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Georg Meggle (left), Günther Grewendorf – as students, 1971
Just having finished their M.A.

Georg Meggle (left), John R. Searle and Günther Grewendorf
– at ZiF-Conference, 1999
Speech Acts, Mind, and Social Reality
Discussions with John R. Searle
Grewendorf, G.; Meggle, G. (Eds.)
2002, VIII, 327 p., Hardcover