

Contents

1 From Personal to Impersonal Exchange in Ideas	1
1.1 Introduction.....	1
1.2 The Economic History of the Patent System: Productivity	4
1.3 The Economic Principles of the Patent System: Exchange	7
1.3.1 A Market in Technology (Market Exchange)	7
1.3.2 A Contract with the State (Social Exchange).....	8
1.3.3 The Economic Principle of Trade in Technology	10
1.4 The Economic Structure and the Patent System: Specialization.....	11
1.4.1 Economic Organization and the Patent System	11
1.4.2 Management of Risk and Uncertainty as a Principle of Organizational Limits	12
1.5 Impersonal Exchange Mechanisms for a Market in Patents with Prices: Coordination	14
1.5.1 A Linear Contract.....	15
1.5.2 A Proposed Informal Theory for Linear Contracts and Prices	17
1.5.3 The Design Mechanisms for a Linear Contract	19
1.5.4 Strength of the Patent System, Legal Uncertainty and Presumed Validity, in the Economic Environment.....	22
1.5.5 The Role of Intermediaries, the “Dynamic Principle”, in the Economic Environment.....	23
1.5.6 The Technology Space – Searchable Technologies – In the Economic Environment	24
1.6 Econometrics for the Experiments.....	25
1.7 Experimental Economics: Studying What People Do	26
1.7.1 A Study of What People Do.....	26
1.7.2 What Can We Learn from Experimental Data	30
References.....	32

2 A Dynamic Microeconomic System Design for Markets in Patents 35

2.1 Introduction..... 35

2.2 Institutional Learning in History and the Two-Dimensional Nature of the Patent System..... 37

2.2.1 A Competitive Market in Technology..... 37

2.2.2 Allocation of Risk Bearing and Risk Sharing 39

2.2.3 Historic Development 39

2.3 The Dynamic Microeconomic System Design 41

2.3.1 The Legal Environment..... 43

2.3.2 The Economic Environment 44

2.3.3 The Institutions 50

2.4 Informal Theory of Prices and Initial Hypotheses 54

2.5 Summary 58

References..... 59

3 Prices and Dynamic Gains in Markets for Patents: Experimental Study of Impersonal Exchange in Ideas 63

3.1 Introduction..... 63

3.1.1 The Patent System as a Trade System..... 65

3.1.2 Summary of a Price System on Patents 66

3.1.3 The Mechanisms Design Criteria..... 68

3.2 The Mechanisms: Details of the Institutions, the Economic and Legal Environments 69

3.2.1 The Endogenous Experimental Flow 70

3.2.2 The Trading Screens 72

3.2.3 Subject Payments, Endowments, and Special “Rules of the Game” 74

3.3 Overview of Experimental Design, Design Parameters, Market Performance, and the Sequence of the Experiment..... 75

3.3.1 Market Performance and Dynamic Gains Under High Validity 79

3.3.2 Experiments with Low Validity 94

3.3.3 Secondary Market Reallocation 98

3.3.4 Homework..... 100

3.4 Linear Prices, System Gains, and Potential Capital Allocation: Hypotheses and Empirical Results..... 101

3.4.1 Linear Prices Compared with Proposed Theory (Static Analysis)..... 101

3.4.2 Comparison Between Institutions (Dynamic Efficiency) 107

3.4.3 Comparison Between Institutions (Heuristic Analysis)..... 108

3.4.4 Gains from Trade (Dynamic Analysis) 111

3.4.5 Capital Allocation (Calculation) 112

- 3.5 Summary and Conclusions: Prices and Dynamic Gains from Trade..... 113
 - 3.5.1 Linear Prices and Informal Price Theory..... 113
 - 3.5.2 Institutional Differences in Price Dynamics..... 115
 - 3.5.3 Predictions of Prices..... 115
 - 3.5.4 Gains from Trade..... 116
- References..... 116
- 4 Coordinating Inventing and Innovating Through Markets in Patents with Prices: Experimental Study of Institutional Behavior and Price Signals..... 119**
 - 4.1 Introduction..... 119
 - 4.2 The Trading System..... 121
 - 4.3 Isolation of the Problem..... 122
 - 4.4 The Economic System: Details of the Institutional, Economic, and Legal Environment..... 123
 - 4.4.1 The Flow of the Experiment..... 124
 - 4.4.2 The Trading Screens..... 126
 - 4.4.3 Subject Payments, Endowments, and Special “Rules of the Game”..... 128
 - 4.5 Experimental Design, Design Parameters, Performance, and the Sequence of the Experiment..... 129
 - 4.5.1 Coordination and Gains from Trade Under High Validity..... 131
 - 4.5.2 Coordination and Gains from Trade Under Low Validity..... 136
 - 4.5.3 Secondary Market Usage..... 137
 - 4.5.4 Summary..... 138
 - 4.6 Coordination, Hypotheses, and Empirical Results..... 138
 - 4.6.1 Does Convergence Take Place?..... 138
 - 4.6.2 Differences in WTS Between Institutions and Validity..... 138
 - 4.6.3 Coordination..... 140
 - 4.7 Conclusions..... 140
 - References..... 141
- 5 Conclusions..... 143**
 - 5.1 Introduction..... 143
 - 5.2 General Themes..... 143
 - 5.2.1 Investigating Design Institutions Toward Impersonal Exchange in Ideas..... 143
 - 5.2.2 How Risk is Shared in the Contract as Coordination Takes Place in a Market with Prices..... 144
 - 5.2.3 Mechanism Design: The Integration of Information and Rules..... 144
 - 5.2.4 A Dynamic Economic System..... 144

- 5.3 Experimental Results 145
 - 5.3.1 Do Experiments Make Sense in a Complex Dynamic Environment Like the Patent System? 145
 - 5.3.2 Why Are There No Organized Patent Markets Yet? 145
 - 5.3.3 What Are the Main Theoretical and Experimental Results? 146
- 5.4 Further Research Propositions 149
- References 150
- 6 Policy Propositions 151**
 - 6.1 Policy Propositions 151
 - 6.2 Future Research to Clarify Further Policy Issues 156
 - 6.2.1 Role of Patent System in Development 156
 - 6.2.2 Insurance 157
 - 6.2.3 Trust Between Firms 157
 - 6.3 Concluding Remarks on Experimental Research 157
- References 158
- Epilogue 159**
- About the Author 165**
- Appendices 167**
- Bibliography 189**
- Author Index 193**
- Subject Index 195**



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