Chapter 2
Continuity and Change: From the Boom to the Slowing Down of International Migration from Mexico to the U.S.

Let's see the mistreatment in emigrant, so cruel they give to him. Once I was caught in Woodstock (Illinois), I was caught in a factory, they called it the factory of peaks, I was one of the first that fell into the trap and they filled a car with about 60–70 people. That's right, I don't know if right now you ignore this that appears on TV, they handcuff and shackle the emigrant I say, why do they do that? I think that the emigrant thing can be solved with some easier topics than that. Now, how many poor souls have died during the trip, I suffered a lot, twice on the brink of death (Antonio 2011).

2.1 Explaining the Continuity and Change of International Migration

In the literature on international migration we notice important efforts to explain, according to various perspectives and theoretical approaches, why do people migrate? And, which are the factors that explain the continuity and change in the international migratory processes? According to Cornelius (1992: 157) four are the factors: the economic crises in Mexico, the economic restructuring and demand for labor migrants in the U.S., the changes in American migratory policy and the maturation of migrants' transnational networks. It might be said that these four approaches allow explaining the dynamics of continuity and change that Mexican international migrations have historical witnessed: the demographic, economic, political and sociocultural approaches.

In relation with the first of these approaches a relation between demographic explosion and economic tension is assumed; in this approach, the demographic growth generates a demand of employment and consumption, which if it is not met, becomes an imbalance between offer and demand (Weiss-Altaner 1973: 166), this is to say, saturated labor markets and stark discrepancies between employment opportunities and requirements (Rionda 2001). In such situation Mexico found in international migration an escape valve for unemployment, poverty, marginalization issues and for the absence of an efficacious model to promote development, to

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the extent that numerous urban and rural households and communities found a strategy in migration to generate monetary incomes.

In like manner, the continuity and change registered by international migrations of Mexicans is closely linked to Mexico's demographic transition, since the transformations observed in the composition and structure of the families modify the socioeconomic organization, the functions, roles and arrangements in the households that nowadays experience a decrease in their average size, an increased presence of feminine heads, a growing economic participation of women [whose roles as providers are revalued in migration and gender studies] and an accelerated aging process (López 2001: 7).

From an economic perspective, the origin of international migrations are explained by the presence of macrostructural factors such as economic crises and wage differences between countries and regions, which make migration a market competition, in which workers are mobilized as a result of wages and employment (González 2002) and base their migratory decisions on cost-benefit criteria, searching to maximize their incomes. This way, according to this perspective, the main reason for the migratory phenomenon are wage gaps, for it involves workers who displace from areas with low salaries toward areas that offer higher incomes (Massey et al. 1993). This is to say, it is assumed that the actors estimate the expected incomes according to an equation in which the income expectations in the destination country, the probability of finding and keep a job and the income received in the origin place concur (Massey et al. 2009a: 16).

Following this line, but now from a microeconomic approach, migration rests upon the individuals' economic rationality to maximize their wages and expectations of upward social mobility (Pinto 1996 in González 2002). Here, rational decision models warn that population movements correspond to the economic cycle in which the sending and recipient countries are (Cerdio 2004), adjusting to the changes in their financial conditions (Ruíz/Vargas 2010: 175). Thus, the migratory flow intensifies when the economic growth of the recipient country is high and the probability of finding a job is higher, however it decreases when growth is slow and there is labor force scarcity.

If this is so, excluding other sort of factors and only paying attention to those of economic nature we notice that at times of crisis and employment scarcity in the recipient society, the dynamic of the process expresses a deceleration of the flow of migrants who leave their origin communities in order to look for employment options in the U.S. (Mendoza 2010; Orozco 2009). Even if the economic platform is one of the main components interrelated with the continuity of migrations, we know that "the motivations to emigrate are not restricted to these cost-benefit calculations […] because the lifetime maximization of the expected incomes is only one of the many motivations for international migration" (Massey et al. 2009a: 16–17).

In the face of a much more complex reality, the American political scenario has also determined the continuity and change in the patterns of international migrations, while its migratory policies have moved from recruitment to restriction, and from acceptance to exclusion, oscillating with recession and expansion periods and

also with the prevailing ideological trends (Timmer/Williamson 1998 in Massey et al. 2009a: 14). According to this political and intervention management approach, the implementation of initiatives that facilitated migration, such as the Bracero Program and the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) are positioned among the principal measures that promoted and reinforced the migratory patterns of Mexicans, even though at the same time, IRCA paved the way for the implementation of restrictive immigration policies that fostered a new migratory pattern (Massey et al. 2009b).

Therefore, it might be said that in the American migratory policy, the topic of migration has been dealt with heavy ideological and racist biases, which have rested upon the formulation of repressive policies (military and police) and the execution of anti-immigrant measures, in which the promoters of hardening find that extreme punishment is a dissuasive factor for undocumented migration (Schmidt 2008). It seems as if it is occurring that way, for the observed changes in the international migration dynamic of Mexicans show close links to the securitization of the border, as well as the set into motion of restrictive actions that criminalize migration, increase the vulnerability of migrants in the U.S. and promote voluntary and involuntary return.

Among the cultural factors of migration Massey et al. (2009a: 25) state that along the migratory process there appear conditions that open the possibilities to perpetuate international migration over time and space. Here, social networks acquire a fundamental role, since one person has emigrated, quotidian friendship and kinship bonds turn into a resource to become employed in the recipient country and to obtain other sort of help, which increase their emigration probabilities. Although culturally, the continuity of migration is also supported on the northern-becoming processes developed in the migrant communities, where emigrating to and working in the United States becomes a tradition, a way of life and a rite of passage, we have to bear in mind that migration is also part of the reproduction and social organization of the households that seek strategies to survive and reach higher wellbeing levels (Alarcón 1992: 315–317).

This way, migration as a process is not only perpetuated from the social structures, as beyond the participation of the states, policies, demographic changes, unemployment and other economic motivations, it has been observed that the action of social subjects is the one that defines the logic and functioning of the migratory system, to the extent that the strategies [the action] promoted by the social actors standout according to the migratory cultures of each locality, in which for instance, "emigrating can mean courage, decision or endurance of a youngster to become a man entering into another country in order to have a try, work and gain prestige" (García 2008: 78).

Finally, migration maintains and reproduces, while rooting is attained between the migrant population and the origin communities, in order to preserve customs and the instauration of practices that foster the feeling of belonging and feed the illusions of return in the near future; at the same time these practices promote communal improvement and wellbeing.

This way then, the interrelation of these four approaches demonstrates that migration is a complex and chaining phenomenon, in which the economic, political, social and cultural structures of the sending and recipient countries intervene, which on the one side, determine the contexts in which migrations occur and the decisions to leave are made, and on the other, the ways the migrant population has to enter into the recipient society. This is to say, regarding the Mexico-U.S. migratory system, these approaches are, partly, a platform to explain the patterns of continuity and change in migrations, as well as the transition between the various migratory stages.

From this stance, the analysis of the transformation processes upon which our argumentation on the configuration of the new migratory phase is supported pays especial attention to the articulation of the economic and political approaches; firstly, alluding to the 2008 international financial crisis, and secondly, to the hardening of American migratory policy.

2.2 Economic Crisis and New Perspectives on Migratory Policy

In the second half of 2008, the most severe financial and crisis ever since the Great Depression unleashed (Zúrita et al. 2009); even if the 2008–2009 Great Depression, thus named by Tanzi (2010), stared in the U.S., it acquired a global dimension, as there were several countries affected by it. The origin of the American economic crisis is due to a number of causes; it is partly explained by the crisis of the real estate sector facing the payment difficulties experienced in the high-risk mortgages (Lozano et al. 2015). Because of this, the financial crisis that started being announced in 2007 took place when the prices of houses stopped increasing, to later dramatically drop; at the same time, the interest rates for house buyers increased and many of the recently-built houses were not sold (Tanzi 2010).

The 2008 crisis, in spite of sharing similarities with previous episodes (such as a fast increase in the price of assets; a credit boom; a dramatic expansion of loans; and a sort of regulation and supervision that was not able to keep up with the occurrences) has its own characteristics, among them: the existence of benevolent macroeconomic conditions before the crisis; the opacity of financial transactions and a prominent role of non-banking institutions; together with a high degree of international financial integration, in which advanced countries played the leading roles (Lozano et al. 2015).

The 2008 global economic crisis had devastating consequences for the national economies, businesses and workers in both industrialized countries (Awad 2009) and emerging economies, to the extent that it ravaged financial systems and abruptly modified the behavior of markets for goods and labor (Martínez et al. 2010). During the last two trimesters of 2008, the U.S. registered a negative growth (−0.5 and −6.2 %) and reduced productivity in the main economic sectors, specifically those that had experienced expansion with a growing demand for labor, particularly that of Hispanic workers, most of whom are of Mexican origin (Awad

2009; SRE 2009). In that year, the most severely affected sectors of the U.S. economy were construction and manufacturing, with annual percentage GNP change rates of −5.6 and −4.6 %, respectively (Mendoza 2010: 5). Among other effects, this decelerated the demand for labor and entailed a loss of approximately 1.1 million and 207,000 jobs, respectively, in these two industries in the first months of 2009 (Awad 2009; SRE 2009).

In this regard, some authors (e.g., Papademetriou/Terrazas 2009) have stated that the concentration of migrants in the most severely affected economic sectors had serious implications for this population because in conditions of crisis and work scarcity it is one of the most vulnerable; often, its members are among the first to be fired. In this respect, the recent economic crisis has been one of the direst in terms of duration and impact, since one of its main consequences was the destabilization of the American labor market. According to BBVA (*Banco Bilbao Vizcaya* 2011), the 2008 recession caused the largest loss of jobs, as the unemployment rate reached historic dimensions in a short period of time, rising from 4.9 % in January 2008 to 9.7 % in August 2009 (Mendoza 2010: 6). Even though the economic recovery began in 2010, the process has been very slow: in fact, only around 20.0 % (1.7 million) of the almost 8 million lost jobs have been recovered (BBVA 2011).

In August 2011, the lack of dynamism in the U.S. economy was reflected in null job creation, despite the fact that some 215,000 employment opportunities were generated between February and April of that year, and 53,000 more from May to July. As a result, it is estimated that the unemployment rate remained steady at around 9.1 %, which meant five consecutive months at levels above 9.0 % (Almonte/Morales 2011).

In this context, Latin American migrants recorded a higher unemployment rate than those of the North American population and foreigners from other countries (Orozco 2009). During the first trimester of 2008, when the economic crisis struck, the general unemployment rate was 5.0 %, but for the Hispanic population it reached 7.3 %, and for Mexican workers, 8.4 % (Tamar 2009). Between the fourth trimester of 2009 and the third trimester of 2011, the situation of Mexicans may have seemed to improve, but in reality it continued to be unfavorable, because while the unemployment rate for the nation as a whole dropped from 10.0 to 9.1 %, among Mexicans the change in the same period was from 12.9 to 11.6 %.

During this very gradual recovery of employment in the U.S., it has been argued that Hispanics are among the most favored sectors, since between the fourth trimester of 2009 and the third trimester of 2011, of 1.33 million jobs generated, 668,000 were taken by Latinos; that is, 52.0 % of all new employment. Estimates indicate that 17.0 % of these jobs were filled by Mexican migrants (BBVA 2011). In that year, the main sectors in which Mexican migrants found jobs were commerce, education and health, agriculture, fishing and reforestation, and professional and entrepreneurial services. Meanwhile, the sectors in which employment shortages persisted were tourism and entertainment, other services, and manufacturing (BBVA 2011: 8).

Accompanying this recessive process, the international migratory agenda, in spite of registering formal advancements in years previous to the crisis,[1] has also witnessed significant drawbacks, apparently stressed by the 2008 economic recession, in virtue that the American migratory policy experienced deep changes in the attitudes toward labor migration, since the reduced employment offer stirred feelings of discrimination, violence and xenophobia (Awad 2009), which materialized as the implementation of restrictive measures that made the lack of protection, irregularity, uncertainty and intolerance which the migrants in the U.S. are subjected to more visible: strengthening of border securitization campaigns; criminalization of the hiring of undocumented migrants; persecution and harassment in the workplace (Kibble 2010).

The anti-immigrant bias renewed in the American migratory policy provoked the reduction of Mexican presence in some states as a result of the interstate mobility registered by such population searching for employment and fewer restrictions. In this mobility process the states that were not usual migrant recipients and that suddenly were overwhelmed by a wave of undocumented population (for instance, Colorado, Virginia and Georgia) responded to the phenomenon with overtly anti-immigrant laws (CNDH 2009).

Between 2010 and 2011, six states in the U.S. (Arizona, Tennessee, Georgia, Indiana, Alabama and South Carolina) promulgated anti-migrant laws, while two others (Florida and Utah) discussed their implementation. It is no coincidence that such measures were ratified or discussed precisely when the protracted decline in the need for labor meant that there was much less demand for this sector of the working class.

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security has also modified the measures applied to control undocumented migration through actions that promote deportations, criminalize the hiring of undocumented workers (Kibble 2010), foster persecution and harassment in the workplace, and problematize the migrants' social interaction by enforcing economic sanctions and suspending their eligibility for social services and health care programs (Durán 2011). It is this setting what Durán (2011) calls a strategy of *forced erosion of the population*; i.e., implementing control and stigmatization policies to confront the problem of undocumented migration by racializing certain segments of the population, since these measures seem to offer a better option than a migratory reform or massive deportations by virtually forcing undocumented migrants to abandon certain states for fears of arrest or deportation (ibid. 2011).

By the end of 2015 and early 2016, the situations of violence against migrant population have been aggravated by the deportation measures that the American government has promoted to send broad sectors of migrant population, particularly

[1]Martínez et al. (2010: 13), point out that in "recent years there was intense activity around the topics of the contemporary migratory agenda fueled by noticeable events such as the UN High Level Dialogue (2006)", the constitution of the Global Forum on Migration and Development, the constitution of the Ibero-American Forum on Migration and Development and the irruption of numerous intergovernmental, agential, academic and civil-society activities.

that in the states of Georgia, Texas and North Carolina, which reached the border in the 2014 wave, was detained by the Border Patrol and received a final deportation order from an immigration judge.

However, it is also true that control measures and border security have been issues in the U.S. since the early 1990s (Koslowski 2011), as shown by the application of initiatives like "Operation Gatekeeper" in 1995, and HR Law 4,437 in 2005 (Rocha 2006). But the measures taken today to protect the border have been intensified by securitization campaigns reinforced by an ever-growing availability of human and material resources and infrastructure, and through the enactment of proposals like the 2010 Emergency Border Security Law (Kibble 2010). These later changes in the measures that originally increased the difficulties faced by migrants seeking to cross the border in recent years to achieve a better quality of life are currently reflected in the deceleration of the average annual number of undocumented migrants that attempt to settle in the U.S. (Durand 2010). Other expressions of anti-immigrant hostility and violence seen in recent years include the historic increase in the number of deportations (from 81,000 in 2008 to 195,772 in 2010), the higher number of arrests and sanctions applied to employers who hire undocumented workers (from 135 in 2008 to 196 in 2010), and the number of notifications of workplace inspections, which reached 2,393 in 2011, for an increase of over 375.0 % with respect to 2008 (Kibble 2010 and 2011).

All signs indicate that the American government will go on enforcing these actions, in spite of the contradictions, in terms of how the economic and political systems of the country articulate, given that unskilled migrants represent only a modest threat to the American population, while offering significant benefits to employers, consumers and the economy in general (Holzer 2011). Nonetheless, these economic changes have materialized in a migratory legislation that is harsher toward migrants who, many believe, overload the welfare system and occupy jobs that pertain to Americans (Papademetriou/Terrazas 2009).

2.3 From High Tide to Reflux: Transition to a New Phase?

In a changing scenario, the crisis has become a necessary frame to analyze contemporary international migration at one of its most significant historical moments, due to the amount, diversity and dynamism of human mobility flows (Lozano et al. 2015). Being so, with the hardening of the migratory policy and economic contraction in the United States, the migratory processes of Mexicans experienced important transformations that apparently establish a migratory status different to the stage of boom and uninterrupted growth of migration and remittances.

From high tide to reflux is the process, which according to Durand (2012), starts to characterize the end of an era and the beginning of a new migratory phase that takes place in an environment of repression, contraction and definition of new rules. Among others, the principal elements that have made room for the emergence of a new pattern are: selective and racial deportation, the contraction of the American

labor market, the slow recovery of labor options and the implementation of increasingly severe administrative sanctions.

Academic studies that take part in this debate have stressed seven principal aspects, which are: diminution of Mexican migratory flows toward the United States; progressive increase of return migration; lesser presence of Mexican population in the U.S.; increase in deportations; diminution of border arrests; deceleration of remittances sent to Mexico; and, the increasing vulnerability of the Mexican migrant.

2.3.1 *Slowing Down of Migratory Flows Toward the U.S.*

"Potential migrants, considering the high costs of migrating and reduced employment opportunities in the destination, have chosen not to migrate" (Awad 2009: ix). According to Awad, in situations of economic and labor crises in the recipient society, the rationality of individuals and migrant households impacts the processes of deceleration and non-mobility because many potential migrants simply decide to stay put. In this regard, and in accordance with rational decision models, the reduction of migrant flows to the U.S. can be explained, in part, by the economic logic of population displacement (Cerdio 2004) and adaption to the changes in the financial conditions in the sending and recipient countries (Ruíz/Vargas 2010: 175). This is because migratory flows intensify when economic growth in the recipient country is high and the probability of obtaining employment improves, but tend to shrink when growth is slow and work becomes scarce.

There is no question that the international mobility of Mexicans has decelerated in the wake of the 2008 economic recession in the U.S., the fall in productivity in the sectors that employ numerous Mexican workers, and the hardened border control measures, all of which function to contain and impose limits on flows of migrant workers (Orozco/Landen 2009: 15; Mendoza 2010: 10).

As a result of this behavior, the National Survey on Occupation and Employment (*Encuesta Nacional de Ocupación y Empleo*, ENOE) demonstrated that the annual flow of Mexicans into the U.S. decreased from 1.026 million in 2006–2007 to just 636,000 in 2008–2009, while the Current Population Survey (CPS) registered an irregular behavior pattern in the size of new migrant flows in the 2001–2009 period, when the annual influx of approximately 443,000 entries in 2007 fell to just 156,000 new arrivals in 2012, and of only 145,000 in 2014 (Passel et al. 2012; Gonzalez-Barrera 2015).

This change is more visible depending on time periods, noticing that from 1995 to 2000 the number of Mexicans who entered the U.S. was close to 3 million, while from 2005 to 2010, i.e., the years of the 2008 depression, this flow decreased to 1,370,000, and to 870,000 from 2009 to 2014; last period in which however, the U.S. started shown signs of economic recovery (Gonzalez-Barrera 2015) (Fig. 2.1); this seems to indicate that in the pre- and post-crisis periods the diminution of the Mexico-U.S. migratory flow is sustained.



Fig. 2.1 Net Migration (*in thousands) from Mexico below Zero after the Great Recession. *Source* González-Barrera (2015)

Following this tendency, the 2000 and 2010 Population and Housing Censuses (*Censo de Población y Vivienda*) in Mexico estimated that the population of international migrants declined from 1,607,357 to 1,072,792 individuals between the 5-year periods 1995–2000 and 2005–2010; a percentage change of −33.3 % and a reduction in the annual average from 2000 to 2010 of approximately 321,000–214,000 people.[2] This deceleration of international migrants was recorded in 22 states that presented negative percentage changes from one 5-year period to the next; among them, several with long migratory traditions, such as Jalisco (−50.4 %), Michoacán (−47.8 %), and Guanajuato (−26.2 %), as well as others considered as 'emerging' migrant states, like the State of Mexico (−38.4 %), in which according to González (2002: 228), some communities have branches in both countries to secure the economic survival, becoming transnational households, which nowadays face a number of economic vulnerability situations, because of the change processes observed in the migratory dynamic and the familial remittance sending patterns (see Fig. 2.2).

According to the type of migratory movement, at national level we observe that the emigrant population declined from 1,209,834 to 683,829 individuals, a change of −43.5 % between 1995–2000 and 2005–2010. For the State of Mexico, it is estimated that in the first 5-year period around 74.7 % (98,811) of the total

[2]These amounts include the international migrant population that remained in the U.S., international migrants who returned to Mexico during the five years prior to the date of the census, and unspecified values.



Fig. 2.2 Percentage variation in the international migrant population between the 5-year periods 1995–2000 and 2005–2010. *Source* Elaborated by the author based on the 2000 and 2010 Population Censuses

international migrant population (132,266) were emigrants. However, during the 5-year period 2005–2010, this population reached a total of only 46,001 people, a percentage variation of −53.4 % (Fig. 2.3).

Additional census data show that the municipalities in the State of Mexico witnessed important changes, including a deceleration of the international migrant population in 73 of its 125 jurisdictions.[3] Of these, Coatepec Harinas (the municipality where Las Vueltas is located) experienced a percentage variation of −53.2 % between the 5-year periods 1995–2000 and 2005–2010. However, we also find that other municipalities in this state with traditions of migration suffered an even more marked deceleration in the size of their international migrant population: for example, Tejupilco (−74.7 %), Villa Guerrero (−66.4 %) and Tlatlaya (−60.5 %). It is also important to mention that this pattern of deceleration is not exclusive to municipalities in the south, as it was also registered in municipalities that border Federal District: e.g., Nezahualcóyotl (−69.9 %), Naucalpan de Juárez (−69.3 %), Ecatepec de Morelos (−63.4 %), and Tlalnepantla de Baz (−59.8 %). Finally, this distribution shows that most municipalities in the State of Mexico are making adjustments and rearrangements in the processes of the international mobility of their inhabitants.

[3]Of the remaining 51 municipalities, 48 registered a positive percentage variation between the 5-year periods 1995–2000 and 2005–2010, while the information available for another 4 is insufficient to make estimates.



Fig. 2.3 Percentage variation in the international emigrant population between the 5-year periods 1995–2000 and 2005–2010. *Source* Elaborated by the author based on the 2000 and 2010 Population Censuses

Regarding only the emigrant population, it is estimated that 93 of these 125 municipalities experienced a negative change in the number of people who left with the intention of finding work in the U.S., Coatepec Harinas, for example, registered a reduction from 2,058 to just 917 migrants between these two 5-year periods, with a percentage change of −55.4.

Clearly, the behavior of these indicators suggests that migratory flows have diminished, since people no longer perceive substantial incentives to emigrate to the U.S. under the existing conditions of "low job creation and high unemployment" (BBVA 2011). Under these circumstances, economic contraction, stiffer migration policies, and increased border security, all seem to have become factors that demotivate emigration (Orozco/Landen 2009: 15), thus situating the dynamism of this process in "waiting mode" (Arango 2010). This phenomenon can be attributed, at least in part, to the fact that communications between migrant populations and their home communities warn that movement by undocumented workers is hardly feasible under the current conditions (Tamar 2009: 592).

2.3.2 Return Migration

In the context of the economic crisis in the U.S., the massive return of Mexican migrants emerged as one of the main consequences of the marked contraction of labor markets. However, the actual number of people that were forced to return as a result of the economic downturn was much lower than what projections anticipated

(Awad 2009). Interpretations of why no such massive return took place despite the conditions of economic crisis and vulnerability for Mexicans in the U.S. refer to a whole series of factors: the economic obligation they have with their families back home; the monetary costs involved in returning; the difficult prospect of attempting to re-enter the U.S. at a later date due to the increasing securitization of the border; the legal status they may have obtained and the benefits it offers; the attachment of those who have consolidated families in 'the North'; and, more generally, the perception of economic weakness and scarce job opportunities in Mexico (Awad 2009; Orozco 2009). In other words, the enormous asymmetries in the degree of development between the U.S. and Mexico serve to de-stimulate any massive displacement or return by migrants (Martínez et al. 2010: 8). This would seem to indicate that the decision of whether return or not is more closely related to the level of economic development in the country of origin and the ease of circulating back to the U.S., than strictly to the economic conditions in the recipient country (Papademetriou/Terrazas 2009: 13). None of these approaches, however, succeeds in explaining an apparent contradiction: even though the return of Mexicans has not been 'massive', it has been increasing over time.

In this respect, in Fig. 2.2 it is observed that in the three analyzed periods, the number of returned migrants has been on the rise, changing from 670,000 between 1995 and 2000 to 1,000,000 between 2009 and 2014. Figures that in comparison with those obtained for the Mexico-U.S. flow, indicate that in recent years more Mexicans leave the U.S. than those who enter (Gonzalez-Barrera 2015).

The 2000 and 2010 censuses, however, indicate that the percentage of returned migrants rose from 17.7 % (284,806) to 32.7 % (350,719) of the international migrant population in the 5-year periods 1995–2000 and 2005–2010, respectively. Specifically, and on a state-by-state basis, we observe a significant rise in the number of migrants who returned from the U.S. in those two periods. The State of Mexico, for example, showed an increase in the percentage of returned migrants from 18.0 % (23,781) to 38.0 % (30,946), while in states such as Baja California Sur, Nayarit, Sonora, Campeche, Federal District and Aguascalientes, this phenomenon affected 43.2 % of the international migrant population (Fig. 2.4).

Among the reasons of this population to return, it is noteworthy that in spite of the increase in the number of deported migrants, according to the 2014 National survey of Demographic Dynamic, around 60 % of the population returned due to family reunion and only 14 % because it was deported (Gonzalez-Barrera 2015) (Fig. 2.5).

The next question to be addressed seeks to determine which migrants are the ones most likely to return? In relation to the geographical distribution of return migration at national level, we notice that in the 5-year period 1995–2000 most return migrants settled in states in the traditional migratory region (45.8 %), while 28.0 and 17.3 %, respectively, returned to the northern and central regions of Mexico. In contrast, although in the 5-year period 2005–2010 the traditional migration region remained in the first place, it witnessed a much lower flow of return migrants (37.7 %), while the south-southeast (16.8 %) and central (21.1 %) regions saw their shares increase. It is certainly possible that this behavior reflects



Fig. 2.4 Percentage of returning migrant population in the 5-year periods 1995–2000 and 2005–2010. *Source* Elaborated by the author based on the 2000 and 2010 Population Census



Fig. 2.5 Family reunification main reason for return Mexican migrant to go home. *Source* González-Barrera (2015)

the relative seniority of the migratory process and the maturity of migrants' social networks, which would allow migrants from regions with long migratory traditions to accrue the capital and other socioeconomic resources required to remain in the U.S. even in times of economic crisis and hostile policies, though perhaps on a somewhat lower scale.

With respect to locality size, it is estimated that from 1995 to 2000 most of the individuals in this population returned to places with 100,000 or more (39.7 %), or fewer than 2,500, inhabitants (27.6 %), although from 2005–2010 the percentage of return migrants to localities with fewer than 2,500 inhabitants (33.4 %) increased. According to this distribution, it is clear that the returning migrant population registered a greater presence in the south-southeast and central regions of Mexico, particularly in rural towns in those states. In terms of jobs and labor markets, the dynamics of these returns in times of crisis will have deep implications and cause

imbalances between the demand for employment and the number of work opportunities offered by the rural settings into which this population is incorporated.

In regard to other characteristics, we find that the composition of the flow of return migrants is made up mostly of males, especially during the 5-year period 2005–2010, when the percentage was 68.7 % (Table 2.1).

Upon examining the age breakdown of return migrants, we find that most are still in their productive working years, whereas from 2000 to 2010 it is estimated that around 80.4 % were between 15 and 59 years of age. This result is important in itself because, as we have mentioned, this is a population sector whose needs and demands require successful incorporation into labor markets in the towns and regions to which they return (Table 2.1).

An analysis of the kinship relations of these migrants reveals similar distributions in 2000 and 2010, since records for both years indicate that a higher proportion of household heads and their children remained in the U.S. Despite this pattern, however, it is important to note the higher presence of heads (43.3 %) who returned to their hometowns during the 5-year period 2005–2010.

Turning now to literacy levels, statistics show positive changes at national level, as the percentage of return migrants who can read and write rose from 91.9 to 93.5 % between 2000 and 2010. It is important to mention that during this period the presence of individuals with no schooling also declined (4.4–3.0 %), however the level of schooling continued to be low, since 71.2 % of the return migrants in 2010 had only attended primary school (Table 2.1).

We found the same behavior pattern for these variables in the State of Mexico and the municipality of Coatepec Harinas, albeit we estimate that the proportion of women who returned is lower at municipal level (25.1 %), as is the percentage of individuals born in the U.S., whose proportion fell from 14.5 to 8.7 % between 2000 and 2010 (Table 2.1).

Also, during the 5-year period 2005–2010, the migrants who returned to the municipality of Coatepec Harinas contained a higher concentration in the 15-to-59-year-old age group, while their kinship relations and marital status followed the same tendency as in the rest of the country, with a larger presence of return migrants being household heads who were married or living in common-law relationships. Finally, we see that the percentages of illiterate population and those with no years of schooling are higher among people from Coatepec Harinas who return to their hometowns, and that most of the individuals who did attend school are significantly concentrated in primary education (Table 2.1).

On the basis of these analyses, we can affirm that the migrants who return to their places of origin are mostly male heads still in productive ages. Although these censuses do not provide information on the reason for their return, in the light of the causes that underlie the origins of Mexican migration in the first place, we can assume that these migrants return for a variety of reasons, but clearly one of their most important motives is the termination of the working season and the increasing instability of labor markets in the U.S.

Table 2.1 Sociodemographic characteristics of the return migrant population in two 5-year periods: 1995–2000 and 2005–2010

Variable		1995–2000			2005–2010		
		Mexico	State of Mexico	Coatepec Harinas	Mexico	State of Mexico	Coatepec Harinas
		n = 337,061	*n* = 16,346	*n* = 393	*n* = 985,383	*n* = 60,231	*n* = 934
		Percentage			Percentage		
Gender	Male	62.3	62.8	74	68.7	71.4	74.9
	Female	37.7	32.7	26	31.3	28.6	25.1
Age groups	5–14 years	20.2	20	18.1	15.6	13.7	7.2
	15–59 years	74.1	77.3	77.9	80.4	83.3	89.3
	60 and above	5.4	2.3	–	4	2.9	3.5
	Not specified	0.3	0.4	4.1	–	0.1	–
Kinship relation	Head of household	37.6	37.1	35.9	43.3	42.8	41.2
	Spouse	14.5	13.9	7.1	12.6	12	8.4
	Child	34.3	34.5	37.7	30.9	30.5	34.7
	Other relative	12.4	13.7	19.3	12.3	13.1	14.7
	No relation	1.1	0.9	–	0.8	0.9	–
	Not specified	0.1	–	–		0.6	1.1
Literate	Yes	91.9	94.5	85.8	93.5	94.7	89.3
	No	7.8	5.2	14.2	5.6	4.2	10.7
	Not specified	0.3	0.3	–	0.8	1.1	–
Education level	No years of schooling	4.4	2.9	–	3	2	8.1
	Primary School	69.5	64.6	84.6	71.2	68	84.2
	High School	12.7	14.1	6.6	18.6	21.7	7.5
	University	11.9	17.4	4.5	6.8	8.1	0.2
	Not specified	1.6	0.9	4.2	0.4	0.2	–

Source Elaborated by the author based on the 2000 and 2010 Population Census

Table 2.2 Return migrant population of 12 years of age and older, according to condition of activity in the 5-year periods 1995–2000 and 2005–2010

Variable	1995–2000			2005–2010		
	Mexico	State of Mexico	Coatepec Harinas	Mexico	State of Mexico	Coatepec Harinas
Population	*n* = 276,024	*n* = 13,375	*n* = 322	*n* = 848,381	*n* = 52,850	*n* = 865
	Percentage			Percentage		
Economically active	54	60.1	60.2	68.1	72.3	77.6
Economically inactive	46	39.9	39.8	31.9	27.7	22.4
EAP	*n* = 149,043	*n* = 8,033	*n* = 194	*n* = 577,697	*n* = 38,236	*n* = 671
Employed	97.7	97.4	100	91.8	91.3	90.8
Unemployed	2.3	2.6	–	8.2	8.7	9.2

Source Elaborated by the author based on the 2000 and 2010 Population Census

When we examine the data concerning the condition of the work activity that return migrants performed, it turns out that the Economically Active Population (EAP) increased between the 5-year periods 1995–2000 and 2005–2010. Although this tendency is similar at national, state and municipal levels, it is important to point out that the municipality has the highest proportion of economically active individuals. However, the increased presence of working-age population has repercussions on the growth of unemployed EAP from one 5-year period to the next: from 2.3 to 8.2 % at national level, but from 0.0 to 9.2 % in the municipality (Table 2.2).

Also, there are significant differences in relation to the sector of activity and the employment status of return migrants, because while national and state levels show a tendency toward the outsourcing of economic activities, the municipality still shows a concentration in agricultural occupations, even though the participation of return migrants in the service sector has increased (Table 2.3).

In relation to this behavior, the differences in the employment status of the EAP can be explained by the fact that while at national level in 2005–2010 most of these people fell into the categories of employees and workers (45.9 %) or self-employed workers (27.8 %); in the municipality, we found that 43.9 % are agricultural day-laborers and only 21.1 % self-employed workers (Table 2.3).

According to this sociodemographic profile, we can affirm that the phenomenon of return migration consists of a flow made up mostly of men (household heads and their sons) with low educational levels (primary school). In terms of age, it is clear that most of these migrants are productive people employed in activities in the commerce-service sector (national and state) and agriculture (municipality), or are employees, self-employed workers, or agricultural laborers. This last occupation accentuates the conditions of employment irregularity and insecurity among agricultural workers in the municipality of Coatepec Harinas, since most of these

Table 2.3 Occupational characteristics of the return migrant population of 12 years of age and older in the 5-year periods 1995–2000 and 2005–2010

Variable		1995–2000			2005–2010		
		Mexico	State of Mexico	Coatepec Harinas	Mexico	State of Mexico	Coatepec Harinas
		n = 145,225	*n* = 7,780	*n* = 194	*n* = 530,496	*n* = 32,495	*n* = 601
		Percentage			Percentage		
Sector of activity	Primary	20.9	10.1	80.9	23.3	11.2	72.2
	Secondary	30.1	25.9	10.8	27.6	26.6	7.2
	Tertiary	49	64.1	8.2	50.1	62.2	20.6
Employment status	Employee or worker	51.4	54.7	10.8	45.9	48.6	17.8
	Day-laborer or peon	9.3	3.9	10.9	11.2	5.7	43.9
	Helper	–	–	–	6.6	6.7	7.2
	Employer	5	3.7	–	3.8	4.5	1.7
	Self-employed workers	28.4	33.7	53.6	27.8	31.3	21.1
	Unpaid domestic worker	6	4.1	16.5	4.7	3.3	8.3

Source Elaborated by the author based on the 2000 and 2010 Population Census

people are workers who take jobs in the fields where they receive none of the employment benefits established by the law, and earn wages that fluctuate from 8 to 10 dollars a day.

2.3.3 *Monetary Remittances: From Continuous Growth to a Slow Down*

Monetary remittances have been identified as one of the principal benefits of migrant labor because they represent important sources of income for migrant-sending countries, especially those with developing economies where these earnings constitute a particularly significant concept for their balance of payments, not to mention their role in the familial economy of migrant households (Rodríguez 2002; Awad 2009; Dadush/Falcao 2009). It is for this reason that the behavior patterns of remittances in times of economic recession have been a central concern of studies that examine the impacts of changes in international migratory processes, especially in economies that export cheap, mostly unskilled labor, where the effects of the deceleration of those resources have been most severe for migrants and their families.

In relation to economic conjunctures, studies by the World Bank signal that remittances have registered a counter-cyclical behavior in times of economic recession in migrant-sending countries, and symptoms of recovery when a host country experiences economic instability (SRE 2009). However, the crisis that ravaged the economies of both developed and undeveloped nations in 2008 triggered a deceleration of remittances on a global scale (Ruiz/Vargas 2010), the impacts of which differed profoundly form one region or country to another (Awad 2009). Among the factors that contributed to the reduction in the scale of monetary remittances, those of particular importance were: high levels of unemployment, reduced wages, raids on workplaces by immigration officials, increased vigilance of migration, more frequent deportations, and in general, the spread of anti-immigrant sentiments (Ruiz/Vargas 2010; Papademetriou/Terrazas 2009; Tamar 2009; Orozco 2009).

In Mexico, the volume of monetary remittances registered a steady growth from the early years of the 21st century (reaching 26 billion dollars in 2007), but since then the scenario has changed drastically. For example, the absolute increase in remittances sent by Mexicans living in the U.S. from 2006 to 2007 was barely significant—just 1.6 %—while in 2008 and 2009 the amount actually shrank by −3.6 and −15.7 %, respectively, to magnitudes of just 25.145 and 21.181 billion dollars, respectively (Fig. 2.6).

Estimates for the 2007–2010 period indicate that family remittances showed a negative growth in all the 31 states and Federal District. The severest reductions compared to the amounts captured in previous years occurred in Tabasco (−39.1 %), Chiapas (−37.6 %), and Hidalgo (−34.5 %), while the behavior of



Fig. 2.6 Volume of monetary remittances that entered Mexico 2000–2014. *Source* Elaborated by the author based on data from *Banco de México*

remittances in more traditional migratory states was similar, though somewhat less intense, with Aguascalientes (−21.2 %) and San Luis Potosí (−19.1 %) being the most gravely affected. It is important to note that even the states of Guanajuato, Jalisco and Michoacán experienced significant downturns, despite their long migratory traditions and heavy concentrations of remittances (Fig. 2.7).

The 2007–2011 period—which ended with the most recent year in which a recovery of remittances was recorded—reflects a similar tendency, as the volume of remittances that entered from the U.S. continued to be below the quantities registered in previous years. The only exception was Federal District, as all other states in Mexico suffered decelerations in the amounts of these resources.

Even if in 2010 there was a slight upturn with 21.308, from 2011 this flow was kept at levels of approximately 22 billion, it is in 2014 when they reach a peak of 23.647 billion dollars, which in spite of still being below the levels estimated before the crisis, represent a higher income, because the American dollar-Mexican peso exchange rate reached 14 MXN per 1 USD, and even 18 MXN by the turn of 2016.

Turning now to the specific case of the State of Mexico, statistics show that remittances registered a marked growth from 1995-to-2007, and even approached the levels seen in more traditional migratory states; from 161 to 2.167 billion dollars. However, in the ensuing years, the aforementioned tendency at national level was also reflected in this state, as the volume of remittances fell to levels of 1.637 and 1.658 billion dollars in 2010 and 2011, respectively, and 1.563 and 1.462 billion USD in 2012 and 2014. In response to this situation, the state government has recognized that the drop in the amount of remittances is causing reversals in the levels of poverty and margination in at least 60 municipalities, because the communities there had developed systems of dependency on the monies sent home by their relatives in the U.S. The most severely affected municipalities in the State of



Fig. 2.7 Percentage variation of remittances by state for the 2007–2010 and 2007–2011 periods. *Source* Elaborated by the author based on data from *Banco de México*

Mexico include Coatepec Harinas, Villa Guerrero, Ixtapan de la Sal, Tonatico, and Tlatlaya (*Milenio*, 13 July 2010).

At a macro level, the repercussions of this reduction have been somewhat attenuated in certain states, while in other states they have proven more susceptible to the fall in the volume of remittances, according to the proportion they represent in their respective gross internal products (GIP). In this sense, the economies of Campeche and the State of Mexico, which were in fifth and sixth place, respectively, on the scale of states with reduced remittances, may experience a less severe impact than a state like Michoacán, due to the degree of dependency that exists there, which is reflected in the substantially different percentages of remittances in the GIPs of these three states: Campeche, 1.0 %; the State of Mexico, 3.8 %; but Michoacán 20.3 %. This proportionality could intensify or reduce the degree of dependence on this source of economic income, because while households in Michoacán have a very high degree of dependence, in the State of Mexico and Campeche the relations of dependence are low and very low, respectively (SRE 2009; BBVA 2011).

2.3.4 Redefining the Index of Migratory Intensity

The changes and rearrangements in migratory flows (to and from the U.S.) and the capture of monetary remittances are also reflected in modifications in the indicators

Table 2.4 Change in the averages of the indicators of the Index of Migratory Intensity at the national, state and municipal levels, 2000 and 2010

Level of aggregation	Year	Households			
		that receive remittances	with migrants in the U.S.	with circular migrants	with return migrants
			in the previous 5-year period		
National average	2000	4.4	3.9	0.9	0.8
	2010	3.6	1.9	0.9	2.1
State average	2000	4.9	4.1	1	1
	2010	4	2	1	2.4
Municipal average	2000	6.6	6	1.2	1.1
	2010	6.5	3.8	1.2	3.4

Source CONAPO 2012

used to compile the Index of Migratory Intensity (IMI) in 2000 and 2010. According to *Consejo Nacional de Población* (National Council of Population, CONAPO 2012: 28) three of the four indicators involved changed significantly between 1995–2000 and 2005–2010. For example, the percentage of households in the country as a whole that received remittances declined—from 4.4 to 3.6 %—as did the percentage of households with migrants in the U.S.: 3.9–1.9 %. These figures contrast with the marked increase in the percentage of households with return migrants: from just 0.8 to 2.1 % (Table 2.4). The variations in the percentages of these three indicators were most marked in relation to the percentage of households with migrants in the U.S., which decreased by 48.7 % from one 5-year period to the next.

To continue with this analysis of the indicators of the IMI, estimates by CONAPO (2012) reveal the same tendency in the averages at state and municipal levels, as the indicators that recorded slightly less pronounced changes were those related to the households that received remittances and had circular migrants. However, as it occurred at national level, there is a marked reduction in the percentage of households with migrants in the U.S., coupled with a significant increase in the proportion of households with return migrants (Table 2.5).

According to CONAPO (2012), the indicator of households that receive remittances at state level recorded its largest reduction in Durango, falling from 9.9 to 6.5 %. This state was followed by states in the traditional migratory region; i.e., Jalisco, Michoacán, Colima, and Zacatecas, while the State of Mexico experienced a reduction from 2.2 to 1.5 %, a fall of 0.7 % points.

In relation to recent migration to the U.S., Zacatecas suffered a reduction of 7.1 % points in terms of the households with migrants, as the index there fell from 11.6 % in 1995–2000 to just 4.5 % in 2005–2010. Michoacán was in second place with a reduction of 5.8 %; while the other states comprised in the traditional migratory region experienced reductions that varied from 3 to 5 % points. The State of Mexico followed this same tendency. Despite the figures for the range of values in this state differed from those mentioned above, it also experienced a fall in the

Table 2.5 Percentage variation in the indicators of the Index of Migratory Intensity in the State of Mexico and the municipality of Coatepec Harinas, 2000 and 2010

Level of aggregation		Households				Degree of migratory intensity	Position in the state
		that receive remittances	wth migrants in the U.S.	with circular migrants	with return migrants		
			in the previous 5-year period				
State of Mexico	2000	2.2	2.5	0.6	0.3	Low	–
	2010	1.5	1	0.6	1.1	Low	–
	Percentage variation	−0.7	−1.5	0	0.8	–	–
Coatepec Harinas	2000	13.9	19.7	8	3.7	Very high	1
	2010	7.4	8.9	4.6	8.4	High	2
	Percentage variation	−6.4	−10.8	−3.3	4.8	–	–

Source CONAPO 2012

percentage of households with migrants, from 2.5 to 1.0 % between the 5-year periods 1995–2000 and 2005–2010 (CONAPO 2012: 30).

Finally, the increased presence of return migrants was recorded in all states, with variations from 0.2 % (Federal District) to 3.1 % (Hidalgo) from one 5-year period to the next. The State of Hidalgo suffered a pronounced increase in the value of this indicator: from 0.9 % in 1995–2000 to 4.0 % in 2005–2010, while in the State of Mexico the change was from 0.3 to 1.1 %. In this respect, while the details and magnitude of the changes varied from one state to another, what clearly stands out is the repositioning of migratory processes at national level. However, as indicative and diagnostic as they may be, these impersonal figures and calculations do not tell the whole story; indeed, doing so requires complementing statistical approaches and interpretation with the voices and perspectives of the subjects and migrant households that confront these patterns of transformation.

This numerical repositioning has also propitiated new migratory dynamics and intensities in municipalities in the State of Mexico. The specific case that interests us here is that of Coatepec Harinas because, according to the behavior of the IMI in 2000, it was classified as the only one of the 125 municipalities in the state with a 'very high' degree of migratory intensity. However, the IMI for 2010 indicates that this municipality underwent significant changes, as the percentage of households receiving monetary remittances fell from 13.9 to 7.4 % (Table 2.5), a decline of −6.4 % with respect to the 5-year period 1995–2000.

In this same vein, the proportion of households with migrants in the U.S. and with circular migrants saw very high negative percentage variations, of −10.8 and −3.3 %, respectively; while the percentage of households with return migrants increased from 3.7 to 8.4 %. Taken together, these transformations have repercussions for the repositioning of Coatepec Harinas as a migrant-sending municipality, due to the fact that the IMI for this municipality fell from 'very high' to just 'high'.

According to these new tendencies, Coatepec Harinas actually ceased to be the main space and territory for departures from the State of Mexico, falling to second place behind the municipality of Luvianos. Finally, the findings presented up to this point indicate and confirm the importance of analyzing the impacts of these transformations on the town of Las Vueltas, which just a few years ago was the principal geographical sending area of this municipal population.

2.3.5 *Apprehensions at the Border and Deportations from the U.S.*

The intensification of anti-immigrant attitudes, sentiments and measures has begun to make itself felt concretely in two ways: (1) a systematic increase in the number of deportations; and, (2) fewer migrants being detained at the U.S. border. These two facts provide additional evidence of the deceleration of the migratory flow of Mexicans toward the southern U.S. border. In the 2000–2011 period, the index of detainees at the border experienced a significant reduction: from approximately 1,636,000 to just 286,000 cases (Passel et al. 2012: 28; USBP 2011). In 2013 and 2014 this tendency remained, even reaching a historical minimum with 257 thousand and 229 thousand detained Mexicans (Krogstad/Passel 2014). Paradoxically, this tendency has emerged despite the fourfold increase in the number of agents patrolling the border, from 5,000 in 1995 to 21,000 in 2011 (BBVA 2012: 9).

Clearly, the lower frequency of detentions is a direct reflection of the reduced migratory flow, as fewer and fewer Mexicans attempt to cross the border into the U.S., in part because the growing securitization of the border area has become a structural barrier to the flow of migrants and a factor that has changed the dimensions of international migration in Mexico.

Similarly, BBVA (2012: 9) argues that the number of Mexicans apprehended by the border patrol is related to the growth of the GNP in the U.S., because when that country's economy expands and employment grows, the number of detained Mexicans increases, while precisely the contrary occurs when the U.S. economy begins to contract. This is because the economic cycle is the most important motor of Mexican migration to the U.S. However, it is important to notice that with respect to the economic recovery in the U.S. in 2010−2011, figures from BBVA show that the predicted impact of an increase in the number of apprehensions effectuated did not occur. According to this institution, one possible explanation of this lies in the so-called "Arizona effect";[4] i.e., the expansion of the anti-immigrant wave that affects employment opportunities for Mexican migrants and the dynamic of their migratory flows.

[4]The "Arizona effect" refers to the series of anti-immigrant laws that began with the promulgation of the so-called "Arizona Law" and later spread to at least five other U.S. states (Alabama, Georgia, Indiana, South Carolina and Tennessee; BBVA 2012: 2).

In addition to the increase in return migration, statistics on the number of forced or involuntary returns also reflect changes, as the number of migrants deported from the U.S. rose markedly. Estimates for the year 2003 speak of approximately 156,000 deportations, but in 2008 this figure increased to around 247,000, and surpassed 307,000 in 2012 (Meza 2014). In 2013, according to the National Institute of Migration (*Instituto Nacional de Migración*, INM), some 332,614 Mexicans were deported from the U.S. through the repatriation points located in Baja California, Chihuahua, Coahuila and Sonora (INM 2014).

Because of this, it may be said that the changes observed in the Mexico-U.S. migratory system respond to an interweaving of economic changes with modifications of the U.S. migratory polices that, on the one hand foster xenophobic feelings and attitudes that have crystallized in the criminalization of migration and increase the costs and risks involved in clandestine border crossings, and on the other, constitute a whole series of measures that the U.S. government has implemented to protect national workers in a time of crisis.

2.3.6 Mexican Migrants in the U.S.

Together, the deceleration in the flow of Mexican migrants to the U.S., the steady increase in the numbers of return migrants, and the rise in the volume of deportations, have acted to dramatically reduce the population of Mexican migrants in "the North"; the largest non-native group in the U.S. Estimates indicate that the number of Mexicans living in the U.S. registered an accelerated and uninterrupted growth up to April 2008, rising from approximately 800,000 people in the 1970s to 10,200,000 in 2005, and 11.2 million in 2007 (Corona/Huerta 2009). This means that the presence of Mexicans multiplied approximately fourteen times over such period. However, recent estimations point out that Mexican population in the U.S. has stopped growing at the rates it used to before the crisis, for over the 2007–2014 period it remained at an average between 11.8 and 11.7 million (González-Barrera 2015).

In general terms, the transformations elucidated here allow us to argue that, at a macro level, these new migratory dynamics respond to conditions in U.S. labor markets, declining demand for unskilled workers, the resurgence of anti-immigrant behaviors and feelings, the securitization of the border, and the record numbers of deportations of undocumented migrants (Papademetriou/Terrazas 2009: 11).

This way, the transformation processes here established reveal that Mexican international migration is moving to the configuration of a migratory phase characterized by its deceleration, as well as the strengthening of anti-immigrant stances that stress the vulnerability, poverty and marginality of the Mexican migrant in the U.S. Albeit, it is important to remember that they are transformations and rearrangements that in spite of configuring *a new migratory moment*, demand continuity in their dynamics, however in a different economic and political context than that which defined the patterns of migratory behavior and the sending of monetary remittances.

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