CHAPTER 1

THE CONTEXT OF HUSSERL’S FIRST ANALYSIS OF TIME-CONSCIOUSNESS

1.1. What precedes Husserl’s first analysis of time-consciousness

1.1.1. Introduction

During the winter semester of 1904/’05, Husserl gave a lecture course (Vorlesung) under the title “Important Points from the Phenomenology and Theory of Knowledge.” This lecture course consists of four parts. The first is entitled: “On Perception,” the second: “On Attention, Specific Meaning etc.,” the third: “Phantasy and Image-Consciousness,” and the fourth: “On the Phenomenology of Time.”¹ The fourth part of this lecture course from the winter semester of 1904/’05² will be at the center of the first part of this inquiry. In the introduction to his analysis of time-consciousness, Husserl points out that the success of this analysis depends on a minute analysis of intuitive acts in general, such as perception, phantasy and memory.³ Husserl here refers to the analyses he had carried out in previous parts of his lecture course in that winter semester.

In view of this state of affairs, I shall discuss a few points from earlier parts of the lecture course from WS ’04/’05 as an introduction to the discussion of Husserl’s analysis of time-consciousness in the fourth part

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2. In the following, this lecture course will be referred to as the lecture course from WS ’04/’05.

of his lecture course. I shall focus on the first part, which deals with perception, and the third part in which image-consciousness and phantasy-consciousness are subjected to analysis. This introduction serves two functions. First, it serves the function sketched out above, which Husserl himself gives to the analysis of intuitive acts in connection with his analysis of time-consciousness. In addition, the terminology of Husserl’s analysis of time-consciousness may be introduced by means of a discussion of some characteristics of intuitive acts in general and perception and phantasy in particular. After Husserl’s analysis of time-consciousness in the fourth part of his lecture course from WS ’04/’05 has been discussed in chapter 2, the first part of this inquiry will conclude with a sketch of some of the developments that occurred in Husserl’s thinking on time-consciousness in the years that follow his analysis in this lecture course.

1.1.2. The first part of the lecture course from WS ’04/’05: “On Perception”

A first characteristic of perception to which Husserl points concerns the relative character of perception. On the one hand, perception is an experience (ein Erlebnis) of a perceiving subject, and, on the other hand, perception is related to the perceived object. This second relation, the one to the perceived object, distinguishes perception from other acts of intuition. Characteristic of this relation in perception is that the object itself is there (selbst da), or that the object is present itself (selbstgegenwärtig). This being present itself, or, using a term that Husserl some-

4. The first part of this lecture course has not yet been published. The manuscript is located in the Husserl Archives in Louvain under the denomination F I 9. The third part of this lecture course has been published in: E. Husserl, Phantasie, Bildbewusstsein, Erinnerung. Zur Phänomenologie der anschaulichen Vergegenwärtigungen. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1895-1925) (Husserliana Band XXIII, E. Marbach, Hrsg.) Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1980. The third part of Husserl’s lecture course has been included in this work as “Text No. 1,” p. 1-108. In the following, this work will be indicated as Hua XXIII.

5. Concerning the introduction of the terminology Husserl uses in the first part of his lecture course from WS ’04/’05, one may also refer to his Logical Investigations. The terms in question here, such as act-quality (Aktualität), apprehension-matter (Auffassungsmaterie) or apprehension-sense (Auffassungssinn), and proper and improper presentation (eigentliche und uneigentliche Präsentation), are also dealt with extensively in the fifth and, in particular, the first part of the sixth investigation.

6. Manuscript F I 9, p. 8a. The reference to this and other manuscripts occurs in accordance with the pagination applied by the staff of the Husserl Archives in Louvain. The
times also uses, this being present "in person" (leibhaft, manuscript F I 9, 10a) of the perceived object in perception, must, however, be understood in a special sense. This being present of the perceived object does not mean that the object may be considered to be a real component of perception. Perception is an experience, that is, perception is a real component of consciousness. The perceived object, however, is not an experience.

In his lecture manuscript, Husserl gives two arguments why the object is not a real component of consciousness. First of all, he points to the difference between true and false perception. He lists hallucinations and illusions as examples of false perceptions. From a purely descriptive perspective, hallucinations, such as a mirage, and illusions, such as seeing a bent stick that is halfway immersed in water, are true perceptions. In other words, in hallucination and illusion something is given as present itself. Still, this does not alter the fact that in the case of a false perception the perceived object does not exist. But how can the object not exist if it is supposed to be contained as a real component in its perception?

In the framework of the distinction between true and false perception, Husserl points to a distinction between two moments that play a role in perception. A hallucination is indeed a true perception in the sense that in a hallucination something is being given as present itself. However, especially in a hallucination that has been recognized as such, a moment is missing that is present in normal perception. This moment is the belief in the existence of the perceived object. Husserl calls this moment the act-quality (Aktualität, manuscript F I 9, 9a). This act-quality posits the existence of what has been perceived. The presence of this belief is indispensable for a perception in the normal sense of the term. However, there is also a concise concept of perception in which one foregoes whether or not this belief is present. This concept is exclusively determined by the appearance of an object as present itself.

In the context of his argument that the perceived object is not a real component of consciousness, Husserl secondly points to the fact that there are different perceptions possible of one and the same object. How would this be possible if the object is a real component of perception? If this were the case, then as many different objects would be perceived as front and backside of every manuscript sheet is indicated by the letters "a" and "b," respectively. With regard to Husserl's unpublished manuscripts, I used the transcriptions of the shorthand manuscripts. These transcriptions are located in the Husserl Archives in Louvain.
there are perceptions. Husserl comes to the conclusion that a distinction must be made between the real content of a perception and the intentional content of a perception (manuscript F I 9, 8b). He also identifies this distinction simply as the distinction between content and object. This distinction, of course, raises the question how a relation to a perceived object can come about on the basis of the real content of perception. This relation comes about on the basis of what Husserl calls the apprehension (Auffassung, manuscript F I 9, 9b) of the real content. Through this apprehension, perception becomes an intentional experience, that is, an experience that is directed toward an object. This apprehension, or, to use another term Husserl also uses, this interpretation (Deutung, manuscript F I 9, 10b) allows the real contents of a perception to become a presentation of the corresponding moments of an object. The qualification “intentional” appertains to the object because this object is meant in the perception, because this object appears in the perception. The meaning or appearance of the object is a real moment of perception, but the object itself that appears or is meant is not a real moment.

With this exposition of the intentional character of perception, Husserl distances himself from the so-called image-theory or sign-theory of perception. According to this theory, perception is structured in such a manner that an image or sign is present in consciousness and functions as a representation of an object outside consciousness. The argument Husserl raises against such a theory is that it leads to an infinite regress. The first step in his argument is that to function as a representation of an object is not a “real predicate” (reales Prädikat), using a term reminiscent of Kant.7 This means that to function as a representative is not a quality that pertains to an object like other qualities such as “red” or “spherical.” In a slightly different terminology, which emerges in his analysis of time-consciousness when discussing the position of Franz Brentano, Husserl distinguishes functioning as an image, as being a modifying predicate, from determining predicates. That something functions as the image of something else is based, according to Husserl, on the activities of consciousness. This implies that an object must first be given

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to consciousness and can then be conceived by consciousness as the image of something else. According to the image- or sign-theory of perception, the object that is given to consciousness can only be given to consciousness because an object that is already present in consciousness has functioned as the image of that object. To which one may again raise Husserl’s initial objection, and so on ad infinitum.

Husserl formulates this argument against the image- and sign-theory in *Logical Investigations*. He also makes use of it in *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy*. Husserl also seems to refer to it briefly in his lecture course from WS '04/'05 when he deals with the question whether the object of perception can be found as an experience in consciousness, in or next to the perception. As has been explained above, he answers this question negatively. Finding the object, according to Husserl, is nothing but another expression for the perception of the object. If this is the case, then the perception of the object cannot consist of another object being perceived in a second perception in or next to the first perception. According to Husserl, in a comment that has, however, been crossed out, this would lead to an absurd regression (manuscript F I 9, 8a).

The role apprehension plays in the process of perception makes it possible, according to Husserl, that the same real content results in the perception of different objects. And, conversely, one and the same object may be perceived on the basis of different real contents. The first possibility is based on the fact that the perceptual presentation (*Wahrnehmungsvorstellung*) is not completely determined by the real content. Husserl speaks of the specifically tinged (*bestimmt tingierten*, manuscript F I 9, 9b) character of apprehension. Apprehension has a certain shaded character, which, in addition to the real content, is co-determinative for what appears in perceptual presentation. He also speaks of a surplus (*Überschuss*, manuscript F I 9, 17a) in the perceptual presentation that cannot be credited to its real content.

Phenomenology of Time
Edmund Husserl's Analysis of Time-Consciousness
Kortooms, T.
2002, XX, 304 p., Hardcover