Preface and Acknowledgments

For more than six decades, relations between Greece and Israel were ambivalent, frosty, and detached. However, starting in 2009, Greek policy was overturned with only a few expecting or predicting it. It is the goal of this study to examine in detail this new relationship, explain how and why it came about and explore its theoretical and regional consequences.

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Of course, I remain solely responsible for all the arguments presented.