Chapter 3
Group Dynamics and Social Cognition

Social cognition has not really been "missing" from the study of small groups, but the two areas have had largely disparate research literatures until recently. Social identity theory (cf. Deaux 1991) and other cognitive explanations are widely applicable to small-group topics, including setting, personality and background variables, social influence, roles and relationships including leadership, social interaction, group decision-making and cooperation, intergroup relations, and groups in organizational settings. For a wide-range view of the relationship between identity and control in social action, see White (1992).

Cognitive-based explanations partially underpin many—perhaps most—social-psychological findings related to conflict resolution, but relevant cognitive mechanisms are not always made explicit.

A major—and admirable—effort in some recent small groups research has been to attempt some integration with social cognition, a largely separate research area. There is no immediate prospect of "unifying" the two areas. This is partly because these two major areas of social psychology are not, or not yet, themselves unified entities. Deliberate effort has however been applied to understand cognitive aspects of small-groups topics—at the same time rendering "social" cognition more *social* (Ickes and Gonzalez 1996).

One major reason to applaud the simultaneous study of cognition and group effects is simply that they shed light on each other. An important part of the variance in how people interact is, not surprisingly, determined by their perceptions and thoughts. The present chapter includes illustrations of this from virtually every major area of small group research. This chapter is not an occasion for casting disparagement on work that is "purely" cognitive or group-based anymore than the study of biochemistry undermines the value of research based in "undiluted" chemistry or biology, nor does it seem wise just now to present the integration of group dynamics and social cognition from within a single theoretical framework, given that (as demonstrated below) the combinatory work draws productively on a wide variety of paradigms. Finally, cognitive approaches are not here put forward as a way to "rescue" group dynamics. As Steiner (1983) eventually pointed out, and as earlier research handbooks have demonstrated (Hare 1976; Hare et al. 1994), small group research remains alive and well, though its ebb and flow are determined partly by

H. Blumberg et al., *Small Group Research,* Peace Psychology Book Series,
DOI 10.1007/978-1-4614-0025-7_3, © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2012

social conditions and their accompanying zeitgeist. Moreland et al. (1994) do document the importance of social cognition—which, according to Mischel (1998), has become virtually synonymous with social psychology—in bolstering interest in group research. Their analysis established this empirically across a sample of articles from specific major journals (including the *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*) but did not assess the breadth of cognitive influence topically across virtually the entire gamut of group research.

As noted above, cognition was not really "missing" from the study of group dynamics nor of peace psychology—as will become apparent in the present chapter. Indeed the cognition/behavior dichotomy is of course rather artificial (as is the disposition/situation distinction that cross-cuts it). In any case, the weaving of person-perception research into group studies seems beneficial for understanding both areas.

In the early summaries of research on social cognition in small groups, the focus was on the social perception of the self and others (see Hare 1976, pp. 113–130). The topics covered included first impressions, the group basis of perception, perceptual accuracy, perception of friends, self-perception, attribution of causality, changing perception through interaction, perception and adjustment, leader's perception, and from perception to action. Aspects of social cognition related to individual and group decision-making were not included, although mentioned in reviews on decision making, nor was the literature on stereotypes related to minority groups and intergroup relations since the stereotypes were usually based on perception of large categories of persons, not on face-to-face groups. However, the relevance of stereotypes and other aspects of social cognition are now included in this review since perceptions at every system level, from individual, to group, to organization, to society, all play a part in interpersonal behavior.

The "part" also includes, but is not limited to, phenomena that give rise to disputes and the negotiations that can settle them.

Conveniently, many of the main contemporary attempts to integrate group dynamics and social cognition have been brought together in a collection entitled *What's* social *about social perception* edited by Nye and Brower (1996b). In their introduction to the volume Fiske and Goodwin (1994, 1996) review research and theory on the influence of social factors on perception and list the various topics involving cognition that are relevant, such as accuracy, memory, shared meanings including stereotypes, and the influence of goals and control. In their summary, Nye and Brower (1996a) note the topics that have been covered in the 11 contributions to the volume, including groups as information-processing units, the interchangeability of the self and group, memory systems, focusing attention on the self and other, self-worth, perceptions of leadership, reciprocal perceptions, social construction of identity, ingroups and outgroups, the contact hypothesis, and group development. The strength of the work is its reasonable thoroughness in covering extant research compactly. Ironically, given its breadth, this excellent volume nevertheless does not assess how fully the social-cognition perspective covers the whole range of small-group topics, nor is it organized so as to facilitate this task—which represents an intended goal of this chapter.

Group members' social identities—the social categories, real or symbolic with which they identify—can be especially important in determining their interaction in small groups and they provide a focus for several reviews that essentially deal with cognition and small group behavior (Abrams and Rutland 2008; Abrams et al. 2005; Ellemers Spears, and Doosje 2002; Hogg 2004; Hornsey 2008; J. C. Turner 2000). Like so many constructs that are often conveniently viewed as unidemensional, social identity combines multiple factors, for example importance, commitment, perceived superiority of ingroup, and deference (Roccas et al. 2008; cf. Cameron 2004).

"Triggers" that render a social identity salient may also activate a group "fault-line" with attendant negative outcomes (Chrobot-Mason et al. 2009). By contrast, "social identity complexity"—where members have a variety of different or partly overlapping ingroups—may in general be associated with increased tolerance of outgroups (Roccas and Brewer 2002; see also Crisp and Hewstone 2000b) and less likelihood of polarization and conflict. Where there are multiple group memberships, participants tend to use heuristics rather than, e.g. algebraic summing to combine information (Urada et al. 2007).

Among other topics, social identity in groups has been studied in relation to: mutual influence of the group and the person (Tyler and Smith 1999); group loyalty and related variables such as collective action (Brewer and Silver 2000; Van Vugt and Hart 2004; Zdaniuk and Levine 2001); social power (Tanabe 2001); partisanship (Greenwald et al. 2002); and affect (Forgas 2002a, b, c; Thompson and Fine 1999). Ironically, identity with a group may follow from feelings of uncertainty about one's self (Hogg 2007) or from a quest for perceived collective continuity (Sani et al. 2008). See also Aron et al. (2004); Barreto and Ellemers (2002b); N. Haslam et al. (2006); Huang (2009); Kashima et al. (2000); Sani and Todman (2002); and Simon et al. (2000).

Social cognition is moreover relevant to linking small group research to other areas of psychology including, e.g. neural bases (Adolphs 2009) and interpersonal problems (Gilovich et al. 1999), comparative (inter-species) research (Emery and Clayton 2009), and to interdisciplinary matters (Hollingshead and Poole 2004; Poole et al. 2004) such as political action (Bliuc et al. 2007; Klandermans and De Weerd 2000).

For publications which review or comment on research on some or all of this chapter's topics, see Brown (1996); Hogg (1996); Howard (1994); Stroebe and Hewstone (1998); Wetherell (1996b). For other "general" work on cognitive aspects of small groups see Abrams (1994); Brewer and Harasty (1996); Gibbons (1990); Hogg and Abrams (1993); Levine et al. (1996); Witte and Davis (1996). For some more specific relevant work that does not seem to fit neatly into any one category, see Biernat and Vescio (1994); Fox and Thornton (1993); Holmes (1997); Latané and Liu (1996); Seidel et al. (1998); Stangor and Duan (1991); Suman (1989); Wilkinson and Kitzinger (1996); Ybema and Buunk (1993).

Research on social identity is relevant to several of the sections of this chapter, as noted below, especially intergroup relations.

Some of the relevant reviews of the literature or collections of articles focus on social perception and do not include topics such as the role of social cognition

on decision making, accuracy, or memory. For example, Kunda (1999) in a book entitled *Social cognition*: *Making sense of people*, organizes the review in three sections:

1. Processes: Concept representation, rules of inference, memory, "hot" [motivated] cognition, and automatic processing.
2. Topics: Group stereotypes, knowledge of other individuals, and knowledge of self.
3. Issues from a cross-cultural perspective.

In texts that cover all of social psychology, such as that by Kassin et al. (2008), we find a chapter on "perceiving persons" that may include a review of research on how "scripts of life" influence perceptions, nonverbal behavior, truth versus deception, attribution theories, information processing in groups, attributions, impression formation, implicit personality theory, the primacy effect, and the self-fulfilling prophecy. Many of these topics have explicit or implicit relevance to social interaction in small groups, intergroup relations, and conflict resolution.

For additional summaries of the literature relating cognition to social behavior see Forgas et al. (2001); Higgins and Sorrentino (1990); Markovsky (1994); Rohrbaugh (1988); Westen (1991).

The findings presented in the present volume and elsewhere are here organized into a progression of small-groups topics. It seems helpful to unfold the topics gradually in an (arguably) intuitively plausible sequence.

One way to assess what has, and has not, been accomplished in building a group/cognition interface is to tour the field of small groups research, with this "interface criterion" in mind. The present "tour" will progress by bringing additional elements "on stage" in approximately the same sequence as that used in the overall organization of this two-volume handbook—Blumberg et al. (2009) and the present volume—and also as used in our previous works (Blumberg 1976; Blumberg et al. 1983; Hare et al. 1994, 1996):[1]

a. The first elements are the pre-existing physical setting and the background and personality variables that people bring with them.
b. Then the effects of others' presence are considered, including the conformity elicited by others' views.
c. Next, with "live" groups now "onstage": The roles and relationships (including leadership roles) among group members.

[1] The two books by Hare et al. (1994, 1996) are co-authored but nevertheless have signed chapters. Author's responsibilities were similar, though not identical, in the two volumes. The authorships, on which some of the chapters' introductory analyses in the present volumes are in part based, are as follows (using the 1996 version). Martin Davies: physical setting and background variables (Chaps. 1 and 2), social interaction (Chap. 7), and intergroup relations (Chap. 12). Valerie Kent: social influence (Chaps. 3 and 4) and leadership (Chap. 6). Paul Hare: roles (Chap. 5) and organizational settings (Chap. 11). Herbert Blumberg: group decision making (Chap. 8), and cooperation and bargaining (Chaps. 9 and 10).

d. Ongoing social processes, including the properties of social interaction and also group decision making.
e. Finally, once the live groups have ongoing social interaction, one needs to consider situational (applied) matters, such as conflict resolution generally, and processes in organizations and teams, in intergroup relations, and in therapy groups.

Physical Setting and Background Variables

The physical situation of a group includes the effects of environment (noise, temperature), material aspects of architecture and room design, and social density and spatial arrangements. The physical environment may facilitate or hinder group processes, and—for the present purpose—it is useful to distinguish between relatively direct effects (as when interpersonal distance makes it hard to hear people seated around a table except for one's neighbors) and more cognitively-mediated ones (as when the ambience of a well-appointed dining room sets the stage for polite conversation). A cognition-based account of these variables would need systematically to explain the extent and mechanisms whereby people's *views* about such dimensions affect the nature and outcome of social interaction. No one, it seems, has yet attempted such a cognitively-oriented account. Some specific findings are relevant, however. For example, group members' needs for regulating the information they receive are associated with the centrality of their seating positions (Koneya 1977; Michelini et al. 1976). Of course one needs a framework to understand these and other effects. An example of such a framework is provided by Mullen and colleagues (Mullen et al. 1996), who have carried out empirical work related to prototypes, discussed below. See also Keyton (1991).

Personal attributes, such as age, sex, personality, and abilities, affect how group members interact with each other. In traditional research on problem-solving groups, for example, males tend to be dominant and task-oriented, and females, friendly and expressive. The specific links (if any) are, however, dependent on context and relate to the functions of particular cognitions and behaviors (LaFrance 2001). For additional research on gender stereotypes and differences in behavior based on gender, see Amancio (1989); Arndt et al. (2002); Bourhis et al. (1992); Breakwell (1990); Carpenter (1994); Cook-Huffman (2000); Fiedler et al. (1993); Grant (1993b); Hunsley et al. (1991); James (1993); Keller and Molix (2008); Kenrick et al. (1994); Nicotera and Rancer (1994); Robinson and Reis (1989); Rudman and Goodwin (2004); and Young (1994).

Many findings are partly cognitive in nature, as when a person's status characteristics help to determine "performance expectation states" in a new group. To take a mundane example, persons who are thought likely to have high task ability are urged to contribute more.

An approach using "prototypes" and "exemplars" cannot "replace" the semi-empirical accounts of the effects, on group processes, of various background di-

mensions. It does, however, provide a framework for understanding many of these effects.

Relatively large, diverse groups tend to be coded by exemplars; one thinks of the large, "background" group in terms of various individual group members. Proportionately small, salient groups, however, are coded in terms of prototypes (Rosch 1978); one tends to represent such a salient group in terms of a particularly good image of a "typical group member," and one exaggerates the "family resemblance" among members. Although such stereotyping is characteristic of how minorities are viewed, the requisite salience can be achieved for any group simply by verbal instructions to focus on the group rather than on the individual.

Eliot R. Smith and Zarate (1990), in an experimental study with university undergraduates, found that students who learned about group prototypes before encountering individual group members (as might occur through social learning of a stereotype) engaged in more prototype-based processing, relative to students who encountered group members at the outset.

For additional research on prototypes and exemplars, see C. G. Lord et al. (1991); Mullen et al. (1994).

When participants sorted stick figures into groups by sticking them onto a response sheet, an instruction to pay attention to similarities—rather than to each individual figure—yielded fewer and larger categories and also yielded a simpler dimensional structure in the way the figures clustered (Mullen et al. 1996).

For additional research on categories see Gastardo-Conaco (1991); Sedikides and Ostrom (1988).

Various authors also corroborated and extended Hamilton and Gifford's (1976) finding that illusory correlations—erroneous judgments of the relation between two variables—may be involved in the development of stereotypes (cf. Meiser and Hewstone 2006). In the relevant experiments, participants were shown a series of stimulus items that described a member of one of two groups with either a positive or negative trait. More statements described Group A than Group B, and there were more positive than negative statements (for both groups, in the same ratio). When participants are asked which traits are characteristic of which group, they over-estimate the negative characteristics of the minority group. This is because the smaller group is salient, as are the negative traits (which are themselves in a noticeable minority).

In an experiment using more negative traits than positive ones, however, it is the positive traits that become salient, and participants over-estimate the positive characteristics of the minority group. Also, because people are particularly concerned to identify meaningful differences between social categories, traits relevant to evaluative differentiation are especially susceptible to illusory correlation (Haslam, McGarty, and Brown 1996).

For additional research on illusory correlations and stereotypes, see Haslam, McGarty, Oakes, and Turner (1993); McConnell et al. (1994); see also Chap. 6.

Women are still sometimes stereotyped as being unlikely to excel in task skills. One of the ways of surmounting such a barrier is to combine an early demonstra-

tion of task skill with a cooperative stance and a style that "attracts others' attention to their high-quality solutions" (Shackelford et al. 1996). For further discussion of stereotyping and ameliorative procedures see below, the section on intergroup relations.

Thus in any given group situation, the personal-background characteristics that are salient (typically, but not necessarily, because they represent minorities) tend to yield impressions of stereotyped, homogeneous groups, and respondents tend to exaggerate the presence of salient traits in these groups. However, when there is more variability in the characteristic that is being judged, a person will be less likely to conclude that the group is homogeneous (see Jetten et al. 1998; Kraus et al. 1993; Lambert 1995, 1998; Linville and Fisher 1993).

Notwithstanding personality variables' known links with attitudes, including cognition and behavior—e.g., between authoritarianism and prejudice—traditional personality variables have not, for the most part, helped to explain cognitive bases of small group processes (Hodson and Sorrentino 2001; Reynolds et al. 2001, 2007). In particular contexts, however, personality variables such as individual or collective self-esteem may be affected by (or may affect) other matters such as group-serving attributional biases or a previously expressed norm of fairness (Ellemers et al. 1999; Hunter et al. 2000; Meeres and Grant 1999; Scheepers et al. 2009; Scholz 2004). If one regards cultural and collective social identities as quasi-personality variables and key determinants of self-concept, then links with small group processes and with properties such as group diversity are of course manifold, as discussed throughout this chapter. For additional examples and analysis see, for example: Abrams and Hogg (2004); Christensen et al. (2004); Haenfler (2004); Mullin and Hogg (1999); Swann et al. (2003, 2004).

Eagly et al. (1994) find serious inadequacies with the rating scale and checklist methods that have generally been used to assess the cognitive and affective bases of attitudes toward social groups. They recommend using open-ended questions that ask participants to write down the beliefs they hold and the affects they experience in relation to the attitude object.

For additional research on stereotypes see Anastasio et al. (1997); Anderson (1990); Biernat and Vescio (1993); Fiske (1993, 2008); Gardner et al. (1995); Mackie, Allison, Worth, and Asuncion (1992); Nakanishi and Kameda (2001); Reicher and Levine (1994); Seta and Seta (1993); Spears, Oakes, Ellemers, and Haslam (1997); Wilder and Shapiro (1991). Stereotyping may interact with other variables such as age, for instance when older adults are more familiar with an outgroup's true characteristics (Chasteen 2005), but such links may often simply go unstudied.

For additional research on cognitive aspects of personality and demographic characteristics of members of small groups see Duckitt (1989); Ellemers et al. (1993); Gaskell and Wright (1997); Goodwin and Soon (1994); Grant (1992); C. T. Miller and Felicio (1990); Sekaquaptewa and Thompson (2002); Uleman et al. (2000); Van Knippenberg and Wilke (1992); Van Twuyver and Van Knippenberg (1998); Wilder (1990); Wilder and Shapiro (1989a); Williams and Sternberg (1988).

Social Influence

The effects of others' presence represents a small but important part of research on social influence—both generally and with regard to cognitive mediation. The presence of others may facilitate or inhibit behavior depending on, among other things, how it is perceived and the difficulty of the task behavior (Blumberg et al. 2009, Chap. 3 by Kent; Zajonc 1965). The much-studied effect that the size of a group of bystanders has on people helping others, for instance, is a complex interaction of the social-category memberships (including the sex) of the parties concerned (Levine and Crowther 2008). See also Gilbert and Silvera (1996) for a review of "over-helping" and B. N. Smith et al. (2001) on individual differences in social loafing (doing less when one's share of group effort is not evident).

Turning to the wider literature on cognition and social influence, pioneered by Sherif (1936): Respondents' social identities affect when, and to what extent, they will be influenced by communication from others. For example, students were (not surprisingly) more influenced by a speech against drinking and motoring accidents, as causes of brain damage, when the speaker was identified as belonging to a group working toward road safety than one committed to banning the consumption of alcohol (Haslam, McGarty, and Turner 1996). The effect depended, however, on group identity being made salient—that is, participants being asked beforehand whether they agreed with the position of the speaker's group. "Ingroup salience" led, not to mindless processing of the speaker's message, but to *more* careful consideration of the content. Possibly, outgroup salience for a speaker simply causes a message to be seen as "biased" (as in the landmark work of Hovland et al. 1953).

Although a steadfast minority may come to wield positive influence—provided that the minority are consistent and that the majority attribute this consistency to minority group members' confidence in their position (Moscovici 1980)—this influence is likely only if the minority is seen as part of one's ingroup (David and Turner 1996). Self-categorization represents an important determinant of both minority and majority influence (David and Turner 2001a, b). When a group loses its majority status, however, its members may experience decreased identification with the group (Prislin and Christensen 2005). More generally, social identity and self-categorization may be viewed as motivated processes—as part of a strain to reduce subjective uncertainty, for instance—not just as purely cognitive ones (Hogg 2001). For additional research on cognition and the influence of the minority see Clark and Maass (1988); Crano (2001); Kelly (1990b); Moskowitz (1996); Moskowitz and Chaiken (2001); Sanchez-Mazas et al. (1997).

Indeed, it has been argued that principles from stereotyping (associated with group identity, as discussed below) and from social influence can profitably be integrated (Haslam, Oakes et al. 1996). In two experiments, pre-existing stereotypes about Americans and Australians were bolstered when they were endorsed (rather than challenged) by an ingroup or challenged (rather than endorsed) by an outgroup. As Haslam and colleagues have put it, group identity is generally at the "start" of the influence process. This moreover seems true for both normative and informational

social influence. Social identity even mediates obedience in studies based on Milgram's paradigm (Collins and Ma 2000; Haslam and Reicher 2006; Reicher and Haslam 2006). A variety of studies confirm the importance of perceived ingroup norms as a source of social influence (Fekadu and Kraft 2002; Kugihara 2001; Mackie and Queller 2000; D. T. Miller and Morrison 2009; Terry and Hogg 2001; Van Knippenberg 2000).

For additional studies linking cognition to social influence see Forgas (2001, 2007); Houser and Ham (2004); Kosmitzki et al. (1994); Lee (2004); D. T. Miller and Prentice (1994); Postmes, Spears, Lee, and Novak (2005); Roussiau and Soubiale (1995); Sassenberg and Postmes (2002); Sinclair et al. (1994); Spears et al. (2001); Weiner (1996); Wilson et al. (1998); Zdaniuk and Levine (1996). Persuasion and social influence are of course important determinants of attitude change; see Wood (2000) for a review of research and see Fleming and Petty (2000) for an integration based on "elaboration likelihood." For a review of social influence including cognitive processes see Forgas and Williams (2001).

In sum, social identity associated with background characteristics and personality is implicated in a wide variety of effects related to interpersonal and intergroup perception. The nature of such perceptions may, in turn, favor—or inhibit—conflict or its resolution or both.

Roles (Including Leadership)

Roles in general, and leadership roles in particular, are obviously often crucial in determining the course of almost any conflict and of reconciliation. Hence, the importance in this context for having a general understanding of roles and associated cognitive processes.

Roles are defined primarily by the behavioral rights and duties associated with them. This is true of formal roles (such as leader or secretary), informal ones (joker), and transient dramatic roles (protagonist or audience member), as well as those actually defined by characteristic behavior (e.g., nonconformist). The role organization of a group leads to expectations about the potential contributions and status of a group member and such expectations constitute a cognitive component even within the established study of roles.

For related research, see Cast (2003); da Silva and Günther (2000); Hogg (2005a); Hornsey and Jetten (2004); Thoits (2003); Wolfensberger (1995).

Once people are at least acquainted with one another, their knowledge and expectations about each other's roles and skills ("who is good at what") contribute to "transactive" (group) memory systems. This shared knowledge increases productivity. In studies by Moreland, Argote, and Krishnan (1996), radio assembly teams performed better following group rather than individual training. The advantage was not found if the group members merely watched each other in training, without being able to converse, or if the training was limited to "team-building" (experience with a different task), or if participants were assigned to different groups (re-

shuffled) prior to production testing. In other words, transactive memory systems can be very specific to the particular situation and persons concerned. Park (2008) has shown that even shared cognition about communication rules such as politeness and efficiency impact on satisfaction and productivity.

For additional research on memory and shared knowledge, see Baumeister and Hastings (1997); de la Haye (1990); Hatano and Inagaki (1991).

The study of more formal role differentiation has been concerned especially with leadership roles. In the Lewin et al. (1939) classic laboratory study of leadership styles, democratic leaders were found to elicit better long-term productivity and satisfaction than authoritarian ones. Even prior to that, as well as subsequently, researchers investigated the personality correlates of good leadership (Hare 1976, pp. 278–281) and, more recently, the mediating effects of people's implicit (cognitive) theories of leadership roles. For example, people who identify strongly with a group base leadership perceptions on the group prototypicality of the leader (Fielding and Hogg 1997; Hains et al. 1997; Hogg et al. 1998).

According to Hollander (1958, 1992), leaders who are perceived as conforming and contributing to a group are viewed as being trustworthy and can then "spend" their "idiosyncrasy credits" on being innovative. For an arguably more comprehensive view of leadership attributions, Lord and colleagues (Lord and Maher 1991) find that various information-processing paradigms provide a theoretical and empirical basis for understanding executive leadership; one challenge is to test these views systematically in small-group settings.

A still prominent contemporary approach to the study of leadership, Fiedler's contingency theory, combines cognition and situation. For the Least Preferred Coworker (LPC) scale, respondents are asked to think of the person with whom they have least preferred working and to indicate, for various traits, how positively (high LPC) or negatively (low LPC) they perceive that person. For particularly favorable or unfavorable group situations, leaders with low LPC scores (whom Fiedler assumed task-oriented) have been found to be especially effective. In intermediate situations, high-LPC (social relationship-oriented) leaders are more effective.[2]

People's *perceptions* of a leader's effectiveness may be based, retrospectively, on successful performance outcomes rather than simply on whether a leader matches their prototypical views of a good leader. At least, as Nye and Simonetta's (1996) experiments show, people will make allowances for performance deficits that clearly follow from the situation, such as a leader being obliged to start work with substandard materials. Individual differences are evident and worthy of study, however, as to whether adequate allowances are made, and endure, in complex situations—such as the perceived effects of a large economic stimulus that has helped to prevent financial "meltdown" in a great recession.

---

[2] Recent research, using the System for a Multiple-Level Observation of Groups (SYMLOG) (Bales and Cohen 1979; S. E. Hare and Hare 1996), suggests that Fiedler may have been comparing a social-relationship-oriented leader with one who combines both task and social concerns, since leaders who only emphasize the task—although found in business management teams—are less likely to be found in student populations (Hare et al. 1998).

As the authors mention, outcome is salient in their experimental design. Where it is less salient, leaders are no doubt less judged by results. The point remains, however, that people's judgments play an important part in how a leader is perceived. A person's views about a leader will in turn impact on group productivity and satisfaction—not only directly, but also indirectly through social interaction and the shared views that may emerge. Thus it is often the followers who may determine what constitutes effective leadership (Hogg 2008).

For additional research combining leadership, social identity, and social cognition see Bar-Tal (1998); Choi et al. (2003); De Cremer and Van Vugt (2002); Foddy and Hogg (1999); Garza et al. (1989); Haslam and Platow (2001); Hogg (2005b); Hogg et al. (2006); Hogg and Van Knippenberg (2003); Hogue et al. (2002); Kane et al. (2002); Kohguchi et al. (2002); Meindl (1995); Pavitt et al. (1995); Platow and Van Knippenberg (2001); and Van Vugt and De Cremer (1999).

Relationships

In contrast to research on roles that is usually focused on formal relations, research on "relationships" is concerned with informal relations, usually between pairs, as persons who are acquainted, friends, or even in love. However, as with roles, persons with informal relationships tend to have expectations for the part played by the other person or persons involved in the relationship. Thus the same types of cognitive judgments that are associated with roles also appear in the analysis of relationships.

As Brewer (2008b) has indicated, most of the literatures on close relationships ("dyadic belonging") and social identity ("collective belonging") are separate despite being potentially mutually applicable, a matter requiring investigation. She cites, however, a variety of empirical studies to support the view that—presumably with regard to the relative importance of various features—the relevant cognitive processes of close-dyadic and group relationships *are* separate or orthogonal rather than being systematically potentiating or compensatory; that is (perhaps depending on what is being measured) the profiles of interaction between groups and between close individuals tend to have a nil or low correlation rather than a positive or negative one.

A utility paradigm of self-disclosure suggests that individuals may, as it were, decide to use disclosure as a means of advancing to their goals for potentially close relationships—and, if so, will monitor their developing relationships and, on the basis of positive and negative perceived utilities, decide about self-disclosure accordingly (Omarzu 2000). Laurenceau et al. (2004) have reviewed more generally how cognitive processes are involved in the advancement of intimate relationships; they, too, emphasize self-disclosure and resultant responsiveness as mechanisms in achieving (sometimes brief) connectedness to others. The attributions of causality made by people seem particularly key to understanding the maintenance and deterioration of close relationships (Karney et al. 2001). Honeycutt and Cantrill (2001)

have reviewed typical gender differences in the progression of how developing liaisons are perceived.

International harmony and discord may, in principle, also be subject to mutual monitoring and public self-disclosure, and some supporting evidence derives from the work of Tetlock (1985) and others on integrative complexity; but the investigation of analogous processes largely remains to be done.

For additional work on cognition and close relationships, see Cross and Morris (2003); Fletcher et al. (2000); Fletcher et al. (1999); Foeman and Nance (2002); Gagné and Lydon (2001); Knee et al. (2004); Krahé (2000); Lydon et al. (2008); Medvene et al. (2000); Murray (1999); Noller (2006); Eliot R. Smith et al. (1999).

Obviously, cognitive processes are of importance for human relationships in general; the study of relationships still needs better integration into evolutionary and other paradigms (Reis and Collins 2004).

Interdependence theory may form a basis for understanding the choices that parties may make, based on the rewards and costs to each party that attach not only to each party's actions but also to the joint occurrence of *combinations* of the various parties' choices. The perceived rewards and costs are, however, themselves dependent on the views parties have of one another—i.e., the schemas in their networks of cognitive "structures" (Holmes 2000). It appears that people's social categories and their interpersonal networks are important in identity formation and in their implications for social interaction (Deaux and Martin 2003).

The ability to take on others' perspectives is known to underpin empathic support for others and may help dissolve the perception of outgroups and the adverse orientation towards their members (Ames et al. 2008).

In establishing cultures of peace internationally, social identity and (e.g.) consequent tactfulness and warmth in social interaction seem indeed as important as the literal content of communications (Andersen et al. 2008).

For contemporary research that has been contextualizing the links between cognition and (not necessarily close) relationships see Ely and Roberts (2008); Fitzsimons and Kay (2004); Hahn and Hwang (1999); Hornsey and Jetten (2003); Marrero and Gámez (2004); Metts (2000); J. Miller (2001); Ruscher et al. (2003); Thye et al. (2002); Veríssimo et al. (2003).

For reviews of related research on relationships in general see Aron and Aron (1996); Berscheid (1994); Campbell (1993); Dindia (1997); Fiske and Haslam (1998); Fletcher (1993); Gudykunst and Hammer (1988); Hassebrauck (1995); Hogg and Hains (1996); Hogg, Hardie, and Reynolds (1995); Kelley (1997); Radley (1991); Tesser et al. (1988); Thompson and Holmes (1996); Townsend (1993); Whisman and Allan (1996).

For related work see also Codol et al. (1989); Dudkiewicz (1991); Ellemers and Van Rijswijk (1997); Gao (1996); Hogg and Hardie (1992); Kramer (1996); Kunda and Nisbett (1988); McCullough and Rachal (1998); Moya (1998); Pheterson (1995); Prentice et al. (1994); Steinfeld (1998); Sze (1990); Triandis et al. (1988).

Social Interaction Including Group Decision Making

Larson and Christensen (1993) note that social cognition occurs in every kind of group problem-solving situation. The cognitive activity involves the acquisition, storage, transmission, manipulation, and use of information for the purpose of creating a group-level intellective product. Such "products" may, for example, relate to harmonious relationships or to dealing with fractious interludes.

Some researchers have paid direct attention to the discourse used by group members in social interaction. Oyserman and Packer (1996), for instance, maintain that social identity and the self are essentially maintained by language, broadly defined. They give examples such as the contrast between what it "means" to be a good student in a blue-collar community in Michigan, or being male or female in inner-city Chicago. As if to support this view experimentally, Steele has found that women and people of color underperform if relevant negative parts of their social identities are made salient (DeAngelis 1996). For instance, black students did worse than whites on a difficult verbal test when told they were taking a test that diagnosed verbal ability. No such differences, due to "stereotype threat," were found when the test was described as a "problem-solving procedure." According to Cadinu et al. (2006), individuals with internal Locus of Control beliefs, although usually performing well, may be particularly susceptible to stereotype threat.

For additional research on social identity see Carbaugh (1996); Dietz-Uhler and Murrell (1998); Lorenzi-Cioldi (1995); Matsui (1990); McKillop et al. (1992); Oyserman and Packer (1996); Smith-Lovin (2003).

The discovery of some previously unknown stigma regarding another person can also change the content of a discussion in a group. Ruscher and Hammer (1994) observed discussion of pairs of university undergraduates to note how a negative revelation of some stigma would disrupt the dyads' shared impressions of the other person. The disrupted dyads now took time to question each other about how the new information would alter their previous impressions. In contrast, when groups discussed controversial topics using an electronic group support system (a form of computer mediated communication), without knowledge of relevant social characteristics of the members, biases of attention and influence were eliminated (Bhappu et al. 1997). Additional evidence for the critical role of social identity in maintaining stereotypes is covered in the section below on intergroup relations. Also below is a discussion of computer-mediated communication.

An interdependence perspective, described above in the context of relationships, also helps one understand the "mutual interconnections" in small-group communication and people's expectations of each other's goals (Holmes 2002) including emotional components (Lawler 2003) and the rewards and costs related to parties' social identities.

In their overview of social identity and communication in small groups, Hogg and Tindale (2005) suggest that identity as manifest in social norms plays a crucial role in many important aspects of social influence, in fact spanning many of the topics covered in this chapter. Indeed the interpretation of many key aspects of iden-

tity—age, gender, and authority to name just a few—may typically be established during social interaction (Mokros 2003). This is almost a truism but provides a framework to help, for example, in understanding and analyzing intergroup perceptions and conflicts.

Moreover, identity helps more generally to explain the spread and adoption of ideas and behaviors through communication in a social network, particularly once a "critical mass" for new adoptions is reached (Blume and Durlauf 2006, using economic mathematical models). "Diffusion of innovation" has very broad applicability to phenomena as diverse as the spread of new agricultural techniques and machinery to ideologies leading to inter-group conflict.

Both the origins and amelioration of conflict seem often to be intertwined with communication processes and how they are perceived. Krauss and Morsella (2006) elucidate these links in terms of four paradigms: encoding/decoding (e.g., improve these by reducing "noise"), intentionalist (e.g., conflict may arise because figures of speech such as Khrushchev's "we will bury you" are taken over-literally), perspective taking, and dialogic (value of interactively cooperative communication).

Even familiar communicators may be viewed as having traits that they have merely described as being present in others (Mae et al. 1999). Hence it may, for example, sometimes be important for mediators to emphasize that they do not necessarily share the views and characteristics which they describe.

Singh and Singh (1995) observed four-member group discussions and discovered that participants were more likely to remember accurately statements made by themselves than those made by others. We conclude that for reviews of the literature, do not take our word for it. Take your own word if accurate recall is important for the discussion!

For additional research on social identity and group decisions see M. E. Turner and Pratkanis (1998). For a discussion of the part played by cognitive factors in information processing and interpersonal communication see Wyer and Gruenfeld (1995).

Some of the current approaches to understanding social interaction emphasize nonverbal as well as verbal communication; some are concerned with exchange and equity processes, some with computer-mediated communication, and some with phases of group development. We now turn to these topics, and then conclude this section more generally with material on group decision-making.

Nonverbal Communication According to Patterson (1996), theories of nonverbal social interaction (including nonverbal cues linked to verbal communication) invoke both compensation (e.g., turning away if somebody sits too close) and reciprocation (e.g., "turning toward" if a particularly attractive person deliberately sits close). The nonverbal adjustments are mediated by cognitions; expectations are based on labeling, scripts, and attributions about others and about the social interaction.

In his research on nonverbal social interaction, Patterson, to whose work we shall shortly return below, has placed some major social-cognition work into a truly social context. Trope's (Trope and Gaunt 1999) two-stage paradigm of person perception involves (a) an identification process (information is sorted into attribution-

relevant categories) followed by (b) a dispositional inference process. Thus, in an experiment where emotion on an actor's face is ambiguously shown: ambiguous calmness (initial perceived category) was seen as less fearful (dispositional) when it was in reaction to a horror film, a Doberman pinscher, or a swarm of bees (Jones 1990). (Thus, presumably you would be seen as especially calm if you display even an ambiguously calm expression if you happen to be viewing a horror film in the company of a dog while being attacked by a swarm of bees!) Similar situational determinants of person perception would be expected to apply to, say, peacekeeping.

Hilton (1995) also records that the social rules governing communication require the listener to go beyond the information given in the message, contrary to the assumption that rational people should operate only on the information explicitly given in judgment tasks. This would seem to support the idea that it is usually better if you "smile when you say that."

Gilbert added a third, fine-tuning stage, to Trope's two stages, which is, however, dependent on adequate time and effort. People may consider context in order to go beyond the dispositional inferences that follow from somebody's explicit verbal content. In one experiment (Gilbert et al. 1992), participants listened to a "dating game" in which male contestants responded in kind to potential female "dates" who espoused either "traditional" or "modern" views about sex roles. Control participants adjusted the face-value disposition (that the male contestants really held traditional or modern views) to take account of the likelihood that the contestants were attempting ingratiation. Experimental participants, who heard an acoustically degraded version of the tape, gleaned as much factual information as the control participants but had to spend so much energy in listening that they failed to fine-tune their attributions and regarded the "traditional" male participants as being genuinely more traditional than the "modern" ones.

Patterson (1996) has demonstrated similar processes when the participants themselves are engaged in social interaction. "Actors" (actually research participants) in a dyad, if asked to make an unfavorable impression, were especially inaccurate in their impressions about the other person and about the other person's impression of themselves. According to Patterson, the lessened accuracy is due to the experimental participants needing to spend energy on the unaccustomed role of giving an unfavorable impression. It does seems possible that the "unfavorable" actors varied in how successfully they put across their intended role and moreover were simply too embarrassed to pay proper attention to the other person's response. (If so, the main point, that perceptual fine-tuning can be impaired by distraction, would still stand.) In theory, the same findings (low accuracy) should apply if the participant's role were varied in other ways—especially high or low dominance or conformity, for example, or mediating in an unfamiliar dispute. It would be enlightening to learn whether less accuracy would indeed be found in such cases. Patterson gives a variety of other excellent suggestions for further research on the "live" study of cognition in social interaction—such as procedures for manipulating and assessing the demands of person perception and of behavior management.

For additional research on perception of nonverbal behavior, see Patterson (1999); Perowne and Mansell (2002); S. W. Smith (1995).

For additional research on attributions, see Darley and Huff (1990); Jones et al. (1989); Thakkar and Kanekar (1989); Wittenbaum and Stasser (1995).

Distributed Information Systems One interesting question about social interaction—especially important within, e.g., conflicting cultures, policy-making groups, and negotiating teams—is whether information "flows evenly" through a social system, and, if not, what are the sources of possible hindrance. Some "filters" seem straightforward, such as interpersonal evaluations being more likely to be discussed reciprocally among friends, and people being more likely to be told the positive things about themselves rather than the negative (Blumberg 1972).

Less obvious is the potentially important information that group members hold but tell to nobody. Transactive memory systems—including the productivity advantages of knowledge about who is good at what—were discussed above, in the section on roles. A perhaps more general picture of groups' "distributed information systems" has been provided by Wittenbaum and Stasser (1996). One of the main findings is that information that is *already* commonly held is the most likely to be shared—indeed shared repeatedly—in the course of discussions. For previously acquainted groups, however, and as a discussion becomes prolonged, individually held information gradually gets put forward—though decisions may still be based on the primacy of early communications emphasizing already-common information.

Exceptionally, although group discussion tends to polarize people's views of another group such as to increase stereotypic appraisal, if counter-stereotypic information is concentrated in just *one* ingroup member, that information is especially likely to be discussed and to influence views of the other group (Brauer et al. 2001). Presumably such counter-stereotypic movement would (in general) facilitate harmony and help to defuse potential conflicts.

Individually held information, which otherwise is less likely to be repeated even if mentioned, is used more in groups with known expert-role assignment. Status (especially leadership) and gender may also affect whether information is used in decision-making. For instance, leaders may be more likely than other members to repeat previously unshared information. If a group is coordinated even tacitly—e.g., if a task is said (by an experimenter) to represent a group decision—members are more likely to recall and draw on others' presumed areas of expertise, thus helping to provide successful coordination for the task.

However, "because the research to date has focused on relatively benign factors ..., we do not know how groups manage information under conditions in which some members can control the need satisfaction of other members, member motives differ from collective goals," or the group is under threat or faces competition (Wittenbaum and Stasser 1996, p. 27). One suspects that these negative factors would undermine the coordination of information. As Zander (1977) has concluded, disparity between individual and group goals has a particularly strong association with low productivity and satisfaction, partly because of poor communication.

For additional research on the relationship between cognitive factors and communication, see De Grada et al. (1999); Leik et al. (1999); Mallubhatla et al. (1991);

McPhee (1995); Pittam (1999); Riva and Galimberti (1998); Seibold et al. (1996); M. E. Turner et al. (1992); Van Ginkel and Van Knippenberg (2009).

For related work, as found in a substantial and diverse literature, see also Andrews (2000); Ball and Giles (1988); Bavelas and Coates (1992); Beck and Orth (1995); Bonito (2002); Burgoon et al. (1996); Cast et al. (1999); Chiu and Khoo (2003); Dietz-Uhler (1999); Douglas (1990); Dugosh et al. (2000); Eliasoph and Lichterman (2003); Georgakopoulou (2002); Hall and Bernieri (2001); Haslam, Jetten, O'Brien, and Jacobs (2004); Houston (1993); Huguet et al. (1998); Hummon (2000); Jones (2001); Kärreman and Alvesson (2001); Kellermann (1995); Lea and Spears (1991); Lesch (1994); Maass et al. (1995); MacGeorge (2001); Mackie, Gastardo-Conaco, and Skelly (1992); Makimura and Yamagishi (2003); Martin and Anderson (1997); Nettle and Dunbar (1997); Nishida (1992); Otten and Mummendey (2002); Parks and Cowlin (1996); Paxton and Moody (2003); Rohde and Stockton (1992); Rouquette (1996); Rubini and Semin (1994); Samter (2002); Samter et al. (1989); Sanders (1991); Santarsiero et al. (1995); Schneider (1994); Schwarz et al. (1991); Sinclair et al. (2005); Strauss (1959, reprinted 1997); Stürmer and Simon (2004); Ting-Toomey (1993); Todorov et al. (2000); Urada and Miller (2000); Vonk (1999); Walther (1997); White and Watkins (2000); Wigboldus et al. (1999); Wiggins (1991); Zucchermaglio et al. (2000).

Equity Kimberly (1997) has developed a particularly thorough theoretical integration of group processes covering social norms (such as equality and proportionality in the distribution of rewards) and how these tend to be aligned with the nature of the group (for instance, "primary" egalitarian social groups and "secondary" task ones). One of the main impacts of equity research has to do with people's presumptions (cognitions) that rewards are, or ought to be, equitably distributed.

For additional research on equity, see Hassebrauck (1991); Matsuura (1991); Wagstaff and Perfect (1992).

Computer-Mediated Communication (CMC) In a laboratory study comparing conflict in CMC and face-to-face groups (who were given a task to carry out), more conflict about relationships and processes emerged on the first day in the CMC groups, but the differences disappeared by days two and three; task-based conflict was the same from day one (Hobman et al. 2002). It would be worth exploring the generality of such a finding and establishing just which properties of CMC contribute to any such temporary conflict—for instance, restricted communication modalities, enhanced information sharing, or relative anonymity.

Some forms of social action, which may resolve or foment conflict (or both), are clearly rendered more feasible by electronic communication such as internet-based calls to (online or direct) social action (Postmes and Brunsting 2002) or text messaging to mobilize people for collective action (cf. Montiel and Christie 2008).

Using a social identity perspective and text-analyzing software to study email communication among 140 students taking a voluntary ungraded computerized statistics course, Postmes, Spears, and Lea (1999, 2000) established that communication norms emerged from the group's interaction with regard both to the form and content of communications. That is, the norms were socially constructed and locally

defined, and conformity to these increased over time. Communication outside the group was moreover governed by different norms. It would be worth exploring further the extent to which these processes differ cross-culturally and between CMC and face-to-face groups—and whether such norms have particular useful (or suboptimal) properties among groups devoted to peace, justice, social action, and conflict resolution.

For additional relevant research on CMC, see Amaral and Monteiro (2002); Bagozziet al. (2007); Baker (2001); Barreto and Ellemers (2002a); Caspi and Blau (2008); Douglas and McGarty (2001); Lee (2006); McKenna and Bargh (2000); Michinov et al. (2004); Postmes, Spears, Sakhel, and De Groot (2001); Riva (2002); Riva and Galimberti (2001); Sassenberg (2002); Sassenberg and Boos (2003); Spears et al. (2002); Taylor and MacDonald (2002); Toranzo et al. (2004); Waskul (2003). The study of CMC, including cognitive and conflict-resolving aspects, is also particularly relevant to organizations and teams (see Chaps. 4 and 5).

Group Development The nature of social interaction, and how group members are perceived, may of course vary in the course of a group's development. Worchel (1996, 1998), who summarizes various paradigms for group development, has found that groups progress from formation, through decisions to join, and then into ongoing overlapping cycles. A "cycle" consists of discontent, a precipitating event, group identification, group productivity, individuation, and decay. In Worchel's research—based on field studies of two "rival" universities as well as laboratory experiments—the typical self-perception of being a prototypical group member usually occurs only in early phases of group development. Perception of ingroup homogeneity is found only in middle and later stages, as individuals have or establish their distinctiveness (or simply have more information about the group?). As a group develops, perceived outgroup homogeneity decreases, though the content of outgroup stereotypes tends to remain the same. Over time (e.g., across lab group meetings, though the same could hold true within a single meeting), the familiar preference for cooperation with ingroup and competition with outgroup reverses. Groups tend to be most productive at their mid-life.

Worchel's description is similar to that of Bales and Strodtbeck (1951) on phases in group problem solving. Worchel, along with most other analysts of group development, is describing *process* rather than *content*. In his analysis one does not know the content that the group is being productive about. Thus it would be useful to compare his categories with some form of content analysis—or a more content-oriented classification system such as functional analysis (Hare 1983), which suggests that—both in reality and in members' perceptions—groups will often be concerned successively with their meaning or purpose, the resources needed, roles, task action, and evaluation.

Worchel notes that many studies have used cognition and minimal groups as an endpoint rather than also covering the relevant group dynamics (see below, the discussion of intergroup processes). To complement such experiments, he suggests analyzing videotapes of ongoing laboratory and field groups (even brief ones) to elucidate the "triggers" of group development.

Group Decision Making One of the crucial processes involving social interaction is group decision making. In a typical well-established finding, called "choice shift," not only do groups tend to converge on a relatively narrow range of views, but also the focus of that range typically moves to a more extreme response, in the same direction as the group's initial view. Explanations for such shifts have focused on two main processes, both of them partly perceptual: the *informational influence* of *persuasive arguments* and the *normative influence of social comparison*. Both of these processes are inherently cognitive, and have been invoked in a variety of contexts in the present review—particularly with regard to the importance of social identity in determining the nature and extent of influence (see, for instance, the discussion above of Haslam, McGarty, and Turner's work (1996) in the section on social influence). For a discussion of the theory of comparison processes, see Jasso (1993).

How a task is perceived may of course affect the way group members use information presented to them. A study by Wittenbaum, Stasser, and Merry (1996) provides experimental evidence for the tacit coordination of task behavior as a function of the perceived goal of a task and others' expected areas of expertise.

In an effort to simplify the cognitive task of problem identification and problem solving by sets of individuals, the "Nominal Group Technique" was developed, in the 1970s, for sets of individuals whose opinions are combined without having face-to-face meetings (see Chap. 6 for consideration of research by Tajfel and colleagues). In this way, there was the hope of eliminating or minimizing problems such as non-productive digressions or hostile arguments. Fox (1989) describes the method and offers suggestions for its implementation and selective use.

Post-conflict forgiveness and empathy can be positively associated with salience of common ingroup identity and negatively with one-sided ingroup identity, as found by researchers in Chile and Northern Ireland (Noor et al. 2008). Such effects presumably follow at least in part from informal social interaction and decision-making.

Many researchers view social identification as central to group consensus. For reviews, see Curseu (2003) and Kaplan and Wilke (2001). Relevant research covers matters as diverse as the acceptance of political decisions (Leung, Tong, and Lind 2007), the effects of group salience and accountability on expressed attitudes (Joanne R. Smith et al. 2007), and cooperating or not in dealing with (often laboratory-based) social dilemmas (Dawes and Messick 2000, in a special issue on diplomacy and psychology; see also Ando 1999; Bicchieri 2002; De Cremer and Van Dijk 2002; De Cremer et al. 2008; De Cremer and Van Vugt 1999; Jackson 2002a; Eliot R. Smith et al. 2003; Van Vugt and De Cremer 2002).

For cognitive aspects of group decision-making see also Beck and Fisch (2000); Dietz-Uhler (1996); Hodson and Sorrentino (1997); Joanne R. Smith et al. (2007); Testé (2001); M. E. Turner and Pratkanis (1997); Tyler et al. (1996).

The present "tour" of cognitive aspects of basic small group research is now complete with functioning, interacting groups present "on stage." In most areas, "classical" findings involved cognitive processes, and the cognition-behavior links have become increasingly articulated. Several significant applied topics complete the picture: Conflict Resolution (already considered implicitly in the material above

as well as in the other sections that follow), Organizations, Intergroup Relations, and Therapy Groups.

Conflict Resolution

Research about conflict resolution, including some cognitive processes, is covered in Chap. 1. Some publications have, however, been devoted particularly to cognitive aspects of conflict management.

Representative of those focusing on social identity are works by Auerbach (2005); Brewer and Yuki (2007); Tyler and Blader (2001, 2003). Depending on context and values, self-affirmation and heightened salience of an identity can increase tolerance in negotiations (Cohen et al. 2007).

Other works emphasize cognitive aspects of: cooperation and competition (Georgiou et al. 2007), conflict strategy (Sorenson et al. 1999), interdependence and social dilemmas (Chen et al. 2007; Morrison 1999), and negotiation (Barsness and Bhappu 2004; Druckman et al. 2009), including findings that shared identity may arise from a variety of intragroup and intergroup processes and can facilitate multiparty negotiations (Swaab et al. 2008).

See also several of the chapters in Deutsch et al.'s (2006) handbook, which covers many of the foregoing topics as well as, more generally, cognitive subjects such as framing and judgmental biases.

Organizations

Allard-Poesi (1998) notes that the cognitive approach to the study of organizations assumes the existence of collective representation in organizations. A collective representation is viewed as being related to the socio-cognitive dynamics occurring between group members. Communication and influence processes are critical to the construction of a collective representation.

One fairly well known form of discrimination—with a bearing on how groups function in organizations—is the tendency to attribute the success of own group (or of self) dispositionally to skill, but to attribute success of other group (or other person) externally. Two main varieties of explanation for this bias, according to Forsyth and Kelley (1996), are "hot" motivational theories (such as a self-serving bias) and "cold" cognitive ones. As an example of the latter, people are better at remembering expectation-confirming agencies. In an experiment using six-person configurations (each having two groups of three people each), feedback about individual "performance" (positive, neutral, or negative) was varied independently of the (sub-) group's "success" or "failure" (Forsyth and Kelley 1996). In a set of results mainly supporting a heuristic (cognitive) explanation of bias: (a) "successful" members of "successful" groups claimed more personal responsibility for the

outcome (compared with members of "unsuccessful" groups). (b) Equally, they also attributed more responsibility to their group (including the other, less successful members) and (c) all the members of the "unsuccessful" groups typically assigned more responsibility to their two fellow members than to themselves. Women who "failed" had particularly low satisfaction with themselves and their group.

Group processes also apply to larger, more formal entities. The organization is part of the group's "external system," which also includes the society and the environment, thus bringing one full circle to the consideration of background variables. The social-psychological principles that apply to ordinary group processes also apply to behavior in organizations. Most of the effective systems for implementing organizational change still involve face-to-face interaction (or the electronic equivalent) in small groups.

Indeed, while a fairly large proportion of small groups articles in social psychology journals now emphasize intergroup relations and beliefs, intragroup research (on group performance, for instance) has become increasingly well covered in organizational psychology journals (Ferdman 1995; Sanna and Parks 1997).

For organizational settings in particular—which clearly would extend to political and social action contexts—one creative development in the study of social interaction blends case histories with systematic analysis. Donnellon (1996) shows how to prepare a profile derived from a team's history and discourse in order to assess goal attainment and foster improvement. A "cross-functional team" might include, for example, specialists in engineering, manufacturing, quality assurance, and marketing, who voluntarily convene in order to speed the realization of a particularly promising new product. To be successful, such a team might typically and prominently show group identification, interdependence, low social distance, conflict management (constructive confrontation), and effective negotiation. "Identification," to take one example, is manifest in discourse samples where "we" and "our" refer mainly to the team.

One might hope that Donnellon's work could be replicated with larger samples than four companies (including one organization with very successful teams and three with more problematic ones). Truly excellent teams are, however, rather rare so, as regards this particular research, one must for now be satisfied with Donnellon's rich detail and her precise procedures for assessing and improving team quality. Some fragments of situational interactions among factors are already known. For instance, it is only when task interdependence is high that increasing group control over decisions may result in better performance (Liden et al. 1997).

The positive processes and outcomes that Donnellon describes actually increase member satisfaction rather than being at its cost. Although performance goals are not particularly cognitive in nature, team members' *perceptions*—as manifest in Donnellon's discourse analysis—are clearly crucial to the outcomes.

For managing diversity in teams, others make recommendations similar to those of Donnellon. Brewer (1995) suggests emphasizing common team goals and attending carefully to the compositional design of teams. Northcraft, Polzer, Neale, and Kramer (1995) introduce the language of negotiation into the dialogue concerning diversity. Negotiation has also been found to influence leader-member exchange

and role differentiation. In an experiment with groups engaged in an organizational problem-solving task, McClane (1991a, b) found that groups whose members experienced higher levels of negotiating latitude tended to have higher overall satisfaction with the leader, the task, and the co-workers.

With regard to diversity in conceptions of a work group's culture, Gruenfeld and Hollingshead (1993) report that, over time, group members become increasingly able or motivated to generate or recognize diversity among their perspectives and to work at incorporating one another's perspectives when constructing shared conceptualizations.

Environmental concerns and globalization provide an opportunity for innovation incorporating a variety of perspectives but individuals' feelings of security and belonging may also be threatened, requiring measures designed to bolster positive outcomes (Van der Zee and Paulus 2008).

For an overview of social cognition in organizations, see Klimoski and Donahue (2001).

For research on work teams, see Hinsz (2004); Lacey and Gruenfeld (1999). See also Dimmock et al. (2005); Driskell et al. (1999, 2000); Rentsch and Woehr (2004); Gundlach et al. (2006); Miles and Kivlighan (2008).

For work on both social identity and team work, see Cicero et al. (2007); Lembke and Wilson (1998).

For additional research on social identity see also Cameira et al. (2002); Dru and Constanza (2003); Elsbach and Bhattacharya (2001); Fielding and Hogg (2000); Platow et al. (2003); Pratkanis and Turner (1999); Postmes and Jetten (2006).

For research with an emphasis on creativity, see Adarves et al. (2006); Bunce and West (1995); Hargadon (1999); Hinkle et al. (1998). See also Bornman and Mynhardt (1991). For other research on cognitive aspects of groups in organizations, see DeSanctis and Poole (1997); Earley (1997); Harrison and Bazerman (1995); Tyler (1997).

Intergroup Relations

The analysis of intergroup cooperation, prejudice, and stereotyping has (like research on leadership) embraced both personality and situation. Some of the research on group stereotyping has already been discussed above in the section on personal background variables. Of course stereotyping may also depend on degree of interdependence and other aspects of social relationships (Bogart et al. 1999).

For research that supports the tendency to evaluate aspects of one's own ingroup group more favorably than some outgroup (ingroup bias), see Abelson et al. (1998); Blanz et al. (1995a, b); Crocker and Luhtanen (1990); Islam and Hewstone (1993b); Jetten et al. (1997a, b); Lindeman and Koskela (1994); Long and Manstead (1997); Long et al. (1994); Maass et al. (1996); Marques, Yzerbyt, and Leyens (1988); Marques, Yzerbyt, and Rijsman (1988); Perez and Mugny (1998); Shah et al. (1998); Yoshida and Kubota (1994).

Ingroup bias has also been associated with the tendency to view one's own group as less homogeneous than an outgroup. The tendency to "level" differences within

"fields", especially distant ones, and to sharpen differences across fields (a) can be demonstrated literally as a perceptual phenomenon (e.g., by a color gradient across a single visual field which is then divided by a fence-like line into two seemingly homogeneous sub-fields of different hues) and (b) can be argued from an evolutionary perspective in terms of human survival via social groups—cf. maximal distinctiveness theory (Brewer and Roccas 2001; Brown and Zagefka 2005). To extend the analogy a little further: a more distant field (analogous to an outgroup?) may literally be seen as more homogeneous. The grass might literally look greener on the far side of the fence! Indeed, Simon (1992b) notes that both ingroup and outgroup homogeneity effects can occur. He suggests that the perception of relative homogeneity is related to: (a) the minority or majority position of the ingroup, (b) the relevance of the specific attributes or dimensions in question to group members' social identities, and (c) the stereotypes prevailing in society at large. For examples and additional research, see Brewer and Weber (1994); Brown and Smith (1989); Kelly (1988; 1990a, b); Marques et al. (1998); Mullen and Goethals (1990); Sedikides and Ostrom (1993); Simon (1992a; 1993).

For scales developed to measure the extent of ingroup identification and its cognitive and affective components, see Ellemers et al. (1988); Hinkle et al. (1989); Karasawa (1991).

Social perception, at least, is also subject to sometimes marked individual differences. Prejudice is still found to be associated with authoritarianism; that is, clearly some variance is attributable to personality. Indeed, needs for cognitive economy and for self-enhancement are both associated with components of prejudice, namely with social categorization and ingroup favoritism (Stangor and Thompson 2002).

According to the "contact hypothesis" prejudice, regardless of its level in a particular individual or group, can typically be ameliorated by intergroup contact having the following four properties: inter-group social interaction, on an equal-status basis, positively sanctioned by authority, and with a common goal (Allport 1954). Various contemporary analyses of these effects invoke Social Identity Theory—people will change their beliefs and their behavior in the direction of the beliefs and behavior that are seen as prototypical for those social "categories" with which they themselves "identify." For a discussion of "prototypicality" in relation to the analysis of category structure and representation see Oakes et al. (1998).

Spears (2008) has argued that intergroup discrimination and conflict are not an inevitable result of social identity but in effect are ameliorated when a social system is perceived as legitimate. Various communication and other processes facilitate resolution of conflict between different social-identity groups (Stephan 2008a, b). Also, positive intergroup attitudes emerge from fostering appreciation of the value of cultural diversity (Crisp 2008). Moreover—in findings reminiscent of the classical negative correlation between authoritarianism and education level—processes that diminish hostility toward one outgroup tend to be associated with generalized "deprovincialization" and social identity complexity (Brewer 2008a; Pettigrew 1997; see also Brewer 2007a, b).

Prejudice typically stems from ignorance and anxiety, and the four properties of the contact hypothesis work to *de-categorize* group members, shifting respondents' impressions from being based on ingroup/outgroup stereotypes into being

more individualized ("exemplar") impressions (Gaertner, Rust, Dovidio, Bachman, and Anastasio 1996). In an earlier laboratory study by Gaertner and colleagues (as described by Gaertner, Rust et al. 1996), the members of paired three-person groups showed less bias in favor of their ingroup if they were induced to conceive of the six persons as individuals or as a six-person group per se rather than as "two subgroups of three persons." Induced perceptions were effected by seating patterns or by inter-team cooperative interaction, both of which were effective. A further study by Gaertner, Rust et al. (1996) extended the findings into a field setting, a multi-cultural secondary school. A "conditions of contact" index, with short sub-scales (derived through factor analysis) was successfully used to predict (a) bias and (b) mediation (of bias) as a function of whether students perceived themselves as members of: one group, equal groups, separate groups, or individuals. The conditions of intergroup contact were found to achieve their favorable effects of de-categorization through various direct and indirect mechanisms.

Findings such as these support the Common Ingroup Identity Model, which proposes that negative intergroup bias—in evaluations, self-disclosure, helping, and other attributes—can be reduced if members conceive of themselves as being in one common group, for at least part of their social identity (Dovidio et al. 1997). For a review, see Gaertner and Dovidio (2005). Dovidio and Gaertner (1996) also discuss practical means for achieving this goal. Likewise, Schmid et al. (2009) have confirmed the association between complex views of social identity and favorable outgroup attitudes in (for instance) Northern Ireland. Effects can be subtle however; comparing a standard to one's self, for instance, tends to increase assimilation or commonness but comparing one's self to a standard may underline the contrast (Mussweiler 2001). For additional research on processes for challenging stereotypes and cultural biases, see Rittner and Nakanishi (1993).

If, however, persons have peripheral membership status in a desirable ingroup, outgroup derogation may be elevated if these persons believe that other ingroup members might learn of their responses (Noel et al. 1995).

When it comes to remembering, people are more likely to remember information related to a stereotype, either pro or con, than unrelated facts (Cano et al. 1991; Fyock and Stangor 1994).

For research on variables related to perceptions of ingroup and outgroup homogeneity, see Bardach and Park (1996); Doosje et al. (1995); Haslam, Oakes, Turner, and McGarty (1995); Haslam, Turner, Oakes, McGarty, and Reynolds (1998); Haslam, Turner, Oakes, Reynolds et al. (1998); Jetten et al. 2004; Kofta (1995); Lorenzi-Cioldi (1993); McGarty et al. (1995); McHoskey and Miller (1994); Ostrom et al. (1993); Park (1990); Reicher and Levine (1994); Simon (1990); Simon and Hamilton (1994); Simon, Micki et al. (1990); Simon and Mummendey (1990); Simon and Pettigrew (1990); Spears, Doosje, and Ellemers (1997); Stroessner and Mackie (1992); Vivian and Berkowitz (1992); Wagner and Ward (1993); Yzerbyt et al. (1998).

For additional research on contact and cooperation, see Brewer (1996); Gaertner et al. (1990, 1994). For research on cognitive aspects of coalitions, bargaining, and games see Bouas and Komorita (1996); Camerer (1988); Coleman (1989); Croson and Marks (1998); Gifford and Hine (1997); Hale et al. (1991); Hardin (1995); Insko et al. (1992); Jin et al. (1996); Kerr (1992); Kiyonari and Yamagishi (1996); Kramer

et al. (1993, 1995); Marcus-Newhall et al. (1993); Price (1989); Sidanius (1993); Tetlock (1997); Wetherell (1996a); Wit and Wilke (1992); Yamaguchi (1991a, b). See also Brown et al. (2001); Helbing (1996); Jopling (1993); Karasawa (1995); Mamali (1988); Masulli (1993); O'Connor (1997); Welbourne and Cable (1995). See also Chap. 1, section on facilitating cooperation.

Some meta-analytic integration of the results of research continues to support the phenomenon of ingroup bias (Mullen, Brown, and Smith 1992; see also Platow et al. 1990). High-status groups tend to be more biased, although this effect is moderated by several variables—according to a meta-analysis by Bettencourt et al. (2001). To the extent that such analyses are based on research using the "minimal group paradigm"—where, for example, participants may be assigned to groups according to the color of a paper pinned to their shirt without actual group interaction—some questions have been raised about the value of the findings based on this research design (Rabbie and Schot 1990). Jetten et al. (1996) also comment on the fact that different results can be obtained from observations of minimal groups and natural groups. For additional research using the minimal group paradigm, see Bourhis (1994); Diehl (1989); Finchilescu (1994); Gagnon and Bourhis (1996); Harmon-Jones et al. (1996); Hartstone and Augoustinos (1995); Hong and Harrod (1988); Mlicki (1988); Morales et al. (1998); Platow et al. (1997).

As Brewer (1999) reminds us, ingroup favoritism and prejudice against the outgroup are fairly independent variables, and much outgroup discrimination follows, for instance, from partiality towards own group rather than animosity towards other groups.

How a group's values and issues are perceived by itself and other groups may of course be as important as perception of the group itself. Fiske's Relational Models Theory (Fiske and Haslam 2005) suggests that most inter-party relations are based on one (or at least one at a time) of four norms: free sharing, a pecking order or hierarchy, equity over time, or market pricing. Tetlock and colleagues (Tetlock et al. 2000, 2004) have analyzed proscribed social cognitions—for instance, offering money to shift a "sacred" belief may be counter-productive where tactful mutual compromise might succeed. (For instance, offering Iran a quid-pro-quo for abandoning its nuclear ambitions is, counter-intuitively, seen by knowledgeable participants as being more likely to succeed than offering the quid-pro-quo *plus* a substantial monetary side payment.)

For a variety of other factors affecting the interrelationships among prejudice, cognition, and intergroup processes see Aviram (2009); Bizman and Yinon (2001); Brewer (2001); Crisp and Abrams (2008); Crocker and Garcia (2009); Eidelman and Biernat (2003); Eller and Abrams (2003); Fiske et al. (1999); Gaertner and Insko (2000); Grieve and Hogg (1999); Jonas (2009); Kaiser et al. (2009); Kessler and Mummendey (2008); Mackie and Smith (2002); Nagda and Zúñiga (2003); Petersen and Blank (2003); Reynolds, Turner, and Haslam (2000); Tarrant and North (2004); Vescio et al. (2004).

For additional research and reviews of research on social identity and intergroup relations see an overview by J. C. Turner and Reynolds (2004) and see also Arcuri and Cadinu (1997); Bodenhausen et al. (1998); Branscombe and Ellemers (1998); Branscombe and Wann (1994); Branscombe et al. (1993); Brewer (1993); DeRidder et al. (1992); Brown and Capozza (2006); Doane (1997); Doise (1988); Dovidio, Gaertner, and Validzic (1998); Dovidio, Isen, Guerra, Gaertner, and Rust (1998); El-

lemers et al. (1997); Gurin and Markus (1988); Harwood, Terry, and White (1995); Hogg and Abrams (1988); Hogg, Terry, and White (1995); Huddy and Virtanen (1995); Jackson et al. (1996); Kramer and Messick (1998); Lee and Ottati (1995); Mehra et al. (1998); Murrell (1998); Ng (1989); Perdue et al. (1990); Rabbie and Horwitz (1988); Rabbie et al. (1989); Schiffmann and Wicklund (1988); Sidanius et al. (1994); Simon et al. (1995); J. C. Turner and Oakes (1989); Van Knippenberg and Ellemers (1993); Wagner and Zick (1990); Wellen et al. (1998); Worchel, Rothgerber et al. (1998); Yzerbyt et al. (1995); Zani (1992). See also Chap. 6.

It is particularly beyond the scope of the present chapter to review, beyond listing most of them, the post-1999 plethora of publications on the seemingly rather specialized but important matter of relating social identity to intergroup processes and social cognition. For two key reviews see Hogg et al. (2004) and Jussim et al. (2001). The work divides roughly into (a) theoretical, minimal group, and other laboratory studies and (b) applied and field studies—as follows.

Theoretical, minimal group, and other laboratory studies: Aharpour and Brown (2002); Ashmore et al. (2001); Brewer (2009); Brewer and Pierce (2005); Capozza et al. (2000); Costarelli and Callà (2004); Crisp and Beck (2005); De Cremer (2001); Doosje et al. (2002); Eggins et al. (2002); Ellemers et al. (2000); Falomir-Pichastor et al. (2009); Glasford et al. (2009); Gómez et al. (2008); González and Brown (2003); Greenland and Brown (2000); Guimond, Dif, and Aupy (2002); Hecht et al. (2005); Hall and Crisp (2008); Hogg and Mullin (1999); Hogg and Williams (2000); Hornsey and Hogg (2000); Hornsey, Trembath, and Gunthorpe (2004); Hunter et al. (1999); Jackson (2002b); Jackson and Smith (1999); Jetten, Spears et al. (2000); Karasawa (2002a, b); Leach et al. (2008); Lipponen et al. (2003); McKimmie et al. (2003); K. P. Miller et al. (2009); Oishi and Yoshida (2001); Ouwerkerk et al. (2000); Paulsen et al. (2005); Perreault and Bourhis (1999); Reid et al. (2005); Rowley and Moldoveanu (2003); Scheepers (2009); Scheepers, Spears, Doosje, and Manstead (2002; 2003); Michael et al. (2001); Sears et al. (2003); Stellmacher and Petzel (2005); Van Leeuwen et al. (2003); Verkuyten and Hagendoorn (2002); Walker and Smith (2002); Worchel and Coutant (2004); Worchel et al. (2000); Yzerbyt et al. (2003).

Applied and field studies: Bizman and Yinon (2000, 2004); Cairns et al. (2006); Crisp et al. (2001); Drury and Reicher (1999); Gudykunst et al. (1999); Gurin et al. (1999); Hong et al. (2004); Hornsey and Imani (2004); Houston and Andreopoulou (2003); Kuwabara et al. (2007); Lalonde (2002); LaTendresse (2000); Levin and Sidanius (1999); Litvak-Hirsch et al. (2003); Martinot and Audebert (2003); McCoy and Major (2003); Nier et al. (2001); Reicher (2001); Reicher, Cassidy et al. (2006); Schmid et al. (2009); Stott et al. (2001); Tausch, Tam et al. (2007); Tropp and Wright (1999); Verkuyten and Reijerse (2008); Weenig et al. (2004); White (2001); Yuki (2003).

For a review of intergroup relations and cognitive implications such as reducing prejudice and conflict and promoting social solidarity see Dovidio, Gaertner, Esses, and Brewer (2003). See also Hogg and Abrams (2001); Jost (2004); Karakitapoglu and Turk (1999). For relevant aspects of American racial politics, see Sears (2004).

For additional research on other variables, such as self-esteem and intergroup relations, see Crocker et al. (1993); Kirchler et al. (1994); Rabbie and Lodewijkx (1996).

The kind of group being considered may of course have a marked effect on intergroup processes and their perception, as documented in various ways by: Abrams

and de Moura (2002); Staub (2001); Kessler and Mummendey (2002); Kumagai and Ohbuchi (2001); Obst, Smith, and Zinkiewicz (2002); Obst, Zinkiewicz, and Smith (2002a, b); Pinter and Greenwald (2004); Sani et al. (2007); Simon and Stürmer (2003); Stott and Drury (2000); Tropp and Brown (2004); Weiloch (2002); Yeung and Stombler (2000).

Many post-1999 studies of cognition and intergroup relations are centrally focused on neither social identity nor prejudice but on a diversity of contextualizing matters. They can be roughly divided into two approximately equal groups: (a) mainly combinations of theoretical and methodological considerations tested in laboratory studies, e.g., work on minimal groups, and (b) mainly applied studies—again as follows.

Theoretical, methodological, laboratory studies: Abrams and Hogg (2001); Albarello and Rubini (2008); Berndsen et al. (1999); Boccato et al. (2003); Boen and Vanbeselaere (2001); Brewer (2000); Cabecinhas (2004); Cadinu and Cerchioni (2001); Cohen (2002); Crisp, Stone, and Hall (2006); Crisp, Walsh, and Hewstone (2006); Cunningham and Platow (2007); Gallois et al. (2005); Gordijn, Yzerbyt, Wigboldus, and Dumont (2006); Hogg and Hains (2001); Hall and Crisp (2005); Harris et al. (2000); Iyer and Leach (2008); Kiyonari (2002); Kwok et al. (2007); Machunsky and Meiser (2009); Mackie et al. (2000); Matheson et al. (2003); McAuliffe et al. (2003); Meiser and Hewstone (2006); Nadler and Halabi (2006); Nagda (2006); Otten (2009); Paladino and Castelli (2008); Pickett et al. (2002); Postmes and Baym (2005); Postmes, Spears, and Lea (2002); Radhakrishnan et al. (2000); Riggio and Riggio (2001); Scheepers, Branscombe, Spears, and Doosje (2002); Scheepers et al. (2006a, b); Schubert and Otten (2002); Stone and Crisp (2007).

Applied studies: Berman and Wittig (2004); Chryssochoou (2000); Corenblum and Stephan (2001); Cunningham (2005); Delmas (2003); Derlega et al. (2002); Dobbs and Crano (2001); Doosje and Branscombe (2003); Dovidio, Gaertner, Niemann, and Snider (2001); Fabick (2002); Halabi and Sonnenschein (2004); Hortaçsu (2000); Hunter (2001); Jetten, Branscombe et al. (2001); Kessler and Mummendey (2001); Lee (2002); Licata and Klein (2002); Liebkind et al. (2006); Liu and Allen (1999); Mullen and Rice (2003); Mummendey et al. (1999); Oetzel and Robbins (2003); Ortiz and Harwood (2007); Pratto et al. (2008); Manfred Schmitt and Maes (2002); Stefan et al. (2003); Struthers et al. (2004); Suleiman (2004); Waldzus et al. (2003); Wenzel et al. (2003); Wolsko et al. (2003); Yzerbyt et al. (2009).

In the flood of research on collective identity, *different* aspects are sometimes treated identically, perhaps out of expedience or insufficient clarity, and conceptually similar matters have on occasion been given different names. A review by Ashmore et al. (2004) goes a long way towards clarifying this situation and moreover to using a sharpened taxonomy to analyze several theoretical approaches to social identity. Among other distinguishable facets of collective identity that they cover are "self-categorization, positive-negative, importance, social embeddedness, behavioral involvement, and content and meaning" (Ashmore et al. 2004, p. 80). See Table 3.1. Among their examples of how the taxonomy can be used to advantage in theoretical paradigms, Ashmore et al. delineate Cross's model in which, for instance, "individual African-Americans must navigate five stages on the path to an integrated sense of racial/cultural self" (p. 106).

Table 3.1 Elements of collective identity as individual-level constructs

Element	Definition
Self-categorization	Identifying self as a member of, or categorizing self in terms of, a particular social grouping
Placing self in social category	Categorizing self in terms of a particular social grouping
Goodness of fit/perceived similarity/ Prototypicality	A person's subjective assessment of the degree to which he or she is a prototypical member of the group
Perceived certainty of self-identification	The degree of certainty with which a person categorizes self in terms of a particular social grouping
Evaluation	The positive or negative attitude that a person has toward the social category in question
Private regard	Favorability judgments made by people about their own identities
Public regard	Favorability judgments that one perceives others, such as the general public, to hold about one's social category
Importance	The degree of importance of a particular group membership to the individual's overall self-concept
Explicit importance	The individual's subjective appraisal of the degree to which a collective identity is important to her or his overall sense of self
Implicit importance	The placement of a particular group membership in the person's hierarchically organized self-system; the individual is not necessarily consciously aware of the hierarchical position of his or her collective identities
Attachment and sense of interdependence	The emotional involvement felt with a group (the degree to which the individual feels at one with the group)
Interdependence/mutual fate	Perception of the commonalities in the way group members are treated in society
Attachment/affective commitment	A sense of emotional involvement with or affiliative orientation toward the group
Interconnection of self and others	The degree to which people merge their sense of self and the group
Social embeddedness	The degree to which a particular collective identity is embedded in the person's everyday ongoing social relationships
Behavioral involvement	The degree to which the person engages in actions that directly implicate the collective identity category in question
Content and meaning	–
Self-attributed characteristics	The extent to which traits and dispositions that are associated with a social category are endorsed as self-descriptive by a member of that category
Ideology	Beliefs about a group's experience, history, and position in society
Narrative	The internally represented story that the person has developed regarding self and the social category in question
Collective identity story	The individual's mentally represented narrative of self as a member of a particular social category
Group story	The individual's mentally represented narrative of a particular social category of which he or she is a member

Therapy Groups

One question that may apply to groups in general but seems to have arisen particularly in the context of therapy groups is whether the group mainly represents a constructive force or a destructive one. Clearly groups devoted to empowering disadvantaged, oppressed, and war-torn groups have positive goals.

Foulkes (1986) notes that all groups have an *occupation*. In most groups, the occupation takes the form of some sort of decision-making or production. Groups also have a *preoccupation*, a concern for the social-emotional relations of members. For analytic therapy groups, the preoccupation becomes the task, that is to analyze the underlying group dynamics. This involves that analysis of the relatedness of individuals in the group, the location and configuration of any disturbance in relationships, and the nature of communication, both channel and process. The relevance for social perception is that every event in a group is assumed to involve the group as a whole. An event is part of a gestalt, a configuration, of which the event constitutes the figure (foreground) whereas the ground (background) is manifest in the rest of the group. Foulkes describes a *matrix of transpersonal relationships* that is the common shared ground which ultimately determines the meaning and significance of all events upon which all communication, verbal and nonverbal, rests. The events in the group are transpersonal phenomena. They only come into existence through the interaction of two or more people. The individual is a nodal point, an open system. The group acts as a whole through one speaker at a time.

Foulkes saw the group as constructive force while Bion saw it as a destructive one. This issue has been covered particularly thoroughly by Nitsun (1991, 1996), who contrasts the mainly positive forces analyzed by Foulkes with Bion's supposedly negative ones. Perhaps not surprisingly, Nitsun concludes that, particularly in a psychotherapy context, the group can be primarily a positive force but that the group's conductor must be aware of, and deal constructively with, people's (sometimes veridical) *cognitions* of negative forces, which Nitsun calls the anti-group. Nitsun systematically provides a theoretical rationale and a variety of anecdotal examples for such a constructive approach to the real and perceived anti-group. His work provides a useful source of hypotheses for understanding groups in therapeutic and other organizational and general contexts.

M. E. Johnson and Neimeyer (1996) suggest that a social cognitive model is helpful for delineating sources of variance in the interdependent perceptions of members of psychotherapy (as well as other) groups. A's rating of B is a function of A's average emitted ratings, B's average received ratings, a systematic deviation unique to the AB dyad (derived from ratings on at least two occasions), and a constant and error. All of these components are shown to be meaningfully present in one or more contexts from therapy groups.

Since the 1970s much of the small groups research, including that in group therapy and other organizational contexts, has been in (what has been called) an "incrementalist" phase—studying how some major paradigms yield varied outcomes as a function of circumstance (such as setting, personal backgrounds, and role or-

ganization). To bring about a renaissance of small groups research, we agree with McGrath (1997) that theory, research, and practice must take seriously the idea that small groups are complex adaptive dynamic systems. Contributing to this goal, it is to be hoped, the recent experimental emphasis on what is still an admittedly patchwork array of cognitive, or at least partly cognitive, explanations may be helping the field to emerge from it's mainly incrementalist period.

http://www.springer.com/978-1-4614-0024-0

Small Group Research
Implications for Peace Psychology and Conflict Resolution
Blumberg, H.; Kent, M.V.; Hare, A.P.; Davies, M.F.
2012, XIV, 362 p., Hardcover
ISBN: 978-1-4614-0024-0