

## Chapter 2

# Bargaining, Coalitions, and Games: Classified Citations

Complementing the research on conflict resolution and cooperation—covered in the preceding chapter—is a tradition of studying coalitions, bargaining and “games,” especially but not exclusively in the laboratory. Hundreds of studies have modeled a wide variety of “real-world” counterparts. To take just a few examples where understanding can be enhanced by empirically known principles, one notes: the historic 2010 British parliamentary elections showing the pivotal power of the weaker party in a coalition government; process and outcomes of bargaining at every level from inter-personal (indeed, *intra*-personal as well) to international; and a broad variety of inter-party phenomena including, for instance, contrasts between the common good and individual rewards, as mirrored in Prisoner’s Dilemma and other “games”. Several experimental paradigms have been particularly heavily covered. Three of these are as follows.

In typical *bargaining* procedures, participants may play in pairs consisting of one “buyer” and one “seller.” They are assigned “payoff” tables specifying how much each will profit if they can agree (say) to sell a particular quantity of a commodity at a particular “price.” They then may take it in turns to make offers which can be accepted or rejected by their co-player. In a variant procedure, they must agree on particular outcomes for each of several “issues.”

In many studies of *coalitions*, each participant in a group is assigned a certain amount of “power” or “votes”—and also a level of reward, sometimes manifest as a real payment. Participants typically make offers to join with others provided that they can agree on how their incipient coalition’s rewards would be split. If enough participants can agree to join in a coalition or partnership that controls sufficient power or votes, then those players can split the associated rewards.

Finally, various “*gaming*” procedures have been studied, the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (PDG) being perhaps the most famous. Outcomes typically depend on the *joint* choices made by each of a pair of players. Rewards may be arranged in such a way that each player is individually tempted to make one particular choice; if only, however, both could agree to make a different choice, both would be better off. The “sting in the tail” is that if one of the players “defects” to the sub-optimal joint choice, that player receives an especially large reward and the “cooperative” player receives a rather harsh penalty.

These paradigms and much of the related classic research have been summarized in a multi-disciplinary variety of publications. See, for example, McClintock (1972, especially the three chapters on coalitions, bargaining, and games) and also Hare et al. (1994, 1996).

At least around 1,000 studies could be delineated and discussed for the present context in the period covered. It would, however, seem to be beyond the interests of most of the readers for this chapter to do so. It is rather useful, however, to have an impression of the scope of the work and, for those having particular interests, the means to retrieve a chosen selection of the studies. Hence the remainder of the present chapter takes the form of a taxonomy and a classified bibliography. We have tried to include a substantial number not only of laboratory studies but also of field applications related to the respective topics. Classified citations follow. The present format is rather compact but one can of course get an idea of the content of each area by consulting the works' titles in the References.

## **Bargaining**

### ***Laboratory and Quasi-Laboratory Studies and Theoretical Papers***

*Reviews and General Studies* Blumberg (1994); Brams (1990); Chatterjee (1996); Güth and Tietz (1990); Ledyard and Palfrey (1995); Lim and Murnighan (1994); Serrano and Vohra (2002).

*Theoretical Papers and Empirical Tests of Rules of Procedure* Abdul-Muhmin (2001); Agastya (1996); Babcock and Landeo (2004); Bac and Raff (1996); Baucells and Lippman (2004); Bensaid and Gary-Bobo (1996); Bigoness and DuBose (1992); Blaquièrre (1994); Blount and Larrick (2000); Bolton and Ockenfels (1998); Bolton and Zwick (1995); Bonacich and Friedkin (1998); Bossert et al. (1996); Boster et al. (1995); Bottom and Paese (1999); Bottom and Studt (1993); Bouckaert (2002); Brams and Kilgour (1996); Brucks and Schurr (1990); Bruttel (2009); Calvó-Armengol (2003); Chang and Liang (1998); Chatterjee and Dutta (1998); Chatterjee and Lee (1998); Church and Zhang (1999); Conley and Wilkie (1996); Dahl and Kienast (1990); Dickinson (2000); Donohue and Roberto (1996); Einy et al. (1999); Esser et al. (1990); Evans (1997); Fershtman (2000); Friedman (1992, 1994); Garratt (1999); Gneezy and Guth (2002); Gneezy et al. (2003); Gomes et al. (1999); Gracia et al. (2000); Güth and Van Damme (1998); Handgraaf et al. (2003); Hoffman et al. (1999); Imai and Salonen (2000); In and Serrano (2004); Inderst (2000); Jones and Jelassi (1990); Kanner (2004); Kibris (2004a, b); Knez and Camerer (1995); Komorita et al. (1989); Kray et al. (2004); Kultti (1999); Kuon and Uhlich (1993); Lahiri (1994); Laskowski and Slonim (1999); Lawler (1992); Lawler and Ford (1993); Lawler et al. (1988); Lax and Sebenius (1991); Lindskold and

Han (1988a); Lopomo (2001); Lu and McAfee (1996); Lusk and Hudson (2004); Mackintosh (1998); Mariotti (1998); Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2004); McCall (1990); Messick et al. (1997); Meyer (1992); Mo (1994); Moldoveanu and Stevenson (1998); Munier and Zaharia (2002); Myerson (1996); Napel (2003); Nawa et al. (2002); Northcraft, Brodt, and Neale (1995); Ockenfels and Selten (2000); Okada (1996); Oppewal and Tougareva (1992); Paquet et al. (2000); Parco and Rapoport (2004); Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2000); Poulsen (2004); Raith (2000); Ramsay (2004); Rapoport, Weg, and Felsenthal (1990); Rosenmüller (1997); Ross et al. (2002); Schellenberg (1988); Schofield and Parks (2000); Schotter et al. (2000); Schweitzer and DeChurch (2001); Sefton (1992); Shalev (2002); Sloof (2004); Sommers (1993); Sosis et al. (1998); Srivastava (2001); Tauman (2002); Thye (2000); Valenciano and Zarzuelo (1997); Van Cayseele and Furth (1996); Vannetelbosch (1999); Vieth (2003); Weg and Zwick (1999); Weg et al. (1996); Westermarck (2003); Yildiz (2003); Zeng (2003); Zwick et al. (1992); Zwick et al. (2000).

*Participants' Characteristics (Gender, Personality, Nationality, and Other Demographic Variables)* Barry and Friedman (1998); Brandstätter and Königstein (2001); Buchan et al. (2004); Calhoun and Smith (1999); Chaudhuri et al. (2003); Costa-Gomes and Zauner (2001); Galinsky et al. (2008); Gunnthorsdottir et al. (2002); Hanany et al. (2007); Katz et al. (2008); Ketelaar and Au (2003); Komorita and Ellis (1988); Maxwell (1992); Murnighan and Saxon (1998); Neu et al. (1988); Nyer and Gopinath (2001); Polzer et al. (1993); Solnick and Schweitzer (1999); Stuhlmacher and Walters (1999); Thompson, Nadler, and Kim (1999).

*Empirical Processes* Abbink et al. (2001); Abbink et al. (2004); Abreu and Sethi (2003); Achterkamp and Akkerman (2003); Allen et al. (1990); Alvarez et al. (2003); Barrett (2004); Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003); Beisecker et al. (1989); Berninghaus and Güth (2003); Boles et al. (2000); Bolton and Katok (1998); Bolton et al. (2003); Bossert and Peters (2000, 2001); Bottom (1990, 1998); Bottom and Paese (1997); Brams and Doherty (1993); Brunner (1994); Burgos et al. (2002a, b); Busch and Horstmann (1997, 2002); Camerer and Loewenstein (1993); Cardona-Coll (2003); Carpenter (2003b); Chun (2002); Conlon and Ross (1993); Croson et al. (2003); Daniel et al. (1998); Dore (1997); Duane (1991); du Toit (1989); Ellingsen and Robles (2002); Enzle et al. (1992); Esser (1989); Eyuboglu and Buja (1993); Fearon (1994); Fenwick (1997); Ford and Blegen (1992); Frankel (1998); Fukuno and Ohbuchi (1999, 2001, 2003); Fum and Missier (2001); Ghosh (1996); Golann (2004); Hegtvædt and Killian (1999); Hennig-Schmidt et al. (2008); Kambe (1999); Kibris (2002); Kim (2002); Kim and Fragale (2005); Klemisch-Ahlert (1992); Kolb (2004); Kramer et al. (1995); Krämer and Schneider (2003); Kravitz and Gunto (1992); Kritikos and Bolle (2004); Kumar et al. (1995); Large (1999); Lawler (1995); Larrick and Wu (2007); Legut et al. (1995); Lerner (1998); Manzini and Mariotti (2001); Marco Gil (1995); McCabe et al. (1998); McGinn et al. (2003); Miyagawa (2002); Montero (2002); Morgan and Tindale (2002); Morris, Larrick, and Su (1999); Murnighan and Pillutla (1995); Muthoo (1995); Nelson (2002); Ok and Zhou (2000); Olekalns (1991); Ostmann (1992); Ostmann (1996); Paese and Gilin (2000); Pillutla and Murnighan (1995, 2003); Ponsati and Sákovic

(1996); Powell (1996); Ravenscroft et al. (1993); Rojer (1998); Roloff and Jordan (1991); Sebenius (2002); Segendorff (1998); Shapiro (2000); Shell (2001); Sonnegård (1996); Sopher (1994); Thompson and DeHarpport (1994); Thompson et al. (2004); Turdaliev (2002); Tutzauer (1990, 1992, 1993); Valley et al. (2002); Van Dijk and Van Knippenberg (1996); Van Dijk et al. (2004); Vanderschraaf and Richards (1997); Viswesvaran and Deshpande (1995); Weg and Smith (1993); Weinberger (2000); Wheeler (2004); Winter (1996); Zott (2002).

*Outcomes* Carpenter (2003a); Chae and Heidhues (2004); Corfman and Lehmann (1993); Dekel and Wolinsky (2003); Handgraaf et al. (2004); Pfungsten and Wagener (2003); Salonen (1998); Tedeschi (1995); Verschuren and Arts (2004); Volij and Winter (2002); Wooders (1998).

## ***Field Applications***

*Cultural and Contextual Effects* Graham et al. (1988); Henrich and Smith (2004); Hill and Gurven (2004); Marlowe (2004); McElreath (2004); Patton (2004); Tinsley (1997); Tracer (2004).

*Formats and Procedural Rules* Blount (1995); Fiske and Tetlock (1997); Graesser (1990); Jap (2003); Keough (1992); Klotz (2004); Kotthoff (1993); López-Paredes et al. (2002); Mandel (2002); Naquin and Paulson (2003); Nygaard and Dahlstrom (2002); Onwujekwe (2004); Scudder (1988); Stroeker and Antonides (1997); Tusing and Dillard (2000); Van Dijk and Van Knippenberg (1998); Walliban (2003).

*Gender and Related Matters* Ishida (2003); Lorber and Bandlamudi (1993); Lundberg and Pollak (2001); Matsumoto (1989); Silvestre (1994); H. W. Smith and Kronauge (1990); Suen et al. (2003); Zick (1992).

*General Considerations and Negotiation* Bazerman et al. (2000). See also Ancona et al. (1991); Banks et al. (2002); Boyle and Lawler (1991); Brodt (1994); Carnevale and Keenan (1992); Connolly et al. (2000); Cutcher-Gershenfeld et al. (2007); DeSimone (2004); Ford (1994); Filzmoser and Vetschera (2008); Forgas (1998); Gullickson (1997); Heifetz and Segev (2004); Johnston and Benton (1988); Komorita and Parks (1995); Lebow (1996); Malhotra and Bazerman (2008); Mintu-Wimsatt and Graham (1998); Morley (2006); Mullen et al. (1991); Pitz (1992); Polzer et al. (1995); Posthuma et al. (2002); Pruitt (1995); Putnam (1993, 1994a, b, 1997); Rapoport (1990); Sebenius (2005); Shell (2006); Stephen and Pham (2008); Van Boven et al. (2003).

*Judicial Contexts* Herzog (2004); McAllister (1990); Pritchard (1990); Beaumont (1995); Becker (1988); Bee and Beronja (1991); Cutcher-Gershenfeld (1994); Devnatz (2004); Elvira and Saporta (2001); Extejt and Russell (1990); Fonstad et al. (2004); Gallagher and Gramm (1997); Gennard (2004); Giacobbe-Miller (1995); Gullickson (1995); Hart (2002); Hebdon and Stern (2003); Hunter and McKersie

(1992); Kelleher (2003); Kelloway (2004); Kelly and Brannick (1990); Kim and Kim (1998); Kramer and Hyclak (2002); Moore and Miljus (1989); Post and Bennett (1994); Putnam et al. (1991); Rose and Danner (1998).

*Miscellaneous* Alvard (2004); Anandalingam (1989); Bose (1996); Cliff and Bruton (1999); Clock of the Long Now (2000); Cohen (1996); Ensminger (2004); Frank (1991); Hagen (2003); Harris and Mowen (2001); Hill (1999); Hull (1999); Kim and Zepeda (2004); Kramer (1995); Lee (2000); Legrenzi et al. (1996); Mulkay et al. (1993); Oots (1990); Rainey (1988); Scudder and Andrews (1995); Snell and Mekies (2001); Woody (1998); Zollman (2008).

*Organizations and Work* Argyres and Liebeskind (1999); Buvik and Reve (2002); Griffin et al. (1995); Hargadon and Sutton (1997); Martinez-Pecino et al. (2008); Marullo and DeLeon (1997); Morley (1992); Oxenbridge and Brown (2002); Shankar and Yan (2002); Stasavage (2004); Stephenson and Tysoe (1988); Strutton et al. (1993); Sutton and Callahan (1988); Vaccaro and Coward (1993).

*Political Contexts* Blaydes (2004); Cottam (1989); Glad and Rosenberg (1990); Lipschutz (1991, 1993); Maoz and Astorino (1992); Papayoanou (1997); Schelling (2008); Sergeev (1991); A. M. Smith and Stam (2004); Torenvlied and Thomson (2003).

## Coalitions

### *Laboratory and Quasi-Laboratory Studies and Theoretical Papers*

*Reviews and General Studies* Blumberg (1994); Polley (1989); Rapoport (1990); Slikker (2001).

*Theoretical Papers and Empirical Tests of Rules of Procedure* Aknine et al. (2004); Amer et al. (2002); Bloch (1996); Bolton et al. (2003); Boros et al. (1997); Bottom et al. (1996); Boyer (1999); Bruxelles and Kerbrat-Orecchioni (2004); Burani and Zwicker (2003); Chavez and Kimbrough (2004); Esteban and Sákovics (2003); Ferreira (1999); Fukuda and Muto (2004); Gulati and Westphal (1999); Hamiache (1999); Klaus (2001); Komorita et al. (1989); Laruelle and Valenciano (2004); Mannix (1993); Okada (1996); Ray and Vohra (1999); Ray (1996); Schofield and Parks (2000); Sengupta and Sengupta (1996); Eric A. Smith (2003); Sobczak (1988); Van Beest et al. (2004b); Yi (1999).

*Empirical Processes* Beest et al. (2005); Bottom et al. (2000); Carreras (1996); Espinosa and Macho-Stadler (2003); Evans (1996); Fader and Hauser (1988); Gale et al. (2002); Holler and Napel (2004); Komorita and Ellis (1988); Madhavan et al. (2004); Maschler (2004); Nandeibam (2000); Perlinger (2000); Polzer et al. (1998); Simpson and Macy (2001); Van Beest et al. (2004a); Van Beest et al. (2003); Van

Schaik et al. (2004); Vassileva et al. (2002); Vidal (2004); Wagner et al. (2002); Watkins and Rosegrant (1996); Wilke et al. (1996); Yamaguchi (1989, 1991a, b, 1992); Young (1989).

*Stability and Other Outcome Properties* Barberà and Gerber (2003); Belleflamme (2000); Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002); Cressman et al. (2004); Ho (2002); Milgrom and Roberts (1996); Moldovanu and Winter (1995); Moreno and Wooders (1996); Pápai (2004); Yi (1997).

## ***Applications***

*Animal Studies* MacKenzie and Kennedy (1991); Noë (1994); Noë and Sluijter (1995); Öst et al. (2003); Packer et al. (1991); Perrey et al. (2004); Putland (2001); Silk et al. (2004); Vervaecke et al. (2000).

*Community Settings* Armbruster et al. (1999); Berkowitz and Wolff (1996); Boydell and Volpe (2004); Bronheim and Striffler (1999); Conway (2002); Feinberg et al. (2004); Foster-Fishman et al. (2001); Granner and Sharpe (2004); Hays et al. (2000); Keys and Factor (2001); Libby and Austin (2004b); Mansergh et al. (1996); Mayer et al. (1998); McFall et al. (2004); Mitchell et al. (1996); Otis (2004); Sink (1991); Snell-Johns et al. (2003); Wiesenfeld (1997).

*Ethnic Groups* Cosmides et al. (2003); Crowfoot and Chesler (1996); Park (1996); Torres (2002).

*Gender Issues and Similar* Butterwick (2003); Grise-Owens et al. (2004); Lepischak (2004); Martin and Meyerson (1988); Padilla (2004).

*Health and Mental Health* Cramer et al. (2003); Garland et al. (2004); Kegler et al. (1998); Libby and Austin (2002a, 2004); Lindholm et al. (2004); Paine-Andrews et al. (1996); Penner (1995); Philips (2004); Preli and Protinsky (1988); Scavone (1992); Smitson (2001); Visher and Visher (1989); Weiss (1996); Wertz (2003); Zapka et al. (1992).

*Miscellaneous* Benveniste (1989); Coates (1990); Cooren (2001); Dluhy and Kravitz (1990); Dyke (2003); Einspruch and Wunrow (2002); Fanis (2004); Flemmons and Tsai (1992); Florin et al. (2000); Galavotti (1989); Grusky et al. (1995); Hagen and Bryant (2003); Huckins (2002); Inniss (1989); Kirsch and Osterling (1995); Kressel (2000); Ma (2001); S. Martinez (1989); Mesquida and Wiener (1996); Mitchell et al. (2004); Mizrahi and Rosenthal (2001); Neighbors and Barta (2004); Nelson (1988); Paul (1996); Pires (1988); Rosen (1996); Shefner (1999); Shipps (2003); Simpson and Cieslik (2002); Stearns and Almeida (2004); Sutherland et al. (1997); Tian (2000); Wolfenstein (1998); Wood and Bohte (2004).

*Organizations* A. T. Cobb (1991); Kenis and Knoke (2002); Mannix and White (1992); Tadepalli (1992).

*Political Groups* Bacharach and Lawler (1988); Bonelli and Simmons (2004a, b); Lai and Reiter (2000); Tedin and Murray (1994); Zurcher and Snow (1990).

## Games

### *Laboratory and Quasi-Laboratory Studies and Theoretical Papers*

*Cooperation* Abbink et al. (2003); Alvard (2004); Bendor et al. (1991); Bilancini and Boncinelli (2009); Boone et al. (2002); R. T. Boone and Macy (1999); Bornstein (2004); Brosig (2002); Cabon-Dhersin and Ramani (2004); Chaudhuri et al. (2002); Cooper et al. (1996); De Dreu et al. (1995); Dinar et al. (1992); Dwyer and Minnegal (1997); Eguiluz et al. (2005); Feeley et al. (1997); Fischer (2009); Fischer and Suleiman (1997); Frank et al. (1993); Friedland (1990); Goren and Bornstein (2000); Güth et al. (1997); Hansen (1990); Hemesath and Pomponio (1998); Huang and Sjöström (2003); Hulbert et al. (2001); Insko et al. (2005); Imhof et al. (2005); Izquierdo and Rafels (2001); Ketelaar and Au (2003); Kiesler et al. (1996); Kim and Webster (2001); Knez and Camerer (2000); Komorita et al. (1991); Lodewijkx (2001); Lopez (1995); Majeski and Fricks (1995); McNamara et al. (2004); Minkler and Miceli (2004); Monterosso et al. (2002); Moreno and Wooders (1998); Mori (1996); Morris et al. (1998); Murnighan (1991); Murnighan and King (1992); Nishizaki et al. (2004); Offerman et al. (2001); Orbell and Dawes (1993); Paese and Stang (1998); Amnon Rapoport and Fuller (1998); Rieskamp and Todd (2006); Scharpf (1990); Schuessler (1989); Signorino (1996); Jeffrey M. Smith and Bell (1992); Srivastava and Lalnunmawii (1989); Stark (2004); Stone et al. (1996); Tsai (1993); Wiseman and Yilankaya (2001); Wu et al. (2009); Zhong et al. (2002).

*Equilibrium* Brandts and MacLeod (1995); Budescu, Rapoport, and Suleiman (1995); Burton and Sefton (2004); Cheng and Zhu (1995); Eichberger and Kelsey (2000); Eliaz (2003); Engl (1995); Groes et al. (1998); Güth (2002); Huettel et al. (2001); Youngse Kim (1996); Maskin and Riley (2003); McKelvey and Palfrey (1995); Ochs (1995); Rapoport, Seale, Erev, and Sundali (1998); Rinott and Scarsini (2000); Sandholm (2003); Schofield and Parks (2000); Shinotsuka and Takamiya (2003); Stanford (1995); Tedeschi (1995); Thoron (2004); Tomala (1999); Van Damme and Hurkens (1996).

*Miscellaneous Games and Constructs—Reviews and General Considerations* Blumberg (1994); Bornstein (2003); Busemeyer and Pleskac (2009); Butler (2007); Charness and Haruvy (2002); Kurzban et al. (2008); Shim (1988); Zwick et al. (2000);

*Miscellaneous Games and Constructs—Background, Demographic Variables, and Rules* Abolafia (1996); Amann and Leininger (1996); Amer et al. (2002); Andreoni and Miller (1995); Attar et al. (2008); Babcock and Landeo (2004); Bacharach and Bernasconi (1997); Badke-Schaub and Strohschneider (1998); Baliga and Ev-

ans (2000); Banks et al. (2002); Baye and Hoppe (2003); Bednar and Page (2007); Ben-Ner et al. (2004); Bensaid and Gary-Bobo (1996); Berninghaus et al. (2002); Betz (1995); Bornstein et al. (1994); Bornstein et al. (2004); Bornstein and Rapoport (1988); Bosch-Domènech and Sáez-Martí (2001); Budescu and Rapoport (1994); Budescu et al. (1990); Budescu, Suleiman, and Rapoport (1995); Cabrales et al. (2003); Camerer (2003); Camerer and Loewenstein (1993); Carreras and Freixas (1996); Chakravarty et al. (2000); Colman and Stirk (1998); Curseu and Curseu (2001); Duffy and Feltovich (2002); Fabricatore et al. (2002); Facer et al. (2004); Felsenthal et al. (1998); Gallucci and Perugini (2000); Garratt and Qin (2000); Garson and Stanwyck (1997); Granberg (1999); Granberg and Dorr (1998); Heifetz and Mongin (2001); Henrich et al. (2005); Hine and Gifford (1996); Holler et al. (1992); Holm (2000); Huck et al. (2002); Insko et al. (1988); Israel et al. (1992); Karaul et al. (2000); Kim and Kim (1997); Koller and Milch (2003); Komorita and Carnevale (1992); Kovalenkov and Wooders (2001); Krabbe et al. (1997); Krauss and Wang (2003); Laing and Slotznick (1991); Laskowski and Slonim (1999); Leifer (1988); Lindskold and Han (1988a, b); Lo (1999, 2000); Metha et al. (1994); Michener et al. (1989); D. T. Miller et al. (1998); Morris et al. (2004); Neyman and Okada (2000); Ones and Putterman (2007); Orshan and Zarzuelo (2000); Ostmann (1992); Otten et al. (1995); Pacala et al. (1995); Parks and Vu (1994); Quesada (2002); Rapoport and Au (2001); Reijnierse et al. (1996); Rustichini (1999); Rutledge-Taylor and West (2004); Saijo and Nakamura (1995); Sakurai (1990); Scharlemann et al. (2001); Schellenberg (1990); Schwartz-Shea (2002); Slikker and Van den Nouweland (2001); Stark and Wang (2004); Sterman (1988); Stewart et al. (2003); Stuart (1997); Sugiyama et al. (2004); Suleiman and Budescu (1999); Suleiman and Rapoport (1992); Suleiman et al. (1996); Sundali et al. (1995); Takao and Okura (2001); Tian and Li (1995); Tyson et al. (1988); Van Huyck et al. (1995); Van Schie and Van der Pligt (1995); Weigelt et al. (1989); Werner (1999); West and Lebiere (2001); Whitehead et al. (1996); Wischniewski et al. (2009); Yamagishi and Kiyonari (2000);

*Miscellaneous Games and Constructs—Processes Emerging from Playing Abele et al. (2004); Anderhub et al. (2004); Anderson (2004); Andreoni et al. (2002); Armantier (2004); Baik et al. (1999); Ben-Porath and Kahneman (2003); Bennett et al. (1994); Betz (1991); Bienenstock and Bonacich (1993); Blume (2003); Bruins et al. (1989); Butler (1992); Camac (1992); Chatterjee et al. (2003); Chen and Plott (1998); Chen et al. (2004); Cheung and Friedman (1997); Cho et al. (2002); Cooper and Stockman (2002); Cotterell et al. (1992); Cressman (1997); Devetag et al. (2000); Devetag and Warglien (2003); Dukerich et al. (1990); Durieu and Solal (2003); Ellingsen and Robles (2002); Enzle et al. (1992); Friedman et al. (2004); Galanos et al. (1993); Gans (1995); Gilboa and Schmeidler (2003); Ginkel and Smith (1999); Gossner and Vieille (2002, 2003); Gray and Stafford (1988); Güth et al. (2003); Güth et al. (1995); Hart and Mas-Colell (2003); Healy and Noussair (2004); Huber (1996); Iizuka et al. (2002); Insko et al. (1993); Israeli (1999); Keren and Wagenaar (1988); Yong-Gwan Kim (1996); Kiyonari et al. (2000); Ladoucer and Dubé (1997); Lambo and Moulen (2002); Langlois and Langlois (1999); Lindskold and Han (1988b); Mannix (1991); Masel (2007); McGinn et al. (2003);*



R. I. Miller and Sanchirico (1999); Mookherjee and Sopher (1997); Nelson (2002); Olcina and Peñarrubia (2004); Parks et al. (2002); Rapoport et al. (1993); Rapoport et al. (2002); Roth and Erev (1995); Sandler (1999); Schummer (2000); Sethi and Somanathan (2003); Sheldon (1999); Sobel (2001); Sonnegård (1996); Sonsino and Sirota (2003); Spiegler (2004); Srivastava (2001); Suleiman and Rapoport (1988); Sundali et al. (1995); Taylor and Zwicker (1997); N. E. Turner (1998); Van Assen and Snijders (2004); Watson (1996); Weesie and Franzen (1998); Wilke and Braspenning (1989); Zhang and Norman (1994);

*Miscellaneous Games and Constructs—Outcomes* Boles and Messick (1995); Boros and Gurvich (2000); Dekel and Wolinsky (2003); Fischer, Kubitzki, Guter, and Frey (2007); Funk et al. (2003); Samuelson and Swinkels (2003); Schopler et al. (1991); Willson (2000); Xue (2002).

*Miscellaneous Games and Constructs—Values and Theoretical Perspectives* Asheim (2002); Budescu et al. (1999); Eliaz and Ok (2006); Kremer et al. (1988); Stahl and Wilson (1995); Wayne and Rubinstein (1992).

*Prisoner's Dilemma Game* Antonides (1994); Au and Komorita (2002); Baker and Rachlin (2001, 2002); Batson and Ahmad (2001); Batson and Moran (1999); Bendor et al. (1991); Bolle and Ockenfels (1990); Boone et al. (2002); C. Boone et al. (1999a, b); R. T. Boone and Macy (1999); Brosig (2002); Cooper et al. (1996); Corfman and Lehmann (1994); De Jong et al. (2002); Fader and Hauser (1988); Feeley et al. (1997); Ferguson and Schmitt (1988); Furnham and Quilley (1989); Goren (2001); Goren and Bornstein (1999, 2000); Harris and Madden (2002); Hauk (2003); Hauk and Nagel (2001); Hemesath and Pomponio (1998); Hoffman (1999); Imhof et al. (2005); Insko et al. (1994); Jin et al. (1996); Jones and Zhang (2004); Kassinove et al. (2002); Kay and Ross (2003); Kiesler et al. (1996); Knez and Camerer (2000); Li and Taplin (2002); Liberman et al. (2004); Lopez (1995); McNamara et al. (2004); Messick (2008); Monterosso et al. (2002); Mori (1996); Morris et al. (1995, 1998); Neuberg (1988); Nishizaki et al. (2004); Oda (1997); Anatol, Rapoport (1988); Sheldon et al. (2000); Tomochi (2004); Van Lange, Liebrand, and Kuhlman (1990); Wiseman and Yilankaya (2001); Wolf et al. (2008); Wong and Hong (2005); Yamagishi et al. (2005); Yi and Rachlin (2004).

*Simulation* Affisco and Chanin (1990); Brusckke et al. (1993); Carr and Groves (1998); Chang (2003); Chang et al. (2003); Clark et al. (2003); Diehl (1991); Druckman (1995); Faria and Wellington (2004); Fischer and Suleiman (1997); Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1997); Gaudart (1999); Gosenpud and Miesing (1992); Gosenpud and Washbush (1996); Gotts et al. (2003); Hemmasi and Graf (1992); Hemmasi et al. (1989); Hill and Lance (2002); Hine and Gifford (1997); Hollenbeck et al. (1992); Inglis et al. (2004); Jaffe and Nebenzahl (1990); Johansson and Küller (2002); Joldersma and Geurts (1998); Karasawa (2002a, b); Kashibuchi and Sakamoto (2001); Keeffe et al. (1993); Kirk (2004); Kirts et al. (1991); Kleiman and Kilmer (2009); Klein and Fleck (1990); Koehler (2001); Krackhardt and Stern (1988); Laukka et al. (1995); Li and Baillie (1993); Murnighan (1991); Napier and House (1990); Poplu et al. (2003); Prohaska and Frank (1990); Remus and Edge

(1991); Renaud and Stolovitch (1988); Ross et al. (2001); Rouwette et al. (1998); Schindler (1992); Signorino (1996); Jeffrey M. Smith and Bell (1992); Snow et al. (2002); Stone et al. (1996); Thavikulwat (2004); Trost et al. (1989); Tsai (1993); Tsuchiya and Tsuchiya (2000); Twale (1991); van Eck and Dempsey (2002); Washbush and Gosen (2001); Wellington and Faria (1996); Wheatley et al. (1988); Whiteley and Faria (1989); Williams (1991); Wit and Wilke (1990); Wolfe (1993); Wolfe and Box (1988); Wolfe and Chanin (1993); Wolfe and Roberts (1993).

*Trust* Barr (2004); Berg et al. (1995); Cabon-Dhersin and Ramani (2004); Chaudhuri et al. (2002); Eckel and Wilson (2003); Fang et al. (2002); Gunnthorsdottir et al. (2002); Güth et al. (1997); Insko and Schopler (1998); James (2002); Malhotra (2004); McCabe et al. (1998); McCabe et al. (2003); Mosler (1993); Orbell et al. (1994); Parks, Henager, and Scamahorn (1996); Parks and Hulbert (1995).

*Ultimatum Game* (In the version generally covered by the following references, one player of two suggests a split and the other player may accept or reject it. If accepted, the split is effected; if rejected, neither participant gets anything. Results typically demonstrate that players do not act wholly in self-interest but that an element of fairness is typical. Otherwise second players might logically accept *any* offer in which they get at least something; whereas typically some cultures find many players simply propose 50:50 splits and also find that offers of small amounts get rejected.)

Abbink et al. (2001); Alvard (2004); Bethwaite and Tompkinson (1996); Dickinson (2000); Gneezy et al. (2003); Gurven (2004); Güth et al. (2001); Huck (1999); Humphrey et al. (2004); Larrick and Blount (1997); Munier and Zaharia (2002); Patton (2004); Ruffle (1998); Suleiman (1996); Sum and Gil-White (2004); Tracer (2004); Weg and Smith (1993); Zhong et al. (2002).

### ***“Real-World” Applications and Effects***

Alvard and Nolin (2002); Auyeung (2004); Baker et al. (1993); Carment and Rowlands (1998); Chertkoff (1992); Cosgray et al. (1990); Davidson and Newman (1990); Dresner (1989); Edge and Keys (1990); Harrison and Horne (1999); Henrich and Smith (2004); Hornby and Saunders (1989); Keren and Raub (1993); Kolasinski and Gilson (1999); Krebs et al. (2003); Krueger and Acevedo (2008); McCarthy (2002); Moreno and Mayer (2004); Nonami (1996); Pelligra (2007); Sayman et al. (2002); Seo and Nishizaki (1994); Sönmez (1997); Stettler et al. (2004); D. A. Turner (1988); Van Lange et al. (2007); Wit and Wilke (1998).



<http://www.springer.com/978-1-4614-0024-0>

Small Group Research  
Implications for Peace Psychology and Conflict  
Resolution

Blumberg, H.; Kent, M.V.; Hare, A.P.; Davies, M.F.  
2012, XIV, 362 p., Hardcover  
ISBN: 978-1-4614-0024-0