Contents

1 Setting the Landscape ............................................... 1

2 Examples of Risk Information Concealment Practice ............. 9
  2.1 Industrial Sector .................................................. 9
      2.1.1 Vajont Dam Disaster (Italy, 1963) ......................... 9
      2.1.2 Three Mile Island Nuclear Accident (USA, 1979) .... 15
      2.1.3 Bhopal Pesticide Plant Gas Leak (India, 1984) ...... 33
      2.1.4 Challenger Space Shuttle Disaster (USA, 1986) ...... 40
      2.1.5 Chernobyl Nuclear Disaster (USSR, 1986) .......... 52
      2.1.6 Exxon Valdez Oil Spill (USA, 1989) .................... 78
      2.1.7 Ufa Train Disaster (USSR, 1989) ....................... 86
      2.1.8 Sayano-Shushenskaya Hydropower Station Disaster (Russia, 2009) .................. 94
      2.1.9 Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill (USA, 2010) ............. 115
      2.1.10 Raspadskaya Coal Mine Burnout (Russia, 2010) .... 125
      2.1.11 Fukushima-Daiichi Nuclear Disaster (Japan, 2011) .. 131
      2.1.12 Other Cases of Risk Information Concealment ....... 153
  2.2 Financial Sector .................................................. 156
      2.2.1 Barings Bank Collapse (Singapore-UK, 1995) ....... 157
      2.2.2 Enron’s Bankruptcy (USA, 2001) ...................... 161
      2.2.3 Subprime Mortgage Crisis (USA, 2007–2008) ......... 180
  2.3 Military, Social and Natural Disasters .......................... 203
      2.3.1 Unreadiness of the Soviet Red Army for the Nazi Invasion (1941) ................. 203
      2.3.2 Worldwide Spanish Flu and SARS Outbreaks (1918–1919, 2003) .......... 215
      2.3.3 Great Wildfires in the European Part of Russia (Russia, 2010) ................. 222
      2.3.4 Krymsk Flooding (Russia, 2012) ..................... 226
  2.4 Retail Production Industry ...................................... 232
      2.4.1 Nature of the Industry ................................. 232
2.4.2 Complexity, Cost Reductions, Arrogance and The Toyota Problems (USA–Japan, 2000s) ......... 233
2.4.3 The 17-Year Poly Implant Prothese Fraud (France, 1993–2010) .......................... 240
2.4.4 Other Cases with Risk Information Concealment: Tobacco and Food Industries .......................... 243

3 Causes of Risk Information Concealment ......................... 247
3.1 External Environment of an Organization ......................... 249
  3.1.1 Global Short-Term Political and Business Philosophy .... 250
  3.1.2 Deregulation ........................................... 251
  3.1.3 Cozy Relationships Between Government Representatives and Representatives of Industries ........... 253
  3.1.4 Low Qualification and Unattractive Wages of Representatives of Government Regulators .............. 254
  3.1.5 Weak Control Over Complex Systems ....................... 254
  3.1.6 Political Instability and Struggle Between Political Camps ........................................... 255
  3.1.7 National Arrogance .................................... 255
  3.1.8 Fear of Massive Panic .................................. 257
  3.1.9 National Security Secrecy ................................ 257
3.2 Internal Ecology of an Organization ............................... 258
  3.2.1 Short-Term Financial and Managerial Objectives and Unrealistic Projections of Future Development .... 258
  3.2.2 Permanent “Rush Work” Culture .......................... 259
  3.2.3 “Success at Any Price” and “No Bad News” Culture .................... 259
  3.2.4 “Ivory Tower Syndrome” or Fragmentary Perception of the Whole Picture of Risks Among Top Managers .... 260
  3.2.5 Absence of Specific Knowledge and Experience Among Members of Boards of Directors ............. 261
  3.2.6 Weak Internal Control Within an Organization ............. 261
  3.2.7 Frequent Labor Turnover ................................. 261
  3.2.8 Habituation (Loss of Fresh Vision on Problems and Risks Because Nothing Has Gone Wrong in the Past) .... 262
  3.2.9 Wishful Thinking/Self-Suggestion/Self-Deception Among Decision Makers ......................... 264
  3.2.10 The Remoteness of Units/Facilities ........................ 264
3.3 Risk Communication Channels ..................................... 265
  3.3.1 Long Chains of Communication for Risk Information. Absence of a Direct, Urgent 24-7-365 Channel Between Field Staff and Executives. Field Staff who do not have Authority to Immediately Stop a Process if they Suspect Evidence of Risk .......... 265
  3.3.2 No Internal or External Incentives for Whistleblowers .......... 266
  3.3.3 Poor Inter-organization Risk Transmission ................... 267
3.3.4 Absence of Direct Horizontal Communication Between Departments of an Organization (Communication Between Units Only Occurs Through Superiors) ........................................ 267

3.4 Risk Assessment and Risk Knowledge Management ................. 268
3.4.1 Absence of a Prompt Industry-Wide Risk Assessment System ...................................................... 268
3.4.2 Unwillingness to Investigate in Details the Causes of an Accident and Absence of Permanent Risk Assessment Systems Within Organizations (Recording, Evaluating and Ranking Risks Over Decades) .................................................. 269
3.4.3 High Frequency of Unconfirmed Alerts ...................... 270
3.4.4 Ignorance Among Critical Personnel and Managers of Other Accidents or Near-Miss Cases Within the Organization, the Industry and Abroad. Absence of a Risk Knowledge Management System (Accumulation, Systematization, and Transmission) .................................................. 271

3.5 Personal Features of Managers and Employees ..................... 271
3.5.1 Problem of “Looking Good in the Eyes of Superiors” and Reluctance to Admit Personal Mistakes Because of Fear of Being Seen as Incompetent ............... 272
3.5.2 Unrealistic Projections of Personal Performance ........... 272
3.5.3 Fear of Criminal Prosecution After Serious Fault .......... 272

3.6 Results and Synthesis .................................................. 273

4 Major On-going Cases with Information Concealment Practice .... 281
4.1 Shale Energy Development in the USA .............................. 283
4.1.1 Economics of Exploration of Unconventional Oil and Gas Resources in the US, Geopolitical Challenges and Oil Prices .................................................. 284
4.1.2 Environment Aspects of Hydrologic Fracturing Technology .................................................. 286
4.1.3 Collapse of Natural Gas Prices in the United States (2008–2009) .................................................. 295
4.1.4 Manipulation of the Estimation of Unconventional Oil and Gas Resources .................................. 298
4.1.5 Stressed Financial Situation of American Shale Operators .................................................. 301

4.2 Genetically Modified Organisms ..................................... 305
4.2.1 Short-Term Profitability Versus Long-Term Sustainability .................................................. 307
4.2.2 Cozy Relationship Between Government Regulators and the Industry .................................. 308
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.2.3</td>
<td>Lack of Independent Risk Assessment</td>
<td>309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2.4</td>
<td>Optimistic Statements of Economic Benefits</td>
<td>312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>Real Debt and Liabilities of US Government and Real GDP of China</td>
<td>313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3.1</td>
<td>Challenges in Assessing the Real National Debt of the United States</td>
<td>313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3.2</td>
<td>Challenges in Assessing the Real Chinese GDP</td>
<td>315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>The Global Cyber Arms Race and Concealment of Vulnerabilities in the Software Industry</td>
<td>317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4.1</td>
<td>The Tumultuous Affair Between Iran and the USA</td>
<td>317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4.2</td>
<td>History-Making Cyber Warfare Between Nation States</td>
<td>318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4.3</td>
<td>Explosive Growth of Complexity in Software</td>
<td>323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4.4</td>
<td>The Special Business Model of Software</td>
<td>327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4.5</td>
<td>Collaboration Between Software Vendors and National Security Agencies</td>
<td>330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4.6</td>
<td>Worst-Case Scenarios and Needed International Collaboration</td>
<td>332</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5  Successful Risk Information Management ..................................... 337
5.1  Toyota’s Production System .................................................. 337
5.2  The Sony Battery Recall in 2006 ............................................. 339
5.3  The Seveso Directive and Beyond ............................................. 340
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