Whatever the future course of relations between psychology and linguistics, it should be a more intelligent one if we pay attention to what has happened in the past (Blumenthal, 1985, p. 820).

Chapter Prospectus

There is a standard version of the history of modern mainstream psycholinguistics that emphasizes an extraordinary explosion of research in mid-twentieth century under the guidance and leadership of George A. Miller and Noam Chomsky. The narrative is cast as a dramatic shift away from behaviorist principles and toward mentalist principles based largely on transformational linguistics. A closer view of the literature diminishes the historical importance of behaviorism, shows a prevailing “written language bias” (Linell, 2005, p. 4) in psycholinguistic research, and elevates some theoretical and empirical thinking of the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries on language and language use to a far more important role than has heretofore been acknowledged. In keeping with the theoretical and methodological perspective of the present book, it is particularly appropriate that the German philologist Philipp Wegener be “given his due in the annals of linguistic sciences” (Koerner, 1991, p. VI*). In his (1885/1991) Untersuchungen über die Grundfragen des Sprachlebens (Investigations Regarding the Fundamental Questions of the Life of Language; our translation), he began his philological research with his own informal observations of actual speaking in everyday settings rather than with analyses of purely formal structure. Moreover, he emphasized the listener’s role in the communicative process. Compatible with Wegener’s own observations is an aspect of speaking that has been most seriously neglected throughout the history of research on the psychology of language use. For him, as well as for Esper (1935), the basic and primary genre of dialogical discourse was not ongoing...
conversation but the occasional use of speech in association with nonlinguistic activities. Bühler (1934/1982) has also emphasized the importance of the genre of occasional speaking. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the historical shifts in the relationship between psychology and other language-related sciences.

The Status Quo

The history of modern mainstream psycholinguistics is not new territory for us. We have already taken up historical issues such as the monologist tradition that has characterized the past half century of psycholinguistics (O’Connell & Kowal, 2003), a historical chapter on mainstream psycholinguistics (O’Connell & Kowal, 2008), the pioneering work of a number of scholars both in general psychology and in the psychology of language use (O’Connell & Kowal, 2009a), an article on The Sources of History for “A Psychology of Verbal Communication” (O’Connell & Kowal, 2011; a precursor of the present chapter), and a general overview of the history of modern psycholinguistics (O’Connell & Kowal, 2012).

But history too is of necessity selective. And there are good reasons why the Toward in our 2008 book title is as yet incomplete. We are still filling in the gaps in our own appreciation of the history of modern psycholinguistics. And we now know that, as children of our culture and zeitgeist and as a function of our own ignorance, we have too readily fallen prey to the currently available version of the history of psycholinguistics. No one concerned about the gradual development of the discipline of psycholinguistics would be expected to place the origins thereof solely with the transformational grammarians of the mid-twentieth century and their psychological followers, although Higgins and Semin (2001, p. 2296), for example, seem to come close to such a position: “Compared with the study of language more generally, the study of the psychology of language is relatively new … it did emerge as a field in the middle of the twentieth century.” Blumenthal, as early as 1970 (p. viii), had already emphasized “an illustrious earlier history of psycholinguistics,” and Rieber and Vetter (1979, p. 21) had specified that “psycholinguistics can be said to have originated as far back in the history of philosophy as one cares to trace psychology.” Nonetheless, there was a suddenness about the emergence of psycholinguistics in those years that was somehow ahistorical; the perspective was thoroughly futuristic, and recent decades were all too often cast as superficial and erroneous insofar as they had been minimally mentalist and maximally behaviorist. It was the eve of the cognitive revolution (Baars, 1986), much vaunted – to this day – as a radical shift in methodology, philosophy of science, and ability to cope with the phenomena of human language use. But the first decade of the twenty-first century has left us still with a cognitive science in which meaning remains “a core unsolved problem” (Fitch, 2005, p. 395) and in which “psycholinguistic data is irrelevant to formal linguistic theory” (Boland, 2005, p. 2). The failure of mainstream psycholinguistics to engage “intention, meaning, consciousness, purpose, perspective, dialogue, social role, culture, affect, and finality” (Sabin & O’Connell, 2006, February 15, p. 9) can largely be explained by the insistence of psycholinguists on limiting their
interests to the processing of individual sentences and written (and often artificial or concocted) materials, while neglecting both the listener and the speaker who are involved in spontaneous spoken interaction, and by the limitation to a methodology not tolerant of field-observational procedures but rather intent on preserving the purity of a tradition of carefully controlled experimentation. Enfield (2010, p. 1600) has emphasized a similar message regarding the historical record of linguistics: “The dominant approaches to linguistics have pursued highly abstract analyses based on data that are only indirectly related to the phenomenon in its natural setting.” However, Garrod and Pickering’s (2007, p. 443) insistence that “psycholinguists need to think in a different way to understand processing in dialogue” has indicated a rather new direction for psychology to pursue.

Suffice it to say that there are abundant historical reasons for these variations to have developed and to be sustained within mainstream psycholinguistics. Some of these will be discussed in the following. But the chronological roots of disarray have not been properly integrated into any extant version of the history of psycholinguistics. There is still a great deal of untapped and in fact suppressed historical evidence from the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that the development of a psychology of language use throughout the twentieth century was largely regressive and ill advised. Such a historical overview contradicts a triumphalistic, simplistic, and even quixotic standard version to the effect that behaviorism was somehow supplanted by cognitivism. It is far more realistic to acknowledge cognitivism for what it really is: a postmodern form of positivism. However, one must grant that cognitivism lacks the philosophical clarity to be explicitly positivistic (for a critique of cognitive science, see Hutchins, 1995, p. 367 f.).

George A. Miller (1965) knew better than anyone else where to round up the usual suspects in the case of the precursors of psycholinguistics:

Among psychologists it was principally the behaviourists who wished to take a closer look at language. Behaviourists generally try to replace anything subjective by its most tangible, physical manifestation, so they had a long tradition of confusing thought with speech – or with “verbal behaviour,” as many prefer to call it. (p. 293)

In fact, Miller’s terminology is a not too subtle reference to B. F. Skinner’s (1957) *Verbal Behavior*, a document which marks rather the end than the beginning of the behaviorist era. In point of fact, the “long tradition” of behaviorist interest in language behavior was less than four decades at the time Skinner’s book was published. And it should also be acknowledged that, to their credit, behaviorists did indeed engage the question What do people say? whereas mainstream psycholinguists have been largely seduced into following the linguists’ path of questioning, and in particular to the question: “Can a speaker ever say this?” (Saporta, 1961, p. v). To Skinner’s (1961, p. 228) credit also is his insistence on the mediation of verbal behavior by “reinforcement imposed by a verbal community,” i.e., “through the reinforcements supplied by other individuals” (Carroll, 1985, p. 835). It is clear then that Skinner acknowledged the social interaction involved in all genuine language use. And further, according to Blumenthal’s (1970, p. 177) critical evaluation, Skinner’s approach to a psychology of language “did not constitute psycholinguistics – it lacked the linguistics. But it did present a behaviorist approach to language
in a way that permitted a more precise evaluation of that view.” We might add that it was two behaviorists who called attention to the embeddedness of language use in everyday nonlinguistic behaviors: Esper (1935) and Pronko (1946). Although they themselves did not pursue the matter empirically, they have contributed to our own understanding of this phenomenon.

The Standard Version of Psycholinguistic History Revisited

In an effort to give a more detailed account of the paths and detours in the historical development of psycholinguistics, we proceed now backward in time through several periods of history, characterized in a number of subsection headings: The Annual Review of Psychology, the Psychological Bulletin, and Allgemeine Psychologie. The first two of these sources are patently Anglophilic, with the justification that much of the twentieth century research and theory was indeed based in the United States. Within each of the three sections, our discussion follows the ordinary chronological order of the historical development. The reason for this unusual procedure is to point the chapter cumulatively in the direction of the neglected influence of the German philologist Philipp Wegener, his contemporaries, and a number of other subsequent researchers who have been neglected in the standard account of the precursors of mainstream psycholinguistics. To put it succinctly, we have found in Wegener – far more than in all other sources we have consulted for this section – a historical rationale for our own new direction of theory and methodology for a psychology of verbal communication.

On our journey into the past of a psychology of language use we have had to be selective in order to find traces in a wealth of data. More specifically, we have sought out in the historical data materials which pay attention to foreign-language and historical sources, to theoretical perspectives on psychology and linguistics, to the dialogical interaction between listeners and speakers, to the question of controlled experimentation versus field-observational research, and to the importance of ongoing versus occasional speech.

The Annual Review of Psychology

The recent history of modern mainstream psycholinguistics has been largely chronicled in the United States in issues of the Annual Review of Psychology, a journal which began publication in 1950. This history spans a period from 1954 to 2001 – the last year in which Psycholinguistics appears in that journal as a separate topic. A summary of these review articles in terms of authorship, year of publication, title, and number, language (only if the citation is in a foreign language), and chronology of articles referenced therein, is presented in Table 2.1.

In Table 2.1, some facts of considerable interest emerge from the numerical data therein. Overall, among the 1,488 references cited, only 40 (2.7%) are in languages
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Entries prefixed with + were in press or in preparation at the time of publication of the review.
other than English (including French, Russian, and German). It is noteworthy that 98% of these foreign-language references occurred in the two reviews of the 1960s. And there are only ten (0.7%) references to materials predating 1950, a hint of the ahistorical. In fact, in all but the most recent review, the vast majority of the references are from the preceding decade. Responsibility for such ahistorical reviews rests partly in the short-sighted concept of a review as mainly a chronicle of current research. One may also find in these data a clear indication of the heyday of psycholinguistics: The 1960s were the decade of most productive research. Fully a third (16.2 plus 17.7%) of all these references date from that decade; these, along with their percentages, are indicated in bold print at the bottom of the table.

As the heading of Table 2.1 shows, the emphasis in the respective reviews, as indicated by their titles, has shifted over the years from Communication to Psycholinguistics, to Experimental Psycholinguistics, and finally to Psycholinguistics: A Cross-Language Perspective. Miller’s (1954) review is in several respects quite different from the reviews which followed: It has the fewest references, and in addition, they are limited for the most part to the years 1952 and 1953. Miller’s title Communication referenced a far more mathematical and engineering approach (see Carroll, 1985, p. 838) than the more limited term verbal communication, as used throughout the present book. Miller (1954) explicitly acknowledged a highly idiosyncratic selection (“Only those studies were covered that interested the reviewer” [p. 401]) and summarized largely theoretical contributions of individuals: linguists (R. Jakobson, Z. S. Harris), philosophers (A. Kaplan, R. Carnap), communication engineers (C. E. Shannon, W. J. McGill), a mathematician (B. Mandelbrot), an economist (J. Marschak), and only one psychologist (C. E. Osgood) – without much reference to empirical research. In his conclusions, Miller stated that there are three themes running through his review: the impact of verbal context, the “treatment of meaning,” and the many attempts to optimize something. Kaplan wants to minimize ambiguity, Shannon wants to minimize redundancy, McGill wants to maximize transmission, Mandelbrot wants to optimize the encoding procedure, Marschak wants to find the best rules for communication within teams. This normative approach is attributable in part to engineering, in part to economists, and it makes many psychologists uncomfortable. (p. 418)

Paradoxically, Miller himself was soon to embrace a novel type of optimization in his adherence to the model of ideal speakers and listeners directly traceable to the transformational hypotheses of Noam Chomsky. This too is still another normative approach, but one which is attributable at least in part to psychology itself, and it too turned out in the long run to make “many psychologists uncomfortable.”

All three reviews written in the 1960s and at the beginning of the 1970s have in common the title Psycholinguistics. But their conceptualizations of the discipline are quite different from one another, in keeping with the shifting zeitgeist. Rubenstein and Aborn (1960) were clearly influenced by behaviorism:

Psycholinguistics is not a well-integrated field of study, and one can hardly speak of anything like a general trend in the field as a whole. Nevertheless, a number of studies concerned with the probability of language segments and with word association have brought forth a point of view which stresses the significance of the concept of response hierarchy in interpreting the subject’s performance in various verbal tasks. (p. 291)
Astonishingly, they mentioned Skinner’s (1957) *Verbal Behavior* only in passing in the last lines of their review.

A dramatic shift in emphasis is to be noted 6 years later in Ervin-Tripp and Slobin’s (1966) review. Although they still contended, as had Rubenstein and Aborn (1960) before them, that psycholinguistics seems to be “a field in search of a definition,” their definition of the field clearly reflects the influence of transformational linguistics: “the study of the acquisition and use of structured language” (p. 435). More specifically, they stated: “To psychologists remains the challenge of finding the processes by which the competence described by linguists is acquired by children and is reflected in performance under a variety of conditions” (p. 436). Quite in accord with this division of labor between linguistics and psychology, their review began with a section on Language Acquisition, followed by sections on Grammar and Verbal Behavior, Linguistic Perception, Internal Language Functions, and Biological Bases of Language. In addition, they included sections on Extralinguistic Phenomena and Sociolinguistics, topics that were not taken up again in the later reviews.

Only 5 years later, Fillenbaum (1971) became the first reviewer to take a rather critical stance toward the development of psycholinguistics. He pointed out the difficulties faced by a psychologist who attempts to use a linguistic model:

> Shall it be a phrase structure model of the sort presented by Yngve…, a stratificational model in the spirit of Lamb…, a transformational model after Chomsky…, or what, and what difference will a particular choice make? (p. 253)

And he added with respect to the revisions of models developed by Chomsky:

> To the extent that psycholinguistic work is based on some linguistic formulation, it may be embarrassing or likely much worse, to find that linguists have now rejected that formulation, making very difficult indeed the interpretation of any result. (p. 254)

In view of later reviews, it is of interest that Fillenbaum included a rather long section entitled Experimental Psycholinguistics. Therein, he clearly expressed his concerns about the perspective taken by the experimentalists with respect to language:

> The view of language which has been focal in recent research, perhaps just because contemporary psycholinguistics has been so strongly influenced by work in generative grammar, is one of language as idea, knowledge, or mental structure, largely or entirely abstracted from its setting, from problems of communication particularly in, say, the context of dialogue, and without much serious worry about normal temporal constraints. Obviously such a view of language concerned principally with the perception of and memory for short stretches of monologue excised from any setting and without continuity, to caricature a little (but only a little) is far from being the whole story, and there have been protests, perhaps most vigorously by Rommetveit. (p. 276)

In a similarly critical vein, he warned researchers about unwanted side effects of experimentation:

> We should be alert to the possibility that the results of some (perhaps much) experimental work may be as much a consequence of special ad hoc strategies adopted for coping with particular laboratory tasks as of anything else, and that often subjects may not at all be dealing with what we want them to deal with, and what we think they are dealing with. (p. 277)

With the 1974 review of Johnson-Laird, there occurred a shift in title from Psycholinguistics to Experimental Psycholinguistics. Accordingly, a focal limitation
to “comprehension and its cognate problems” (p. 135) was established, and this limitation persisted through the following review by Danks and Glucksberg (1980). According to Carroll (1985, p. 839), “it was Miller’s work on the psychology of grammar, inspired by Chomskyan theory and reported in his 1962 paper in the American Psychologist, that established the new subspecialty, called experimental psycholinguistics.” Foss (1988) once again widened the scope of his review of experimental psycholinguistics so as to include both comprehension and production. He also made explicit what Johnson-Laird as well as Danks and Glucksberg had done implicitly: He limited his review to “work done with adults” (p. 302).

The last review of psycholinguistics to appear in the Annual Review up to 2011 was published 13 years after the one authored by Foss (1988) – the longest interval between any of these reviews. Bates, Devescovi, and Wulfeck (2001, p. 369) entitled their review Psycholinguistics: A Cross-Language Perspective and thereby emphasized the need for crosslinguistic research in an attempt to identify “universal processes in language development, language use, and language breakdown.” Their contention shows that developmental psycholinguistics, neglected in the reviews on experimental psycholinguistics since 1974, was again being considered a focal part of psycholinguistics. Moreover, the inclusion of language breakdown in aphasia as a topic marked another shift toward inclusiveness. Many years earlier, Rubinstein and Aborn’s (1960) review had explicitly pointed to methodological difficulties involved in such research:

The research in the area of language disturbance has been quite unsatisfying from a psycholinguistic point of view. This is not to make light of the difficulties of working with abnormals – where the experimental method has limited application and where the psycholinguist is, for the most part, faced with the time-consuming and laborious task of minute analysis of utterances. (p. 308)

Their warning was well taken: The topic did not occur again in the reviews for the next 40 years. Bates et al. (2001) concluded their review with a note critical of the past, but hopeful for the future of psycholinguistics:

The dominance of English in twentieth-century psycholinguistics was a historical accident, more socio-political than scientific. However, it has had particularly unfortunate consequences for those fields that try to study the universal psychological and neural underpinnings of language. Psycholinguistics has finally broken away from the hegemony of English, and the field is better for it. (p. 390)

Interestingly enough, Bates et al. did not cite any non-English references, although research regarding languages such as Russian, Kiswahili, Chinese, Italian, and Dutch was indeed referenced in English-language reports. In other words, Bates et al. were being Anglophilic in another sense: They actually included many references to research on languages other than English, but they did not include among their references research published in languages other than English. Given the geographical spread of modern science, a monolingual presentation of a scientific discipline almost always carries with it a loss of information. Another aspect of Anglophilia is that it may also have consequences for science politics. This has been emphasized recently by Warnecke (2011, September 15): The European University
The Standard Version of Psycholinguistic History Revisited

Association (Europäische Universitätsvereinigung [EUA]) has criticized an Anglophilia intrinsic to international university rankings insofar as US researchers “tend to ignore colleagues from other countries” (p. 28; our translation).

The fact that the generic term psycholinguistics does not occur in any of the titles of Annual Review articles in the decade between 2001 and 2011 should perhaps give us pause. It is fairly clear that psycholinguistics is thereby being divided into other subdisciplines in the cognitive domain. For example, reviews of Speech Perception (Diehl, Lotto, & Holt, 2004), Speech Perception and Language Acquisition in the First Year of Life (Gervain & Mehler, 2010), and Speech Perception (Samuel, 2011) all dispense with any generic mention of psycholinguistics in the title. These omissions would seem to reflect a return to historically more traditional terminology in the area of language studies. The very fact that speech perception itself has recurred so often in the most recent decade in these titles manifests a dominant research interest in that specialty. It is interesting to note that the announcement on the part of the Annual Review of Psychology for 2012 includes no contribution on the topic of psycholinguistics, and the preliminary announcement for 2013 has only a contribution under the general topic of Language and Communication.

An exception to what we have described here as a recent decline in the use of the generic term psycholinguistics can be found in a series of three handbooks of East Asian psycholinguistics in China (Li, Tan, Bates, & Tzeng, 2006); Volume II Japanese (Nakayama, Mazuka, & Shirai, 2006); and Volume III Korean (Lee, Simpson, & Kim, 2009) dedicated appropriately to Elizabeth Bates for her extensive international work in psycholinguistics, particularly in the areas of aphasiology and developmental psycholinguistics. The emphasis in all three volumes is on acquisition and processing, and in the Chinese volume additionally on language and the brain. The hegemony of the English language in international psycholinguistics is to be noted in this series. We have accordingly summarized the languages represented in the references in all three volumes in Table 2.2. And although the majority of the chapters in each of the volumes are written in what is clearly the current lingua

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franca of psycholinguistics, it is gratifying to note that many of the chapters have been written by East Asian researchers. One phenomenon that Table 2.2 clearly indicates is the fact that the Chinese researchers seem to be the most Anglophilic of these three groups, with fully 96.4% of all the references in the book in the English language. Nonetheless, the corresponding percentages of English references for the Japanese (88.1%) and Korean (89.6%) volumes also contribute to the overall impression that psycholinguistics remains still in the twenty-first century a discipline dominated by English-language publications.

**The Psychological Bulletin**

In the first half of the twentieth century, the preferred English-language venue for reviews of articles and books related to a psychology of language was the *Psychological Bulletin*. From 1919 to 1946 – a span of time almost half as long as the period covered by the *Annual Review* articles – five such reviews appeared: Faris (1919), Esper (1921), Adams and Powers (1929), McGranahan (1936), and Pronko (1946). In Table 2.3, quantitative results parallel to those in Table 2.1 are summarized. As the heading in Table 2.3 shows, the reviews occurring between 1919 and 1936 all adopted as title *The Psychology of Language*. A change occurred only in the review of 1946 entitled *Language and Psycholinguistics: A Review*.

The first of these reviews, by Faris (1919, p. 95), a philosopher, psychologist, and sociologist, included only three references, of which two are in French, two are theoretical (one with an acknowledgement of the influence of Wilhelm Wundt), and one is “an experimental investigation of the relation of vocabulary to general intelligence.” All three references date from 1918, with no introduction as to the aim or emphasis of this selection and no summary or conclusions at the end.

The behaviorist psychologist Esper (1921) reviewed the period from 1917 to 1921, thus overlapping Faris in time but not in his selection of references. As Table 2.3 shows, 29% of Esper’s references are French- and German-language works. In this pre-psycholinguistic period, across the reviews by Faris and Esper, references from disciplines other than psychology dominated: five from education; three each from communications, linguistics, philosophy, and psychology; two from biology; and one from anthropology. Only in the later reviews did the dominance of psychological research emerge. In his introduction, Esper expressed his discontent with the neglect of language by psychologists in the past and looked forward to increased participation on their part:

Such a review, incomplete though it may be, is yet sufficient to indicate that this field is not being extensively worked by psychologists, and this in spite of the increasing recognition of the fact that a large proportion of the apparently most perplexing problems in psychology are really language problems. Indeed, it seems likely that many of the problems of the other sciences will find their solution in an investigation of the genesis of verbal reactions involved in the statement of these problems. The linguists and the philologists, too, have long been awaiting an adequate psychology for the interpretation of their data; those who have found

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We have cited Esper at considerable length because he is one of the few psychologists who, as early as 1921, emphasized the role that psychology has to play in the psychology of language. His activity in the field of language and psychology extended over more than 50 years (e.g., Esper, 1918; 1968; 1973) and, according to Carroll (1985, p. 834), was “most closely associated with linguistics” whereas, in general, the Psychological Bulletin reviews “reflected little awareness of, or even interest in, developments in linguistics.” This association may have been due to the fact that Esper was a student of A. P. Weiss, a behaviorist psychologist who in his 1925 article strongly argued for an “investigator trained in both linguistics and psychology” (p. 57). Esper’s (1921) review includes, among others, topics such as Speech Disturbances, the Origin of Speech, Phonetics, and Language Development of Children.

Eight years later, the review by Adams and Powers (1929) listed almost seven times as many references, 83% of which cover the time period from 1921 to 1930 and 18% of which are in German or French (see Table 2.3). As Esper (1921) before them, they discussed the relationship of psychology to linguistics but came to a more specific conclusion: “The psychology of language seems related most nearly to the branch of linguistics termed general grammar.” They adopted the principle that grammar is “concerned with the relation between grammatical forms and mental categories” (Adams & Powers, 1929, p. 241). Accordingly, they structured their review in terms of that relationship, with their longest section on “The Relationship of Language and Thought” (pp. 241–247). They concluded with a reference to the psychologist Judd (1910, 1926), who “gave early attention to the scientific study of language” and “called attention to the lack of an adequate consideration of the problems of language by psychologists” (Adams & Powers, 1929, p. 255).

As Table 2.3 indicates, the review by McGranahan (1936) includes again more references than his predecessors and a higher percentage (36%) of foreign-language references (mostly German and French but also one reference each in Russian and Italian). Of the seven nineteenth-century authors referenced, four were also included in Blumenthal (1970): H. Lukens, M. Müller, H. Paul, and G. J. Romanes. The only overlap in these references with the other Psychological Bulletin reviews is Lukens, who was mentioned in Pronko’s (1946) review.

The first sentence of McGranahan’s (1936) review reads as follows: “A growing interest in the psychology of language is apparent today, perhaps more on the continent than in America” (p. 178). His interest in European research, evident in his commentary as well as in the quantity of his foreign-language references, is quite unusual in the field of psychology of language. In fact, Blumenthal (1970, p. 173) bluntly stated: “Several American reviews of the psychology of language appeared during those decades [the 1930 and 1940s] and they show either no sympathy for
The Standard Version of Psycholinguistic History Revisited

the early and foreign work, or an incomplete awareness of it.” McGranahan (1936, p. 178) divided his review into three topics: the Nature of Language, the Phylogenetic and Ontogenetic Development of Language, and the Significance of Language for Social Psychology. But with respect to the social use of language, his comments are limited to the following statement: “The most important of them is that of controlling and coördinating social behaviour. This is also without doubt the original social function of language.” In recent research, the discussion of coordination among interlocutors has, in fact, become quite prominent (e.g., Clark, 1996, p. 36; Shockley, Richardson, & Dale, 2009).

Pronko (1946, p. 189) adopted a decidedly behaviorist position in his review on language and psycholinguistics: “The interest of the present paper is primarily in the behavioral phases of language events.” The inclusion of “psycholinguistics” in his title was likely derived from Kantor (1936), in view of the fact that Pronko had been his student (see also Murray, 2001, p. 1679). As Table 2.3 indicates, Pronko’s (1946) review includes the most numerous references (of which only 2.5% are non-English) and covers for the most part the period from 1931 to 1945. Pronko complained that “the literature in this field is not readily amenable to systematic classification” (p. 189); accordingly, he organized his review in three sections with very general topics: Non-Psychological Study of Language, Psychological Studies in Language, and Theory in Psycholinguistics. In his introduction to this last section, he objected that despite a wealth of interest and of work, there seems to be no corresponding increase in our understanding of linguistic responses. Descriptions of such common, ordinary everyday-behavior as occurs in the case of two human organisms conversing (behavior, incidentally, which in filtrates all other forms of behavior) is conspicuously absent in our most up-to-date text books in psychology… or where developed in scanty fashion… they follow traditional prescriptions known equally well to the man in the street through his cultural heritage. (p. 213)

His own psycholinguistic approach “Interbehavioral Language Theory” (p. 226) was presented in critical opposition to “mentalistic language theory” (p. 215). The latter comprised two forms: “expressionistic construction” (p. 215), as exemplified in Wundt and Gardiner, and “symbolic theory” (p. 218), as exemplified in Jespersen, Ogden and Richards, and “Buhler” [sic]. Despite Pronko’s enthusiasm, interbehavioral language theory died on the vine, whereas a number of the mentalist theories have become historically important.

Allgemeine Psychologie

Before the turn of the nineteenth century, there was a considerable amount of research on the psychology of language, largely under the aegis of German general psychology. Perhaps the most famous of these are Cattell’s (1885; 1886) work on individual words in experimental reading settings, Ebbinghaus’s (1885/1992) studies of memory for consonant-vowel-consonant trigrams, and Thumb and Marbe’s
(1901/1978) experimental studies on the psychological foundations of analogy in language. It is noteworthy that all of these investigations provide early examples of what was already the established mode of procedure: the study of isolated individuals (experimental subjects) confronted with artificial, atypical language materials in an experimental setting and with very specific instructions as to what to do. O’Connell (1988) commented on the unwillingness to separate a psychology of language use from general psychology:

Cattell, James, the Sterns, Stumpf, and Wundt were all part of this picture, as Blumenthal (1970) chronicled in his historical overview. A separate psychology of language use, however, was not [deemed] necessary. It would have introduced useless conceptual impediments and would have led to harmful isolationism. (p. 16)

It should be noted that in the five Psychological Bulletin reviews presented above, few of these references were cited, even though they were currently available: none by both Faris (1919) and Esper (1921), Stumpf (1924) by Adams and Powers (1929), Stern and Stern (1907) and Wundt (1916) by McGranahan, and Cattell (1886) and Wundt (1921) by Pronko (1946).

Other early influences have been sporadically recognized as part of the relevant history of psycholinguistics. According to Clark and Van der Wege (2002, p. 209), “psycholinguistics was launched in 1900 with the publication of Wilhelm Wundt’s Die Sprache (Language) as the first two volumes of his monumental Völkerpsychologie.” And yet, Wundt’s sociocultural approach to language research has found very little resonance in mainstream modern psycholinguistics. There has been hardly any recognition of the founding in 1859 of Lazarus and Steinthal’s Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft (see Blumenthal (1970, p. 7) who translated the journal title as Journal of Social Psychology and Linguistics), even though Blumenthal considered it to be “the first journal largely devoted to the psychology of language.” By way of contrast, Knobloch (2001) has emphasized that Lazarus and Steinthal as well as high-school teachers such as Ludwig Noiré (e.g., 1885) and Philipp Wegener (1885/1991) are among the “standard bearers” (p. 1663; our translation) of the psychology of language in the nineteenth century. Knobloch’s emphasis pinpoints the fact that all these authors were Germans. In her review of the history of psychological linguistics, Elffers (1999) has confirmed Knobloch: “19th-century psychological linguistics was in fact developed most prominently in Germany” (p. 306).

Recasting the Historical Background of Psycholinguistics

According to Arens (1980, p. 104), the second half of the nineteenth century saw a turn in the approach to linguistics. The Junggrammatiker (neogrammarians) sought to reject a linguistics based on the reconstruction of ancient texts from dead languages. Instead, they proposed linguistic research based on language users, an approach which would also engage psychology. One of their number, Karl Brugmann, formulated the new project in the Preface of his 1878/1975 Morphologische Untersuchungen auf dem Gebiete der indogermanischen Sprachen
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(Morphological Investigations on the Topic of Indogermanic Languages), coauthored with H. Osthoff: “It is true that languages themselves have been investigated quite enthusiastically, but the speaking individual has been engaged far too inadequately” (cited in Bartschat, 1996, p. 18; our translation). And Jespersen (1922) still counted among “general tendencies” (p. 96) toward the end of the nineteenth century the new attitude taken with regard to the study of living speech … With the greater stress laid on phonetics and on the psychology of language, the necessity of observing the phenomena of actual everyday speech was more clearly perceived. (p. 97)

For him, it was Paul’s (1880) *Prinzipien der Sprachgeschichte* that provided “the profoundest and fullest treatment” of the new interest in “language in terms of speaking individuals, who have learnt their mother-tongue in the ordinary way, and who now employ it in their daily intercourse” (Jespersen, 1922, p. 95). And he observed “a steadily growing interest in living speech as the necessary foundation of all general theorizing” (p. 97). However, both Arens (1980, p. 104) and Bartschat (1996) have emphasized that this project on the part of the neogrammarians was not successful; in fact, according to Bartschat, the neogrammarians were later criticized for their “isolation of language from the language user” (p. 30; our translation).

In view of this historical background, the contributions of Philipp Wegener, a contemporary of Brugmann, Paul, and the other neogrammarians, assumes particular importance for a psychological approach to verbal communication. According to Juchem (1986), it was Wegener “who was the single scientist of his time to seriously pursue the communicative aspect of language” (p. 158 f.; our translation). And Nerlich (1990, p. 159) has pointed out Wegener’s contemporaneity: “In his insistence on dialogue, he shows a more advanced understanding of communication than some modern speech-act theorists.”

Perhaps the best way to explain Philipp Wegener’s historical importance for our own psychological approach is as follows: Well before the end of the nineteenth century, he had focused on the single most important aspect of a psychology of verbal communication, namely, “the living mother tongue itself” (Wegener, 1885/1991, p. 7; our translation). Not only have modern psycholinguists ignored his wisdom, they are still neglecting his focus on verbal communication. This is precisely why Koerner (1991, p. VII) insisted that Philipp Wegener be “given his due in the annals of linguistic science.” The effort on the part of Koerner to reinstate the reputation of Wegener by republishing his *Untersuchungen* along with an English commentary by Knobloch (1991) after a full century of neglect is to be seen as quite unusual. Wegener has been for the most part a footnote in the history of linguistics, or as Innis (1985, p. 577) has put it at the beginning of his own positive evaluation of Wegener: “Scholars often bury the past in a footnote or allusion and only when we turn to the contents of the grave itself do we sometimes find a still warm, fresh, and perhaps even living body.”

For example, Paul (1920/1975) referred to Wegener only in a set of three footnotes (pp. 78, 126, and 127; but see Nerlich, 1990, p. xii), even though his comments were all quite positive, and the later editions of his book were influenced by Wegener’s thoughts. And von der Gabelentz (1901/1984, p. 46; our translation), in
a chapter on the psychological formation of language researchers, recommended Wegener’s “insightful” book, but only in a brief postscript to the chapter. Perhaps part of the rationale for this neglect resides in the fact that Wegener was not a university professor but a secondary-school teacher. Within the most recent half century, Blumenthal (1970, p. 63 f.) has referred to Wegener as simply a “nineteenth century intellectual who gave some inspiration to the functionalist movement and who is little known today.” In a later publication, Blumenthal (1985, p. 806) classified Wegener as belonging to the “mechanistic tradition” in the history of the psychology of language, without any explanation for this classification. On the face of it, such a diagnosis seems at odds with Wegener’s (1885/1991, p. 3; our translation) own deliberate characterization of humans as “self-determining.” In fact, we are dealing here with a central and at the same time complex idea. According to Knobloch (1991), “mechanization and grammaticalization are partly synonymous in Wegener’s theory” (p. xxi*): As the motor of language change, mechanization accounts for the shift in function and context of expressions; as a psychological process, it accounts for the shift from conscious to automatic use.

We have found in the writings of both Alan Gardiner and Karl Bühler some historical exceptions to the neglect of Wegener. Gardiner (1932) dedicated his The Theory of Speech and Language to Wegener as “a pioneer of linguistic theory” and in many references to Wegener’s work as “far in advance of his contemporaries” (p. 12) throughout the book (see Innis, 2002, p. 54 ff., for more information on Wegener’s influence on Gardiner). And according to Bühler (1934/1982), there is a close relationship between Wegener and Brugmann; in fact, he occasionally presented them as “Wegener-Brugmann” (e.g., p. 119). [N. B. Goodwin’s translation of Bühler (1934/1990) erroneously reads “Wegener and Delbrück” (p. 135)]. Especially in his chapter on Das Zeigfeld der Sprache und die Zeigwörter (The Deictic Field of Language and Deictic Words), Bühler (1934/1982, p. 81; our translation) acknowledged their influence on his own work: “What I am now able to present as new in these matters should be looked upon as a fulfillment of what Wegener and Brugmann have began.”

In more recent years, Arens (1980), in his history of linguistics, has also praised Wegener for his 1885 book:

His book confronts the question as to how language is understood, a question which had never before been articulated as a problem. Beginning with the variety of speaking situations, he develops a new and independent conceptualization of word, sentence, and function of spoken discourse … this is altogether an astounding accomplishment on the part of an outsider. The formulations we have listed mark an incipient emancipation from the one-sidedness in theory and practice of the dominant orientation [in linguistics] and its historicism. (p. 105; our translation)

In addition, Nerlich (1990) has stated that Wegener “is gaining increasing attention from theoreticians and historians of communicational linguistics, constructivism, and psychology of language” (p. xii; see also pp. 157 and 163). She has also insisted that his book “from the start was well received in Germany,” but was “forgotten with the advent of structuralism in the 1950s” (p. 159). Knobloch (1991) has expressed
an opinion different from that of Nerlich (1990) with respect to the initial reception of Wegener’s work in Germany and has provided an explanation for the lack of interest at that time:

When the *Untersuchungen über die Grundfragen des Sprachlebens* first appeared in 1885 hardly anyone realized its importance…. In line with epistemological preoccupation of the time, the then current model and metaphor of language was mainly monological and cognitive. In contrast, Wegener explicitly states (1885: 64–65) that for him monologue is ‘purposeless speech’ and only dialogue is purposeful and relevant for the functioning of language. His emphasis on the preconditions and embeddings of language communication in social and cultural processes produced the impression that he was not actually dealing with language itself, but only with the contingent exterior factors of language use (Knobloch, 1991, p. xxxi*)

To date, we have been unable to find any evidence of a recent increase in attention to or respect for Wegener’s work among linguists and psychologists of language use in the United States. For example, one might have expected some acknowledgement of Wegener’s historical importance in a recent presentation of *Cognitive Grammar* by Langacker (2008), but there is no mention of him. By contrast, van Dijk (2008) has expressed his respect for Wegener in the following encomium:

Wegener’s book has a surprisingly modern style of thought and exposition. Many passages, for instance, on the relations between language and action, and on the development and the use of language, are still relevant in contemporary psycholinguistics and pragmatics. (p. 52)

In fact, van Dijk in his effort to develop his own theory of context, has been critical of the “empiricist leanings” (p. 53) of the systemic-functional approach to context and has clearly stated that his “own approach to context is closer to that of Wegener” (p. 54). The most recent evidence we have been able to find that European linguists consider Wegener useful is a brief reference in Schnelle (2010, p. 137) to Wegener’s preoccupation with communicative efficiency.

The historical picture that emerges, then, indicates that there was a rather consistent neglect of Wegener’s work in Germany in the late nineteenth century. In the twentieth century, a few individual scholars have accorded him some acknowledgement. These would certainly include Gardiner (1932). In the most recent half century, there has indeed been a gradual growth in recognition of his relevance on the part of nonmainstream European scholars, primarily on the part of Juchem, Knobloch, and Nerlich. In the United States, however, there has not been a general recognition of Wegener, although Innis (1985) has certainly recognized his importance.

What then is this extraordinary accomplishment from the vantage point of a psychology of verbal communication? As early as 1876, Moritz Lazarus (1879/1986, p. 5; our translation) had defended the investigation of “actual, everyday, hour-by-hour conversations of ordinary people” (see also Käsermann & Foppa, 2003). In other words, the defense was not original with Wegener, but it was best formulated and developed in his (1885/1991) *Untersuchungen* and explicitly presented as a critical refutation of contemporary language research that was preoccupied with archaic language forms:
Just as physiological evidence becomes clear only from the observation of living, spoken discourse – and indeed in the first instance of one’s very own speaking, accordingly primarily a becoming aware of what we do on a daily basis – exactly so must living, contemporaneous spoken discourse, understandable in its finest detail by the speaker, in other words the living mother tongue itself, constitute the foundation and operational domain of all psychological observations. (p. 7; our translation)

At the same time, Wegener acknowledged a healthier tendency on the part of the neogrammarians to take “living speech” into account.

In view of the approach taken in the present book, it is important to emphasize the historical weight of Wegener’s position. In passing, we should add that we have deliberately refrained from using the published English-language translation of Wegener (1885) by Abse (1971); his translation was made in connection with his own psychiatric preoccupations, and consequently Abse was unaware of the theoretical and historical relevance of many of Wegener’s passages for research in the psychology of verbal communication (see also Knobloch, 1991, p. xiv*, for a criticism of Abse’s translation).

Wegener’s position, as summarized in the citation above, was not presented as his own novel view but as an integrated part of a tradition that relied on the work of Steinthal, Lazarus, Paul, and Whitney, although he refrained from specifying their detailed contributions. This acknowledged dependence is all the more important insofar as it highlights the mystery of his relegation to obscurity by researchers of language use. Had Wegener been alive in the second half of the twentieth century and able to take part in an English-language discussion, he would have been an extremely vocal critic of the then popular version of psycholinguistics.

The methodological convictions with which he would have disagreed the most can be summed up in the following two statements, both derivable from his own text:

- Neither a synchronic nor a diachronic investigation of written materials is the primary task for a study of “the fundamental questions of the life of language” (Wegener 1885/1991); it is indeed best to begin research with one’s native language and one’s own consciousness of how it is used in everyday discourse.
- Artificially concocted experiments with equally artificial materials do not constitute the primary evidential basis for a psychology of verbal communication; field observation is the basic methodology.

A number of basic theoretical principles also serve as the foundation of Wegener’s psychological approach to verbal communication. It is certainly no accident that he developed his ideas about language change ontogenetically: From the very beginning, language is used in a cooperative interaction between speaker (child) and listener (caretaker). Although children will utter their initial one-word sentences with variable phonetic articulation, they will be understood by the caretaker because their prosodic expression is consonant with their needs, because the caretaker is aware of these needs, and because the situation itself supports the meaning of the children’s utterances. From these reflections, Wegener developed his ideas about the tight relationship between the grammar of utterances and the situation in which the articulate adult is communicating. In fact, according to Elffers (1999, p. 329),
Wegener was one of the first linguists who emphasized “that language elements are, at least partially, determined not by the speaker’s private thought but by the communicative situation.”

Speakers formulate for listeners utterances that consist of a logical subject (i.e., what is already known) and a logical predicate (i.e., what is newly articulated regarding the logical subject). Wegener (1885/1991) adopted the term exposition (our translation of his Exposition on p. 21) as more fitting for the logical subject. According to Nerlich (1990, p. 169), “an exposition in Wegener’s sense of the term is everything which prepares the ground for the appearance and the understanding of the predicate.” The extent to which exposition must be made verbally explicit depends on how much of the situation the speaker can assume to be already shared with a listener – perceptually, in memory, and/or culturally: “The clearer and more complete the situation becomes through perception, the less it needs linguistic means” (p. 140). A speaker’s decision to be more elliptical or more verbally explicit depends on the amount of information garnered from the facial expression of the listener. In other words, the speaker must assess the understanding of the listener in order to determine how and how much to speak; this conceptualization emphasizes the role of the listener in determining the linguistic shape of a speaker’s utterances. The process of reciprocal adjustment between speaker and listener for the sake of understanding can result in several corrections in exposition on the part of the speaker. According to Wegener (1885/1991), this process explains not only the change of linguistic forms in a concrete instance of verbal interaction but also the historical development of certain grammatical forms in a given language. Thus, for example, “all types of pronominal subordinate clauses are derivative from the supplementary correction of a communication deficient in exposition” (p. 40; our translation). A further indication of the contemporary relevance of Wegener’s idea as well as of the historical disregard shown for his insight becomes transparently obvious in the following introduction by Fox (2008) to her summary of “discourse-functional syntax”:

In the 1970s, a group of American linguists began exploring the possibility that at least some syntactic structures could be understood historically as solutions to recurrent communicative problems faced by speakers … As the scholars in this area began to make greater use of naturally-occurring discourse data, the extent of the functional basis for syntactic structures became more apparent. (p. 256)

Historically, the beginnings had actually been made by Wegener 85 years earlier.

Wegener has become of particular importance for our own work on verbal communication not only because he conceptualized language as “an instrument of communicative interaction, its goal being mutual influence, its nature intentionality and purposefulness, its setting dialogue” (Nerlich, 1990, p. 166). More specifically, his theory of exposition allows for grammatically incomplete utterances to be flawlessly communicative as long as the situation provides the needed information. In addition, his theory implies that the most basic form of language use – both phylogenetically and ontogenetically – is not one that relies primarily or exclusively on sustained verbal interaction, prototypically on conversation, but one which is heavily embedded in a nonlinguistic situation. Such a contention fore-
shadows Esper’s (1935) distinction between primary and derivative types of speech: “Linguists who occupy themselves with the recording of narratives or the study of written documents might well fail to see the primary relation of speech to practical situations and to behaviour” (p. 455, footnote 16). The following description on the part of Esper constitutes both a radical and fundamental definition of conversation as a derivative type of speech:

Verbal interaction may thus occur in the absence of practical situations and of manual-locomotor adjustment to such situations. There is thus in a sense a cutting-loose of speech from immediate practical concerns and concrete environment… There is thus created an entire artificial environment, which is in touch with the concrete environment only at certain points or only indirectly. (p. 455, footnote 16)

The unusualness of these conceptualizations on the part of both Wegener and Esper becomes evident in light of the fact that future generations largely lost sight of them. In this regard, it is of more than passing interest to note that Krauss (1987), in reviewing the coverage of language as a topic in the various editions of The Handbook of Social Psychology, observed: “The chapter in the 1935 edition, which I think is in many ways the most interesting, was written by Erwin Esper” (p. 81).

The same type of speech related to “practical situations and to behaviour” (Esper, 1935, p. 455, footnote 16), although in a quite different formulation, has been emphasized by Bühler (1934/1982). In the course of this book, we have consistently used our own translations of Bühler, since we find Goodwin’s translation of Bühler (1934/1990) inadequate for our purpose. Practically speaking, the most recent translation (Bühler, 1934/2011) by Goodwin and Eschbach has not been available in time for us to make use of it. According to Bühler’s theory of language, utterances are embedded in a surrounding field (Umfeld), i.e., in “shifting ‘totalities’ of psychological processes” (p. 155; our translation) which modify how we understand the utterances. Typically, the most important surrounding field of an utterance is its verbal context (Kontext). But there exists a special type of utterance, quite common in daily life, that has little or no verbal context and yet is embedded in a surrounding field: “the empractical namings and pointings by means of isolated language signs” (p. 155; our translation). These are extreme cases of elliptical speech which, at the same time, exemplify the empractical nature of the situation insofar as the relevant activities involve nonlinguistic interaction:

Consider the case in which a taciturn guest in a coffee house says to the waiter ‘one black’ or the passenger in a streetcar says to the conductor ‘no transfer’ or ‘transfer’. Both utterances are practically sufficient to the occasion…: Islands of speech emerge in the sea of silent but unequivocal interaction at those locations where a differentiation, a diacrisis, a choice among several options has to be and can conveniently be engaged through the insertion of a word. (p.155 f.; our translation)

The anecdotes also serve well to relate Bühler’s empractical speech to Wegener’s (1885/1991) exposition, in which the nonlinguistic elements of the situation suffice for an understanding of what is expressed verbally in only minimal terms.

A somewhat different type of speech, in which terseness and prolonged silence, rather than nonlinguistic activities are emphasized, had already been mentioned by
Moritz Lazarus (1879/1986) in a lecture on Gespräche (Conversations). In order to demonstrate the variability of temporal organization in what would today be referred to as turn-taking, he told the story of two farmers who went to market together:

In the morning, they walk side by side in silence, until one of them looks at the fields and says: ‘The rye looks great’. They walk into town, do their business, and return home – still in silence – until they come upon another bit of field. The second farmer says: ‘The barley too’. (p. 16; our translation)

Lazarus’s example dramatically contrasts occasional and ongoing speech. A century and a quarter later, Baldauf (2002), in her book Knappes Sprechen (Terse Talking), has once again taken up the topic of occasional speech under the rubric of empractical speech, engaged while watching television.

All these cases of occasional speech are in stark contrast to the use of ongoing conversation. In recent decades, it has been rather generally assumed by the conversation analysts that conversation is stereotypically the primary and basic form of spoken interaction. On the part of a psychologist, Clark (1996, p. 8) has cited Fillmore (1981, p. 152) approvingly as follows: “The language of face-to-face conversation is the basic and primary use of language, all others being best described in terms of their manner of deviation from that base.”

Psychology, Linguistics, and Other Social Sciences

Ultimately, science is always the communication of people with one another. In view of that truth, we wish to present an anecdote from an international conference on psycholinguistics which took place in Kassel, Germany, in June of 1978. We had been assigned the task of summing up the proceedings of the foregoing several days for a final discussion. In the course of the actual discussion, a vigorous argument arose between ourselves on the one hand and Jim Deese and Karl Pribram on the other. The discussion was interrupted by a coffee break during which the argument continued. At one point, we mentioned in passing that we were speaking as psychologists. Both our interlocutors proclaimed in amazement and relief to the effect: “Why didn’t you tell us? We thought you were linguists.” The designation made all the difference in the world. Clearly, our putative identity was more important than our real identity – or, for that matter, than our arguments.

Before we discuss the problem of interdisciplinarity from a psychological perspective, we would like to quote from Elffers’ (1999) summary on the fate of psychological linguistics:

By loosing the links between linguistic entities and psychical occurrences, sophisticated psychological linguistics provided the study of language with a metatheory that largely covered general linguistic practices. By stressing the relatively independent character of language as an object of research, they gradually dissolved psychological linguistics itself. Although the relationship between linguistics and psychology has certainly yet not been entirely clarified, the time of extensive psychological involvement as an inherent feature of linguistic investigation in fact drew to an end around 1940. (p. 336)
In a footnote to her summary, Elffers has pointed out that there were additional developments responsible for loosening the ties between linguistics and psychology: “the disappearance of the phenomenological and introspective approach in psychology and the success of structural linguistic practice” (p. 336).

As psychologists, we would like to summarize here what our selection of historical references has made clear to us about the relationship of psychology of language (use) to linguistics. In today’s era of at least lip service to interdisciplinary scholarship, it can hardly be popular to claim that the understanding of the proper scholarly relationship of psychology to linguistics has always been murky. And, notwithstanding all the current hype about cross-disciplinary cooperation, there seems to have been very little clarification over the course of years.

As we have indicated above, the *Psychological Bulletin* reviews in the first half of the twentieth century for the most part referred to the area of study as Psychology of Language. According to Esper (1935, p. 417), who had himself written the first substantial review on the topic 14 years previously (Esper, 1921), the Psychology of Language embraces “an outline for relating linguistic data to psychological principles and for suggesting research by which such relationships may be discovered.” In other words, the linguist provides the empirical data, and the psychologist provides the theory. On the other hand, the very term *psycholinguistics* suggests a diametrically opposite relationship: The discipline belongs to linguistic science, but it somehow takes psychological issues into account. Indeed, during the heyday of psycholinguistics in the first decades of the second half of the twentieth century, hypotheses were dictated by linguistic transformational theory but were tested in carefully controlled experiments conducted by psychologists, and the results were given a psychological interpretation and import. Sandra (2009) has summarized the effect thereof very bluntly:

> Despite the fact that many psycholinguists still make frequent use of linguistic terminology and that quite a few also believe that there are mental correlates for (some) linguistic distinctions, one cannot deny that there has been a divorce between the two disciplines. (p. 291)

One can scarcely avoid speculating what the relationship of psychology and linguistics would be today, had there developed a psychology of verbal communication based on Wegener’s work. The listener and speaker would surely be of central importance, rather than the linguistic system abstracted from their verbal behavior. The title of the present book has not been chosen in ignorance of such a speculative discipline. And so, we intend to place emphasis literally on listeners and speakers throughout this volume, i.e., on listening and speaking persons.

But the impasse remains. And it is not at all clear even wherein the impasse lies. Interdisciplinarity turns out to be an extraordinarily complex matter. Sometimes, it exists within a single researcher who has mastered two or more disciplines. But his or her success in dealing with multiple disciplines does not necessarily bring us closer to the rationale of the relationship of the disciplines themselves. The reason for this is perhaps to be sought in the manner in which interdisciplinarity has been practiced – both within a single researcher and among researchers. For the most part, it has proceeded pragmatically, i.e., without even asking the question as to the
overall underlying relationship of the disciplines one to another. One uses from another discipline whatever helps to foster a research project. For example, lexicographers’ definitions of what a word is and the lists of words which we call dictionaries are generally accepted by researchers without question as the definitive criteria for wordness. This constitutes a dependence upon a neighboring discipline, in this case lexicography – surely not a psychological discipline in itself. A pragmatic view on the relationship between the two disciplines has also been presented by Schriefers (2003, p. 23).

Let’s take a concrete example which involves the interdependence of lay people, psychologists, linguists, and lexicographers. The adult native speaker of English can easily see that the status of two word-like items, namely, *uh* and *um*, is equivalent: He or she knows from a bit of reflection that they occur frequently as fillers in everyday conversation. The two items differ only in that the latter is prolonged by continuing to voice while closing the lips. The psychologists Clark and Fox Tree (2002) are also native speakers of English, but as psychologists, they chose to accept from the London-Lund Corpus (Svartvik & Quirk, 1980) the equivalent treatment of the two items in a linguistic research monograph. Now, as it turns out, the lexicographers, who are also a species of linguists, beg to disagree: In two twenty-first-century dictionaries, *Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary* (11th ed., 2003) and *Collins Cobuild Advanced Learner’s English Dictionary* (4th ed., 2003), *um* is included as an English word, whereas *uh* does not even occur. Now let us add one more empirical fact of interest to our case: The item billed as a nonword (*uh*) actually occurs in ordinary everyday conversation far more frequently than the item billed as a word (*um*). Additionally, in media interviews (O’Connell & Kowal, 2005, p. 567), *uh* occurred four times as often as *um*. A number of questions now arise: “Who has the last word? Who is right? And what difference does it make?” A rather radical answer has been given by Linell (2009), though from a more general dialogical rather than from a psychological perspective:

We must move from autonomous (“segregational”) linguistics to interdisciplinary (“integrational”) language sciences. Dialogical theory can contribute to filling the gap between discourse and language, and therefore also between discourse studies and linguistics. (p. 292)

Linell’s use of the term “integrational” can be traced to Harris’s (1997) theory of integrational linguistics, to which we refer below. Linell’s optimism remains to be confirmed by the efforts of language scientists to narrow the gap. In the second decade of the twenty-first century, the more specific relationship of a *psychology of language use* to linguistics and to other related disciplines still remains murky, complicated, and at the whim of individuals and passing fads.

For ourselves, we have chosen to make Wegener’s emphases garnered from his philological background a model for our own psychological procedures. Hence, the present book emphasizes Wegener’s use of living speech, his conviction of the importance of the listener in the investigation of understanding, and his use of occasional speech to characterize elliptical, empractical, and terse usage of language.

Most of the concepts discussed thus far in this chapter have been – we must quite frankly admit – novel to ourselves. Our own research up until the present has evolved
from the carefully controlled type of experiment to the use of naturalistic observation, first of storytelling, reading aloud, and other more monological performances and later of dialogical settings such as media interviews. The phenomena which have interested us have included the use of interjections, fillers, laughter, and various aspects of temporal organization. Thus far, we have been able to access the listener’s role only indirectly through the speaker’s performance, the listener’s back-channeling, and applause. The corpora used in our research all focused on verbal performance, to the exclusion of concurrent nonlinguistic activities. We now find that the appearance of terse talking on our research horizon has presented a new opportunity to integrate our research around the listener, silent – but very active – intervals, and occasional speaking. Wegener has served to consolidate both our interest in the listener and the setting of occasional speaking, wherein the verbal component is reduced and nonlinguistic activities are emphasized. At a more theoretical level, we have found Wegener’s preoccupations and principles consonant with a set of four principles which we developed in O’Connell and Kowal (2008). These remain requisites for dialogical spontaneous spoken discourse: intersubjectivity, perspectivity, open-endedness, and verbal integrity. This approach to occasional speech is not only methodologically new for us, it involves an explicit acknowledgement that we cannot meaningfully engage such research without the addition of a phenomenological and indeed mentalist perspective.

Whether the historical perspectives presented in this chapter will suffice to shift or alter the orientation of American cognitivism with respect to a psychology of verbal communication remains to be seen. At the present moment, there seems to be little prospect of a significant paradigm shift (but see Clark, 2006). There is indeed new interest in the dialogical on the part of scholars such as Garrod and Pickering (e.g., 2007). And it is encouraging to note in this context that Mackenzie (2010, p. 284), in his discussion of Functional Discourse Grammar (FDG), has singled out the research by Pickering and his colleagues (e.g., Pickering & Garrod, 2004) for their acknowledgement as psychologists “that cooperation with linguists is essential.” At the same time, he has emphasized the potential of FDG for “collaboration with psycholinguists who stress the close association between speaker and hearer in dialogic interaction” (p. 84).

It should be noted also that a number of European scholars have already shown considerable interest in what well might be called post-psycholinguistic approaches to verbal communication. As regards some workable solution to the relationship of psychologists and linguists, it is perhaps a hopeful sign that both psychologists (e.g., the group including Graumann, 1995) and linguists (e.g., Enfield, 2010) have been involved in this movement.

Also quite recently, Harris (2010, p. 2) has further developed what he has been referring to as “integrational linguistics”:

This is the study of language as it features in the various modes of human interaction; in other words, as the faculty that makes available for us the characteristic human forms of communication. This approach is pursued today in integrational linguistics. It aims to free the understanding of language from the many popular misconceptions and biases about it that are current in the modern world. (p. 2)
The consequences of Harris’s reconceptualization of linguistics would be to subsume all the other language sciences under this one heading. An utterance (e.g., a grunt) or inscription (e.g., pictures painted on the wall of a cave millennia ago) would be a linguistic act even though no words were used. And the other language disciplines would all be at home in integrational linguistics.

In terms of our own interest in language use in empractical settings, i.e., in settings which Harris has referred to as “nonlinguistic practices” (p. 2), his explication of the term integrational is of specific interest. His “nonlinguistic practices” include

all those that do not depend in any way on being able to speak or write; i.e. most of the basic activities needed for everyday living … This ubiquitous prelinguistic substrate of behaviour is a prerequisite for the emergence and maintenance of verbal communication in all its forms. (p. 2)

Harris has thus expressed a radical departure from a traditional view of interdisciplinarity in language studies. This realignment is intended by him for the sake of a better understanding of “the actual linguistic experience of day-to-day communication” (p. 6). Harris’s wish is in complete accord with our purposes in this book.
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