§5. Disappointment as an Occurrence that Runs Counter to the Synthesis of Fulfillment

We must now expand our insights in a new direction. Up until now we have investigated the continuous, unitary courses of perception in which the unity of an object is maintained concordantly. This took place by virtue of the unanimity of a coinciding that bestows fulfillment upon the intentions, namely, the intentions that are aroused as perception progresses. The process was a constant process of expanding knowledge. This expansion proceeds through discrete syntheses of perception in such a way that a thing, already fairly familiar through a previous perception, occasionally gets perceived again under a simultaneous remembering of previous perceptions, that is, in straightforward recognition. As we can easily see, the new acquisition of knowledge continues the previous acquisition with respect to new sides. But all of this concerns syntheses of fulfillment, that is, of concordance.

There is, however, an occurrence that runs counter to fulfillment, namely, disappointment; there is an occurrence that runs counter to determining more closely, namely, determining otherwise. Instead of the acquired knowledge being preserved and enriched further, it can be placed in question, annulled. In short, there is something like the difference between the modalized consciousness of being in distinction to the originally non-modalized consciousness of being, and we are now in a position of gaining deeper insights into the structure of the modalities of
being and their constitution, and noetically speaking, insights into the structure of perceptual belief and its modifications such as "doubt," "supposition," "negation," etc.

As we know, the intentional systems occurring in the normal case of perception that we have described (noetically speaking, the apprehensions apperceiving the respective sensation-complexes) have the character of actual or potential expectations. That is, if in perceiving I instigate a kinaesthetic series, for instance, a certain head movement, the appearances will run their course in a motivated succession such that they accord to my expectation. Thus, in the normal case of perception, all fulfillment progresses as the fulfillment of expectations. These are systematized expectations, systems of rays of expectations which, in being fulfilled, also become enriched; that is, the empty sense becomes richer in sense, fitting into the way in which the sense was prefigured.

But every expectation can also be disappointed, and disappointment essentially presupposes partial fulfillment; without a certain measure of unity maintaining itself in the progression of perceptions, the unity of the intentional lived-experience would crumble. Yet despite the unity of the perceptual process occurring with this abiding, unitary content of sense, a break does indeed take place, and the lived-experience of "otherwise" springs forth.

There is also a lived-experience of "otherwise" without a break, a disappointment of a regular style, which by virtue of its regularity can be anticipated and which thus can even be prefigured in the empty horizon. In other words, there is a steady consciousness of alteration whose phenomenological analysis is fundamental for [understanding] the constitution of a change.

Change is a continuous process of becoming otherwise; however, this becoming otherwise maintains unity, namely, a unity of the object remaining concordantly the same as the substratum of its continuous alterations in and through which it becomes otherwise, and in and through which it becomes otherwise time and again.

Let us now already assume a unitary object, be it unchanged or changed, that first abides "concordantly" in the continuity of the original experience, "getting known" better and better. But then all of a sudden, and contrary to all expectation, green rather than red
shows up on the back side that is now becoming visible; instead of
the ball-shape indicated by the front side, an indentation or
something angular appears, etc. Prior to the ensuing perception of
the back sides, perception in its living flow was intentionally
prefigured toward red and ball-shaped; perception's referential
indicators were determinately directed toward red and ball-shaped.
And rather than being fulfilled in this sense, and thereby being
ratified, the intentional prefigurings and referential indicators
became disappointed. The general framework of sense is retained
and fulfilled, and only at this point, only after we have these
intentions, does "something else" occur: a conflict between the
intentions still living, and the contents of sense being newly
instituted intuitively along with their more or less full intentions.
We have a system of continual concordance once again insofar as
the insertion of this new framework into the old one restores
concordance. But in a partial system we have a superimposing
group of intentions that exist in the relationship of disappointment
with those upon which they superimpose. After we saw the green
and the indentation, and after they lasted concordantly during the
course of corresponding appearances, the entire perceptual sense
gets altered, and not merely the sense in the current expanse of
perception; rather, from it the alteration of sense radiates back to
the preceding perception and all its previous appearances. They
are reinterpreted in their very sense as "green" and "indented."
Naturally, this does not take place in explicit acts; but if we were
to go back actively, we would necessarily find the altered
interpretation explicitly and consciously, that is, the continual
concordance that has been produced. But layered beneath this is
something that does not accord with it, and actually what does not
 accord pertains to the entire series that has flowed-off insofar as
we are still conscious of the old apprehension in memory. But it
especially comes to life at that place where "green" and
"indented" emerged. Occurring here is not only the phenomenon
of conflict involving both contrary determinations, ball-shaped
and indented, red and green; rather, the "it is not ball-shaped and
not red," the empty red-intention, is "annulled," negated by the
superimposing "green," that is, by the full superimposing green-
perception; and with it the substratum itself, the thing itself, which
in the original perceptual series bore the sense determination "red" at the corresponding place of its shape, is in this respect crossed out and at the same time reinterpreted: It is "otherwise."

<§6. Partial Fulfillment—Conflict through Unexpected Sense Data—Restored Concordance>³⁶

Our³⁷ considerations had taken a new turn in the last lecture. The study of the structure of perceptions with respect to their intentional accomplishments enabled us to gain deeper insights into the essence of modes of being and into the way in which they are intentionally constituted. In the normal case of perception, the perceived object gives itself as being in a straightforward manner, as existing actuality. But that "being" can be transformed into "dubitable" or "questionable," into "possible," into "supposed"; and then "non-being" can also occur here, and in contrast to this, the emphatic "it really is," the "it is indeed so." Correlatively, (i.e., in a noetic regard), one speaks of a believing inherent in perceiving; from time to time we already speak here of judging, that is, of judicative perception. In the case of normal perception—what is usually and straightforwardly meant by "perception"—even if the object is believed to exist with certainty, this belief can pass over into doubt, into taking-something-to-be-possible, into rejecting, and again into an affirming active acceptance. What one so hotly debated under the rubric of the theory of judgment in the newer logical movement since Mill, Brentano, and Sigwart is at its core nothing other than the phenomenological clarification of the essence and logical function of the certainty of being and modalities of being. Here as everywhere, the phenomenological method alone brought to light the problems of pure consciousness and their genuine sense. That is, it concerns understanding how consciousness necessarily equips sense with modalities of being in every sense-giving that it carries out, and it concerns understanding which feature of

³⁶ Editor: For §§6-8 see Appendix 1: <Descriptions of the Phenomenon of Conflict without Regard to Position-Taking> pp. 425ff.
³⁷ Editor: Beginning of a new lecture.
constituting consciousness is to be made responsible for this accomplishment. Here the source of really radical clarifications is perception; and for reasons that will become clearer below, transcendent perception is privileged where these clarifications are concerned. What we have said holds even though the specific concept of judgment, the one that dominates the [inner] logic of theory does not even occur yet in the framework of mere perception. Still, the modalities occur precisely here, and it is no coincidence that perception and judgment have these modalities in common. From there we will be able to show that the modes of belief necessarily play their role in all modes of consciousness. Moreover, we must gain clarity so that we can surmount the confusion that blinded such a brilliant researcher as Brentano concerning the questions of belief and judgment, and on the other hand, so that we can understand the constant role of modalities in logic. Let this suffice as an indication of what is to come.

Our analyses up to now have illustrated that every phase of perception presents itself as a system of rays of actual and potential intentions of expectation. During the continual elapse of phases—and during the normal case of perception, during the so-called perception that occurs usually and straightforwardly—there is a continual process of inciting actualizations, then further, there is the continuous fulfillment of expectations whereby fulfillment is always a process of determining more closely. But we also have now the occurrence of disappointment as a possibility that runs counter to the fulfillment of expectations. In order for a unity of an intentional process to be maintained, however, a certain measure of thoroughgoing fulfillment must be presupposed under all circumstances. From a correlative direction this means that a certain unity of sense must be maintained throughout the course of changing appearances. Only in this way do we have the constancy of a single consciousness, a unitary intentionality spanning all phases during the course of lived-experience with its appearances.

What happens now if a disappointment occurs in the [perceptual] process rather than a fulfillment, regardless of whether a changing or unchanging object had been constituted in it perceptually? So, for example, we see a uniform, well-rounded red ball; the flow of perception has flowed-off for some time, and
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