CHAPTER 4

THREE MODELS FOR THE DESCRIPTION OF THE STRUCTURE OF TIME-CONSCIOUSNESS

4.1. General introduction

4.1.1. Justification for the selected texts

The second stage in Husserl’s thinking on time-consciousness found its expression in the so-called L-manuscripts. These manuscripts are also referred to as the Bernau manuscripts, named after the place in which Husserl wrote them in the years 1917 and 1918.¹ As has already emerged in the preceding part of this inquiry, Husserl also occupied himself with the analysis of time-consciousness in the years between the lecture manuscript from 1905 and the L-manuscripts. This is attested by the texts that are included in part B of Hua X under the title “Supplementary Texts Setting Forth the Development of the Problem.” Nevertheless, the L-manuscripts may be considered the first extensive attempt following the lecture manuscript to achieve clarity in this domain. One occasion for Husserl’s renewed interest in the analysis of time was the reworking of his lecture manuscript on the phenomenology of time from WS ’04/’05 and some of the texts on this subject from the following years by Edith Stein, Husserl’s assistant in Freiburg in the period from 1916 to 1918. Stein started with this reworking in Bernau in the summer of 1917. Husserl’s own occupation with this reworking led to the emergence of completely new manuscripts.²

1. These manuscripts have been published in: E. Husserl, Die Bernauer Manuskripte über das Zeitbewusstsein (1917/18) (Husserliana Band XXXIII, R. Bernet and D. Lohmar Hrsg.) Dordrecht/Boston/Lodlon: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001. In the following, this work will be indicated as Hua XXXIII.
With regard to the designation of these manuscripts as Bernau manuscripts and L-manuscripts, one may note that both groups of manuscripts do not coincide completely. The manuscripts that are kept in the Husserl Archives under the denomination "L" do not include all manuscripts Husserl wrote in Bernau in 1917 and 1918, and they also include manuscripts Husserl did not write in this Bernau period. The L-manuscripts encompass the manuscripts that Eugen Fink, Husserl’s assistant in Freiburg from 1928 until 1938, presented to the Husserl Archives in 1969. Fink, in turn, received these manuscripts from Husserl in 1928, with the request to rework them into a publishable whole. These L-manuscripts are arranged into two groups, L I and L II, which each consists of 21 bundles. For a significant part, the manuscripts of group L II consist of transcriptions of Husserl’s manuscripts, carried out by Edith Stein, Ludwig Landgrebe, and Eugen Fink. Many of the appendices of the 1928 edition of “Edmund Husserl’s Lectures on the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time” are based on texts of this L II group.

The L-manuscripts have gained a certain reputation in the reception of Husserl’s work. On the basis of what Husserl told him about the content of these manuscripts, Roman Ingarden, for example, claims that this was certainly Husserl’s “most profound” and probably also his “most important” study. Equally, Herbert Spiegelberg explicitly mentions the L-manuscripts, when, in his list of desiderata for a better understanding of Husserl’s phenomenology, he points to the importance of the edition of significant works by Husserl. The L-manuscripts probably also owe their reputation to the fact that they were inaccessible for a long time. They were only recently published in the Husserliana series, and, for a long time, they could not be accessed via the Husserl Archives, as had been the case with other unpublished material. This was simply so because they

3. For more detailed information, see R. Bernet and D. Lohmar, “Einleitung der Herausgeber,” in: Hua XXXIII, p. XXIV ff. It is not entirely clear how far Fink progressed in this reworking. In any case, it was never published. In the Husserl Archives in Louvain, a classification draft by Fink’s hand is present that refers to this planned publication. This draft was published by Roman Ingarden in his edition of Husserl’s letters addressed to him. See E. Husserl, Briefe an Roman Ingarden. Mit Erläuterungen und Erinnerungen an Husserl (R. Ingarden Hrsg.) Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968, pp. 171-172.
4. In Hua X, in which the text of the 1928 edition has been included in part A, these appendices occupy pages 99-134, CW IV, p. 105-137.
were not located in the Archives, but in Eugen Fink’s office, who only made them available to the Husserl Archives in 1969.

One consequence of these circumstances is that hardly any studies of the L-manuscripts have as yet been published, in contrast to, for example, the C-manuscripts. The latter manuscripts, dating from the late 1920s to the early 1930s, in part also deal with the analysis of time. These C-manuscripts have not yet been published in the *Husserliana* series, but, because they were accessible to research from the beginning onwards, that is, as of the foundation of the Husserl Archives in 1939, several studies are dedicated to these manuscripts. 7 To my knowledge, the only study in which at least some of the L-manuscripts are addressed in greater detail is an article by Ronald Bruzina, entitled “The Revision of the Bernau Time-Consciousness Manuscripts: *Status Questionis* - Freiburg, 1928-1930.” 8 However, central to this article is Fink’s involvement with the L-manuscripts, and it is in this light that some of the L-manuscripts are discussed.

The L-manuscripts are so-called research manuscripts. As is well known, Husserl’s thought developed in writing. The research manuscripts constitute the most direct expression of this thought-process. In other words, these manuscripts were not written for a wider audience. Neither for a reading audience, nor, like the lecture manuscripts, for a listening audience. This entails that these manuscripts are not easy to read. It is characteristic of these manuscripts that they often lack a clear end-point in the form of a conclusion. 9 One may further note various repetitions. One manuscript does not pick up the thread of the argument of the previous manuscript but rather repeats the analysis that was carried out in a preceding manuscript. Upon closer consideration, such a reiteration often turns out to be more than a mere repetition, such that new nuances are added with respect to earlier analyses. 10 Finally, it is in any case characteristic of the L-manuscripts that, in some manuscripts, attempts are made to describe the structure of time-consciousness that seemed to have been shown to be untenable in earlier manuscripts.

7. Theses studies will be referred to in the following part of this inquiry, dealing with the analysis of time-consciousness as it has been carried out in the C-manuscripts.
9. This characteristic is pointed out by, amongst others, Ingarden (1962/63), p. 159.
In his introduction to the first volume of the *Husserliana* series that is largely based on research manuscripts, Iso Kern provides a general characterization of these manuscripts. He points out that, in these manuscripts, Husserl did not note down what he knew but rather what he did not know. His aim was to develop new insights by thinking and writing. In doing so, the research manuscripts do not so much offer results as paths of thought and, as Kern notes, also wrong paths of thought. With regard to the L-manuscripts, one may comment that the term “wrong paths” is perhaps too strong. Some of the paths Husserl pursues in the L-manuscripts do indeed come to a dead end, and he sees himself forced to retrace his steps. However, all these routes have their own rationality that cannot be jettisoned as such, and which other projected paths must take into account.

Given this character of Husserl’s research manuscripts, an intervention is called for in order to discuss these manuscripts. In my discussion of the L-manuscripts, I have opted for a two-fold approach. In this chapter, I discuss three, of what I call, models Husserl developed to describe the structure of time-consciousness. These three models correspond to the three attempts I believe Husserl undertakes in the L-manuscripts to describe the structure of time-consciousness. Concerning the order of these three models, some reservations are called for. It is not simply the case that Husserl first develops what I call the first model, then rejects it and proceeds to the development of the second model, and so on. In my order, chronologically later manuscripts address an earlier model and vice versa. In chapter 5, I shall discuss a number of developments that may be delineated in Husserl’s analysis of time-consciousness in the L-manuscripts. These developments concern the structure of the perceptual phase in which something is given as present now, the phenomenology of recollection (*Wiedererinnerung*), the theme of time as a principle of individuation, and the relation between time and the ego. These developments will be elucidated from the perspective of so-called genetic phenomenology. The period in which Husserl started to elaborate a genetic phenomenological perspective coincides with the period in which the L-manuscripts were written. This perspective can do justice to the novel character of a number of developments in his analysis of time-consciousness in the L-manuscripts.

In the present chapter, the thread for the discussion of the three models Husserl develops is constituted by manuscript L I 15 entitled

"New Attempt to Clarify the Structures of the Consciousness That Constitutes Temporal Objectivities." ¹² It is published in Hua XXXIII in "Text No. 11," "Appendix VI," and "Text No. 2." This manuscript has the character of a recapitulation of the analyses Husserl has carried out up to that point. In this manuscript, Husserl distinguishes three different attempts he has carried out to describe the structure of time-consciousness. These three attempts correspond to the three models I distinguish. In this chapter, in addition to the texts mentioned, I shall also make use of "Text No. 3," "Text No. 4," "Text No. 5," "Text No. 10," "Text No. 12," "Text No. 13," and a few appendices. In the following chapter, I shall further make use of "Text No. 1," "Text. No. 6," "Text. No. 8," Text No. 9," "Text No. 14," "Text No. 15," "Text No. 18," "Text No. 19," "Text No. 20," "Text No. 21," "Text No. 22," and several appendices to these texts. All these texts belong to the Bernau manuscripts in the sense of that name mentioned above. Before I proceed to discuss the first model, I shall introduce the most commonly used, new terminology in the L-manuscripts.

4.1.2. Introduction of new terminology

Compared with his lecture manuscript from 1905, Husserl uses a number of new terms in the analysis of time-consciousness he carries out in the L-manuscripts. In these manuscripts, he no longer speaks of primary memory in order to indicate the non-representational consciousness of the past. He uses the term "retention" instead. Husserl already started using this term in the time preceding the L-manuscripts. It already occurs in some of the texts that have been included in part B of Hua X. Chronologically speaking, the first text in which the term is used is "Text No. 51." This text was the basis of part of Husserl's lecture course from SS '09.¹³

Complementary to retention is protention, the non-representational consciousness of the future. Analogously to the distinction between retention and recollection, protention must be distinguished from expectation. Just like retention, protention also already plays a role in per-

¹². For the title of this manuscript: "Neuer Versuch der Aufklärung der Strukturen des Zeitgegenständlichkeit konstituierenden Bewusstseins," see Hua XXXIII, p. 398.
¹³. See Hua X, pp. 340 and 341, CW IV, pp. 351 and 352. The term "retention" already occurs in "Text No. 50" in Hua X, but, in contrast to what the editor of Hua X claims, this text was probably not written before the fall of 1909. For this dating, see Bernet (1985), p. XLV.
Phenomenology of Time
Edmund Husserl's Analysis of Time-Consciousness
Kortooms, T.
2002, XX, 304 p., Hardcover