Chapter 2

Women as Victims of Violence and Terrorism

Introduction

The media often portray women as caught up in a situation of terrorism—not as protagonists but as bystanders or victims. Osama bin Laden’s wives, discussed in Chap. 1, are often discussed collectively, along with their children, as a being influenced by terrorism but not related to it. In 2012, Pakistan placed three of bin Laden’s wives, who were present during the Abbottabad raid, under house arrest for having illegally entered Pakistan. After serving their sentence, it was unclear where these women and children would go. While they were not believed to be active in Al Qaeda, their home countries, Saudi Arabia and Yemen, did not jump to get them back from Pakistan. The two Saudi wives, Khairiah Sabar and Siham Sabar, lost their citizenship along with Osama bin Laden in the 1990s, yet, on humanitarian grounds, Saudi Arabia eventually accepted them and bin Laden’s younger, Yemenese wife, Amal Ahmed al-Sadah. These women and their children were portrayed as passive, bending to the will of governments. In a sense, they were “victims” of association with bin Laden, not actors with their own agency.

This chapter explores how political violence negatively influences women, thereby marking them as “victims.” We investigate the assumption that political violence particularly hurts innocent women and children, contextualizing and critiquing it. We also discuss how political violence victimizes women and how/whether women see themselves as victims, survivors, and/or actors with agency.

The foci of the chapter are threefold. First, the chapter discusses state terrorism and genocide and introduces the concept of gendercide. Second, the chapter discusses rape as a weapon of war. Case studies—the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s and the Darfur region of Sudan in the 2000s—illustrate gendercide and/or rape during political violence. Third, the chapter looks at women who are victimized by terrorism and how terrorism’s victims are gendered as women in the popular conscience.
Women as Victims of Violence and Terrorism

Genocide and Gendercide

As explained in Chap. 1, genocide is the intentional murder of people because of their group membership, where group membership can be ethnic, racial, political, religious, or economic. Genocides have occurred throughout human history and throughout the globe. Notable among pre-World War II genocides was the mass killing of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire during and after World War I. Turkey, the largest state to emerge from the Ottoman Empire, denies the genocide. This brings up an important point—many societies engage in revisionist thinking after genocides occur, meaning they deny genocide happened or they present events in such a way as to not be seen as genocide. While many of the genocides discussed in this chapter take place in developing countries, developed countries are not immune from genocides and revisionist thinking. Other prominently disputed pre-World War II genocides include the killing of indigenous people in the United States during Westward expansion and the killings of indigenous people in Argentina and Australia.

The atrocities of the Holocaust during World War II led many in the international community to vow “never again” and inspired the CPPCG (UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide); however, according to experts, 37 genocides have occurred since the CPPCG. This number is disputed because not every mass killing is agreed upon as genocide. Mass killings may not be called genocide because they do not meet the CPPCG legal definition of genocide. This is true with politicides. Genocides also are disputed when revisionist denials of genocide exist. Furthermore, some countries use vetoes on the UN Security Council to block the labeling of killing as genocide. Finally, the CPPCG commits the international community to act once mass killing is deemed genocide. Thus, if the political will to act, often militarily, does not exist, the international community may not label mass killing as genocide. Even with these disputes, some atrocities universally are seen as genocides (see Table 2.1).

The Gendering of Political Violence and Gendercide

When genocide is perpetrated in a way that targets a particular gender it is referred to as gendercide (Jones, 2004, 2). According to Jones, a gendercide may target men, women, and/or those who identify with non-heteronormative sexuality, such as homosexuals who are seen as “asocial threats” as they challenge gender expectations (Jones, 2006, 474). Mary Anne Warren originally used the term gendercide in 1985 arguing, “‘gendercide’ is a sex-neutral term, in that the victims may be either male or female…sexually discriminatory killing is just as wrong when the victims happen to be male…” (Gendercide Watch, np).

In fact, political violence typically results in the deaths of more men—thus more gendercides of men—than women because battle-age men are targeted as potential combatants even if they are civilians (Jones, 2002; see also Yugoslavia case study...
Genocide and Gendercide

Table 2.1 Non-disputed genocides since World War II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of origin</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number killed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>500,000 to 3 million, mostly Hindus (20,000 women raped)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Timor</td>
<td>1975–1999</td>
<td>200,000 East Timorese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>1975–1979</td>
<td>1.7 million ethnic minorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>1981–1983</td>
<td>200,000 mostly Mayan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>1992–1995</td>
<td>200,000 Muslims killed, two million displaced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>800,000 mainly Tutsi and some moderate Hutus (250,000–500,000 women raped)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darfur, Sudan</td>
<td>2004-continuing</td>
<td>70,000 non-Arabs killed, 1.5 million displaced</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mass grave of victims of the genocide in Bosnia, near Vitez. Photo courtesy of the ICTY

“Root and branch” genocides, in contrast, lead to the extermination of all people, including women, children, and the elderly. Women give birth to a new generation of enemies, i.e., the children or so-called branches. Thus, perpetrators see all of the population as a threat and seek to eliminate everyone. The Rwandan genocide is an example of a “root and branch” genocide.

While gendercide is a gender-neutral term, feminicide or gynocide refers to the targeted killing of women or girls. Current cases of feminicide can be seen in Guatemala and Juarez, Mexico. In Guatemala, more than 3,800 women and girls have been murdered since 2000, prompting the government to set up a special unit on feminicide in March 2012. In Juarez, nearly 1,000, mainly indigenous, women working in the maquila industry have been killed over the past two decades.
Violence in Iraq provides an example of gendercide against homosexuals. The gender identities of homosexual men and women threaten fundamentalist religious values, resulting in the harassment, torture, and assassinations of homosexuals by militias (Jones, 2010). In March 2012, the press reported, “at least 15 teenagers [in Iraq] have been stoned, beaten, or shot to death in the past month, while local activists put the toll far higher [at possibly 58]” (Rao, 2012, np). Militants targeted these youth because they are “Emo,” i.e., they favor alternative-style, Western culture, dress in black, and are stereotyped as homosexual even if they are not.

As with genocide, it is difficult to pinpoint a definitive number of gendercides. Some of the better known and more universally agreed upon cases are in Table 2.2.

### International Response to Genocide and Gendercide: Punishing Perpetrators

If the international community calls killings genocide, individuals responsible for conducting, aiding, and/or inciting genocide can be tried under international law. The most famous of these trials was the Nuremberg Trial (1945–1946) after World War II to try Nazis for crimes committed during the Holocaust.

Since the Nuremberg Trial, the international community has convened trials and/or tribunals to investigate genocides in four cases—Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Cambodia, and Darfur. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), established in 1993, has convicted leaders involved in the Yugoslavian conflicts of the 1990s. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was created by the United Nations after the Rwandan genocide in 1994. As of 2012, 62 convictions have been handed down by the ICTR, including the first conviction for the crime of genocide as defined by the CPPCG.

The Cambodian genocide occurred in the late 1970s, but it was not until 2003 that the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia was created to try perpetrators. As of 2012, no convictions have been handed down. The International Criminal Court (ICC) tries cases of genocides occurring after 2002, thus the ICC is pursuing Darfur crimes. In 2009, the ICC issued a warrant for the President of Sudan, Omar al-Bashir, for crimes committed and ongoing in Darfur. This was the first time the ICC indicted a sitting head of state, but as of 2012 he has not been convicted.
Rape as a Weapon of War and Genocide

While gendercides can target men or women, rape is the most common type of violence used against women during violent conflicts and often occurs alongside genocides or state terrorism as a strategy to humiliate, ethnically cleanse, or silence opponents (Lykes, Brabeck, Ferns, & Radan, 1993). The rape of women also is a way to victimize men and men are sexually tortured during genocides. Rape is defined by the United Nations as “sexual intercourse without valid consent” (United

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Poster for fugitives of the Rwandan genocide created by the US government [www.state.gov](http://www.state.gov)
Case Study: Gendercide and Rape in the Former Yugoslavia

Introduction

The former Yugoslavia—in which the republics of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia fought a civil war against the seat of Yugoslav power, Serbia is a case of genocide against Croatians and Bosnians. It is also considered a gendercide of men and a mass rape of women. President Slobodan Milosevic came to power in Yugoslavia in 1987 with plans for unifying Serbian populated areas, including those located in the other republics, into a “greater Serbia.” Milosevic’s Serbian, ultra-nationalism prompted the breakup of Yugoslavia. The republics varied in religious identity, with Croatia and Slovenia being largely Catholic, Serbia being mostly Serbian Orthodox, and Bosnia as a Muslim society. Slovenia declared independence from Serbia in 1991 and had sufficient military resources to challenge Milosevic, but Croatia was not well equipped and lost its territories inhabited by Serbs. Bosnia’s declaration of independence in 1992 left it more defenseless than Croatia, as it lacked the means to fight Serbia and incorrectly anticipated assistance from Western states (Kuperman, 2008). Serbia’s conflict in Slovenia ended quickly, but its war with Croatia and Bosnia lasted until the Dayton Peace Accords of late 1995. The mass killings at Srebrenica, Bosnia took place in July 1995, just months before the Dayton Accords—even though the United Nations earlier had declared the area a safe haven.

Gendercide and Rape in Yugoslavia

It is estimated that over 100,000 people died in the Yugoslavian conflicts, with approximately 80% of those being men (Jones, 2002, 2010). Deaths from Srebrenica are estimated at 8,100 persons, mostly men shot in open fields and mass buried (Leydesdorff, 2011). Thus, the Yugoslavian case constitutes a gendercide. Young and middle-aged men were targeted because of their potential to be combatants. When Serb forces ethnically cleansed a desired territory, they rounded up residents, separating them by sex, sending away women, children, and the elderly to other territories, and then executing the “fighting age” men (Jones, 2006, 323). Forced conscription also is considered violence against men, as men can be physically abused and demasculinized when avoiding it (Carpenter, 2006). Milićević (2006) describes the reluctance of some Serbian men to fight, explaining that the “lack of enthusiasm for war participation would be interpreted as a lack of masculinity” (280). Seven hundred thousand men avoided conscription during the Yugoslav conflicts. As refugees, war dodgers were met with little sympathy, as avoiding conscription is typically not an acceptable reason for seeking asylum in another country (Carpenter, 2006).

(continued)
Approximately 8,000 men were raped during the Yugoslav conflicts (Norredam et al., 2004), and many experienced sexual violence, including beating of the genitals, objects inserted into their rectums, and psychosexual threats about losing fertility (Loncar, Henigsberg, & Hrabac, 2010). For entertainment, camp guards made men perform sexual acts on each other. These atrocities are impossible to fully document because many men died and were disposed of after sexual abuse, and officials have yet to collect much data from men survivors (Carpenter, 2006). Estimates of sexual assaults of women in Bosnia and Croatia range from 10,000 to 60,000 (Sharlach, 2000). Rapes and murders occurred in special camps and detention centers but also in villages as troops entered them. Though no side in this “civil war” is entirely innocent of violence, “independent observers agree… Serbs bear responsibility for the overwhelming preponderance of rape and other war crimes … mostly against Muslims [in Bosnia] but also Croats” (Kressel, 2002, 15).

Photos from a torture camp called Omarska outside Prijedor, Bosnia reveal prisoners who were “half-starved” and “semi-naked” (Omarska: A vision of hell 2001, np). Approximately 6,000 Bosnian and Croat prisoners were held at the camp, with “most prisoners …[being] male, [though] several dozen women were kept at Omarska and were forced to mop floors littered with hair and teeth, and stained with blood” (Omarska: A vision of hell 2001, np). The women were raped frequently while the men were killed. Humiliation of intellectual and professional women was purposeful at Omarska, as they were raped by and forced to clean and take orders from men that they had known in their professional capacities.

Furthermore, Serb forces forcefully impregnated women. Serb graffiti stated the intent of forced impregnation: “We’re going to rape your women, and they will give birth to Serbian children” (Sharlach, 2000, 98). To ensure rapes resulted in pregnancy, forces held women captive long enough that abortion would not be option for them (Daniel-Wrabetz, 2007). Perhaps 35,000 women became pregnant as a result (Daniel-Wrabetz).

Post-Conflict Challenges and Solutions

Given the multiple challenges men and women faced during the conflict, their post-conflict struggles are numerous. Many men are dead, but the ones who survived suffer mental and physical repercussions of abuse, such as nightmares, headaches, and sexual dysfunction (Loncar et al., 2010), and they are plagued with humiliation because they were not able to protect their families or even protect themselves.

Women who were raped face shame and rejection from their families and husbands. The mental health ramifications for women are nearly unspeakable: “Massive bodily and mental injuries, the loss of any self control and continual

(continued)
mortal dread determined their realities for days, weeks, and months” (Grandits, 1999, 40). One woman, for example, “suffers insomnia, takes tranquilizers and sometimes cannot do basic work at home” (Skjelsbøk, 2006, 389). Some women require gynecological surgery due to violent rape. Women who are widows or single, cannot see themselves marrying (again) or having children due to sexual trauma and fear. Some women cannot speak about what they have gone through—even to someone they trust like their own mothers (Skjelsbøk).

Solutions for victims have been less than perfect. Many women feel betrayed by the international community that did not rush to help them during the conflict and since has not provided the social services needed for recovery (Grandits, 1999). The media, too, have disappointed women in that their rapes have been sensationalized and their private identities have been disclosed. Men survivors as well do not receive proper social services, as they might not come forward for help or health and social workers may not consider them possible victims. To counter this situation, advocates for men suggest greater awareness among health professionals of men’s experiences (Norredam, Crosby, Munarriz, Piwowarczyk, & Grodin, 2005).

To discuss their pain, women have organized women’s groups. In the documentary, *Calling the Ghosts—A Story About Rape, War and Women* (1996), women name their experiences, some reject the identity of “victim” for “survivor,” and they memorialize their friends and families who died during the conflicts. Women have also teamed with lawyers and mental health professionals to establish women’s centers to treat rape survivors (Wallis, 1995, np). The director of one center said, “the first thing a traumatized woman needs to do is to tell her story…For many women, the usual support systems have broken down” (Wallis, np). As of 2012, women’s centers continue to function in Bosnia, for example, teaching weaving to women as a form of therapy and income (BOSFAM, 2012).
Rape as a Weapon of War and Genocide

The World Health Organization defined rape in 2002 as “physically forced or otherwise coerced penetration—even if slight—of the vulva or anus, using a penis, other body parts or an object” (WHO, 2012, np). These definitions refer to rapes of women or men.

Rape has been used as a weapon of war many times in the past century. In the systematic “rape of Nanking” in 1937, Japanese soldiers killed 300,000 Chinese, and at least 20,000 women and girls were raped, including infants, the elderly, and the infirmed. During the battle for Bangladeshi independence in 1971 from Pakistan (at that time West Pakistan), a staggering 200,000 women are estimated to have been raped. Some of these women died from the physical consequences of gang rape, and some later committed suicide (Sharlach, 2000). In the Rwandan genocide in 1994, rape was used in a widespread manner, and rape has been used in ongoing conflicts in Darfur and the Congo since 2000. One estimate puts the number of rapes in 2011 in the Congo alone at 400,000.

The words of the women who have experienced rape speak volumes to how devastating rape can be. A Ugandan refugee, raped during the Ugandan civil war (1980s–present), explains how women with children are vulnerable to wartime rape.

I couldn’t run because I have two children. I stayed in the house with them. After a while someone pushed the door open and flashed a torch at me. I realized he was a soldier. He threatened me with death if I made an alarm or noise. He then draped me aside from the sleeping children and raped me inside my own house. I was gang-raped by four soldiers who took their turn, one after another. In all I was raped eight times that same night so I almost became unconscious without ability or energy to walk (Turshen, 2000, 803).

Sometimes rape is referred to as genocidal rape, in that the rape is not just a sexual act, but also has genocidal intentions or after effects. Rwanda is a paradigmatic example of genocidal rape. Between 250,000 and 500,000 women were raped during the genocide (out of a total population of eight million people), with two-thirds of Tutsi women who were raped testing positive for HIV. As Chris McGreal poignantly states “…soon there will be tens of thousands of children who have lost their fathers to the machete and their mothers to AIDS” (2001, np). Furthermore, following the genocide, some women were questioned with the “rape card,” namely their fellow residents wondered if they had managed to spare their lives by sleeping with attackers, i.e., facilitating rape instead of immediate death (Sharlach, 2000).

Sexualized torture—short of the legal definition of rape—is similarly dehumanizing. This can happen against women and men, but has been found to be an action often used against men. For instance, women and men suffered torture in the targeting of genital areas and nipples, during the Argentine Dirty War (1976–1983), through the picana, an electric cattle prod. Eric Stenner Carlson researches beating of the male genitals. He stresses that anal rape is not the only form of assault on men and that whether or not men become sterile or have sexual dysfunction because of a beating, “a crime is a crime, and a victim is a victim” (2006, 18). Similarly, forced nakedness may be considered as a form of sexual torture, as it is discriminatory and coercive (Oosterhoff, Zwanikken, & Ketting, 2004).
Women as Victims of Violence and Terrorism

Why Use Rape and Sexualized Torture as a Weapon During Conflicts?

Motives for why sexual violence and rape are used during war fall into the categories of circumstantial factors leading to anomie, threatening masculinity, threatening communities, constructing male identity, rape as a strategic weapon, and the difficulty in prosecuting rape (Office on the High Commissioner on Human Rights, 2012).

As citizens of war torn countries become victims of violence, the society as a whole loses order and social norms disintegrate, leading to anomie, or the lack of usual social and ethical standards of a group. Anomie is compounded by poverty, malnutrition, and the availability of weapons. Furthermore, the breakdown of social order leads to an environment conducive to sexual violence as anomie breaks down social standards (Card, 1996).

Rape also occurs in conflict as a way to threaten masculinity. Historically, women have been seen as the possessions of men, without agency. This view of women persists in many countries, particularly in rural areas. When women are viewed as property of a male relative and they are raped, the rape is viewed not as much as an attack against the woman, but as “property damage” against the man to whom she “belongs” (Sharlach, 2000, 90). Thus, the woman not only loses agency through the rape but also in the aftermath of rape when violations against her become less important than the rape’s effect on the men. In this way, rape is a tool for men to attack other men. Rape threatens to emasculate the man because he is unable to protect his woman (Goldstein, 2003).

For years to come, the rape may challenge what it means to be a morally upright family. Where women’s chastity is linked to a family’s honor, rape can become a collectively experienced form of family shame (Sharlach, 2000). Nationalism in an ethnic community is sometimes tied to the purity of women. Women are viewed as a symbol of a nation because they ensure its continuity through reproduction. When women are violated, a nation and ethnicity are violated as well and the continuity of the group is put in danger. The ethnic group/society is also demoralized when men are raped, for homosexuality may be a taboo and rape of men by men is seen as such.

Rape is also used as a tool to construct the male identity during times of combat (Goldstein, 2003). For example, in Rwanda, Hutu masculinity was compromised before the genocide, as Hutu men often were unemployed and felt unsuccessful. Tutsi women were seen as elites and more successful than Hutu men; thus, Hutu men sought superiority by raping Tutsi women (Jones, 2002). In some societies, male combatants believe that raping women will make them invincible, and raping certain categories of women, like pregnant women, is thought to lead to more strength in battle (Sow, 2009). Motives of power and intimidation over another individual are often more compelling than sexual motives, for wartime rapes target old and young, attractive and unattractive women alike (Kressel, 2002). Combatants also use rape, particularly gang rape, to create a sense of male unity and cohesion among forces. This violence, for the purposes of forging a “brotherhood,” removes women’s agency, treating them as a shell for the benefit of male wartime behavior.
Rape is also a strategic, military tactic during wartime (Card, 1996). Enloe (2000) argues that militarized rape is different than circumstantial rape because it is conducted in a context of institutional policies and decisions. Military commanders promote its use as a battle tactic and they compel individual soldiers to use rape. Rape can effectively send a threatening message to one’s opponent, thus rape becomes political as it achieves a political goal. In many societies, after a woman is raped and her virginity compromised, she is no longer “suitable” marriage material. As mentioned above, this can lead to an unraveling of families and the social fabric of a community (Card, 1996). Thus, war rapes have a strategic political impact beyond the woman who has been violated. Bosnian women were strategically raped and impregnated as a part of ethnic cleansing, and state-backed Pakistani troops also used rape as a strategic attack against Bangladeshi women in 1971. Rape also instills fear in a society, and the threat of rape can diminish a population’s resistance.

Furthermore, rape is used strategically to inflict economic violence. If women are cast out of families or communities after a rape, they lose their livelihoods by being cut off from sources of income. After a rape, rapists sometimes commit economic violence against women by stealing their material possessions and seizing control of their labor, thus allowing the rapist to gain assets needed during wartime. Again, this plays into the idea of women being constructed as property. They can be stolen and used, and their property can be transferred to their rapist (Turshen, 2000).

Rape and sexual torture also are strategic because they are difficult to prove in court, and most soldiers do not get prosecuted for these charges (Sharlach, 2000). When someone is killed in war, her/his corpse may exist and serve as forensic evidence in a trial. Physical evidence of rape, or, for instance, trauma to the male genitals, may be unavailable when trials take place, oftentimes many years later (Carlson, 2006). Thus, deterrents to rape in violent contexts are minimal, and few are held responsible for rape and torture in comparison to how often they occur.

**International Responses to Rape: Regaining Agency?**

Two trials display the international community’s response to rape, one from the ICTR (Rwanda) and one from the ICTY (Yugoslavia). The Akayesu case from the Rwanda tribunal was the first recognition under international law of rape as a form of genocide. Jean-Paul Akayesu was the mayor of Taba, Rwanda. Though initially protecting Tutsis from the Interahamwe (Hutu) militia, Akayesu later acquiesced to the militia and facilitated genocide by exposing safe havens and encouraging people in the town to participate in killings and rapes. Activists fighting for legal recognition of genocidal rape lobbied the ICTR to include the Taba rapes as part of Akayesu’s trial. The tribunal found Akayesu guilty of many genocidal acts, including rape and he was sentenced to life in prison in 1998. Although the Akayesu case is a “jurisprudential pioneer,” the ICTR has not been widely successful in convicting other suspected rapists since 1998 (Van Schaack, 2008, 29). As of 2008, four
individuals in Rwanda, including Akayesu have been convicted of sexual crimes, including rape. This number pales in comparison to the estimated 250,000–500,000 rapes during the genocide.

Second, the Foca case centers on the town of Foca, Bosnia that experienced the deaths or refugee exit of close to 20,000 non-Serbs during the early 1990s. In this trial three men were accused of imprisoning, torturing, and raping Muslim women and girls in 1992, though the ICTY tribunal initially had wanted to try around 25 men for similar crimes but could not due to lack of resources (Kuo, 2002). One man raped a 12-year-old girl, sold her for 100 Euros to a Montenegrin soldier, and she was never seen again. According to the US State Department, “this case is the first before an international tribunal to focus entirely on crimes of sexual violence and to enter a conviction for enslavement as a crime against humanity” (US State Department, 2001, np). A 28-year sentence was given to a commander, and a 20-year sentence was given to the man who had sold the above-mentioned 12-year-old. The third man received a 12-year sentence. The ruling was handed down in 2001, almost 10 years after the crimes were committed.

While these cases were pioneers in prosecuting rape, rape was not officially acknowledged by the international community as a weapon used in war until June 19, 2008 when the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1820 declaring that “women and girls are particularly targeted by the use of sexual violence, including as a tactic of war to humiliate, dominate, instill fear in, disperse and/or forcibly relocate civilian members of a community or ethnic group.” Although the resolution called for an “immediate and complete cessation by all parties to armed conflict of all acts of sexual violence against civilians,” it remains to be seen if it will result in more international prosecutions of wartime rapists.

Survivors of rape deserve the utmost justice, but tribunals are not the only and perhaps best remedy for them. The tribunal process as it pertains to gender crimes may be critiqued for several reasons. First, rape and gendered torture are hard to prove. Second, perpetrators are not likely to be tried at all or in a timely manner. Tribunals cost a lot of money in comparison to the number of criminals eventually convicted and they linger for many years after an atrocity (for example the ICTY and ICTR were still hearing cases as of 2012, and in 2010–2011, the ICTY budgetary costs were over $300,000,000). Third, though some women desire to publicly state atrocities and seek closure, trials may rob survivors of their agency once again as “‘revealing is not healing,’ and the performative aspects of the courtroom may not be therapeutically in the survivors’ best interest” (Mertus, 2010, 113). The legal setting prioritizes perpetrators’ narratives, because the trial is about whether the perpetrator is guilty. Thus, the survivor will not be able to give a therapeutic retelling of events, as the court is not interested in the complex impact violence has had on her life. Though defense lawyers cannot directly accuse survivors of being complicit in rape, they tend to portray women who testify as weak and non-credible witnesses. Moreover, psychologists have found retelling one’s story of violence from genocide can induce fear and post-traumatic stress (Brounéus, 2010). Women then lose agency as they are discredited, re-traumatized, and cut off in the expression of their story.
What should international agencies, politicians, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and individuals do in response to gendered political violence? Some women want to take part in gatherings of women, whether formally or informally organized, as a way to regain agency after mass rape. One Yugoslavian woman pursues healing, by getting “together [and talking] with other women from her village who were in the concentration camp with her” (Skjelsbæk, 2006, 388). On the other hand, some women do not speak to friends, their mothers, or husbands about their experiences (Skjelsbæk). Other women’s post-traumatic stress disallows them from leaving their homes and functioning socially on a day-to-day basis.

Women also call for better social services for survivors. In conflict-torn countries, strong social service institutions may be lacking; however, survivors often need counseling, physical therapy, surgeries, and/or prescription medicine. Making sure health networks are adequate to meet this demand is a pressing policy concern for post-conflict societies and the international community. Social service providers, in order to satisfactorily respond to refugees, must be trained to understand how diverse gender norms impact various women and men. For instance, counselors might not suspect that men are also victims of gender violence and they might underestimate the great stigma of rape in a woman’s home culture (Oosterhoff et al., 2004).

Some NGOs go beyond basic health care and seek to enhance women’s wellness and mental health. An interesting example of this is Project Air in Rwanda and Eastern Congo that facilitates yoga classes for sexual violence survivors. Through yoga, “… something inside…[the women] began to stir, to shift. This was something below the level of thought, below the level of memory, below the level of conscious feeling even, but when it was sparked, it was as if… women became able to feel again and so love again the life that was in them” (The Story of Project Air, nd). Finally, the political rehabilitation of women in the aftermath of conflict involves reestablishing women’s standing in their communities because community status is the first instance of women’s citizenship. In order to reestablish citizenship, post-conflict policy should focus on the promotion of women’s rights and the reform of outdated and discriminatory laws (Turshen, 2000).

Terrorism’s Victimization of Women

Terrorism, like rape, can be used strategically to remove agency and victimize women. Moreover, terrorism’s victimization is wrought with gender dynamics. Given that the fight against terrorism is perceived as a war, it is logical to expect that more men than women are victims of terrorist violence. Men make up the majority of fighters in terrorist organizations and men predominate in militaries fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan. A way to gauge the gendering of terrorism’s victims is to look at the sex identity of victims killed by terrorist organizations. This data is hard to come by worldwide, but the Basque Country in Spain provides an interesting gender analysis.
Case Study: Genocide and Use of Rape as a Weapon in Darfur

“We were sleeping when the attack on Disa started... They took dozens of other girls... During the day we were beaten and they were telling us: ‘You, the black women, we will exterminate you, you have no god.’ At night we were raped several times...” –as told by Darfuri refugee (Amnesty International, 2004, 1).

Introduction and Background to the Case

Darfur, in western Sudan, has been embroiled in conflict since a famine in the 1980s. Fighting intensified in the early 2000s when two Darfuri rebel movements (the Sudan Liberation Army and the Justice and Equality Movement) began armed conflict against the Sudanese government that was unable and unwilling to protect farmers and sedentary people from government-supported attacks by nomads. The Arab-controlled government responded to the rebels by arming Arab militias, called Janjaweed (also spelled Janjawid or Janjawiid), and having them attack villages throughout Darfur (United Human Rights Council, 2012). The targets of attacks are ethnic black Africans, mainly farmers, of the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa groups. Arab villages have not been attacked.
When the Janjaweed attack, they kill men, rape women, and displace villagers from their homes, burning homes and either burning or looting crops and cattle (Amnesty International, 2004). The genocide has claimed over 400,000 lives and over 2.5 million people have been displaced. In June 2005, the ICC launched investigations into human rights violations in Darfur. The ICC indicted former Sudanese Interior Minister Ahmad Harun and Janjaweed militia leader Ali Kushayb in 2007. In March 2009, the ICC indicted the President of Sudan, Omar al-Bashir, for mass killing, rape, and pillages against Sudanese civilians (United Human Rights Watch, 2012). Many Western nations supported the ICC’s actions, but China, Russia, and many African nations strongly criticized it. In March 2012, the ICC issued an arrest warrant for Abdel Rahim Mohammed Hussein, Sudanese Minister of Defense. Sudan has not surrendered any of these suspects. The ICC also indicted Darfuri rebel leaders Bahr Idriss Abu Garda (United Resistance Front), Abdallah Banda (Justice and Equality Movement), and Salah Jerbo (Sudanese Liberation Army); all voluntarily appeared before the court. Attempts at peace have not been successful. Peace agreements were signed in 2006 and 2010, but all rebel groups did not support them. The Doha Peace Agreement was negotiated in 2011, but again, not all rebel groups chose to accept the agreement.

Rape as a Weapon of War in Darfur

Rape is being used as a weapon of war in the Darfur conflict (Reeves, 2012). Some estimates suggest 40% of Darfuri women have been raped. Other reports suggest that 100% of Darfuri women and girls are subject to gender-based abuse (Robertson, 2008). Girls as young as eight have been raped, and gang rape is widespread. In many instances women who resisted rape have been killed. Often displaced women and girls are raped when they walk to outer areas of refugee camps to collect firewood. A study found that a “majority (82%) were raped while they were pursuing their ordinary daily activities. Only 4% of women reported that the rape occurred during active conflict, while they were fleeing their home village” (Doctors Without Borders, 2005, 3).

In several ways, the Sudanese government is using rape as a political weapon in Darfur. First, rape is used being used to impregnate women with babies who are not ethnically African in an attempt to ethnically cleanse Africans from Sudan (Reeves, 2007). Women with “rape babies” are ostracized and the child born is considered an “enemy child.” Women who are married are rejected by their husbands after the rape and often feel compelled to abandon the baby conceived during the rape (Amnesty International, 2004). Women impregnated during rape are at higher risk of death during childbirth (continued)
as medical care in the refugee camps is poor, and there are increased levels of HIV/AIDS among the Darfur female population as a result of rape (Amnesty International, 2004; Genocide Intervention, 2012).

Second, rape is being used to ostracize women so they cannot begin families, and to damage women’s bodies so that they cannot have children (Genocide Intervention, 2012; Reeves, 2007). Raped women often are left with scars to mark them as raped and tainted, thus further destroying the social fabric of the region (Reeves). Due to the social stigma of rape, women suffer economic effects after the rape. In Darfur, a husband can disown his wife if rape occurs, and an unmarried woman can be considered “damaged goods” and not marriageable and be thrown out of her family (Genocide Intervention, 2012). Because many women, especially married ones, cannot talk about rape due to social stigma, many of them remain silent or leave their families due to shame. These women become economically vulnerable because they have no source of income, as most women in the region are economically dependent on families until marriage and husbands afterwards (Amnesty International, 2004).

Rape is also being used to instill fear in the civilian population, so that land and agricultural goods can be captured. Finally, the government uses rape to demoralize and emasculate the male Darfuri population (Reeves, 2007).

**Conclusion**

Rape is an unabated weapon of war in Sudan. Sudan’s neighbor, The Democratic Republic of Congo, suffering a similar conflict over 15 years, estimates the number of women raped there at 400,000. It is reasonable to believe that if violence continues in Darfur, we could see similar numbers. In the face of these atrocities, what can be done?

The ICC is working to convict Sudanese leaders of crimes of genocide, including rape. In addition, NGOs such as Amnesty International and Médecins Sans Frontières are trying to raise awareness. The Nobel Women’s Initiative started a “Stop Rape in Conflict” campaign to raise awareness about rape as a wartime tactic. Moreover, several women’s groups, many of them based in the United States and comprised of women who either fled Darfur or are of Darfuri origin, lobby the international community to intervene in Darfur. Without strong international support and the declaration of genocide in Darfur, however, many in the international community will sit by while atrocities continue.
In more than 40 years of ETA terrorism in Spain (Euskadi TaAskatasuna, Basque Homeland and Freedom), over 800 people have been killed. Government estimates of victims by sex show that men are 93% of ETA’s mortal victims. Though most of ETA’s victims are targeted for death as enemies of the group, 87% of women killed by ETA were indiscriminate deaths, meaning they were not targets but bystanders in a large attack on other people. More men have died because police, state security forces, and politicians are ETA targets. Women have gained political representation in Spanish political institutions since the 1990s, yet men still hold more of these targeted positions (Varona, 2009). The sex of targeted victims of terrorism is the same for the case of the Red Army Faction (Germany, 1970–1998); this Marxist group targeted businessmen and politicians, thus most of its victims were men. In the twenty-first century, terrorism by fundamentalist Islamic groups is more indiscriminate as, for example, a biological attack would hurt all citizens in the attack’s vicinity and not just men politicians. In fact, in the late 1990s, Osama bin Laden declared deaths of American civilians as part of the global jihad, meaning that Al Qaeda sees all citizens—men or women—as fair targets of terrorism.

Even if women do not numerically exceed men as victims killed by terrorism, the atrocities of terrorism are often gendered in a way that views women as the innocent victims of terrorism. Take for example the story that opened this chapter. Though one of bin Laden’s wives fought back against US troops in the Abbottabad raid, his wives and children were discussed in the year that followed as being caught up in terrorism, as innocents caught in the middle. A discourse surrounds terrorism—both on the side of the United States and the side of transnational terrorist networks—that women and children are not safe due to the actions involved in and the values embedded in the war on terror.

Western, developed countries and their media often express concerns about women during violent conflict. After September 11, 2001, when the United States invaded Afghanistan, the United States and its leaders expressed concern about the oppression of women in Afghanistan under the Taliban. In a radio address in November 2001, First Lady Laura Bush announced that the Bush administration was kicking off a “world-wide campaign to focus on the brutality against women and children by the Al-Qaeda terrorist network and the regime it supports in Afghanistan, the Taliban” (quoted in Cooke, 2002, 469). Though packaged through the words of Laura Bush, feminist scholars saw the administration expressing a form of “masculinist protection.” Male, American troops were going to save Afghan women who were the victims (Young, 2003). A more direct way to put it was that the war was partially a case of “white men saving brown women,” thus serving as an insult to the Afghani women who rarely gained voice in the matter (Cooke, 2002, 469; Spivak, 1988). Similarly, in 2012, President Obama came under attack for his policy of using drones to eliminate terrorists in countries such as Yemen and Pakistan. Administration officials expressed that they “count all military-age males in a strike zone as combatants…unless there is explicit intelligence posthumously proving them innocent” (Becker and Shane, 2012, np). The gender implication of this statement cuts two ways. First, it confirms the logic of gendercide: men are often targeted because of their age—they are threats even if we do not know their
intentions. However, we must presume that women in the targeted zones are considered as noncombatants, i.e., innocent victims of attacks. Although women are sometimes terrorists (see Chap. 3), we are left to think of them as helpless bystanders.

The terrorists who target the United States also think of women as victims who need to be protected. Victimization in their eyes comes from the ill effects of Western culture—sexualized and materialist—on Islamic society and women. The global jihad with its accompanying terrorism is meant to restore conservative Islamic values and sexual propriety.

**Women as Targets of Terrorism**

Acid terrorism is another way women are targeted as victims of terrorism. Acid terrorism is defined as assaults with acid meant to punish, kill, and/or disfigure victims. Men may use acid to terrorize women who do not accept their engagement proposals or women who are seeking an education. While some of these violent perpetrators are not terrorists in the sense of participating in a terrorist organization, they are practicing a new form of terrorism that must be analyzed by feminist scholars. It is terrorism in that it is political (not permitting women in the public sphere) and it is meant to terrorize a particular audience (women) and seek control over them.

Cambodian acid attack victim, 2007. Photo courtesy of Sand Paper
That said, terrorists in organizations also use acid attacks and other violent methods to punish women who transgress societal norms. This is the case with acid attacks against girls attending schools in Afghanistan. In Yemen, in 2012, terrorists in the Al Qaeda affiliate Ansar al-Sharia attacked women with acid who they believe to be inappropriately dressed (Onassis, 2012). In Cambodia, victims of acid attacks are often the young mistresses of prominent men who are attacked by the wife of the man or family members who consider her a “whore.”

Finally, transnational terrorists may victimize women as they take them as wives and start families outside of their home countries. Terrorists, who came from abroad to fight in the insurgency in Iraq, took local Iraqi women as wives in unofficial marriage ceremonies, often against the women’s will (Al Arabiya, 2010). These women now have children deemed illegitimate in the eyes of Iraqi society and government, creating a social service problem for the women, as their children are not citizens. In this way, women are caught in the middle of terrorist actions.

Conclusions

This chapter focused on gendered violence and the victimization of women, yet it also demonstrated ways in which women are regaining agency after political violence. First, we examined genocide and gendercide, showing that genocides have occurred throughout history. The international community is often slow to recognize genocides and international courts have prosecuted a limited number of genocide cases. When genocides have a gendered component, they become gendercides. The former Yugoslavia provided an illustration of gendercide as well as wartime rape. We elaborated on rape as a weapon of war and as a political strategy through the case of Darfur. Finally, we focused on women who are viewed as targets of terrorism because of their sex.

The theme of women’s agency was prominent in the chapter. In much of the discussion surrounding terrorism and violent conflict, women are viewed as victims and passive vessels without agency, often needing to be saved. Efforts to regain agency, however, are underway, including women organizing and advocating for themselves as well as local and international organizations working to improve women’s lives. While women can regain agency, some women may never truly be “ok” given the nature of horrific crimes committed against them. Moreover, justice may not always come from a courtroom. This begs the question of what is “justice” for women who have to be targets of state violence or terrorism?
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