INTRODUCTION

The first book of Edmund Husserl’s *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy* consists, as the subtitle indicates, of a general introduction to a pure phenomenology. In this introduction, Husserl very briefly addresses time-consciousness. In § 81,¹ he points out that, in his quest for an absolute foundation of a pure phenomenology, he has hitherto remained silent about an entire dimension. The absolute foundation he had found, pure or transcendental consciousness, turns out not to be the ultimate and truly absolute foundation. The dimension that has remained unmentioned, which does provide such a foundation, is time-consciousness. However, because time-consciousness is a completely delimited sphere of problems, he did not need to take the enigma of time-consciousness into account in the preliminary analysis that is constituted by the general introduction to phenomenology. In a footnote to this passage from Hua III/1, Husserl reports that, with respect to what is essential, his involvement with this enigma was brought to a conclusion in 1905, and that he presented the results in his lectures. The lecture course Husserl refers to is the course he gave in the winter semester of 1904/1905.² The fourth part of this lecture course is entitled “On the Phenomenology of Time.”

In the introduction to the lecture course from WS ’04/’05, Husserl also emphasizes the fundamental character of the analysis of time-consciousness. He points out that, in *Logical Investigations*, he has remained silent about an entire dimension, namely the dimension of the phenomenology of the original intuition of time. He assesses the diffi-

2. In the following, this lecture course will be referred to as the lecture course from WS ’04/’05.
cultures associated with the development of a phenomenology of the original intuition of time as being probably the greatest in the whole of phenomenology. In this introduction, Husserl is more modest than in the footnote from Hua III/1 mentioned above. In this footnote he points out that his involvement with the enigma of time-consciousness has come to an end with respect to what is essential, but in the introduction to his lecture course from WS '04/'05, he argues that, as a teacher, he prefers to speak about issues that have not yet come to a conclusion and about which he remains silent as an author for that very reason. The attitude to which this remark in the introduction bears witness is better suited to the actual course of events of Husserl’s thinking in general, and certainly to his actual involvement with the analysis of time-consciousness in particular. His involvement with the enigma he faces in this analysis is not at all brought to a conclusion in the fourth part of the lecture course from WS '04/'05.

On the fundamental importance of the problem of time-consciousness for Husserl’s phenomenology in general, one may refer to what Martin Heidegger has to say on this issue, in his foreword to the 1928 edition of Edmund Husserls Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewuβtseins. According to Heidegger, the exposition of the intentional

3. This lecture course from WS '04/'05 has not been published in its entirety. Only its third and fourth parts have been published, respectively in E. Husserl, Phantasie, Bildbewusstsein, Erinnerung. Zur Phänomenologie der anschaulichen Vergegenwärtigungen. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1895-1925) (Husserliana Band XXIII, E. Marbach Hrsg.) Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1980, and in: E. Husserl, Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins (1893-1917) (Husserliana Band X, R. Boehm Hrsg.) Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966. English translation: E. Husserl, On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917). Translated by J.B. Brough (Edmund Husserl Collected Works Volume IV) Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991. The fourth part of this lecture course, the part that deals with the phenomenology of time, has not been reproduced in its original form in volume X of the Husserliana series, but in the form that it assumed after its thorough reworking by Edith Stein, Husserl’s assistant in Freiburg in the years 1916-1918. For further information about this reworking and about the original lecture manuscript, see section 1.2.1. The introduction to the lecture course from WS '04/'05 is to be found in a manuscript preserved in the Husserl Archives in Louvain, under the denomination F I 9. The passage referred to here is found on page 4b.

4. This edition was published under the editorship of M. Heidegger in: Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, 9(1928): 367-498. It is included in volume X of the Husserliana series as part A. The first part of this edition is Edith Stein’s thorough reworking of the fourth part of Husserl’s lecture course from WS '04/'05. Heidegger’s foreword to the 1928 edition has been included in the “Einleitung des Herausgebers” of volume X of the Husserliana series. See pp. XXIV-XXV. English
character of time-consciousness in particular, and the fundamental elucidation of the notion of intentionality in general, is of decisive importance in Husserl’s analysis. He points out that the term “intentionality” must also today, that is, in 1928, be understood as the title for a central problem, rather than as a slogan.\(^5\) The extent to which Heidegger’s last remark is correct, in particular concerning the development in Husserl’s analysis of time-consciousness, may appear from Husserl’s texts discussed in the inquiry at hand. In these texts, Husserl continues to struggle with the meaning of the concept of intentionality, and with the question whether, and if so, how, this term applies to what takes place in time-consciousness.

Many texts bear witness to the fact that during the whole of his philosophical career, Husserl concerned himself again and again with the analysis of time-consciousness. This is especially demonstrated by two collections of manuscripts, the so-called L-manuscripts and the so-called C-manuscripts. The L-manuscripts, also known as the Bernau manuscripts, named after the place in which they were written, originate in the years 1917 and 1918.\(^6\) These manuscripts are almost exclusively dedicated to the analysis of time-consciousness. The C-manuscripts come from the period lasting from the late 1920s to the early 1930s. In these manuscripts, Husserl also extensively addresses the enigma of time-consciousness, but not as exclusively as in the L-manuscripts. Both collections of manuscripts bear witness to the fact that Husserl by no means concluded his analysis of time-consciousness in the fourth part of his lecture course from WS ’04/’05.

I consider the texts mentioned here to be three stages in the development of Husserl’s thinking about time-consciousness. They provide the material on which my inquiry is mainly based. In the first part, the fourth part of Husserl’s lecture course from WS ’04/’05 is at the center; in the second part, the L-manuscripts are discussed; the third part deals with the C-manuscripts. Both the L- and the C-manuscripts are so-called research

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manuscripts. As is well known, Husserl developed his thoughts in writing. The research manuscripts are the direct expression of this thought process. What Husserl says about his lecture manuscripts in the introduction to his lecture course from WS '04/'05 applies a fortiori to research manuscripts. What is portrayed in these manuscripts is not so much the result of a thought process, but rather the process itself, in all its versatility and restlessness. Because my inquiry is largely based on research manuscripts, it offers a good insight into the workroom of the philosopher Edmund Husserl.

Introducing the discussion of the first stage, the first chapter of this inquiry begins with a consideration of two parts of the lecture course from WS '04/'05 that precede the fourth part. In these two parts, Husserl discusses the structure of perception and the distinction between perception and phantasy. Especially in the discussion of this distinction, two issues are raised that also play a part in Husserl's analysis of time-consciousness. These issues concern the modifying character of phantasy and the discontinuous transition from perception to phantasy. Perception and phantasy cannot form a continuous unity with respect to the object that is presented (vorgestellt). The point of departure of the first stage of Husserl's analysis of time-consciousness consists of a formulation of the tasks of this analysis and of a discussion of Franz Brentano's view of time-consciousness. The first task is to submit the subjective consciousness of time to phenomenological analysis. The second task is to answer the question how temporal objectivity is constituted in the subjective consciousness of time. The consideration of Husserl's discussion of Brentano's view shows how his criticism of Brentano is partly founded on the results of his analysis of phantasy. Husserl can use these results because Brentano considers phantasy to be the origin of the presentation of time.

The second chapter consists of a consideration of Husserl's analysis of time-consciousness in the lecture course form WS '04/'05. By way of an outline of the problems involved, I discuss the positions taken by several other authors concerning the perception of time. In my choice of these authors, I follow Husserl. He discusses the position of several authors in his analysis. I select two themes from the debate among these authors. The first theme concerns the question whether consciousness of time is itself of a temporal nature. The second theme concerns the structure of

7. For a more detailed description of the nature of Husserl's research manuscripts, see section 4.1.1.
so-called primary memory. How should this primary memory be distinguished from memory in the everyday sense of the word, that is, from recollection? With regard to the first theme, Husserl takes sides against A. Meinong. He strongly believes in the temporal nature of time-consciousness. The assumption of a consciousness of time that takes place in one indivisible moment cannot be justified phenomenologically. With regard to the second theme, Husserl points to a double meaning of what is called perception. If the notion of perception is taken in the abstract and ideal sense of a perceptual consciousness of something that is present at this moment in time, then perception can be opposed to primary memory. If the notion of perception is taken in the concrete sense of an original consciousness of an object, then primary memory is an essential part of perception. In this regard, Husserl joins the position taken by W. James in this matter. Primary memory, contrary to recollection, cannot be considered to be a mode of consciousness that represents (vergegenwärtigt) something. Finally, Husserl briefly examines the second task of an analysis of time-consciousness: answering the question how objective time is constituted in the consciousness of time. He does not elaborate on this question in his lecture course from WS '04/'05. He only points out that, in his analysis thus far, in which the temporal determinations “present” and “past” play an important role, he has paid no attention to the objective determinations of time. These last determinations refer to the absolute position an object occupies in objective time.

In the third chapter, two developments are sketched that occurred in the years following Husserl's analysis from 1905. The first development concerns the discovery of so-called absolute time-consciousness. In this absolute consciousness, the temporal unity is constituted of those things Husserl used to consider to be really immanent components of consciousness. Husserl no longer looks at sensation as being equal to merely having a content of sensation. Sensing presupposes an underlying intentional constitution of this content. The second development concerns Husserl’s new interpretation of the modifying character of both primary memory and representing consciousness, such as phantasy and recollection. In this new interpretation, Husserl no longer adheres to the hypothesis of a content of consciousness that is now present, which serves as an apprehension-content of a special apprehension that results in the presentation of an object that is not present itself. His new interpretation is expressed in what he calls the through and through modifying character of recollection and phantasy as well as primary memory.
Phenomenology of Time
Edmund Husserl's Analysis of Time-Consciousness
Kortooms, T.
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