Chapter 2
Affecting Psychoanalysis

Abstract  Between the years of 1910 and 1939 Klein was a younger contemporary of Sigmund Freud, reading his findings and essays as he wrote them. She would be known for emphasizing aspects of Freud’s theories—the life and death drives, anxiety and melancholia, and the mental agencies of id, ego, and superego—while significantly revising their developments with the subtle distinctions of infantile emotional life. Klein first observed in her practice with very young children and with adults, a mind-world composed of active object relations, multiple emotional dramas, affect scenarios, personifications of organs at war, and what she came to group under the terms of phantasies. As early as 1921, Klein believed that the object of child analysis was psychoanalytic understanding and not, as many of her child analyst colleagues argued at the time, helping the child achieve a stronger sense of reality by providing instructions in a psychoanalytic pedagogy. It was listening for the child’s unasked questions Klein felt, that must be interpreted as an appeal to freedom. Two dilemmas follow: What can knowledge mean psychoanalytically? And, how could Klein garner enough understanding to narrate with children and adults what she would simply call “a time before?” One can say that Klein’s theory of the emotional world is, above all, a theory of phantasy that has as its destiny the development of the mind beholden to both the fate of internal object relations and the imagination so needed to think. Her theory of learning to live, then, remains radical and for education proposes deep existential dilemmas on the nature of knowledge, love, authority, thinking, and relationships in teaching and learning.

Keywords  The self • Education • Libido • Phantasies • Anxiety • Early analysis • Transference • Melancholia

But what are our selves? Everything, good or bad, that we have gone through from our earliest days onwards: all that we have received from the external world and all that we have felt in our inner world, happy and unhappy experiences, relations to people, activities, interests and thoughts of all kinds—that is to say, everything we have lived through—makes part of our selves and goes to build up our personalities. If some of our past relationships, with all the associated memories, with the wealth of feelings they called forth, could be suddenly wiped out of our lives, how impoverished and empty we should feel! How much love, trust, gratification, comfort and gratitude, which we experienced, would be
lost!… Now I want to show that these earliest emotional situations fundamentally influence our relationship to ourselves.


The baby cannot distinguish between ‘me’ and ‘not-me’; his own sensations are his world, the world to him; so when he is cold, hungry or lonely there is no milk, no well-being or pleasure in the world—the valuable things in life have vanished. And when he is tortured with desire or anger, with uncontrollable, suffocating screaming, and painful, burning evacuations, the whole of his world is suffering; it is scalded, torn and racked too….It is our first experience of something like death, a recognition of the non-existence of something, of an overwhelming loss, both in ourselves and in others, as it seems.

—Joan Riviere, “Hate, Greed, and Aggression” (1937, p. 9)

Klein’s writing involves attempts at interpreting the pathos of psychical life, an area of the human lifeworld subject to uncertainty, phantasies, and defenses and most surprisingly, to a hated fear of emotional life made from profound anxiety that presents as symptoms of intellectual inhibition, a turn away from reality, and as depression. It is here that interpretation of children at play mattered to her theoretical trajectory as well as to her eschewal of education. We still have to ask, what kind of communication accompanies the child absorbed in play? The subtitle of her last edited volume, New Directions in Psycho-Analysis tells us the story in miniature: “The Significance of Infant Conflict in the Pattern of Adult Behavior.” Klein’s contribution, “The Psycho-Analytic Play Technique: Its History and Significance,” was not so much a synthesis of her earliest work, as it was a continuation of the longstanding debate over her approach:

In offering a paper mainly concerned with play technique as an introduction to this book, I have been prompted by the consideration that my work both with children and adults, and my contributions to psycho-analytic theory as a whole derive ultimately from the play technique evolved with young children. (Klein 1955a, p. 3)

Learning from the nature of such layering conflict, moving as she felt deeper into the interpretation of the unconscious, asking what else must be communicated in pernicious scenes of love and hate, finding one’s way into and out of a constellation of anxiety, and then permitting our emotional situation to be the basis for theories of it, is, for Melanie Klein, the only means to encounter and communicate with the psychical consequences of the human condition. And, as for the matter of self/other relations, Klein tells us why psychical reality is so difficult to know, so easily denied, and so pernicious in design. The most complicated relation of all would be to you.

### 2.1 Preconditions as Another Term for Origins

Klein’s lifelong claim is that from the beginning of life the tiny human resides in its precocious anxiety situation with its first object, the breast. The pain of weaning, tied to the availability of the breast, constitutes the infant’s earliest experiences of
frustration and loss that Klein came to understand as the roots of adult mourning. Such an origin is in fact a bold move, though it is the terms of origin that concerned Klein. At times, origin seems to stand in for an original, essential lost cause; at other times, origin will signify the preconditions for development, designation, and givenness. Here, we can note the hypothesis of two new ideas, both of which are difficult to accept: young infants arrive with innate meaning of loss and suffer from depression and second, the unconscious mind of the adult is not very different from that of the infant. Why we hate and love the same object is part of Klein’s story of the origin of the mind. But what is unreasonable is difficult to narrate, let alone to remain open to her idea that anxiety is the foundation of psychical apprehension, symbolization, and the human condition.

The tie between suffering and thinking has a long philosophical history. Hannah Arendt (1958) signaled this philosophical problem when she defined the human as a conditioned creature, in that whatever the human encounters becomes a condition for her or his existence. Arendt’s (1978) study of thinking begins with an inaugural confusion: “First you see, then you know” (p. 87). She presses on:

All thought arises out of experience, but no experience yields any meaning or even coherence without undergoing the operations of imagining and thinking. Seen from the perspective of thinking, life in its sheer thereness is meaningless; seen from the perspective of the immediacy of life and the world given to the senses, thinking is, as Plato indicated, a living death. (Arendt 1978, p. 87)

Klein considered experience as “the immediacy of life,” apprehended through phantasies needed for the development of thinking from a particular pain of beginnings. She could then propose phantasies as constituting the inside of the ego, always affected by the drives of life and death. The infant inherits a struggle between meaninglessness and meaning. For Klein, anxiety precedes seeing and inaugurates searching for what cannot be seen, namely objects inside of the body. The search may be likened to panic and immature attempts to defend against the brute reality of absence and loss with mental mechanisms of introjection, projection, splitting, and identification. The struggle is between love and hate. Thinking, then, cannot be extricated from the anxiety situation that calls thought forth. A second assumption follows. For Klein, thinking depends upon toleration or acceptance of loss in order to create new objects. The growing capacity to imagine what is not there, then, mirrors the functions and procedures for symbolization that lean upon imagining what is absent. Step by step, the sequence of anxiety, suffering, loss, searching, looking, and seeing are all deeply entwined in the human’s earliest emotional situation of feeling the urge to know before one can understand. Klein then reverses Arendt’s formulation: First you anticipate what you know, then you feel, then you believe, and then you see. The infant, Klein argued, possess innate knowledge of annihilation and an unconscious anxiety that death and life are its struggle.

Origin for Klein is not a predestiny, though at times, her emphasis on negativity can appear as though she agreed with the doctrine of original sin. There is something inseparable about biology and psychology and as the care of others recedes
from view, it is as if biology takes on the attributes of fate. Yet Klein is, after all, examining the uncanny emotional logic and structures of infantile phantasies that create the mind and lend affect to its procedures. The danger concerns the apperception of the other as either a good or bad delegate to the figurations Klein will handle as the internal world of object relations. At first, objects are terribly concrete. Both good and bad objects are introjected, forming a nascent world of object relations that may then be projected to the outside for more identification. Bad objects are at war with good objects and the inside world is conflated with the outside. With this claim Klein stretches Freud’s (1911) early idea that thought perceptions are equated with the object. But in distinction from Freud, Klein gives to the infant all of the emotions we only expect from grown-ups: greed, envy, depression, psychosis, paranoia, the drive to know, inexplicable hatred, aggression, and phantasies of persecution, retribution, reparation, and gratitude. She maintained that through her technique of interpreting play, of inviting the child’s most difficult and persecutory thoughts into her consulting room, the child’s anxiety could be dispersed to free the child to enter into the less certain capacity for symbolization. Only then, when psychical life is bestowed with an overabundance of meanings, may emotions be understood as relations to someone or something and so evolve into imagination, needed to tolerate myriad human loss and the desire for beauty and goodness.

2.2 An Education in Psychoanalysis

Klein was a diasporic figure, moving between countries—Austria, Germany, Hungary, and Slovakia, then to the United Kingdom—and languages: German, French, and English. She lived through two world wars and glimpsed the atomic age. Klein was born in Vienna in 1882, the fourth and last child of Moriz Reizes and Libussa Deutsch, a Jewish family. Her older sister, Sidonie taught her how to read and died when Klein was 4 years old; her father, Moriz died when she was 18; her older brother, Emanuel, whom she greatly admired for his intellectual loves and poetical sensibilities died when she was 20. When Klein was 52, her son Hans died during a holiday accident. And by 1941, her first-born daughter, Melitta Schmideberg, also a psychoanalyst, would publicly express her hatred and alienation from her mother. Old age would be another blow and bring Klein (1963) to write her last paper on the topic of existential loneliness. Loss, depression, and mourning would be significant themes and lead to her key questions on inhibition in thinking and on creativity and freedom. She constantly asked, what is it about our emotional situation that holds us back and what are the steps to overcome fear of freedom?

The question of inhibition is taken personally. Klein had a strong desire to go to medical school, as did her brother Emanuel. Instead, when Klein turned 21, she married Arthur Klein, a businessman who travelled for his living. By the age of 36, when Klein entered the psychoanalytic scene she had three children: Melitta, age
14, Hans, age 11, and Erich, age 4. Family movements between European cities were partly due to Arthur’s travels and to the upheavals of World War I. But the significance of Klein’s movements between Budapest, Berlin, and finally London, belonged to her dedication to psychoanalysis. Budapest was where she began working with her first analyst, Sándor Ferenczi (1873–1933) who encouraged her to become a child analyst. By 1921 Klein had moved to Berlin from Budapest to undergo an analysis with Karl Abraham (1877–1925). Both of her analysts were Sigmund Freud’s closest colleagues.

But it was during her Berlin years between 1921 and 1926, along with her analysis with Abraham, that Klein established a psychoanalytic practice with children, adolescents, and a few adults (Frank 2009). Through conference papers and articles, she began to articulate her theory and techniques of early analysis and play. We can be certain that while in Berlin, a lively scene of modernist experiments in psychoanalysis and culture was underway: child analysis, social analysis, literature, psychoanalytic cinema, dance, music, Dadaism, and lectures, meetings, free clinics, journals, and intellectual arguments (Fuechtner 2011; Meisel and Kendrick 1985). In 1927 Klein was 45 years old. That same year she divorced her husband Arthur and immigrated to London.

The situation of her migrations, tied to significant losses and the upheavals of war, complicates any narrative of Klein. In fact, to stay close to a Kleinian viewpoint, one can surmise that Klein’s development of her theories and techniques of early analysis are variations on themes of highly charged emotional situations, historical disasters, conflicts within the psychoanalytic societies, and mourning losses. Individual biography, however, cannot quite settle the question of Klein’s dedication to research and intellectual freedom, though it may qualify our understanding of her psychoanalytic education. After all, the psychoanalyst must know anxiety, depression, and madness, and experience these vacillating mental states as her own. And part of the human condition involves not only being in the world but also crafting an interest in symbolizing its uncertainties and the slow work of self-transformation. It was during her Berlin years that Klein drew from Abraham’s extension of Freud’s theories of libidinal development, with a focus on Abraham’s view that with each development of libido or erotic energy, bodily processes go into making the mind and serve as its soft spot for infantile depression, obsessional neurosis, phantasies of aggression, and intellectual inhibition. These were the grand themes of psychoanalysis as well as the world of aesthetic expression (Lyotard 2011).

2.3 Entrances and Exists

Between 1907 and 1925, Freud and Abraham exchanged over 500 letters (Falzeder 2002). Reading through them today, one receives a sense of their closeness and competition, and their feelings of being misunderstood by the psychoanalytic communities of Vienna, Budapest, Berlin, and London. The letters document not
only daily details of shaping a psychoanalytic movement but also the warp and weft of arguments over ideas, individual members, and concerns for the Freudian future of psychoanalysis. Occasionally, Melanie Klein is mentioned in this correspondence; Abraham is enthusiastic about her work with children, while Sigmund Freud carries his doubts—we can say anger—over the arguments in child psychoanalysis between Mrs. Klein and Anna Freud. On October 7, 1923, in one of his most prescient comments on the style of Klein’s approach, Abraham writes to Freud:

In my work on melancholia… I have assumed the presence of a basic irritation in infancy as a prototype for later melancholia. In the last few months Frau Dr. Klein has skillfully conducted the psychoanalysis of a three-year-old boy with good therapeutic results…. The case offers in general amazing insights into the infantile instinctual life. (Falzeder 2002, p. 471)

Abraham’s assumption of early infantile depression would serve as Klein’s key premise in her work with both children and adults. Gradually Klein would refine her theory, joining instinctual life to depressive anxiety to create “the depressive position” and its working through.

Abraham mentions Klein’s first presentation “The Technique of Analysis of Young Children” given at the Eighth International Psychoanalytic Congress in Salzburg in late April 1924. Freud remains silent on these glowing reports. And this gives us a brief clue of the seeds of hostility on Freud’s part as well as Klein’s lifelong insistence that even if her theories were built upon new findings, whether the Viennese Freudians recognized this or not, she never left Freud’s key ideas.

Ernest Jones, the founder of the British Psychoanalytical Society, heard Klein’s 1924 Salzburg paper on early analysis and with the help of James and Alix Strachey, invited a willing Klein to come to London in 1925 for six lectures. Both James and Alix Strachey translated and edited the London lectures (Meisel and Kendrick 1985). Jones as the editor of The International Journal of Psychoanalysis also invited Klein to contribute to the 1927 Symposium on Child Analysis. Klein used the occasion for a stringent critique of Anna Freud’s 1927 book published in Vienna, Introduction to the Technique of Analysis of Children.1 That same year Jones published Klein’s paper and over the years, through to 1947, Klein continued to refine her original 1927 arguments on early analysis.2 The paper also sealed the conflicts within the young field of child analysis.

In late December 1925 Klein’s Berlin analyst, Karl Abraham, suddenly died. Klein must have felt there was nothing left for her in Berlin and she was more than

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1Miss Freud’s book was later issued in English as “The Theory of Child Analysis” (1926[1927]). Jones did not publish Anna Freud’s article in the 1927 Symposium.

aware of the hostility of Anna and Sigmund Freud and many other Viennese psychoanalysts. Even her first analyst, Sándor Ferenczi, in a letter to Freud questioned whether Klein’s theories had gone too far (Falzeder and Brabant 2000). Given her positive reception during her first visit to the British Psychoanalytical Society, in 1926 Klein accepted a second invitation to London. She never left.

2.4 Education as We Do Not Know It

We have already mentioned that Melanie Klein is not typically considered a key thinker in the fields of modern education, psychology, and pedagogy. Nor did Klein attempt sustained contact with those beyond psychoanalytic practice, in distinction from the work of Anna Freud who wrote consistently to educators, medical professionals, legal experts, child workers and so on. Klein’s work proceeds slowly and is revised case-by-case, article-by-article, and book-by-book. Yet even with Miss Freud’s lifetime efforts in education, today’s teachers and university professors do not consider psychoanalysis as the learning theory of choice. Most forget the long history between the fields of education and psychoanalysis (Britzman 1998, 2011). One significant exception is found in the phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s (2010) Sorbonne Lectures in child psychology and pedagogy given to students of education between the years 1949 and 1952. Klein was still at work. His discussion of Klein is even handed, overviewing the pros and cons of her views with commentary on the Anna Freud and Melanie Klein Controversies where, in the British Psychoanalytical Society in London between the years 1941 and 1945, Klein’s theories were debated.

Merleau-Ponty uses Klein’s understanding of corporality to discuss such concepts as envy in the Oedipus complex, psychological rigidity that pertains to inhibitions in interpreting symbols, Klein’s interest in awakening latent anxiety, the preponderance of the child’s aggression, the centrality and diffusion of sexuality, and more readily, the poignancy of the child’s difficulty with the ambivalent position. He makes the simple statement: “The child does not think about sex in the same way as adults do” (Merleau-Ponty 2010, p. 287). And herein lies the problem: How then can the adult enter the child’s world without accounting for her or his horizon of transference to an intersubjective world? If we begin with the assumption that the child’s knowledge is different from that of the adult, how close can we get to the immediacy of the child’s lifeworld of experience? Is there something about adult forgetting that interferes? More generally, how do we come to know our own psychological world? And, could this dissociation also affect Klein’s reception in the field of education?

The reasons for the field of education’s avoidance of Klein are instructive for both Kleinian thought and for how we may re-conceptualize the existential problem of loss that human relations press into the emotional situation of education. Perhaps the primary dilemma is that Klein felt the enterprise of education was of a different order from the imperatives of psychoanalytic practice and thus while these fields
share a common human subject, psychoanalysis cannot assume that communication is conscious, that people know their emotional world, and that enlightenment resolves anxiety. It can seem as if the enterprise of education—its functions, modes of address, attachments to transmission and adaptation, devotion to curricular imperatives and styles of discipline, and to an insistence that consciousness is synchronized to the timing of learning—has forgotten uneven development. And Klein is not interested in the values of measurable behavioral objectives, social adaptation, and compliance. One of the most astute formulators of Kleinian views put it this way: Her ideas, concepts, and techniques for the practice of psychoanalysis, and the vocabulary she creates as scenery for the life of the mind, enacts the very difficulties of learning to live, change, and symbolize one’s psychic states (Petot 1990, 1991). Klein begins with the problem of thinking that emerges from a terrifying negativity: anxiety, fear of falling into bits and pieces, paranoia, inhibitions, and the earliest defenses against loss of the breast: omnipotence, projection, splitting, and identification. Our first education is the one we do not know.

We place Klein’s theory of anxiety into this paradox of knowing the reach of emotional life that trades in loss of love for its symbolization. We do so mainly because she gave free admission to the self’s utter difficulty in knowing the evolution, origin, and contingencies of its own impressions. Yet Klein also claimed that the infant arrived with innate knowledge. As contradictory as it seems, thoughts feel as if they come from the outside. Emotional situations and thought perceptions, she argued, are first equated with our earliest encounters with the object world. And in this sense, bad thoughts have the capacity to turn into bad, persecuting objects. To enter this world one would have to take it on its own terms without suggesting what one should do or think. However, educators want something from the child and have prearranged measures for correction, improvement, and progress based upon cognitive skill development. Klein opposed such measures: She understood cognition side by side with emotional life. Development, however uneven, then, involves learning to open the mind to greater freedom, new attitudes, and a desire for worldliness. She began with the infant’s drive to know and then its dispersal into the urge for creative and freethinking. And in this sense she seems to imply the difficult question, how much freedom can education tolerate?

The stronger obstacle to disillusioning the ideality of educational measures, however, belongs to Klein’s theory of psychical development and the painful road to symbolization, abstraction, and thinking. So we have to ask three questions: What did Klein say about human natality? Why did she focus on the inner world of object relations as the means to imagine one’s own body and the external world of others? What happens to our theories of learning if we begin from Klein’s suppositions on the infantile roots of the child and adult’s mind? Admittedly, Klein’s theories of the self are a bit like the Russian Matryoshka or nesting doll, where within the large doll are other dolls of decreasing size, one placed inside the other. But imagine these dolls as object relations and then as populating and multiplying an emotional world. Then we can say that Klein presents us with a subterranean, teeming education we barely know. This education attributes to the tiny subject the
givenness of the drama of conflicting feelings of emotional life that are normally only thought of as the property of adults.

Whenever Melanie Klein commented on the actual world, she emphasized the difficulty of perceiving and tolerating two dimensions of reality: the internal world and the external world of others. Between these worlds, Klein placed the drive to know. Reality, for Klein, is always interpreted reality, subject to symbolic filters of anxiety or urgent emotional situations that configure one’s relation to the apprehension of the object. Klein’s understanding of the fear of symbols emerged from her clinic, a space of experiment that followed from the intimacies and terrors of her work with children and adults. No matter what age, anyone experiences great difficulty in trying to distinguish feelings about others from feelings within the self. Such merging signifies the emotional ripples object relations have to actual events. Neurosis and psychosis, then, become normal albeit painful features of the human condition and Klein argued that their symptoms, for the young child, came in the form of learning inhibitions: phobias, night terrors, eating disturbances, tics, excessive shyness, obsessional rituals, repetitive play, and lack of questions. All these symptoms—that expressed what Klein considered as rather congealed homemade solutions to mental pain, depression, and to the burden of trying to know—were also the child’s emotional methods of handling anxiety, envy, and guilt. There would be what Lyndsey Stonebridge (1998) in her discussion of Klein and modernism, termed as “the destructive element”: Uncontrollable drive derivatives carried into a proliferation of phantasies about the other and that defend against the affective logic of the drive to know.

Centering the earliest anxiety situations as the origin of mental life is a radical approach. Julia Kristeva specifies the terms:

Because Klein understood anxiety, that conduit of pleasure, more deeply that did more than anyone else, she turned psychoanalysis into the art of caring for the capacity for thought…. Klein considered the death drive to be the primary agent for our distress, but also—and especially—for our capacity to become creatures of symbols. (2001, p. 14)

But listening to Klein’s discussions come as a disturbance. In perhaps one of the only eyewitness comments on Klein’s early presentations, Alix Strachey wrote to James Strachey, December 20, 1924, with her shock:

I have made a few notes on the meeting in which Klein’s paper was discussed… The arguments, if one has understood them, are not the difficulty; it’s the examples. And I shouldn’t like to be detected in the intercalation of my private phantasies. (Cited in Meisel and Kendrick 1985, pp. 154–155)

Later, she sent a less fraught summary, under the title, “Report on Melanie Klein’s Berlin Lecture,”

At a meeting of the Berlin Psycho-analytic Society held on December 13, 1924, Frau Melanie Klein read a paper on the analysis of children. The paper was based on a number of child-analyses carried out by Frau Klein… and showed how the same factors that existed in the psycho-neuroses of adults could be found in the obsessional acts, morbid anxieties, and various inhibitions in children….Her method was to allow her small patient the freedom of her room, and to encourage it to play with the toys in it, or to invent games with her, or to
tell stories; while at the same time observe its acts and words and interpret their meaning as
she thought the occasion suitable. Thus the analysis assumed the character of play, the form
most acceptable to the mind of the child. (Cited in Meisel and Kendrick 1985, pp. 325–326)

Klein used various words to indicate the mind’s capacity to tolerate its own
mental processes: phantasies, inhibitions to learning, infantile theories, anxieties,
destructive drives, obsessional neurosis, and psychosis. Such terms always referred
to object relations. Her theories of development then matched the world in which
she lived but not in any way that could be immediately recognized though a
narrative of continuity. This is one of the thorny places that affected how the
psychoanalytic communities responded to her theories and claims. Yet her life’s
work remains as testimony to the 20th century’s confrontation of new realities,
revolts, and upheavals of old social orders. Julia Kristeva (2001) groups these
revolts as “the psychoanalytic century”: demands for women’s rights to education,
divorce and birth control, the rights of children, the European emancipation of
Jews, the new science of psychoanalysis, and simultaneous demands for new
freedom in the difficult contexts of the two world worlds, genocide, massive dis-
placement of stateless people, liberation movements, decolonization, and the
founding of a discourse dedicated to human rights.

We have mentioned that Klein’s vocabulary is deeply emotional: good and bad,
love and hate, me and not me, love, guilt, and reparation, then near the end of her
work, envy and gratitude. Her theories, I believe, lend to the Kantian need for
education a heart that can be broken and repaired with the wish for free and
uninhibited understanding. Here the world returns: The good and bad breast, the
mother and father, and the pain of integration must also involve care for being and
thought, the capacity to love the other, and the wherewithal to tolerate the slow,
uneven development of learning to live. All of these human relations must involve
acknowledgement of psychical reality and eventually, the love of transience. In the
strongest and most basic sense, Klein recovers a notion of self-responsibility that
emerges from phantasy. From great negativity, she maintained, comes moral psy-
chology by which she meant the capacity to symbolize anxiety, feel guilt, desire to
repair the self and the other, and permit the mind its cognitive liberties.

Yet there are a number of problems in both conveying her terms as depictions of
mental processes, as mechanisms that carry out functions, and as techniques for
their handling. She built her theories of the mind from the meeting between the
infant and the breast and in so doing the needs of biology already contains the
wishes of psychology. She uses this beginning to understand why the pain of
suffering, the terror of loss, and the vicious cycle of depression in adults is
something they have experienced before without any memory of it. And we are left
with the question as to whether Klein’s vocabulary opens a description of mental
phenomenon or a set of theories affected by transposition. Klein herself hated the
technical terms she had to use; she felt the words paranoid-schizoid, depressive
position, and projective identification could not match the emotional situations they
carried (Bion 2013).
The antinomies between Melanie Klein and Anna Freud turn on three large questions that underscore significant theoretical and technical disputes and involve: (1) the nature of the development of the infant’s mind; (2) the timing of the Oedipal complex and of the superego; and (3) the child’s actual relations to others. The questions are: What is the child capable of in psychoanalytic treatment? Is child analysis just like that of the adult analysis? Are young children capable of transference in the psychoanalytic situation? And what position does the analyst assume? Each question has a foothold in assumptions about the status of the child’s relation to reality and phantasy, to the relational work of psychoanalytic treatment, and, to whether education has any role in the clinic. For Anna Freud, the child’s reality belonged to her or his attachment to parents and then to adaptation to school. For Melanie Klein, the only reality at stake would be psychical reality and its contribution to inhibition, imagination, and thinking. We will meet the flowering of these disputes again in what will be known as the Freud-Klein Controversies between the years 1941 and 1945. J.-B. Pontalis orients our inquiry:

The technical debate opposing Melanie Klein to Anna Freud reflects the confrontation of two ethics: For Anna Freud, in the end, it was a question of making the child find the adult’s alleged autonomy; for Melanie Klein, it was a matter of coming to meet the child’s psychic reality and measuring adult knowledge against it ‘in the spirit of free and unprejudiced research.’ (1981, p. 97)

In 1927 the field of child analysis was barely 18 years old. Its key principles sided with the question of Aufklärung—education as enlightenment—and the techniques of psychoanalytic pedagogy were dedicated to helping the child move from superstitious thought sustained by societal repression of sexuality to a more realistic view of her or his situation (Geissmann and Geissmann 1998). Yet Klein understood that education and psychoanalysis were at odds and in her critical paper on the state of child analysis Klein writes,

I think that child-analysis as compared to that of adults has developed so much less favourably in the past because it was not approached in a spirit of free and unprejudiced enquiry...but was hampered and burdened from the outset by certain preconceptions. (Klein 1927, p. 141)

The preconceptions Klein thought were those of Anna Freud who believed that children were neither capable nor interested in transference to an analyst since they are still preoccupied with their actual parents. Thus Miss Freud argued that the analyst should hold an educative stance and through role-play make friendly suggestions to build ego confidence and gently introduce the difficulties of reality. Essentially, the argument was whether child analysis was any different from that of adult analysis. Klein is quite adamant:
Analysis is not in itself a gentle method: it cannot spare the patient any suffering, and this applies equally to children. In fact, it must force the suffering into consciousness and bring about abreaction if the patients are to be spared permanent and more fatal suffering later. (Klein 1927, p. 144)

And while it is true that the analyst must not be cruel, the analyst must be prepared to understand the cruelty of suffering and that could only mean that the child was terribly subject to anxieties and defenses and to phantasies that felt terribly real and that were really terrible. All Klein had to do to learn of the child’s overarching anxieties, defenses, and inhibitions was watch the child’s play with toys and listen to the child’s halting narratives that she understood as standing in for actual people and imagined object relations. By definition play was a transference phenomena.

The education Klein grasped was the opposite of enlightenment due to the unbearable density of the human’s drives and emotional life that arrived too soon. That education, Klein maintained, continually underwrites the rough drafts of the drive to know and the problem of inhibition.
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