Back in 2000, during the defense of my Ph.D. thesis, a Husserlian phenomenological elucidation of thought experiments in Physics, my mentor in Phenomenology, Giorgos Xiropaidis (a young doctor of von Hermann’s when he started teaching us in Athens, Greece, in the mid-1990s and now a professor at the University of Fine Arts in the same city), asked me perhaps the most provocative question of that session: “Since in our seminars,” he said, “we had the opportunity to see that Heidegger in fact unleashed a devastating critique against Husserl’s Phenomenology, what made you decide, after all, to pursue research into Husserl’s thought, and to use its terms?” My immediate and somewhat playful response of the moment was that my stance was the result of secret reading outside the seminars. It was indeed true that the enchantment that Husserl’s texts exerted upon me in the course of my studies was somehow stronger than the impact of Heidegger’s indeed rather tough critique.

From the point of view of my complementary philosophy-of-science classes with my Doktorvater Aristides Baltas (now emeritus professor at the National Technical University of Athens, Greece), and more particularly through the spectacles that Kuhn offered us in his Structure, my first answer might also have been my final reply to that tricky question. Selecting your first and primary philosophical hero and his or her philosophy is not such a different affair to what scientists face when they begin their work within one or another scientific paradigm. There is always some kind of evidence, which is not at all ultimately decisive but is just enough to convince you that the promises of this philosophy are much more interesting than those of some others.

Since that time, however, I have managed to reexamine my overall relation to the philosophies of Husserl and Heidegger. After the first formation of my paradigmatic stance, as it were, the “normal-scientific” research resulted in the accumulation of further evidence in favor of my initial decision. Nevertheless, as happens in such cases, this research also brought to the surface some serious intraparadigmatic anomalies. Heidegger can indeed serve as a valuable touchstone for an overall estimation of Husserl’s and Phenomenology’s accomplishments. This, however, does not make Heidegger the absolute measure of everything. Recalcitrant problems in the philosophies of both Husserl and Heidegger, like the ones we are here to
discuss, may be annoying for all of us who choose to study them. Nonetheless, they also contribute to the deepening of our understanding of the possibilities and the limitations of the specific philosophical paradigm, and of philosophy as such. Thus, I think that I am now in a position to offer a much fuller account of how I see the ideas of Husserl and Heidegger, the enigmatic relationship between them, and the prospect of some kind of combination of the two in developing a new phenomenological perspective that overcomes Phenomenology’s original divide.
Husserl and Heidegger on Reduction, Primordiality, and the Categorial Phenomenology Beyond its Original Divide
Theodorou, P.
2015, XXVI, 381 p. 1 illus., Hardcover
ISBN: 978-3-319-16621-6