<Division 3: Association>

<Chapter 1. Primordial Phenomena and Forms of Order within Passive Synthesis>

§26. The Position and the Delimitation of Themes Concerning a Phenomenological Doctrine of Association

The rubric “association” characterizes for us a form and a lawful regularity of immanent genesis that constantly belongs to consciousness in general; but it does not characterize, as it does for psychologists, a form of objective, psychophysical causality; it does not characterize a regulated manner in which the emergence of reproductions, of rememberings, is causally determined in human and animal psychic life. For we are working within the framework of the phenomenological reduction in which all objective reality and objective causality is “bracketed.” What is there for us is not the world taken as reality with its psychophysical beings and its causalities, but only the phenomena of them, thing-phenomena, human-phenomena, etc., in their intentionality. In this framework of pure consciousness, we find the streaming present of consciousness, we find constituted in every case a perceptual reality constituted as in the flesh. But pasts can also enter into present consciousness through remembering. Put more precisely, in the unity of a consciousness that is streaming in the present, we find concrete perceptions with their retentioal components, as well as concrete retentions—all of that

---

103 animalischen
104 Translator: See below footnote 120.
in the flow of retention fading away into the distant horizon of retention. But in addition to this, emergent rememberings as well. Between the noematic components of something present and something remembered we find a phenomenologically peculiar connective trait that can be expressed in the following way: Something present recalls something past. Likewise, a second remembering can occur while a remembering runs-off; the second remembering can occur along with the first one in a nexus that is characterized noematically by the fact that the first recalled event recalls the second recalled event. A perceptual consciousness, that is, a consciousness that is constituted originally can accordingly be characterized as a consciousness that awakens, awakening a reproductive consciousness, and this consciousness can function as awakening in its turn as fetching a past of consciousness, as it were.

It follows from the exposition of our previous lectures that association is a possible theme of purely phenomenological research. For instance, there is still something that remains of the Modern, customary psychology of association after the phenomenological reduction; if one goes back to its immediate experiential material, the phenomenological reduction will initially yield a core of phenomenological facts that also remain within the pure inner attitude and that will shape the preliminary point of departure for further research. If we pursue this more deeply, we will realize that the path is cleared from here toward a universal theory of the genesis of a pure subjectivity, and in particular, initially in relation to its lower level of pure passivity. Phenomenological eidetic analyses of consciousness constituting a temporal objectlike formation already led to the beginnings of a lawful regularity of genesis prevailing in subjective life. We see very quickly that the phenomenology of association is, so to speak, a higher continuation of the doctrine of original time-constitution. Through association, the constitutive accomplishment is extended to all levels of apperception. That the specific intentions arise through it is already clear to us. Actually, Kant already saw that in phenomenological contexts, which we first come across in the natural departure from objective-psychological observations under the rubric of association, not mere accidental
facts, but rather, an absolutely necessary lawful regularity is manifest without which a subjectivity could not be. But his brilliant doctrine of the transcendental necessity of association is not supported by a phenomenological eidetic analysis. It does not attempt to show what is actually at issue under the rubric of association with respect to elementary facts and essential laws, and thereby making comprehensible the genetic unitary structure of pure subjective life. On the other hand, I do not want to say that the development of phenomenology has already progressed so far that it would have neatly solved the genetic problems existing here. But it is far enough along to be able to specify these problems and to sketch the method for their solution.

A first group of pure phenomena and nexuses to which the traditional doctrine of association leads us concerns facts of actual and possible reproduction, or more clearly, of actual and possible rememberings. When we practice the phenomenological reduction, they are initially given as transcendental facts. Accordingly, this is still prior to eidetic, essential insight that would intuitively obtain essential necessity and essential laws. Right in the midst of these facts are the phenomena that interest us: the splitting of rememberings into rememberings. These rememberings have been muddled, as we say, such that the memorial images of separate pasts have blended to form a unity of an illusory image. This problem of the fusion of rememberings leads us a step further, then, to the problem concerning the extent to which mere phantasies lead back, through intentional analyses, to rememberings, that is, the extent to which they are products of the fusion of rememberings with respect to their intuitive content.

The doctrine of the genesis of reproductions and of their formations is the doctrine of association in the first and more genuine sense. But inseparably connected to this, or rather, grounded upon this is a higher level of association and doctrine of association, namely, a doctrine of the genesis of expectations, and closely related to it, the genesis of apperceptions to which belong the horizons of actual and possible expectations. All in all, it concerns the genesis of the phenomena of expectation, that is, of those specific intentions that are anticipatory. We could also call this association inductive association. For it is a matter here of the
founding level proper to passivity, the founding level of all the
active-logical processes that are treated under the rubric of
inductive proofs.

Taking them in order, let us now first of all observe
reproductive association, naturally, as a purely phenomenological
occurrence. We can <call to mind> here the Aristotelian
distinction between what is in itself first and what is for us first,
namely, what is first from the standpoint of explanatory
knowledge (knowledge that makes comprehensible). The
associative facts and essential insights of the reproductive sphere
that are accessible to us as first (for essential reasons and not
accidentally) concern reproductively awakening intentional lived-
experiences and awakened reproductions in which we are
conscious or become conscious of objects as objects for
themselves. It does not initially occur to us that this is something
special; therefore, wherever we speak of a consciousness, of an
intentional lived-experience, we think without further ado of a
consciousness of something offering itself as something for itself,
a consciousness of something prominent, existing in a singular
manner.

But it is precisely the analysis of associative phenomena that
draws our attention to the fact that consciousness must not
necessarily be a consciousness of a single object for itself, and
accordingly, we touch on a new problem here: how a
consciousness of something particular and how a consciousness of
explicit particulars becomes possible as a consciousness of a
multiplicity and a consciousness of wholeness; namely, a
comparative analysis also shows the opposing possibility of many
[elements], indeed, a multiplicity being continually fused into a
unity within one consciousness, *implicite*, such that consciousness
is not a consciousness of a multiplicity, a consciousness that
becomes aware of separated particulars in a unitary and yet
separate manner. The following example can clarify roughly what
that "implicite" should mean. A white square, which is in itself
completely and homogeneously white without any specks and so
forth, becomes prominent as a single square, and many like
squares as a multiplicity of particular ones. But however much
every square is given as a unity, and given as a unity that is
undifferentiated in itself, it is indeed our view that each one can be divided in a number of ways; to our mind each one is in itself a continuum of white whose phases are just not prominent for themselves. Naturally, that is not an arbitrary interpretation but one that has a phenomenological basis.

Let us now set aside the problem of prominent particulars and their implicit multiplicities and only point to the fact that for the time being we can only catch sight of associations, and only of direct ones, by having particular objects given to us phenomenologically or by having in consciousness closely consolidated multiplicities forming unities for themselves or by having articulated wholes, in short, if we have unitary, prominent objectlike formations which, as such unities, recall other unities as past ones; naturally, recalling them as past for us. Remaining within the phenomenological reduction, the associative relation concerns exclusively the given\textsuperscript{105} objects as such in their respective noematic mode, that is, correlativeil it concerns the corresponding modes of consciousness. We are not saying that we see this "recalling something" everywhere, but only that we see it in certain cases, that is, that we have grasped it in originary prehension. For example, if winding down a path we catch sight of a cirque, we are reminded of another cirque, one that emerges reproductively. We can note that the reproduced one is not only altogether reproduced, and is not only an altogether reproduced, similar object, but that there exists a certain relation between them both beyond the mere relation of similarity. Something present recalls something reductively presentified, which is to say, there is a tendency that is directed from the former to the latter and a tendency that is fulfilled by intuitive reproduction. It follows from this that we, as attentive egos, look from this to that by being referred from the one to the other; and we can also say: The one points to the other—even though there is still not an actual relation of indication by signs and designation. Further, the phenomenon gives itself as a genesis, with the one term as awakening, the other as awakened. The reproduction of the latter gives itself as aroused through the awakening.

\textsuperscript{105} \textit{bewuβten}
Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis
Lectures on Transcendental Logic
Husserl, E.
2001, LXVII, 661 p., Hardcover