PART 2:
ANALYSES CONCERNING PASSIVE SYNTHESIS:
TOWARD A TRANSCENDENTAL AESTHETIC

<SELF-GIVING IN PERCEPTION>

5 §1. Original Consciousness and the Perspectival Adumbration of Spatial Objects

External perception is a constant pretension to accomplish something that, by its very nature, it is not in a position to accomplish. Thus, it harbors an essential contradiction, as it were. My meaning will soon become clear to you once you intuitively grasp how the objective sense exhibits itself as unity in the unending manifolds of possible appearances; and seen upon closer inspection, how the continual synthesis, as a unity of coinciding, allows the same sense to appear, and how a consciousness of ever new possibilities of appearance constantly persists over against the factual, limited courses of appearance, transcending them.

Let us begin by noting that the aspect, the perspectival adumbration through which every spatial object invariably appears, only manifests the spatial object from one side. No matter how completely we may perceive a thing, it is never given in perception with the characteristics that qualify it and make it up as a sensible thing from all sides at once. We cannot avoid speaking of such and such sides of the object that are actually perceived. Every aspect, every continuity of single adumbrations, regardless how far this continuity may extend, offers us only sides. And to our mind this is not just a mere statement of fact: It is

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20 Translator: The following pagination to the German text corresponds to Husserliana XI.
inconceivable that external perception would exhaust the sensible-material content of its perceived object; it is inconceivable that a perceptual object could be given in the entirety of its sensibly intuitive features, literally, from all sides at once in a self-contained perception.

Thus, this fundamental division between what is genuinely perceived and what is not genuinely perceived belongs to the primordial structure of the correlation: External perception and bodily "object." When we view the table, we view it from some particular side, and this side is thereby what is genuinely seen. Yet the table has still other sides. It has a non-visible back side, it has a non-visible interior; and these are actually indexes for a variety of sides, a variety of complexes of possible visibility. That is a very curious situation peculiar to the very essence of the matter at hand.

For proper to the very sense of every perception is perception's perceived object as its objective sense\textsuperscript{21}, that is, this thing, the table that is seen. But this thing is not [merely] the side genuinely seen in this moment; rather (according to the very sense of perception) the thing is precisely the full-thing that has still other sides, sides that are not brought to genuine perception in this perception, but that would be brought to genuine perception in other perceptions.

Generally speaking, perception is original consciousness. We have, however, a curious schism in external perception: Original consciousness is only possible in the form of an actually and genuinely original conscious-having of sides and a co-conscious-having of other sides that are precisely not originally there. I say co-conscious, since the non-visible sides are certainly also there somehow for consciousness, "co-meant" as co-present. But they do not appear as such, genuinely. They are not there like reproductive aspects are, as intuitions that exhibit them; we can nevertheless produce such intuitive presentifications\textsuperscript{22} any time we like. Viewing the front side of the table we can, whenever we like, orchestrate an intuitive presentational course\textsuperscript{23}, a reproductive

\textsuperscript{21} gegenständlicher Sinn

\textsuperscript{22} Vergegenwärtigungen. See translator's note, p. 110, fn. 64.

\textsuperscript{23} Vorstellungsverlauf. Translator: The term, "Vorstellung" is translated throughout as "presentation," and not, for example, as representation. Whereas the latter term suggests an
course of aspects through which the non-visible side of the thing would be presented to us. But here we are doing nothing more than presentifying a course of perceptions to ourselves in which we would see the object—passing from a perception to new ones—from ever new sides in original aspects. Still, that only happens in exceptional circumstances. It is clear that a non-intuitive pointing beyond or indicating is what characterizes the side actually seen as a mere side, and what provides for the fact that the side is not taken for the thing, but rather, that something transcending the side is intended in consciousness as perceived, by which precisely that is actually seen. Noetically speaking, perception is a mixture of an actual exhibiting that presents in an intuitive manner what is originally exhibited, and of an empty indicating that refers to possible new perceptions. In a noematic regard, what is perceived is given in adumbrations in such a way that the particular givenness refers to something else that is not-given, as what is not given belonging to the same object. We will have to understand the meaning of this.

Let us first note that every perception, or noematically speaking, every single aspect of the object in itself points to a continuity, to multifarious continua of possible new perceptions, and precisely to those in which the same object would show itself from ever new sides. In every moment of perceiving, the perceived is what it is in its mode of appearance [as] a system of referential implications with an appearance-core upon which appearances have their hold. And it calls out to us, as it were, in these referential implications: "There is still more to see here, turn me so you can see all my sides, let your gaze run through me, draw closer to me, open me up, divide me up; keep on looking me over again and again, turning me to see all sides. You will get to know me like this, all that I am, all my surface qualities, all my inner sensible qualities," etc.

You understand what I mean to convey with this suggestive manner of speaking. In the particular present perception I have just

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active cognitive operation, "Vorstellung" is functional on a passive level of experience as well.

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these aspects and their modifications, and no others, just these
aspects that are always limited ones. In each moment the objective
sense is the same with respect to the object as such, the object that
is meant; and it coincides with the continual course of momentary
appearances, as for instance this table here. But what is identical is
a constant $x$, a constant substrate of actually appearing table-
moments, but also of indications\footnote{Hinweisen} of moments not yet appearing.
These indications are at the same time tendencies, indicative
tendencies that push us toward the appearances not given. They
are, however, not single indications, but entire indicative systems,
indications functioning as systems of rays that point toward
corresponding manifold systems of appearance. They are pointers
into an emptiness since the non-actualized appearances are neither
consciously intended as actual nor presentified. In other words,
everything that genuinely appears is an appearing thing only by
virtue of being intertwined and permeated with an intentional
empty horizon, that is, by virtue of being surrounded by a halo of
emptiness with respect to appearance. It is an emptiness that is not
a nothingness, but an emptiness to be filled-out; it is a
determinable indeterminacy. For the intentional horizon cannot be
filled out in just any manner; it is a horizon of consciousness that
itself has the fundamental trait of consciousness as the
consciousness of something.

In spite of its emptiness, the sense of this halo of consciousness
is a prefiguring that prescribes a rule for the transition to new
actualizing appearances. Seeing the front side of the table, I am
also conscious of the back side, along with everything else that is
non-visible, through an empty pointing ahead, even though it be
rather indeterminate. But no matter how indeterminate it may be,
it is still a pointing ahead to a bodily shape, to a bodily coloring,
etc. And only appearances that adumbrate things of that kind and
that determine more closely what is indeterminate in the
framework of this prefiguring can be integrated concordantly; only
they can stay the course of an identical $x$ of determination as the
same, being determined here newly and more closely. This holds
time and again for every perceptual phase of the streaming process

\footnote{Hinweisen}
of perceiving, for every new appearance, only that the intentional horizon has altered and shifted. Proper to every appearing thing of each perceptual phase is a new empty horizon, a new system of determinable indeterminacy, a new system of progressing tendencies with corresponding possibilities of entering into determinately ordered systems of possible appearances, of possible ways that the aspects can run their course, together with horizons that are inseparably affiliated with these aspects. In the concordant coinciding of sense, they would bring the same object as being ever newly determined to actual, fulfilling givenness. To our mind, the aspects are nothing for themselves; they are appearances of only through the intentional horizons that are inseparable from them.

We thereby distinguish further between an inner horizon and an outer horizon of the respective aspect-appearance. It should be recognized that the division applying to what is genuinely perceived and what is only co-present entails a distinction between determinations with respect to the content of the object [a] that are actually there, appearing in the flesh 26, and [b] those that are still ambiguously prefigured in full emptiness. Let us also note that what actually appears is, in itself, also laden with a similar distinction. Indeed, the call resounds as well with respect to the side that is already actually seen: "Draw closer, closer still; now fix your eyes on me, changing your place, changing the position of your eyes, etc. You will get to see even more of me that is new, ever new partial colorings, etc. You will get to see structures of the wood that were not visible just a moment ago, structures that were formerly only viewed indeterminately and generally," etc. Thus, even what is already seen is laden with an anticipatory intention. It—what is already seen—is constantly there as a framework prefiguring something new; it is a x to be determined more closely. There is a constant process of anticipation, of preunderstanding. In addition to this inner horizon there are then also outer horizons, prefigurings for what is still devoid of any intuitively given framework that would require only more differentiated ways of sketching it in.

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Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis
Lectures on Transcendental Logic
Husserl, E.
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