## Contents

### Part I  Introduction

1 **Introduction** ................................................................. 3  
  1.1 The Issues ........................................................................ 3  
  1.2 The Parts ........................................................................ 5  
  1.3 The Chapters ................................................................... 7  
  1.4 The Further Aimings ....................................................... 12  

### Part II  Method and Possibilities of Phenomenology

2 **The Phenomenological Reductions in Husserl’s Phenomenology** .... 17  
  2.1 Introduction ....................................................................... 17  
  2.2 Outline of Husserl’s Development: Transcendence,  
      “Natural Attitude,” and the Phenomenological Stance .......... 20  
  2.3 Psychological-Phenomenological and  
      Transcendental-Phenomenological Reduction .................... 27  
  2.4 With Regard to the “World-Annihilation Experiment” .......... 33  
  2.5 Transcendental Reduction as Widening and as  
      Radicalization of the Psychological Reduction .................. 37  
  2.6 Further Refinement of the Transcendental Reduction  
      and Its Residue .............................................................. 41  
      2.6.1 Transcendental Reduction and Eidetic Reduction ....... 41  
      2.6.2 Transcendental Reduction Does Not Present  
          Us with Non-actual Particulars in Reflection ............... 46  
      2.6.3 Transcendental Reduction Does Not Leave Us  
          with Senses or Meanings .......................................... 48  
      2.6.4 Phenomenological Reduction  
          and Methodological Solipsism ............................... 49  
  2.7 Transcendental Reduction: Elucidating the Remaining Adytum... 51  
      2.7.1 Phenomenological Psychology  
          and Transcendental Phenomenology:  
          Sciences or Philosophies? ................................. 51
2.7.2 One Step Forward Two Steps Back: Mundane and Monadological Transcendental Phenomenology ..... 54
2.7.3 Traces of the Developing Change ........................................ 59
2.7.4 Beyond Fink’s Advocacy of Husserl’s Transcendental Phenomenology ......................... 62

3 Heidegger and the Phenomenological Reductions in Husserl ........ 67
3.1 Introduction .......................................................... 67
3.2 Husserl’s Difficulty in Presenting the Move from the \( LI \) to Transcendental Phenomenology ....................... 69
3.3 Husserl’s Rejection of Heidegger’s Understanding of the Reduction(s) ......................... 73
3.4 Heidegger General Background Relation to Husserl’s Works ..... 74
    3.4.1 Heidegger’s Search for the Meaning of Phenomenology’s Anti-Psychologism: Pure and Empirical Psychology ........................................ 74
    3.4.2 Heidegger’s Search for the Meaning of Husserl’s Transcendental Reduction .................. 76
3.5 Heidegger’s Palpable Confusion With Regard to the Reduction(s) ........................................ 78
3.6 The \( Residua \) of the Phenomenological Reductions in Heidegger and Husserl ................. 81
    3.6.1 Heidegger’s Faulty Understanding and his Final Stance ........................................ 81
    3.6.2 Husserl’s Actual Intentions With the World-Annihilation ...................................... 83
3.7 The Standard Heideggerian Reception of the Transcendental Reduction ........................................ 86
3.8 Heidegger’s 1927 Fallacious Apprehension of Phenomenological Psychology and of Its Place Within Phenomenology and Philosophy ........................ 90
3.9 Husserl’s Ultimate Conception of Transcendental Consciousness ........................................ 92
3.10 Absolute Transcendental Consciousness and \( Dasein’s \) Absoluteness ........................................ 96
3.11 Husserl’s Final Estimation Regarding the Reception and Fate of his Work ............................ 100

Part III Key Husserlian Teachings and Heidegger’s View

4 Perception and ‘Action’: On the Praxial Structure of Intentional Consciousness ........................................ 105
4.1 Introduction ..................................................... 105
4.2 “Praxial” in the Sense of the Doing that Brings in Fulfilling \( Reell \) Contents .......................... 107
4.3 The Senses of Act or Activity Rejected by Husserl in \( LI \) ........ 110
4.4 Perception Is Always Already Fulfilled, but Never Absolutely so (Without This Signifying Some Essential Insufficiency) .............................................. 112
4.5 ‘Praxial’ in the Sense of a Handling Pervading All Givenness .... 114
4.6 Imagination as Fulfilling Intentional Experience ................. 117
4.7 Intermediate Considerations ......................................... 119
  4.7.1 A Possible Objection to the Conclusion of §§4.4 and 4.6. ............................................ 119
  4.7.2 Having Real Contents and Being Intentionally Conscious of Appearing Transcendent Objectivities ..... 120
4.8 On the Structure of Perception as Intentional Act ................. 123
4.9 Intentionality as a Rule-Guided Process Aiming at the Telos of Evidence or Truth .................................................. 126
  4.9.1 Intentionality as Hermeneutic Praxial Achievement ..... 127
  4.9.2 Praxial Intentionality and Teleology .......................... 129
  4.9.3 Praxial Intentionality and ‘Embodied’ Consciousness.... 131
4.10 Intentionality, Streben, and Time .................................. 132
  4.10.1 Intentionality and Streben .................................. 132
  4.10.2 Intentionality and Time ...................................... 134
4.11 Concluding Remarks and Further Issues ............................ 137

5 Perceptual and Scientific Thing: On Husserl’s Analysis of “Nature-Thing” in Ideas II ............................................. 139
  5.1 Introduction .......................................................... 139
  5.2 Overview of the Problem and Its Reflection in the Relevant Literature .......................................................... 141
  5.3 Nature-Things and the Question of the Most Primordial Intentionality .......................................................... 143
  5.4 ‘Theoretical’ Consciousness and Pre-giving Acts .................. 144
  5.5 The Constitution of res Extensa .................................... 146
  5.6 The Constitution of res Materialis ......... 149
  5.7 The Constitution in Terms of Substrate and Properties ............ 152
  5.8 Mere Experiential Thing Versus Scientific Thing .............. 155
  5.9 The Character of Husserl’s Analyses of Nature-Thinghood in Ideas II: Nature-Thing in Perception and Science ............................................. 157
  5.10 Summary and Conclusion ............................................. 161

6 Primordial Givenness in Husserl and Heidegger ................. 163
  6.1 Introduction ................................................................ 163
  6.2 Vorhandenheit and Theoreticity in the Appropriate Husserlian Context .................................................. 166
  6.3 Concerning the Character of Intentional Foundedness .......... 169
    6.3.1 Moments, Pieces, Foundedness .......................... 169
    6.3.2 Static and Genetic Phenomenological Perspectives ... 170
6.4 Determining the Actual Meaning of Heidegger’s Stance .......... 172
6.5 Equipment Cannot Be the Result of Active, Thematizing Genesis .................................................. 174
6.6 Husserl’s Actual View Regarding Our Experience of Cultural Beings ............................................. 177
6.7 Husserl’s View on Passive Genetic Foundedness and Equipmentality ............................................. 181
   6.7.1 The Case of Passive Genesis .................................. 181
   6.7.2 Passive Genesis and Habitual Sedimentation .............. 183
   6.7.3 Passive Genesis and Association ............................ 185
6.8 Passive Genesis and Foundedness Relation Proper to the Constitution of the Spiritual/Cultural .................. 187
6.9 The Meaning of the One-Sided Dependence of the Cultural Layer on the Simply Perceptual .................... 190
   6.9.1 The Perceptual Thing Is Independent; the Cultural Dependent ............................................. 191
   6.9.2 Passive Co-genesis ............................................. 192
   6.9.3 Nature-Thing Givenness Is Value-Mediated Because We Do not Only Cognize ......................... 194
   6.9.4 The Case of Psychic Blindnesses ............................ 195
   6.9.5 Pure Nature-Thing Givenness Is Phenomenologically Legitimate But Only Limitly Possible ...................... 196
6.10 Overcoming Heidegger’s Aporia and His Rhetoric Suppress of the Sache Selbst ......................................... 197
   6.10.1 Resolving a Persistent Phenomenological Obscurity ..... 197
   6.10.2 Heidegger’s Ultimate Presupposition Behind His Unsound Thesis ........................................... 200
7 The Question of ‘Categoriality’ in Husserl’s Analysis of Perception and Heidegger’s View of It .................. 203
7.1 Introduction ........................................................................ 203
7.2 Heidegger’s Analysis of Perception and of Categorial Intuition ........................................... 204
   7.2.1 Perceptual Assertions and Perceptions: The Intricate Bond ................................................. 205
   7.2.2 Perceptual Assertions and Perception: The Obvious Difference ............................................. 205
   7.2.3 Implicit and Explicit Categorial Formation ............... 207
   7.2.4 Real Relatedness and Categorial Formation .......... 208
7.3 A Step Further in What Heidegger Really Means by All This .... 209
   7.3.1 Recapitulation of the Situation ................................ 209
   7.3.2 Heidegger’s Point of View Reconstructed ................. 210
   7.3.3 An Additional Major Double Claim ....................... 212
   7.3.4 Summation of Heidegger’s Reading ......................... 213
7.4 Perception and Categorial Formation in the Current Phenomenological Literature ........................................ 214
  7.4.1 Sokolowski’s View ............................................. 214
  7.4.2 Drummond’s Understanding of Our Issue ............... 215
  7.4.3 Dahlstrom’s View ............................................. 216

7.5 Evidence and Reasons, Found in the Husserlic Corpus, Which Underpin the Heideggerian Reading ..................... 218
  7.5.1 Perceptual Articulation and Logico-Syntactical Articulation .................. 219
  7.5.2 Categories as Philosophical Heritage ........................ 220
  7.5.3 The Objectivity of Categorial Forms in Phenomenology ........................................ 221
  7.5.4 Heidegger’s Amazement at the Objectivity of the Categories ........................................ 222

7.6 In Husserl’s Phenomenology of Perception, the Perceptual Is Not Predicatively Constituted ......................... 223
  7.6.1 Husserl’s Warning Against Overemphasizing the Mirror Metaphor ................................. 223
  7.6.2 A Few Answers on Issues Pending ........................... 226
  7.6.3 Some Forms of ‘Categoriality’ Harmlessly Connected with Perception ....... 228

7.7 Husserl’s Proto-Hermeneutic Concept of Truth in Perception and Its Downplaying or Suppression in the Phenomenological Tradition ........................................ 230
  7.7.1 The Puzzle of the Monothetic Acts .......................... 230
  7.7.2 The Three Senses of Truth Analyzed in the PHCT ...... 230
  7.7.3 The Missing Solution in Heidegger’s Treatment of Truth in Monothetic Acts ............... 232
  7.7.4 The Non-solution in an Interpretation of Heidegger’s Silence on the Issue ......................... 234
  7.7.5 The Hermeneutic Nature of Truth in Perception as Genuinely Monothetic Act ............... 237

7.8 A Word on Phenomenology’s Sought-for złógos ἄλαθής ........ 238

Part IV Heidegger’s Advancement and Course

8 Husserl’s Doctrine of “Categorial Intuition” and Heidegger’s Seinsfrage ................................................ 245
  8.1 Introduction .......................................................... 245
  8.2 Husserl’s Discovery of Categorial Intuition ..................... 249
  8.3 Overview of Key Approaches to the Question Under Discussion ....................................................... 251
    8.3.1 Tamiaux’s View ............................................... 251
    8.3.2 Øverenget’s Interpretation .................................... 256
    8.3.3 Dahlstrom’s Approach ....................................... 260
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