippines, Bolivia, Columbia, Iran, Kingdom of Iraq, France, Liberia, Chile, Ecuador, Kingdom of Egypt, Lebanon, Paraguay, Peru, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela.

⁶ Benjamin Welles, Sumner Welles: FDR's Global Strategist; St. Martin's Press; November 1997, pp. 330.

Box 2.4 Secret Collaboration Between the Council on Foreign Relations and US State Department

The War and Peace Studies project was “strictly confidential,” wrote Josiah Bowman, a Director and prominent leader of the Council on Foreign Affairs “because the whole plan would be ‘ditched’ if it became generally known that the State Department is working in collaboration with any outside group.” The Rockefeller Foundation agreed to fund the project, reluctantly at first, but, once convinced of its relevance, with nearly \$350,000.

The public admission of the secret existence of the Studies project had been made by the Council itself in 1996 with the publication of its history “Continuing the Inquiry” by Peter Grose. It described how almost 100 experts of the Council assisted the US State Department in its preparations for America’s WW2 role, postwar foreign policies, and the creation of the United Nations.

Four topic groups focused on economics and financial issues, security and armaments, territorial, and political issues, met more than 250 times, and produced 682 memoranda for the State Department, which marked them classified and circulated them among the appropriate government departments. They encompassed pivotal policy definitions on “The Impact of War upon the Foreign Trade of the United States”; contingency blueprints for the case if the British Isles fell to German occupation; for a tolerant appeasement policy towards Japan; for an American occupation force in defeated Germany; for the status of Chiang Kai-shek’s China relative to postwar US trade and its strategic implications regarding Japan and the Soviet Union, and finally on the extension of the Monroe Doctrine to cover the strategically important Greenland.

According to the CFR book, the fourth group, focused on political aspects of the war and postwar order, was largely superseded by the State Department’s own postwar policy planning staff. What is left unsaid, however, was that the three vice-chairs of the State Department’s Advisory Council on Postwar Foreign Policy were all CFR’s War and Peace Studies experts and in fact served actively at the time either as directors or officers of the CFR.

reshuffling of the State Department management structure alluded vaguely to a policy committee. Participants were identified as “Norman H. Davis, Red Cross chairman; Myron C. Taylor, the President’s special representative on missions to the Vatican, and Dr. Josiah Bowman, president of John Hopkins University” (New York Times 1943). What New York Times readers did not learn was that Davis was vice-chairman, while Taylor and Bowman served as senior officers of the CFR. They were the vanguard in the secret arrangement between the State Department and the

CFR, widely known as America's most prominent think tank, and the perfected WW2 version of Woodrow Wilson's "The Inquiry" of 1917.⁷

Once Hull resumed his duties as Secretary of State, he supported the broad outline, but not necessarily the entirety, of each of Welles' tactical proposals. The old jealousies grew more intense particularly because Welles had actually delivered on a key foreign policy objective that implemented FDR's version of a pragmatic collective security arrangement. Even before Roosevelt won the presidential election in 1932, Welles had championed reforms in the United States' approach to its southern neighbors. As one of the US's most important Latin American specialists, he argued successfully for a break from the traditional treatment of the southern neighbors as banana republics that were subject to periodic military police actions. To restore trust and friendly relationships, he envisioned four principles guiding future South American policies: no armed intervention unless American lives were at stake; no recognition of revolutionary governments until legitimized by free elections; inter-American consultations in event of a crisis; and reciprocal trade agreements. Once implemented, his proposed approach became known as one of FDR's early foreign policy successes. The "Good Neighbor Policy" gained unexpected gravitas when the US declared war with Japan, Germany, and Italy in late 1941. Now, the Roosevelt administration was interested in obtaining commitments from their neighbors that they would respect US interests and disengage from the Axis powers. Welles obtained consent in early 1942 to this hemispheric agreement.

The success of his Good-Neighbor Policy strengthened Roosevelt's macro-political vision for a post-WW2 order. In his earliest discussions with Churchill, Roosevelt had always emphasized not so much the postwar need for an international organization, but for an order dominated by the major powers, each policing its share of the world. During the Atlantic Conference in August 1941, he had anticipated that only the United States and the United Kingdom would emerge as postwar powers dominant enough to police the world (Welles 1942). He explained to Churchill what he envisioned as the winning police procedures. The key was trust, not the application of "sanctions," that is force, he said (Kimball 1997). Under the unfolding strategic prerogatives to win WW2, he would eventually include Russia and China in his interpretation of collective security. These "Four Policemen" would protect his Four Freedoms. Historian Warren F. Kimball who has studied the entire correspondence between FDR and Churchill, states: "The peaceful global cooperation that FDR thought indispensable, was a consultative, trusting, regionalized relationship between the major powers" (Kimball 2008). And Walter Lippman, as a former leader in President Woodrow Wilson's Inquiry, one of the most respected writers on international affairs, provided an endorsement of the underlying principle

⁷The Council on Foreign Affairs was created by American internationalists (diplomats, politicians, and business leaders, educators, and academics) who had informally created "The Inquiry," as a political support group for Woodrow Wilson and his efforts to create the League of Nations. As America turned isolationist, they created in 1921 the CFR, funded in large part with their own investments. They also started to publish *Foreign Affairs*—still considered an influential policy journal of the world. In the 1930s the think tank started to receive substantial financial contributions by America's leading industrialists' foundations (Rockefeller, Ford, Carnegie, and others).

with his very successful book *U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic*. He argued that the formula for peace was not a new League of Nations, but a basic alliance of the United States, Britain, and Russia (Lippman 1943).

By August 1943, Secretary of State Hull presented the President with the Department's "Charter of the United Nations." It was based on the previously agreed outline plan with these central assumptions⁸:

- That the four major powers will pledge themselves morally bound not to go to war against each other or against any other nation, and to cooperate with each other and with other peace-loving states in maintaining the peace;
- That each of them will maintain adequate forces and will be willing to use such forces as circumstances require to prevent or suppress all cases of aggression; and
- That there is a necessity for a small Council, in which the great powers would have a predominant position, to direct the security system.

The public caught glimpses of how meticulously the US delegation had prepared their positions as they arrived to the Four Power conferences.⁹ "When the Secretary of State went to Moscow he took with him documents so well and carefully prepared that they were adopted with little change by the representatives of Soviet Russia, Great Britain and China in what became known as the Declaration of Moscow," reported Arthur Krock (Krock 1943).

With preparatory negotiations well advanced, Roosevelt's remaking of the world order now took practical shape. To prove to the world that his promise of four freedoms was not empty talk, he organized a series of conferences to create organizations that would help the world to overcome the inevitable postwar deprivations and build a safe future. In spring 1943, the United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture opened at the Homestead Resort in Hot Springs, Virginia. The purpose of the gathering was to create a permanent organization capable of coordinating food production and distribution and supporting the global agricultural industry—needs that were expected to dramatically increase as the war progressed and chaos multiplied. Eventually, the organization was converted into the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). Almost simultaneously Roosevelt also convened a second conference in Washington, DC, for the purpose of creating an international relief agency that was eventually called the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA). Finally, in December 1944, Roosevelt convened the Chicago Convention that led to the signing of the Convention on

⁸For a detailed discussion on these assumptions and the drafting of the UN Charter see Ruth B. Russell, *A History of the United Nations Charter—The Role of the United States 1940–1945*; The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC; 1958, pp. 245.

⁹Up to the third Moscow Conference it was always assumed that the post-war order would be dominated by the US, UK, Soviet Union, and China. However, as WW2 progressed and Russia's Red Army defeated the Germans along the Eastern front lines UK's Prime Minister Churchill grew increasingly cautious. Anticipating that Stalin would demand heavy strategic and political post-war rewards for the tremendous price Russians paid in the war against the Germans, Churchill wanted to forestall a dominant Soviet role in the UN Security Council. For this reason he lobbied Roosevelt to invite France as a fifth member into the Council, assuring Western dominance.

International Civil Aviation by 52 countries. Under its terms, a Provisional International Civil Aviation Organization (PICA0) was established and eventually renamed the International Civil Aviation Organization. In between these achievements fell yet his biggest endeavors with the establishment of multilateral economic systems and the organizations that eventually would be called the United Nations.

In July 1944 the Conference at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, created a new monetary system through which the eventual rebuilding of war-torn countries would be subsidized and to combat poverty in the world. Specifically, the conference provided the basis for the foundation of the International Monetary Fund and the

Box 2.5 Proposals for the Establishment of a General International Organization

There should be established an international organization under the title of The United Nations, the Charter of which should contain provisions necessary to give effect to the proposals which follow.

Chapter VIII. Arrangements for the maintenance of international peace and security including prevention and suppression of aggression

Section B. Determination of Threats to the Peace or Acts of Aggression and Action With Respect Thereto.

1. Should the Security Council deem that a failure to settle a dispute in accordance with procedures indicated in paragraph 3 of Section A, or in accordance with its recommendations made under paragraph 5 of Section A, constitutes a threat to the maintenance of international peace and security, it should take any measures necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Organization.
2. In general the Security Council should determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and should make recommendations or decide upon the measures to be taken to maintain or restore peace and security.
3. The Security Council should be empowered to determine what diplomatic, economic, or other measures not involving the use of armed force should be employed to give effect to its decisions, and to call upon members of the Organization to apply such measures. Such measures may include complete or partial interruption of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic and economic relations.
4. Should the Security Council consider such measures to be inadequate, it should be empowered to take such action by air, naval, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of members of the Organization.

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.¹⁰ In August 1944, in two rounds, first with the US, United Kingdom, and Russia, then with the US, United Kingdom, and China, the principals met at Dumbarton Oaks in Washington, DC, to draft the UN Charter. Of course, all national delegations brought their plans and the real work now was to iron out their differences. Officially called the Washington Conversations on International Peace and Security Organization, the talks commenced in August and would last until October 1944.

The outcome document, titled “Proposal for the establishment of a general international organization” described sanctions—without ever using the term—in language slightly weakened compared with Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations (United Nations 1947). There was virtually no discussion over the concept of sanctions. The cataclysmic global confrontations between Axis and Allies had relegated any non-military backed peace strategy to the realm of wishful thinking. The truly contentious issue was over the permanent members’ veto power, the conditions under which they might deploy their military under UN command, and what to do when one of the permanent state members violated the UN Charter.

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¹⁰Eventually the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development would be turned into one of the five divisions of the World Bank Group.



<http://www.springer.com/978-3-319-60004-8>

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Human Rights

Carisch, E.; Rickard-Martin, L.; Meister, S.R.

2017, XXX, 501 p. 6 illus. in color., Hardcover

ISBN: 978-3-319-60004-8