By pursuing our interest especially in the clarification of knowledge, that is, by focusing especially on the function of knowledge within pure subjectivity, we had acquired an orderly series of systematic insights before our break. At the end [of the lecture] we were occupied with the rudiments, the most basic elements of a theory of judgment. By undertaking a systematic study of perceptions we came across the moment of belief, of passive doxa, and attended to the modalizations of belief. Naturally, what was demonstrated here is mirrored mutatis mutandis in each mode of intuition and accordingly in remembering, which in itself is characterized as a re-perceiving, as it were. We then contrasted with these doxic events occurring in the passive sphere, the functions of higher judicative activities that are founded in them. By doing this, we acquired an initial, concrete understanding of the opposition between the passive and experiential accomplishment and, on the other hand, the spontaneous accomplishment of thought, the accomplishment of the ego who in the strict sense makes judgments, makes decisions, and who actively appropriates and establishes its acquisition of knowledge.

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60 Editor: See Appendix 5: <Intuitive Presentations and Empty Presentations>, and Appendix 6: <Sense and Intuition> pp. 445ff. and 447ff.
61 Editor: Christmas break, 1925.
We are now going to study the peculiar characteristics and accomplishments of the sphere of judgment that are of particular importance for logic, characteristics and accomplishments that we already encounter in the sphere of passivity or mere receptivity. I mean the functions of fulfilling confirmation, \(^{62}\) corroboration. They are special synthetic functions that we already encountered much earlier, but at that time we were unable to clarify their relation to other syntheses sufficiently. While carrying out our analysis of perception we had to point to its synthetic character as something fundamental. Perception is a process of streaming from phase to phase; in its own way each one of the phases is a perception, but these phases are continuously harmonized in the unity of a synthesis, in the unity of a consciousness of one and the same perceptual object that is constituted here originally. In each phase we have primordial impression, retention, and protention, and unity arises in this progression by the protention of each phase being fulfilled through the primordial impression of the phase that is continuously contiguous to it. Considered concretely, as in process, the perceptual lived-experience is continuously being fulfilled, and precisely for this reason, it is a unity of continual concordance. When this concordance is ruptured, which is altogether possible, modalization occurs, and we no longer have a perception in the normal sense, namely, we are no longer continually consciousness of the one perceptual object as something existing in a straight-forward manner.

We also speak of fulfillment in other respects within the sphere of mere presentations to which we restrict ourselves now, within mere receptivity. And so, with respect to all expectations that arise as special presentations in presenting life. We expect something to happen—now the very thing occurs, confirming the expectation in the most original confirmation of a ratifying perception. We are interested in such an original confirmation in which a presenting

\(^{62}\) Translator: Throughout this Division, Husserl tends to use the term *Bewährheitung* and its cognates to refer to a corroboration or kind of “verification” belonging to the passive sphere, and the term *Bewährung* and its cognates to refer to a process of verification proper belonging to the active sphere. To remain consistent with Husserl’s employment of these two different terms, I translate the former term *Bewährheitung* as “confirmation,” and the latter *Bewährung* as “verification.” See p. 133.
intention is fulfilled in a synthesis of the intended object and the corresponding object itself: We can also say that we are making an initial study of the nature of evidence. Making a presentation evident to us is indeed bringing it to originally fulfilling confirmation. Thus, it is not a question of an arbitrary synthesis of identification; rather, it concerns a synthesis of a presentation that is not self-giving with a presentation that is self-giving.

Naturally, we take at first the mode of certainty and positionality as a basis for these presentations. From the outset we see that the important distinction between empty and full or intuitive presentations, a distinction with which we are familiar, especially becomes an issue for the syntheses of confirmation. To be sure, we know that even a perception, in particular, an external, transcendent perception, can occur in syntheses of fulfillment—and not only as a perception confirming an intention; rather, it can even occur as a mere intention that becomes fulfilled in new perceptions. This happens, for example, when we perceive a tree from the front, and wanting to know it better, draw nearer to it and now perceive it in new perceptions; by determining the tree more closely, we also have a fulfilling confirmation. Meanwhile, every external perception harbors its inner and outer horizons, regardless the extent to which perception has the character of self-giving; this is to say, it is a consciousness that simultaneously points beyond its own content. In its fullness it simultaneously points into an emptiness that would only now convey a new perception. The self-givenness of a spatial thing is the self-givenness of a perspectival appearing object that is given as the same in the fulfilling synthesis of appearances intertwining and devolving upon one another. But it is the same object that itself appears now this time in one way, now another time in another way, appearing in other perspectives, always pointing from a perspective to ever new perspectives in which the same object that is exhibited is continually determined more closely, and yet is never determined definitively. For we always expect appearances of newly opened, empty horizons. Thus, where there is no horizon, where there are no empty intentions, there is likewise no [synthesis of] fulfillment. A datum that is given in immanent perception, i.e., that is adequately given in each Now does not therefore admit of any
further confirmation with respect to this Now. Still, it does occur as a fulfillment insofar as the preceding perceptual phase already points to what is to come. This fulfillment is a fulfillment of an anticipation and is a definitive, absolute fulfillment, or evidence.

Accordingly, it may now seem that the unity of a synthesis of fulfillment (of a confirming one) would be characterized by the fact that an empty consciousness (be it a consciousness that is standing completely empty for itself, or a consciousness incompletely saturated by intuition) would be synthetically united with an appropriate intuition, whereby what is emptily intended and what is intuited coincide in the consciousness of the same [object], that is, coincide in the identity of the objective sense. One would like to think, however, that fulfillment is certainly a bringing to intuition: confirming an intending, that is, meaning an object but not having the object itself intuitively, or having it intuitively, but still meaning beyond what is already intuitively given, and now passing over to the intuition of what is not yet given. But we will see that this characterization would not work, for not every process of bringing to intuition, that is, not every fulfillment is confirming.

It is of fundamental importance to distinguish between the different possible syntheses pertaining here to intuitions and empty presentations, and to characterize them in more detail. The possible syntheses are determined according to their phenomenological character by the types of intuitions and empty presentations founding them. Conversely, one can become aware for the first time of the different sorts of founding presentations in the different operations of closely related presentations within the synthesis, and in the different character that the synthesis assumes in these cases. Without distinguishing between different possible syntheses, one might easily overlook distinctions within intuitions and within empty presentations that could occur here.

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63 Vorstelliges
§17. Description of the Possible Types of Intuition

Let us pursue this matter more deeply by proceeding initially from the general distinction between intuitive presentation and empty presentation. The intuitive presentation has for its part different modes. Perception is the primordial mode of intuitiveness (as always, understood as doxic positionality). It is to be contrasted with the mode of presentification, which, upon closer inspection has various forms, too. By studying intuitive remembering we have learned that a remembering in itself manifests itself as a presentification of a perception, thus, that it is not structured as simply as a perception. It is a present lived-experience that is not itself a perception; instead, it presentifies a perception in the temporal mode of a past perception, and precisely thereby it presentifies its previous perceptual object as having-been. Every other kind of presentification has a similar structure. Thus, there are intuitive presentations of something present that are surely not perceptions of that present something, but rather are presentifications of it: for example, when we make intuitively present the back side of a thing that is more or less familiar from a previous perception, or when we make intuitively present the co-presence of other things, like when we intuitively presentify Berthold's Fountain. Here we do not merely present it as the fountain seen yesterday in its mere pastness, but it as now and as actual, just like the intuitions that we

64 Translator: Empathy [Einführung] as a mode of presentification does not make present a previous or futural perceptual object because the other or the alien can in principle never be given "originally." This is certainly different from a remembering that literally represents its object, or from a futural presentification that anticipates a futural object as present, or finally from a co-presentification in which something that is not given in the original at present, but can in principle be present (cf. below 367, 373f., 377f.). Accordingly, rather than translate Vergegenwärrigung as re-presentation, which would be well-suited for temporal acts, I prefer the common neologism, presentification, since it includes the full complement of acts ranging from imagination to empathy.

65 The original Berthold's Fountain to which Husserl refers was located in the center of Freiburg at the junction of Kaiser-Joseph-Straße and Salzstraße. It was erected in 1807 for Bertold III, Herzog von Zähringen and was destroyed in 1944. In 1965 a new fountain was erected for the Dukes of Zähringen, the founders of Freiburg. (This is not to be confused with the fountain built in Freiburg to commemorate the Franciscan Friar Berthold Schwarz, which was erected in 1852 and is still standing on the Rathausplatz.)
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